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How the extractive industries contribute to development outcomes continues to be an 
important question in light of continued promotion of the extraction model as a development 
strategy for countries in the global south. Oil is seen as posing a particular challenge in the 
context of the post-colonial Sub-Saharan African state, having been linked to conflict, 
authoritarianism and deepening inequalities. The literature has tended to focus on national 
scales of analyses and the struggles that take place over oil as revenues, rather than focus on 
the social and political transformations taking place prior to oil becoming a resource and the 
ways these might shape and constrain development outcomes.  
 
The thesis seeks to contribute to understandings of subnational dynamics in a new Sub-
Saharan African oil context. I use an assemblage approach, bringing together a focus on 
materialities, ideas, practices and agency to analyse the emergence of Uganda’s oil assemblage 
in the pre-oil stage of the industry. The study demonstrates the importance of exploring 
subnational dynamics in the pre-oil stage; it is during this time that the interests of a range of 
actors are mobilised and shaped, and processes are taking place at the subnational level that 
have a bearing on equitable outcomes. The study finds that the subnational space is not a 
passive recipient of a global oil project but plays an active role in shaping the oil assemblage.  
 
The findings of the study are presented in three empirical chapters. The first shows that 
Uganda’s oil assemblage is shaped not only by oil capital, but also the materiality of the 
resource and ideas about oil.  The second empirical chapter builds on this to explore the role 
of oil MNCs and corporate engagement practices in the oil assemblage. I find that corporate 
engagement practices and activities are driven and shaped by multiple factors and change 
over time. While all three companies draw on global norms to craft legitimacy in the resource 
space, implementation differs considerably, and the subnational space plays an active role in 
shaping outcomes. The third empirical chapter explores the role of civil society in the oil 
assemblage. I find that civil society activity on oil and gas is carried out by urban 
professionalised CSOs and is shaped by a resource governance assemblage, which has 
implications for outcomes. However, the findings demonstrate that subnational dynamics 
shape and constrain the role of CSOs at the local level.  
 
Rather than a dichotomy between industry on the one hand and local communities supported 
by civil society on the other, I find that the subnational space in Uganda during exploration is 
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more complex and ambiguous. There are increasing vulnerabilities for some and opportunities 
for others, and at the same time as subnational actors contest the impacts of the industry, they 
also seek inclusion. The study generates insights into the more productive processes in 
frontiers, opportunities for agency, and actor positions that challenge the idea that oil 
frontiers are characterised solely by the hegemony of oil. The findings have broader relevance 
for understanding oil and development outcomes in new extractives contexts in the global 
south and demonstrate the importance of moving beyond a national focus in analyses and 
beyond a focus on oil as revenues.   
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1.1 The special status of oil  
There is something special about oil. As an object of ‘mystification and fetishisation’, oil has 
been imbued with magical, almost Olympian transformative powers (Watts, 2009c, Watts, 
2009a). Its apparent power to distort development, to enable astonishing wealth and excess, to 
impoverish and to breed violence and war suggests that oil is indeed more than a regular 
substance. Since oil’s emergence as a fuel to challenge coal in the early 20th century it has 
assumed a political reach like no other commodity. Leading industrialised countries are ‘oil 
states’ to the extent that without oil their “current forms of political and economic life would 
not exist” (Mitchell, 2009: 400).  
 
Oil is the engine of growth and the price of peace and war, having long been entangled with 
foreign policy and militarisation (Hiro, 2007). The so-called scramble for Africa’s oil during 
the early 2000s (Frynas and Paulo, 2007) and the accompanied military support for ‘friendly’ 
African states, has been framed as a low-level military competition with China for the loyalty 
of local African elites (Klare and Volman, 2006). Indeed, oil is frequently the epicentre of 
violence (Watts, 2009a). It has been associated with authoritarianism (Ross, 2001), secessionist 
claims (Le Billon, 2001), corruption (Leite and Weidmann, 1999), armed rebellion (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1998) while at the same time bringing unimaginable wealth to a few (Watts, 2004a), 
exemplifying Karl’s assertion that:  
 
“[C]ountries that depend on oil for their livelihood eventually become among 
the most economically troubled, the most authoritarian, and the most 
conflict-ridden in the world” (Karl, 2004: 662).  
 
It is perhaps not surprising then, that Uganda’s oil discoveries were met with cautionary 
optimism by international observers (e.g. Shepherd, 2013). While on the one hand, 
commercial quantities of oil could propel Uganda to middle income status. On the other 
hand, based on the experiences of Uganda’s peers and neighbours on the African continent 
and recent trends in Uganda, oil could exacerbate existing challenges of poverty, inequalities, 
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and tendencies towards authoritarian rule (De Kock and Sturman, 2012, Hickey and Izama, 
2017, Hickey et al., 2015). Uganda, like many of its contemporaries, could become 
“impoverished by its wealth” (Watts, 2009a: 8). This is the paradox of oil. It holds great 
promise and great peril in equal measure.  
 
Yet Watts (2009c) cautions us not to invest powers in oil that it does not deserve. While oil is 
considered a seductive and cursed substance (Weszkalnys, 2009), oil does not have any 
intrinsic qualities and causality, rather it has forms and functions that are defined socio-
culturally (Bridge and Le Billon, 2017). As such, oil has no inherent power outside the social 
and political relations that produce it as a resource (Huber, 2011). The curse of oil is not 
inevitable, yet in the context of the post-colonial Sub-Saharan African state, oil poses 
considerable challenges. It is in light of these challenges and assumptions of oil’s causal 
powers that this thesis seeks to understand some of the processes that produce oil as a 
resource in the pre-oil stage of the industry.  
 
As I embarked on this research in late 2012, Uganda was poised to become an oil state. Having 
surpassed the threshold for commercial viability in 2009, Uganda’s fortunes had become tied 
to oil. The government’s vision 2040, which aimed to achieve middle income status by 2017, 
was largely predicated on revenues from oil (Government of Uganda, 2013). Indeed, the 
amount of recoverable oil is estimated to be at around one billion barrels, out of total reserves 
of 6.5 billion barrels, with the potential to generate $3.3 billion in revenue annually for the 
government over the lifetime of the project (Global Witness, 2014). For Uganda, one of the 
world’s poorest countries, heavily dependent on external aid, and with a GDP per capita of 
$730 in 2016 (World Bank, no date), this is potentially transformational.  
 
However, as a landlocked country, Uganda’s oil project requires considerable capital 
investment to meet the costs of the massive infrastructures needed to extract, process and 
transport the oil. A 1,445km pipeline is planned to the Indian Ocean, a route that will cross 
south eastern Uganda and northern Tanzania, to the port of Tanga on the Tanzanian coast. 
The material properties of Uganda’s oil – a sweet, waxy crude – means that the pipeline must 
be heated, which adds extra costs. In addition to this, the Ugandan government is building a 
small domestic oil refinery to ensure some of the oil is processed locally, which requires 
investment. What this means is that for Uganda’s oil to be economically viable to produce, the 
price of oil on the global market has to be at least above $60 per barrel (Patey, 2015). In 
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summer 2014, during the first round of my PhD fieldwork, oil prices peaked at just over $100 
per barrel, then plummeted to below $35 a barrel, where they remained for much of the next 
three years. The viability of Uganda’s oil project plunged into uncertainty with the oil price 
drop, and the target for ‘first oil’ continually pushed back.  
 
While the wait for Uganda’s first oil continues to drag on, there has been much activity on and 
around the shores of Lake Albert in the western region, where the oil deposits lie. Since 
Heritage Oil acquired the first seismic data in 1998, there has been ongoing exploration and 
development work; seismic surveys, hundreds of test wells drilled, heavy machinery 
transported in, infrastructure built (roads, drilling rigs, workers camps, bridges) permanent 
and temporary land acquisition (people moved, houses demolished, crops destroyed, bush 
cleared), noise and dust, and a myriad of consultations, meetings, and community 
development projects. Many of these processes and activities feature in this thesis, which 
considers what happens when a vast, globalised oil industry comes to a remote, marginalised, 
and ecologically sensitive region in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
1.2 Conceptual and empirical gaps underpinning the study  
If oil has no inherent powers outside of those social and political processes that produce it as a 
resource (Huber, 2011), then an appreciation of those processes is important to understand 
outcomes. In the literature however, oil is presented as a hegemonic force which produces 
predictable development outcomes, and as such the capacities for pathways for change are 
limited (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). Although, the ‘rules of the game’ in which extraction 
occurs are being transformed, for example by norms and practices to govern industry (Larsen, 
2015), or by the challenges from social movements (Bebbington et al., 2008b), the idea that the 
hegemony of oil capital will undercut obstacles to ongoing accumulation remains strong 
(Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).  
 
One of the reasons why this idea of oil’s hegemony persists is the approach in the literature 
predominantly from the viewpoint of oil as revenue, which misses the social and political 
transformations which take place before oil becomes a resource, and the ways in which these 
might have a bearing on which groups or actors benefit or not (Haarstad, 2016). Uganda 
provides an ideal context for empirically and theoretically assessing the emergence of a new 
industry and the associated social and political processes around the development, 
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management and governance of the industry and the implications for the equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits. The view of oil before it is revenue also directs attention to a 
wider range of actors that are involved in the emergence of a new industry, not only in terms 
of its operation and management, but also in its governance in the pre-oil stages. The 
literature review for the thesis demonstrates that there has been little focus on this wider web 
of actors. Surprisingly, given their impact, extractives MNCs have tended to be overlooked in 
debates about natural resources and development (Maconachie and Hilson, 2013, Watts, 
2009c, Watts, 2009a). As I show in the literature review, debates tend to focus on the 
behaviours of national level elites. Further, and importantly for this study, where civil society 
has been examined in the literature, it has often been in relation to its role as promoting the 
interests of local people vis a vis extractives companies (Larsen, 2015, Sawyer, 2004, Gedicks, 
2001). In the next section I highlight and summarise the key research gaps before outlining the 
research aims and objectives of the thesis.  
 
The literature reveals that there is a tendency of studies on oil to do four things. The first is to 
present oil as a hegemonic force, and as a consequence there is little shift from seeing oil as 
having causal powers, for example oil as the ‘crazy curse’ (Behrends et al., 2013). Second, and 
relatedly, is the tendency to focus on oil as revenues. Studies discuss the oil rents, the income 
accruing after the petroleum is turned into government revenue. Third, struggles then are 
seen to emerge over the resource rents, which misses a focus on a broader set of actors and 
dynamics involved before oil is revenue. As Mitchell argues: “most of those who write about 
the question of the rentier state or oil curse… have little to say about the nature of oil and how 
it is produced” (2009: 400). The fourth, is that the focus tends to be on the national level of 
analysis. If the subnational is brought in, it is often in relation to the national, in terms of 
decentralisation and revenue sharing. Based on these observations, I aim to address the 
following gaps in this thesis: 
 
Gap 1. The need to focus on the early stages of the industry, before oil is revenue   
 
Scholars have pointed out that many studies which try to make sense of the relationship 
between oil and poor development outcomes pay little attention to “the ways that oil is 
extracted, processed, shipped and consumed, and the forms of agency and control these 
processes involve”  (Mitchell, 2009: 400). In other words, the focus on oil as revenue misses a 
focus on the social and political transformations which take place before oil becomes a 
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resource, and the ways in which these might have a bearing on which groups or actors benefit 
or not (Haarstad, 2016). The focus on oil as revenue dominates studies, especially how the 
struggle over oil revenues plays out in terms of the nation as a whole, and in terms of macro-
development outcomes, corruption, rent seeking, etc. This suggests that there is a need to 
focus on the early stages of the industry, before oil is money (Mitchell, 2009) and the social 
dynamics involved in this phase. Those contexts in which oil exploration is taking place or 
where extraction has only just begun, such as Uganda, are under-studied (Behrends et al., 
2013). This suggests the shift from national levels of analyses to the subnational level, to the 
dynamics taking place at this level in the pre-oil stage of the industry.  
 
Gap 2. The need to focus on interactions that are not ‘conflict’  
 
Many studies have focused on the conflicts that emerge in extractives and these are often 
framed as struggles over resource rents. Watts (2008) shows us the proliferation of indigenous 
militant groups, oil employees in heavily fortified compounds, government providing security 
to the industry and failing to protect communities that centres around the revenue sharing 
mechanism in Nigeria. Other studies also show the conflict promoting properties of resources, 
in terms of struggles over rents. Studies in which struggles are over identity and territory 
provide an alternative take, but the polarised positions of actors are often the starting point of 
studies, for example, Sawyer’s examination of indigenous struggle against oil in Ecuador: the 
“slick corporate manoeuvres, knowing state complicity and oppositional indigenous tactics” 
(Sawyer, 2004: 7). 
 
Much of what we understand about the social relations of oil is through such accounts. Yet on 
closer reading these accounts demonstrate how struggles emerged, and emphasise, if only 
implicitly, the importance of exploring these dynamics over time. Sawyer shows that 
indigenous identity is not an inherent social cleavage, but rather politicised indigenous 
identity is produced over time. Both Sawyer and Watts show the importance of links with a 
wider range of actors, which contributed to shaping the outcomes of the struggles. This 
supports Haarvard’s and others suggestion that a wider range of different actors with a stake 
in resource outcomes must be considered (Haarstad, 2016) and following Logan and McNeish 
(2012b), so must the possibility of accommodation and compromise, as well as contestation. 
And, while recognising the important role that resistance and social struggle has played in 
shaping outcomes (Logan and McNeish, 2012a, Bebbington and Bury, 2013), it is equally 
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important “to take account of the more mundane processes of confrontation and negotiation 
and to appreciate their social dynamics” (Logan and McNeish, 2012a: 23). 
 
Gap 3. The need to focus on a wider web of actors and their interactions below 
the national  
 
What the review of the literature reveals is that central to questions about resources and 
development is the relationship between industry, the state, local communities and civil 
society. And although these relationships are played out on the ground, at the local level, they 
are influenced by global forces, be it through connections to international social movements, 
to international markets, to international guidelines on sustainable development, human 
rights, CSR etc.  As Bridge (2008), Watts (2009c), Haarstad (2016), Haarstad and Wanvik 
(2017) and other critical scholars have argued, the relational aspects of oil are important to 
move beyond the narrow focus on oil as revenue, on national actors, and a national level of 
analyses. Scholars have pointed to the need to include a wider web of actors in studies. The 
role of western actors, especially extractives MNCs, have tended to be overlooked in debates 
about natural resource and development (Maconachie and Hilson, 2013, Watts, 2009c, Watts, 
2009a). Extractives MNCs have been critiqued mainly from the perspective of CSR 
implemented in extractives as discrete activities, rather than their role in the wider 
development processes taking place in extractives contexts at the local level (Banks et al., 
2016), and their role in shaping the trajectories of local struggle (Himley, 2013). The literature 
on social movements and resistance in relation to extractives industries highlights the 
importance of global actors and networks of support in shaping the contours of local struggle. 
However, there are few studies that bring oil MNCs and civil society into the same analysis to 
explore their respective roles in shaping outcomes.  
 
To summarise, contrary to the dominant ways of studying oil in the literature, which I identify 
to be oil as hegemonic, oil as revenue, with a focus on a national framing and conflictual 
relations between actors, my thesis takes an approach which emphasises a range of 
interactions at the subnational level, prior to oil becoming revenue. This will enable a different 
perspective on the social and political processes and relations which produce oil as a resource.  
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1.3 Research aim and objectives  
The overall aim of the thesis is to explore the subnational within Uganda’s oil assemblage 
during the pre-oil stage of the industry. A subsidiary aim is to consider the implications of the 
social and political processes taking place at the subnational level for equitable outcomes. The 
study is guided by the following research objectives:  
 
Objective 1a Map the key actors in Uganda’s oil assemblage and show how their 
interests are shaped during the exploration phase of the industry. 
 
Objective 1b Explore how the subnational level articulates with the emerging oil 
assemblage to shape outcomes.  
 
Objective 2 Explore the role of oil MNCs in the oil assemblage and the significance 
of the subnational level in shaping and constraining their interests and activities.  
 
Objective 3 Explore the role of civil society actors in the oil assemblage and the 
significance of the subnational in shaping and constraining their interests and 
activities. 
 
1.4 Summary of thesis contributions and key findings 
In addressing the research aims and objectives, this thesis makes conceptual, empirical and 
methodological contributions.  
 
Conceptually, this study develops a novel framing using an assemblage approach and brings 
together a focus on ideas, materiality, practices and agency into the conceptual framework. An 
assemblage approach enables a focus on the subnational as a constitutive part of the 
assemblage and identifies opportunities for change inherent in assemblages (Delanda, 2006). 
Through an analysis of the subnational within the assemblage the study shows that the 
subnational is not a passive recipient of a global oil project, but rather plays an active role in 
shaping and constraining outcomes. This conceptual contribution extends our understanding 
of the processes taking place in the oil frontier during the pre-oil stage of the industry, which 
influence equitable outcomes and open opportunities for change. The study shows that the 
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assemblage is not only shaped by oil capital and the project cycle, but ideas and materiality 
are also consequential in the pre-oil stage, mobilising actors interests and shaping social 
relations. The framing also provides insights into extractives relationships in frontiers by 
illuminating that actor positions in the assemblage are not fixed or clearly distinguishable, and 
that relations are not conflictual by default. The study emphasises the importance of 
conceptualising frontier processes not solely in terms of their destructive characteristics but 
also considering the role of aspirations and agency in frontier spaces.  
 
Empirically, the study focuses on the interactions of a range of actors at the subnational level 
during the pre-oil stage. The findings across the empirical chapters show that the interests of 
actors in the assemblage are shaped over time and involve processes of collaboration, 
cooperation, negotiation and contestation. The analysis shows that the assemblage 
configuration is not only shaped by oil and the project cycle, but also by the materiality of the 
resource and ideas about oil. This means that there are material impacts of oil in terms of 
livelihoods implications through enclosure, restriction and displacement, and also in terms of 
development imaginaries which shape responses to the industry (chapter five).  
 
A further empirical contribution is the comparative analysis of three international oil 
companies in the study; Anglo / Irish (Tullow Oil), French (Total) and Chinese (CNOOC). 
Findings show that while all three companies share similar aims and draw on similar 
discourses in relation to CSR, their approaches to managing the resource space and legitimacy 
seeking differ and shape the oil assemblage in different ways (chapter six).  
 
The empirical focus on the emergence of resource governance in a new oil context with no 
previous extractive industries makes a novel contribution. The findings show that the 
influence of a resource governance assemblage shapes and constrains oil governance in the 
early stage of the industry through expert knowledge and oil narratives that shape the debate 
and delimit what issues are focused on (chapter seven).  
 
An additional novel contribution is from the inclusion of civil society actors and oil company 
actors into the same study and analysing their activities and interactions during the early 
stages of the industry. The findings show that both CSOs and oil MNCs face the challenge of 
ensuring legitimacy in the oil region, and over time there is increasing cooperation between 
these actors. The focus on the subnational in the study shows the ways that subnational 
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dynamics shape and constrain the efforts of industry and CSOs to manage the resource space 
and govern oil. Subnational dynamics shape and constrain the legitimacy seeking process of 
oil industry actors by influencing the ways in which industry actors engage to improve 
community relations. Subnational dynamics shape and constrain how oil governance by CSOs 
plays out at the local level, and shows that the materiality of the resource and ideas about oil 
are consequential in mobilising the interests of actors across scales and opening new avenues 
for the agency of local actors (chapters five and seven). 
 
Methodologically, this thesis makes a contribution through the longitudinal perspective to 
studying the oil assemblage. Due to my involvement in the context over a four-year period, I 
was able to map the oil assemblage over time and identify how actors, interests, events, 
narratives, practices and interactions changed and evolved.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two sets out the key literatures and 
concepts which inform, frame and guide my analysis in the thesis. I argue that in light of the 
gaps that the thesis seeks to address, an assemblage approach can provide important 
analytical insights to the study of an emerging oil frontier. Chapter three discusses the 
methodology, including the philosophical underpinnings of the approach, the data and the 
analysis. Chapter four provides important background and context for the study, including the 
key developments in Uganda’s oil industry to date, and a brief social history of the region in 
which the oil industry is being established and this study takes place. The empirical chapters 
of the thesis follow.  
 
In chapter five I address objective 1a and contribute to objective 1b. I map out the key actors in 
Uganda’s oil assemblage and, drawing on the conceptual framework I set out in chapter two, I 
demonstrate how their interests are shaped by the assemblage elements as the oil industry 
develops. A range of actors’ interests are mobilised by Uganda’s oil, and I show that oil MNCs 
and civil society actors become key social actors at the subnational level. In chapter six, I 
address research objective 2 and contribute to objective 1 b. I focus on the role of oil MNCs in 
the assemblage and explore the ways that CSR and community engagement by oil companies 
changes as the industry develops and differs between companies. I highlight the importance of 
the subnational in shaping and constraining the role of oil MNCs. In chapter seven I address 
research objective 3 and contribute to objective 1b. I focus on the role of civil society and show 
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how their activities are shaped by, and shape, the oil assemblage and the significance of the 
subnational in this. In chapter eight I discuss the importance of the research and synthesise 
the results of the three empirical chapters to answer the overall aim and sub-aim of the thesis. 
Chapter nine concludes the thesis; I summarise the key findings, outline the main 
contributions of the study, note the limitations of the study and discuss ideas for future work.   
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2.0 Chapter Two 
Literature and conceptual framework 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The extractives industries are operating in an increasingly complex environment with diverse 
pressures. There has been a geographical shift in the demand for resources, and the opening of 
new extractives frontiers in politically and environmentally fragile regions in the context of 
climate change, transparency and human rights concerns high on the agenda (Bridge, 2008). 
There are demands for increased benefits to accrue to producer states from civil society actors, 
IFIs, and host governments. The most recent commodities super cycle, which peaked in 2009, 
renewed optimism that the extractives industries could be harnessed for growth and poverty 
reduction in the global south. Indeed, the 2009 African Mining Vision sets out an extractives-
based development vision, whereby the exploitation of mineral resources is to underpin 
broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development on the continent (African 
Union, 2009). It is the ‘contention and ambiguity’ inherent in the possibility that the 
extractives industries could contribute to development that is at the root of much social 
conflict in relation to the sector (Bebbington et al., 2008b). 
 
This chapter critically reviews and synthesises the key literatures and concepts that this thesis 
draws on and contributes to. It establishes the research gaps by exploring the key debates on 
the topics of natural resources and development, resource governance, social struggle and 
social conflict in the extractives industries, CSR and the social licence to operate. These 
literatures and the identified gaps underpin the research objectives that I address in chapters 
five to seven of the thesis. The chapter then introduces the core concepts that the thesis draws 
on to carry out the study.  
 
2.2 The extractives industries and the possibility of development 
This section discusses the key debates about the contribution of natural resources and 
development, noting that oil is seen as posing a particular challenge in the context of the post-
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colonial Sub-Saharan African state. Framings and approaches have been in terms of resource 
curse, however there is a recent focus in the literature on the politics underlying the resource 
curse, and the importance of the materiality of the resource for outcomes.  
 
2.2.1 The natural resources and development conundrum 
The question of whether or not ordinary Ugandans will benefit from its potential oil windfall 
has dominated discussions of the country’s future. In the academic literature, in policy and 
NGO circles, and in the national and international media, the question tends to be framed in 
terms of the ‘resource curse’. A global media headline in 2013 proclaiming ‘Ugandans fear 
curse of oil wealth’ (Akumu, 2013) is typical. This framing has its roots in academic work that 
has explored the linkages between natural resource wealth and poor development outcomes, 
under this catch-all term. Coined by Auty in 1993, the resource curse describes how countries 
rich in natural resources have paradoxically performed less well in economic and human 
development terms than those countries that are resource poor (Auty, 1993).  
 
There are several sub-elements of the resource curse. Economic arguments raise concerns that 
an abundance of natural resources can distort the structure of the economy; the booming 
extractives sector draws resources away from other sectors, the production of non-tradeable 
goods falls, the national currency appreciates making imports cheaper and exports more 
expensive, a phenomenon known as Dutch disease (Acosta, 2013). Further, the extractives 
sector is vulnerable to commodity fluctuations, which makes economic planning difficult and 
can have negative consequences during times of bust.  
 
Other scholars have focused on the political aspects of the curse, notably the behaviours of 
national elites and the negative effects of resources on institutions. They show that the influx 
of windfall revenues from a booming extractives sector effects processes of state formation 
and provides opportunities for elite rent seeking (Yates, 1996). Income is redistributed 
regressively and wealth is concentrated in a few hands (Acosta, 2013), and the result is 
resource extraction without development (Bridge, 2004). Studies began to focus on the 
problem of the weakness of the national institutions existing prior to investments in the 
extractives sector, and the further adverse impacts of the sector on institutions (Robinson et 
al., 2006, Humphreys et al., 2007, Ross, 2015). 
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The resource curse term is also employed to explain the afflictions of violent conflict, 
authoritarianism, rebellion and corruption in resource abundant states, especially those in 
Sub-Saharan Africa; what Watts claims is a sort of ‘commodity determinism’ (Watts, 2004b). 
The associated terms of ‘blood diamonds’, ‘resource wars’ and ‘petro-violence’ attributed 
conflicts in the global south directly to natural resources, which Keen concluded are best 
explained as the continuation of economics by other means (Keen, 2005). Much of this 
thinking was inspired by Paul Collier’s study, which claimed that the higher the proportion of 
primary commodity exports a country has, the higher the risk of civil war. Analysing civil war 
between 1965 and 1999, Collier claimed that “conflicts are far more likely to be caused by 
economic opportunities than by grievance” (Collier, 2000: 91). Although the direct link 
between natural resource wealth and conflict has been refuted by a number of other studies 
(Ross, 2004, Watts, 2009b, Ballentine, 2003), it played an influential role in shaping policy 
towards so called resource-wars in the global south, and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
One issue is that the ‘greed’ thesis places the causes of conflict on individual actors in the 
global south and misses the wider web of complicity, including the embedded commercial 
interests and the role of external forces (Cater, 2003). 
 
The narrow focus on national states and individual actors is a general problem with ‘resource 
curse’ explanations, which fail to account for the role of social forces, or external political and 
economic environments in accounting for the curse (Rosser, 2006). The problem was framed 
as one of national elites managing oil rents, and as I show in section 2.2.5, the solution became 
one of ‘getting the institutions right’ (Hilson and Maconachie, 2008).  
 
Although the existence of a ‘curse’ has been qualified in the literature, critical engagement 
with resource curse debates remains important for three reasons. First is the continued 
promotion of natural resource extraction as the key driver of economic growth across the 
global south; second is that states continue to struggle to harness natural resource wealth for 
development and poverty reduction; and third is that resource governance policies in the 
global south build on this academic architecture (Appel et al., 2015), a point I return to in 




2.2.2 Oil: a seductive and cursed substance 
Oil poses a particular sort of challenge for development and democracy. Oil is likely to disrupt 
the ‘normal’ course of development, yet scholars tend to differ in their assessments of how and 
why this is the case. Drawing on a number of studies, Ross concludes that resource curse 
outcomes are more likely to occur in oil dependent states – oil tends to strengthen 
authoritarian governments, promote corruption and raise the risk of conflict (Ross, 2015). For 
Mitchell, oil tends to strengthen political and economic elites more than do other 
commodities due to its capital intensity (Mitchell, 2009). Karl argues that oil creates 
Petrostates, which are rentier states par excellence, “marked by especially skewed institutional 
capacities” (Karl, 1997: 34). These are thought to be especially problematic in the context of 
the of the post-colonial African state (Weszkalnys, 2011). 
 
Explanations for African problems in relation to oil and development have concerned 
themselves with the problem of patrimonialism (Watts, 2004a, Watts, 2004b, Watts, 2005). 
This is seen to be a key feature of African post-independence politics, reflecting an apparent 
resistance to conform to western standards of liberal democracy and continue with tradition 
and modernity, seen simply as the way in which ‘Africa works’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This 
is problematic when oil rents are inserted into this dynamic, which further reduces incentives 
for a social compact with citizens and increases opportunities for elite rent seeking (Yates, 
1996). Petrodollars solicit more extreme actions on the part of leaders, who “rely on an 
unsustainable development trajectory fuelled by an exhaustible resource – and the very rents 
produced by this resource form an implacable barrier to change” (Karl, 1997: 31).  
 
Although important, this work has a national level focus. Indeed, it tends to focus heavily on 
the behaviours of national elites in resource producing states. Speaking from the empirical 
context of Nigeria, Watts critiques Collier’s and others’ work for assuming a ‘predation 
proneness’ for what instead is state and corporate enclave politics. Watts notes the ways in 
which oil becomes an idiom for doing politics, the substance is “inserted into an already 
existing political landscape of forces, identities and forms of power” (Watts, 2004b: 76). This 
political landscape has been shaped by longer histories of colonial rule, identify formation, 




So, while oil interrupts development, it has no inherent causal powers (Huber, 2011). This 
means that oil does not automatically condemn Uganda to the category of countries whose 
resource wealth has paradoxically brought poverty, inequality and conflict. Rather, it is more 
accurate to say that oil and other extractive resources are conducive to particular types of 
social organization, and by extension, to particular development outcomes (Haarstad, 2016). 
 
Given the discovery of oil in a post-colonial, semi-authoritarian, post-conflict, and ecologically 
diverse Sub-Saharan African nation – Uganda, the ‘Pearl of Africa’ - it is hardly surprising that 
many studies have sought to question the effects that oil will have. A number of studies on 
Uganda’s oil industry have used the ‘resource curse’ framing to assess whether or not Uganda 
is likely to succumb to the curse, with little optimism that oil is going to benefit the Ugandan 
people (Bategeka and Matovu, 2011, Kiiza et al., 2011, Mosbacher, 2013, Olanya, 2015). Studies 
that do express some potential for positive outcomes promote the ‘blueprint approach’ and 
suggest lessons for success (Shepherd, 2013), for example, from the ‘Norwegian model’ (Polus 
and Tycholiz, 2017). Related to this approach are studies around managing expectations 
(Bategeka et al., 2009, Mawejje, 2019), the implications being that social conflict in the sector 
could be due to ‘out of control expectations’ fuelled by the expectation of oil wealth. As such, 
this scholarship follows the mainstream views of resources and development, and good 
resource governance, which privileges a focus on management, and replicating good 
behaviours and good institutions.   
 
2.2.3 Beyond ‘politics matters’ 
The literatures cited in the previous sections, particularly those which looked at the adverse 
political consequences of oil (Watts, 2004b, Ross, 2013, Mitchell, 2009, Karl, 2004) advanced 
thinking beyond a narrow economic focus of Dutch disease, or that encapsulated by the term 
‘resource wars’. Watts (2004a) and Logan and McNeish (2012a) work draws attention to the 
importance of the underlying historical, political and social forces shaping the political 
landscape that oil is introduced to. The recent work of Bebbington and colleagues also push 
the political perspective further, beyond the recognition that ‘politics matters’, to think about 
the ways in which it matters for outcomes (Bebbington et al., 2018). Using a political 
settlements framework, they engage critically with the institutional focus of resource 
governance to look at elite strategies of political pact making underlying institutional 
formation. They analyse the balance of power between contending social groups at the 
national, regional and local scales to understand why states have been unable to translate 
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natural resource wealth into broad based, inclusive development. They find that in the cases 
of study (Peru, Bolivia, Zambia and Ghana), elites prioritised the short-term objectives of 
political survival over a national development vision. While this finding in and of itself is not 
surprising, a focus on the politics underlying these outcomes reveals the various factors which 
shaped and constrained them, and broadens the focus out from one of national level elites as 
the problem (i.e. corruption) and national level institutions as the solution. They highlight the 
role of history, external intervention, post-colonial constraints, and excluded actors in shaping 
dynamics. The political settlements approach has been used to study the power dynamics 
underlying Uganda’s transition to an oil state with a national focus (Hickey et al., 2015, Hickey 
and Izama, 2017, Bukenya and Nakaiza, 2018). Hickey and Izama’s later work reveals important 
insights into the changing political settlement dynamics in the country and how this is likely 
to influence the politics of oil once oil revenues start flowing (Hickey and Izama, 2017). 
Indeed, the political settlement approach across cases helps to explain why similar sets of 
institutions often produce divergent outcomes. However, what it does not do so well, as 
Bebbington and co-authors acknowledge, is deal with the significance of ideas, such as the 
national imaginings invoked by resources, and the materiality of the resource in shaping 
outcomes.  
 
There has been renewed interest in materiality in the study of natural resources (Bakker and 
Bridge, 2006). Haarstad (2016) argues that in order to understand the prospects for natural 
resource-led development, scholars must consider how the material properties of resources 
might shape development pathways. Mitchell (2009), Bridge (2009) and Le Billon (2008) have 
shown that the particular properties of natural resources have implications for how their 
extraction, distribution and consumption are organised. This means that “the development 
prospects of a resource-rich country is shaped not just by the ‘quality’ of its own institutions, 
but also by the materiality of its resource base and the relationships with various actors and 
stakeholders that emerges around these material properties” (Haarstad, 2016: 148).  
 
Similarly, Bridge (2008), speaking about oil in particular, argues that missing from the current 
policy debate over extractive industries and development is a sense of the relational way in 
which production is organised. Mitchell also emphasises the importance of a broader, 
relational focus:   
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“Failing to follow the oil itself, accounts of the oil curse diagnose it as a malady 
located within only one set of nodes of the networks through which oil flow… in 
the decision-making organs of individual producer states” (Mitchell, 2009: 400). 
 
They are among a number of scholars critical of the national-scale mode of analysis that 
pushes questions about the transnational organization of production into the background. 
Such a narrow focus misses the wider web of complicity, which has implications for equitable 
outcomes, as well as policy in relation to resource governance, and serves as a key idea 
underpinning this thesis.  
 
2.2.4 A subnational resource curse?  
As demonstrated in the previous sections, debates about the relationship between natural 
resources and development – especially oil - have typically focussed on the national scale. The 
literature reviewed so far has focused on the links between natural resource abundance and 
poor growth, conflict, democracy and institutional quality at the national level. A more recent 
literature has focused on the subnational level, to suggest the existence of a subnational 
resource curse (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, 2015, Arellano-Yanguas, 2011, Suutarinen, 2015). 
 
Arellano-Yanguas (2011) showed that subnational authorities in Peru have been unable to 
harness resource revenues for poverty reduction, due to rent seeking among local elites and 
struggles over access to and control over revenues. Lawer et al. (2017) argue that 
unaccountable subnational institutions in Ghana constrain access to mining revenues. The 
literature tends to be focused on establishing if the curse exists at the subnational level and in 
what ways it manifests (Poncian and Jose, 2019). Further, the struggles identified are those 
which emerge over resource revenues, whereas the Ugandan context is in the pre-oil stage, 
prior to revenues flowing from oil production.  
 
Some of the recent literature on oil which has a subnational and ethnographical focus does 
not debate the existence of a curse, but starts from the point of ‘oil as the crazy curse’ 
(Behrends et al., 2013). Here, oil is the hegemonic force and struggles are over oil as revenues, 
which mirrors the trend of national level studies. While this subnational literature broadens 
the debate from the national level focus, it remains focused on mineral wealth as revenues. 
Further, as Hinojosa and co-authors argue, resource curse thinking remains focused on 
questions of rent seeking, corruption, and government capacity which not only risks failing to 
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recognise or capture the complexity of what happens in these spaces but does not account for 
the pre-existing structure of the regional economy and society (Hinojosa et al., 2015). Struggles 
over the share of benefits from oil wealth often become caught up in longstanding issues of 
inclusion / exclusion, social identity struggles and complex relationships to land and resources 
(Logan and McNeish, 2012a). Social identity struggles and complex relations to land are 
significant in Uganda, therefore it is important to pay attention to the relevance of these in the 
pre-oil stage.  
 
2.2.5 Governance approaches for the extractives industries 
Approaches to governance of the extractives sector have tended to reflect dominant 
understandings of the relationship between natural resources and development. In particular, 
‘resource curse’ explanations for the poor performance of extractives economies have been 
influential, and as noted above, have tended to focus on the problems stemming from the 
weakness of national institutions, and the behaviours of national elites. As such, a focus on 
‘getting the institutions right’ became central to avoiding the ‘curse’ and ensuring good 
governance of extractives industries (Maconachie and Hilson, 2013, Hilson, 2014, Haarstad, 
2016). Resource governance policies in the global south have been informed by this 
‘institutional turn’ in mainstream academic approaches, which generally sees national level 
elites as the problem and national level institutions as the solution. As Appel argues, building 
on the academic architecture on the ‘resource curse’, resource governance approaches treat 
the oil industry as a “mere revenue‐producing machine—a black box with predictable effects” 
(Appel, 2012b: 693). This has given rise to a ‘blueprint approach’ to oil governance. The oil 
world is seen through a techno-managerial framework whereby oil can be managed into a 
blessing, or mis-managed into a curse (Logan and McNeish, 2012a). Although these 
approaches recognise that there is no pre-determined path, the success (or not), comes down 
to prudent decision making and implementing the rights kinds of institutions.  
 
Institutional mechanisms to ensure ‘good governance’ have tended to focus on policies to 
strengthen revenue management. The Extractives Initiative Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a 
case in point. To use the example of the transparency agenda, the idea that revenues from 
natural resources erode national institutions and prompt rent seeking behaviour in national 
elites led to transparency initiatives to address the challenge of corruption (Hilson and 
Maconachie, 2008). As Hilson and Maconachie (2008) argue, behind the EITI is the logic that 
if it can be shown that host governments receive substantial revenues from natural resources, 
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then it follows that failure to translate them into development benefits must be due to 
national elites mismanaging the revenues.  
 
While there have been some notable achievements through EITI, including procedures put in 
place in host countries for multi-stakeholder consultations and oversight (Van Alstine, 2014), 
there is little evidence that transparency measures lead to any impact at the subnational level. 
An increase in information through openness of information does not mean that people can 
access the information or, if they can access it, are able to act on it (Acosta, 2013). This is one 
of EITI’s significant shortcomings. Another issue is the ‘empowerment’ of civil society, which 
is assumed to occur through EITI, which fails to recognise that civil society organisations 
operate under restrictive and repressive conditions in many countries which have signed up to 
EITI (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000, Öge, 2017). And while Uganda had not yet signed up to 
the EITI during the period of my research, the repressive conditions that Ugandan civil society 
operates raise questions about the effectives of such an initiative going forward.  
 
The institutional approach to resource governance in the African context can be seen in light 
of the wider good governance agenda in Africa, and the way that post-colonial Africa has been 
theorised. As Achille Mbembe, reminds us, Africa’s complex social issues tend to be dealt with 
as technical matters, a result of the particular challenges on the continent coupled with the 
‘atomisation of knowledge’ that is a result of the short-term research horizons of development 
agencies and NGOs that intervene (Mbembe, 2016: 212). Africa, he argues, is treated as a crisis-
prone entity, as if the people involved have no histories or agency. Resource governance treads 
a similar path. ‘Curse’ or ‘blessing’ narratives simplify the complex features of resource politics, 
and shift the attention away from other explanations of poor resource outcomes (Logan and 
McNeish, 2012a). This is significant in the case of Uganda, where discussion of the industry by 
a range of actors has been framed in terms of resource curse, and as this thesis will show, 
much of the external support to Uganda from donors and NGOs has focused on the quality of 
national level institutions. 
 
As I noted in section 2.2 there is a growing consensus among critical scholars that weak 
national level institutions cannot by themselves explain poor development outcomes from 
extractives led development (Haarstad, 2016, Hilson and Maconachie, 2008, Bebbington et al., 
2018). Ross (2015) argues that policy interventions proceed without any systematic knowledge 
about which policies work and under what conditions. Dietsche (2012) further argues that 
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generic institutional reform is based on a pre-conceived idea of what good institutions are, 
with no shared definition. She points out that recognising that institutions are important is 
not the same as knowing how institutional change is brought about, and what is needed for 
institutional change. As I also showed in 2.2 scholars note the need to focus on the politics 
underlying governance arrangements (Logan and McNeish, 2012a, Bebbington et al., 2018), as 
Haarstad articulates: 
“Resource governance is shaped by both longer term historical social power 
relations that are unique to specific contexts and transnational networks of oil 
companies, geopolitical interests, financial institutions etc.” (Haarstad, 2016: 140) 
 
Indeed, as Hilson and Maconachie (2008) argue, because the ‘good governance’ focus centres 
on the problem of national elites managing oil rents, the role of extractives MNCs, or western 
actors in general, in explaining poor performance of the extractives industries in Africa has 
been overlooked. As I discuss in section 2.4, extractives companies have largely been left to 
self-regulate, through corporate social responsibility and community relations efforts.  
 
Before I go on to discuss the role of extractives companies in resource governance, I turn to 
review a wider literature on subnational social struggle and the extractives industries, which 
offers insights to the study of onshore oil during the early industry stages.  
 
2.3 The extractives industries and subnational development struggles 
For the study of subnational level oil in Uganda, a review of the literature on the subnational 
level dynamics of extractives industries is necessary, much of which has focused on mining, 
but shares commonalities with onshore oil development. Although this literature often 
overlaps with the ‘resource curse’ literature, the latter tends to focus on the macro-level 
developmental contribution of the extractives industries.  This section reviews the literature 
on the subnational aspects of the extractives industries, including the social and 
environmental impacts, the enclave nature of the industry, social conflict in the sector, and 
forms of resistance and agency. This not only offers insights for the study of onshore oil, but 
provides the context for the discussion of corporate approaches to managing the complex 
local spaces that extractives companies operate in section 2.4.  
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2.3.1 Social and environmental aspects of extractives 
Subnational studies provide important insights to how the complex relationship between 
natural resources and development play out at the subnational level. While some scholars, 
industry associations and IFIs point to the possibility that extractives can be harnessed to 
achieve socio-economic development, with good governance and corporate responsibility, 
there is a vast body of literature which suggests that local populations, and especially the most 
vulnerable, continue to lose out (O'Faircheallaigh, 2013, Hilson and Maconachie, 2008, 
Bebbington et al., 2008b, Acuña, 2015). As mentioned above, while these studies tend to focus 
on mining, the studies are relevant for onshore oil in the early stages of development, given 
the issues relating to land acquisition and displacement1.  
 
In a review of fifty-two empirical studies on the relationship between extractive industries and 
poverty, Gamu and colleagues found no evidence to suggest a ‘universal’ effect of extractive 
industries on poverty levels (Gamu et al., 2015). Rather, they found that the social and 
environmental impacts associated with extractive sector developments can exacerbate poverty 
through diverse mechanisms. The majority of the subnational studies were on mining, with 
large scale mining found to have the worst impacts, exacerbating poverty through its 
considerable social and environmental footprint, and lack of productive linkages to the local 
economic context. Subnational studies of oil looked at the impacts of oil spills and corporate 
irresponsibility in Nigeria, where gas flaring and pollution from oil spills have devastated local 
livelihoods (Watts, 2004b, Watts, 2012, Idemudia, 2012), and community grievances over oil in 
Ghana (Ackah-Baidoo, 2013).  
 
The literature on natural resource extraction in Sub-Saharan Africa observes that large-scale 
natural resource extraction often takes places in regions inhabited by politically marginalised 
populations (Buur et al., 2017, Lavers, 2012). Some of the most vulnerable of these populations 
are youth (Maconachie, 2014) and women (Lahiri‐Dutt, 2015, Jenkins, 2014). In Latin America 
and South East Asia, indigenous peoples have been among the worst impacted by extractives 
industries, experiencing the loss of land, water sources and erosion of cultural traditions 
(Bury, 2004, Li et al., 2010, O'Faircheallaigh, 2013).   
 
 
1 While this section focuses on academic literature, it should be noted that civil society organisations have played an 
important role in compiling studies about the adverse impacts of extractives industries for local populations, 
documenting human rights, land, and indigenous struggles, and these have complemented academic studies.  
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Extractives industries are transforming local livelihoods in diverse locations through processes 
of accumulation by dispossession (Bebbington et al., 2008a, Harvey, 2004). Perreault (2013) 
notes that in addition to land dispossession, the accumulated environmental burdens can lead 
to ‘dispossession by accumulation’. Acuña (2015) notes that dispossession also refers to the 
adverse impacts on health, habitat and way of life; what Nixon (2011) refers to as ‘dispossession 
without moving’. These processes are leading to new forms of social differentiation and the 
emergence of new and potentially fragmented territorial identities (Humphreys Bebbington, 
2012). 
 
Extractives industries transform the social, political, and economic life of territories in 
complex and multiple ways (Hinojosa et al., 2015). While Bebbington and colleagues point to 
the “spectacularly unequal distributions of wealth” associated with mining, they also point out 
that extractives industries have long been caught up in the making of cultures, especially in 
Latin America (Bebbington et al., 2008b: 966). In a later paper, Bebbington and co-authors 
showed that the local effects of extraction depend considerably on the pre-existing structure 
of the rural and regional economy (Hinojosa et al., 2015). They pay particular attention to the 
imaginaries and ideas about development and argue that these aspirations can shape the 
outcomes of resource extraction. In the study, they show how visions of territory that 
preceded the gas boom in a regional department in Bolivia shaped struggles over the control 
and access to resources and revenues. Other literatures have also shown the ways in which 
extractives industries interact with pre-existing dynamics. Sawyer (2004) shows how 
indigenous identity was shaped by the experiences of extractive industries in the Amazon. 
 
These studies are important in that they demonstrate the ways that the extractives industries, 
and local responses to the industries, have to be understood in the context of historical and 
contemporary relationships to land and resources and the formation of identities. What is also 
significant is that the knowledge of industry impacts becomes a reference point when 
populations in other areas are faced with the possibility of the extractives industries arriving in 
their areas (Bebbington and Bury, 2009). This is relevant in the case of Uganda, because what 
is known about the impacts of oil in the Niger Delta serves as a reference point for Uganda’s 
potentially ‘good’ or ‘bad’ outcomes from oil (as discussed in chapters five and seven).  
 
While there have been relatively few studies of oil in Uganda that focus strictly on the 
subnational so far, those that do have a subnational focus have studied the impacts of oil at 
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the local level, from the perspectives of actors living in the oil regions (Byakagaba et al., 2019, 
Mawejje, 2019, Ogwang et al., 2018, Manyindo et al., 2014). Recent ethnographical work from 
Witte (2018), which focuses empirically on some of the same sites as I do in my study, 
approaches oil in Uganda in terms of oils ‘not yet’ state, the uncertainty of the industry and 
the emplacement of risk which enables actors to negotiate their positions. Although both of 
our studies examine the ‘resource-making’ process in Uganda and some of the themes in 
Witte’s work overlap with my own, for example the role of civil society in reproducing 
resource curse narratives, our work has crucial differences. In particular whereas Witte focuses 
on risk narratives and did not interview industry, I take a relational approach and bring in a 
focus on corporate engagement practices and the dynamics of subnational resource 
governance.  
 
Building on the perceptions analysis in Manyindo et al. (2014), Van Alstine et al. (2014) 
identified emerging trends at the subnational level during the exploration period which 
suggest fragmented modes of resource governance. Industry-driven interaction at the local 
level was taking place in the context of weak local government capacity and limited, 
fragmented civil society activity. These questions relating to the roles of industry and civil 
society at the subnational level, along with the wider literature review, helped to inform the 
direction of my study. Among these impacts, land is a salient local issue, and a recent body of 
work explores the implications of the land and oil issue, raising important questions about oil 
and land, territory, and conflict (Kinyera, 2019, Ogwang and Vanclay, 2019, Sjögren, 2013b, 
Witte and Nakayi, 2019). Although land also emerged as an important theme in my research, it 
is not central to my study, but rather is one of the contentious issues which emerges and 
serves to influence social and political dynamics during the pre-oil stage.   
 
2.3.2 Enclave nature of extractives   
One of the contentious issues surrounding extractives is the enclave nature of operations. Not 
only do these projects interrupt the lives and livelihoods of local populations, but they often 
operate in securitised enclaves, providing little in the way of productive linkages to the local 
economy or society. Ferguson (2005) argues that especially in Africa, capital is invested in 
spatially segregated mineral-extraction enclaves.  These ‘socially thin’ environments are 
separated from the cultural, economic, and legal contexts in which they are situated 
(Ferguson, 2006). As Ferguson explains, while oil companies are ‘globally networked’: 
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“Capital “hops” over “unusable Africa”, alighting only in mineral rich enclaves 
that are starkly disconnected from their national societies” (Ferguson, 2005: 380). 
 
The enclave literature provides some insights into the development of oil, both onshore and 
offshore. Indeed, it is argued that enclave development is a particular feature of oil, as it 
absorbs less local labour than large scale mining, and operates largely independently of other 
economic processes (Humphreys et al., 2007). Yates (2006) posits that the enclave nature of 
oil development has been unique to the history of Africa’s natural resource development in 
the post-colonial period. He argues that African extractives economies continue to have a high 
dependence on foreign firms who ‘self-rule’ and work in secured enclaves, like Shell in the 
Niger Delta, Total in Gabon, Congo and Cameroon, and Chevron in Angola, “their global oil 
distribution networks, investments, loans and commissions give them semi-sovereign power” 
(Yates, 2006: 29). 
 
Recent studies on oil have noted the ways that oil companies seek to deliberately disembed 
themselves from their local surroundings (Appel, 2012b, Zalik, 2009). What Appel terms 
‘modularity’ is the attempts by oil companies to replicate near identical operations across the 
world, that remain walled off and distant from the local politics in which they are deeply 
enmeshed (Appel, 2012a). Barry (2006) shows that standardization practices are important 
elements of capitalist disentanglement work that seeks to differentiate between the inside and 
outside of what he calls ‘technological zones’; a space within which differences between 
technical practices have been reduced or common standards have been established. This is 
especially the case in the oil industry, where high quality standards, health and safety and a 
clean image has been increasingly important to reassure shareholders in the wake of disasters 
such as the Exxon Valdez spill (Appel, 2012a). As Barry states, to adhere to standards of 
conduct and safety, oil companies must demonstrate that they are disentangled from the 
locality that might be experiencing conflict, corruption and violence (Barry, 2006). But whilst 
they seek physical and discursive separation from the unruly surroundings, extractives 
companies are inevitably entangled in the contexts, and furthermore, they play a role in 
creating and sustaining those ‘unruly surroundings’. Watts’ work in Nigeria shows an extreme 
example of the complex and violent entanglements that have arisen partly through oil MNCs 
seeking to disentangle themselves from the local space by buying off local groups (Watts, 
2012). Gardner, through her work in Bangladesh, has shown that MNCs seek to disentangle 
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themselves through corporate social responsibility projects through ‘partnerships’ that 
inevitably tie them (Gardner, 2015, Gardner et al., 2012). 
 
Enns and Bersaglio (2015) note that recent oil development in the Turkana region of Kenya is 
developing in enclave fashion, which has significant implications in a region historically 
marginalised by the state. The local population seek to engage with oil companies to secure 
rights, creating new patterns of inequalities. Similarly, Lesutis (2019) shows that in 
Mozambique the mining enclave interacts with the broader socio-economic landscape to 
entrench class differences. What this work suggests is that the enclave is not entirely separate 
but interacts with the local context in complex ways, to mediate access to rights and services, 
and to influence development outcomes.  
 
2.3.3 Social conflict in extractives  
Given the considerable social and environmental costs, and the tendencies for extractives 
industries to pass over the local population in terms of productive linkages and benefits, it is 
not surprising that the sector has been plagued by social conflicts. With the latest boom in 
exploration and production, conflict in relation to extractives industries increased 
dramatically in the period 2000 to 2013 (Andrews et al., 2017). This increase can partly be 
attributed to the expansion of extractives frontiers in the global south. (Andrews et al., 2017) 
also note the increase in protests worldwide during this time frame. Much of the social 
conflict is related to the issues discussed in the section above: the adverse impacts on water, 
land, culture in the context of minimum benefits accruing to local populations. In a review of 
‘resistance to mining’, Conde (2017) states that conflicts can arise due to a ‘clash of 
metabolisms’, between a subsistence and an extractive economy. Acuña (2015) frames this in 
terms of differing political ontologies that are in tension between extractives projects and 
indigenous people.  
 
Franks et al. (2014) point out that the increase in social conflict is taking place in a context of 
increasing industry attention to sustainability standards, community relations and best 
practice, which aims to mitigate social conflict; a finding which resonates with Larsen’s post 
frontier concept I discuss in section 2.5.3. As Hodge from the International Council of Mining 
and Metals (ICMM) notes, this corresponding increase appears to present a paradox (Hodge, 
2014). A debate about this apparent contradiction took place in the Journal of Cleaner 
Production in 2014 between Hodges and three political ecology scholars. For Hodges, mining 
 43 
affected communities, able to share their experiences with other communities across the globe 
thanks to an exploding communications system, are becoming empowered to the extent that 
they are less likely to accept the imposition of an ‘un-palatable future’ and more and more 
likely to resist. This means that for industry, “the goal posts are moving more quickly than the 
team on the field” (2014: 32). The discussants cast doubt on whether industry performance is 
improving at all, and point to the stark power differentials between local communities and 
industry (Brereton, 2014); power imbalances which Hodges passes over as “alternative values” 
(2014: 28). Yet rather than see this dialogue as industry attempting to shift the blame for 
increasing conflict onto ‘overly empowered’ communities as suggested by Hodges, what the 
debate highlights is the significance of social conflict and community resistance in pushing 
the industry to take note and attempt to improve its performance. In this regard, Bebbington 
(2014) notes that the increase of social conflict is an important driver for industry innovation 
and institutional change.  
 
However, the idea that social conflict is a positive or productive is not a view shared by the 
majority of scholars. Of course, social conflict is costly and disruptive of livelihoods, and it is 
well known that poverty and underdevelopment is further exacerbated by conflict (Stewart, 
2002). The link between natural resources and conflict in the mainstream resource curse 
literature was noted in section 2.2, as were some of the critiques. The literature has progressed 
from viewing conflict as caused by natural resources (i.e. Collier’s work), to acknowledging the 
longer historical trajectories of conflict; social conflict can be deeply rooted in a region’s social 
history and can reflect wider struggles over territory and identity (McNeish, 2012). So, while 
conflict can be a clash of ‘metabolisms’ or ‘ontologies’ as Conde (2017) and Acuña (2015) 
respectively, point out, social conflict can reflect longer term struggles.  
 
Much of the literature on natural resources and social conflict discusses conflict in terms of 
struggles over access to and control of resources or revenues (Watts, 2009a, Behrends, 2011). 
However, other studies highlight that social conflicts have deeper roots and are not always 
about the control of resources; they can be as much about social relationships as they are 
about material interests (McNeish, 2012). Hilson and Laing (2017) show that conflicts may 
appear to be about resource control, but can instead be a product of deeply rooted ethnic 
tensions. As Sawyer (2004) and Li et al. (2010) show in relation to indigenous struggles, 
cultural and emotional attachments to place can be a source of conflict. However Bebbington 
et al. (2008b) argue that it is important to consider that struggles are not always about 
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resistance to industry per se, but can be about the meaning of development more broadly, and 
if development should take place then what kind of process it should be. It is this recognition 
in the literature of the variations and complexities in local people’s relationships with 
extractives projects that I engage with in this thesis. The focus on the pre-oil stage in the study 
provides an opportunity to consider extractives relationships in the early stage of a project, 
including how these relationships take shape, and if struggle and resistance emerges, how and 
why.  
 
2.3.4 Forms of resistance and agency in extractives contexts  
 
I noted in section 2.3.3 that social conflict in the extractive industries has increased, and I also 
noted that at the same time, there has been increasing industry attention to the need to 
address legitimacy issues and manage social relations which I discuss in section 2.4. The 
increase in social conflict and the corresponding increase in industry concern to address social 
conflict demonstrates the success of local community resistance, defined as ‘opposition’ and 
‘action’ to power relations (Conde and Le Billon, 2017), and the ability of local communities to 
build, or become part of broad-based movements. As Hodge (2014) notes, these movements 
have gained additional strength through ability to have a global reach through globalised 
communications. But contrary to his suggestion, these global movements are not the result of 
a digitally networked society (Castells, 2010), although these connections have certainly 
intensified and increased the profile of local issues in recent years. Grassroots movements, 
such as the rubber tappers in the Brazilian Amazon, gained their momentum from 
international support in the 1970s and 1980s prior to the Internet age. Rather, they have been 
facilitated by these connections. An alliance between indigenous groups, scientists, human 
rights groups and environmentalists in the 1980s to defend the Amazon was the first example 
of “organised modern, political confrontation” by extractives affected communities in the 
global south (Gedicks, 2001: 11).  
 
A decade later in the Niger Delta, Ken Saro Wiwa, the leader of the Ogoni people, linked the 
Ogoni struggle against the oil industry to the green movement to gain international support, 
successfully framing the struggle as an environmental struggle (Watts, 2004b). As Tsing (2011) 
notes, environmental advocacy was well established prior to the extractives expansion in 
Indonesia’s frontier, and this knowledge helped to shaped local responses. The oil industry in 
Uganda is developing in a global context where social movements relating to the environment, 
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human rights and indigenous peoples are well established, and the experiences of 
communities such as those in the Niger Delta are part of the global imagination about oil 
extraction in the global south. These local struggles do not stay local. These experiences have 
shaped the context into which extractives projects now operate. In short, the literature on 
resistance and social movements in extractives contexts demonstrates not only the continuing 
importance of international networks to bring attention to environmental and social issues, 
but the role such connections can play in shaping the contours of social movements and 
protest. These studies point to the importance of global networks of support for local struggle 
against extractive (Gedicks, 2001).   
 
However, it is important to note that not all communities resist extractives projects. A recent 
study by Conde and LeBillon found that resistance to extractives projects varies (Conde and Le 
Billon, 2017). Whilst they too note the dramatic increase of local resistance to extractive 
projects, they also find that not all communities resist, “and if they resist, they do not resist 
with the same objectives, narratives and intensity” (Conde and Le Billon, 2017: 682). Their 
explanations for these findings include the extent to which local people are dependent on 
extractives companies, the extent of political marginalisation and confidence in institutions. 
Resistance can take different forms and can be visible and overt or invisible and covert (Conde 
and Le Billon, 2017). They find that the likelihood of resistance increases in the context of 
large environmental impacts from projects. Interestingly, they note that although resistance is 
as common in Africa as in Latin America, violence in African cases is less common than in 
Latin America (Andrews et al., 2017). 
 
Other studies highlight the differences between the Latin America and African cases in terms 
of the trajectories of struggle against extractives. In the volume by Bebbington et al. (2018) 
which analyses the underlying political settlements driving resource governance in four cases, 
they point to the possibility of excluded groups to challenge the political settlement using 
‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 2008). They note that this has been less successful in the African 
cases of Zambia and Ghana, yet there is no explicit discussion of why that is the case. Indeed, 
the literature on natural resources and social struggle has less to say about the character of 
resistance in African states and the role played by social movements, in comparison to the vast 
literature on cases from Latin America. De Waal and Ibreck (2013) discuss the problem of 
African social movements sustaining change. They note that while protest in Africa is 
frequent, broad-based popular movements are weak and especially vulnerable to co-option or 
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collapse, a reflection not of the ‘weakness’ of society in these contexts, but rather of the 
distinct character of Africa’s hybrid political orders. These insights highlight the importance of 
looking at the specific socio-political context of each case, as well as considering a range of 
responses and constraints. Studies have noted the seemingly contradictory responses to 
extractives, from outright rejection to acceptance (Maconachie, 2014). It is the case that local 
people might see the potential for benefits from extractives industries or might adapt to the 
realties brought by such projects. Yet in the literature, resistance tends to be emphasised over 
negotiation and accommodation (Bebbington, 2000). Bebbington (2000) argues that the ways 
in which people struggle for meaningful livelihoods necessarily brings them into contact with 
‘development interventions’, and resistance is not the only response (Ibid.). He further notes 
that transformations in social relations brought about by extractives projects can structure 
access to resources and power, and identifies in the case of Latin America, the progressive 
expansion of grassroots influence and control over how these places are governed in some 
cases, for example by NGO and church, or by local popular initiative.  
 
However, again, it is necessary to make a distinction between the African and Latin American 
experiences. A lot of the literature on social movements in extractives contexts includes cases 
from Latin America where NGOs have historically functioned in opposition to the government 
and played an important role in strengthening civil society (Banks and Hulme, 2012). In 
contrast, Africa did not have an NGO boom until the 1990s, and as such ‘civil society’ has 
unfolded differently. For example, ‘civil society’ in Uganda is conflated with professionalised 
NGOs whose role it is to provide a vehicle for social service delivery, as I show in chapter 
seven. Further civil society in Africa is a donor-nurtured section of civil society, and is based 
on a western conception of civil society which is seen to exist separately from the state (Lewis, 
2001). Such a view becomes problematic in the context of postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, 
where African societies are plural and fragmented, with vertical relations and patronage bonds 
(Chabal et al., 1999). As such, scholars have questioned the idea of a distinction between state 
and civil society in the Sub Saharan African context (Markovitz, 1998, Karlström, 1999). This 
means that the NGO sector in Latin America emerges from a stronger and more radicalised 
body of civil society organisations in opposition to the authoritarian regimes across the region 
(Bebbington, 1997, Miraftab, 1997) whereas in contrast, “state and society in Africa intertwine 




2.4 The extractive industries and the social licence to operate 
 
It is important for this thesis on subnational level dynamics in a new oil context to consider 
the ways in which oil companies engage with the resource space, especially in light of the 
above discussion on enclaves and social conflict. Extractives companies have realised that the 
negative impacts of extractive industries on communities can have damaging impacts on the 
company itself, in terms of time lost through stoppages, conflict and reputational damage 
(Wilson, 2016). Oil companies therefore seek to acquire a “Social Licence to Operate” (SLO), 
to ensure that the project and companies have the approval of society (Joyce and Thomson, 
2000). 
 
The Social Licence to Operate emerged as a key concept originally formulated by the mining  
industry to try to understand and explain the negative societal opinions of the sector (Gehman 
et al., 2017). As such, SLO emerged in response to opposition as a mechanism which aimed to 
ensure the viability of the sector (Owen and Kemp, 2013). Given its origins in the narratives of 
companies themselves, it is unsurprising that the term is critiqued as focusing more on 
business risk then business-society relationship building (Wilson, 2016). Nonetheless, as 
extractives companies face increased scrutiny, the SLO concept has grown in importance 
(Gehman et al., 2017), seen by some as a platform for stakeholder negotiation (Prno, 2013).  
 
SLO is closely related to legitimacy, and if a company has the ‘social licence’, this broadly 
denotes its acceptability by the community in question. However, there has been less focus in 
the literature on the complexity of legitimacy-seeking for complex organisations such as oil 
MNCs, or the processes of how it happens. The increase of company and community conflict 
in extractives contexts and its far reaching implications for both companies and local 
communities (Franks et al., 2014, Andrews et al., 2017) suggests that local level legitimacy is of 
increasing importance. Legitimacy can be defined as a generalizable perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995). A key issue then 
is which ‘socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ do oil MNCs 
engage with and how?  
 
One of the most common tools that extractives companies use to build relationships, maintain 
legitimacy and manage the resource space is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Larsen, 
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2017, Billo, 2015, Rajak, 2011). CSR denotes the range of (mainly voluntary) practices 
undertaken by businesses to meet or exceed the ethical and legal expectations of society 
(Blowfield and Frynas, 2005). In fact, the oil and gas sector has been one of the leading 
industries to embrace CSR in order to reduce negative and promote positive externalities 
associated with operations (Frynas, 2005). The oil companies that have shown most 
commitment to engage with CSR are those dependent on international financial markets and 
international reputations, suggesting the importance of external norms and value systems 
(Frynas, 2009).  
 
However, CSR continues to evolve over time to meet changing societal expectations, drawing 
on new management frameworks and philosophies in the process (Dolan and Rajak, 2016). 
Scholars have noted a shift from first generation CSR as ‘philanthropy’ to second generation 
CSR as ‘social engagement’, the latter embodying an aim to be more ‘inclusive’ of local 
communities in terms of consulting them about the costs and benefits from extractives 
projects (Laplante and Spears, 2008). In the oil industry, CSR has moved from old style 
‘philanthropy’, featuring donations and infrastructure projects, to ‘empowerment’ projects 
which promote community self-reliance (Frynas, 2005, Rajak, 2011, Billo, 2015). The latter 
approach has been inspired by the ‘win-win’ or business case approach to CSR which flags not 
only compatibility, but synergies between doing good and profitability: 
“Approached strategically, [CSR] generates opportunity, innovation, and 
competitive advantage for corporations—while solving pressing social problems.” 
(Porter and Kramer, 2006: 1) 
 
As such, to avoid the idea that companies are ‘patrons’, a more strategic approach to CSR has 
been adopted among oil companies (Rajak, 2011). In this approach, social engagement and 
‘participation’ of local communities have become a key strategy. However, this has tended to 
rely on the stakeholder model, which critics argue focuses on mitigating the risk to the 
corporation rather than addressing community concerns (Hamann, 2003, Gilberthorpe and 
Banks, 2012). Indeed, the stakeholder model can reinforce or exacerbate power relations. Since 
the model recognises the most ‘salient’ stakeholders in terms of their potential impact on the 
company (Mitchell et al., 1997), it overlooks those actors which may be the most important in 
terms of ensuring wider social goals (Heikkurinen and Bonnedahl, 2013).  
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Further, while the SLO may be a key concern, the motivations for implementing CSR can vary 
between companies, from instrumental approaches in which the economic motive is central, 
towards approaches where ethical considerations are more central (Garriga and Melé, 2004). 
Extractive industries actors have engaged in CSR to try to address the problem of ‘socially thin’ 
environments arising from the enclaving tendencies of extractives (Ferguson, 2006). However, 
Gilberthorpe (2013) among others has questioned if this ‘framework of improved intervention’ 
has benefitted communities at all. CSR is seen as creating patron / client relationships “on 
which structures of patronage and dependency are built” and is used to buy support from local 
communities (Rajak, 2017: 191). Indeed, the more critical work on CSR and the anthropological 
approaches of Gilberthorpe and Rajak among others, look at the ‘social life of CSR’ (Rajak, 
2011) and have been useful in drawing attention to the wider power effects of CSR, especially in 
light of more ‘innovative’ and strategic CSR approaches. Linking back to the problem of 
‘socially thin’ environments and the potential for instability, CSR and community engagement 
have played a role in attempting to contain and shape social struggle (Himley, 2013). This 
suggests that subnational social conflict and resistance must be placed within the broader 
framework of extractives relationships. Both social control and development are caught up 
together, which Banks et al. (2016) suggest can explain why CSR approaches by extractives 
companies seek both social control and community development at the same time.  
 
2.5 Concepts and conceptual framework  
 
The previous section reviewed the literature on the links between natural resources and poor 
development outcomes, social conflict, forms of resistance, and CSR. I identified a number of 
gaps relating to the ways in which studies of oil tend to focus on oil as revenue, on struggles 
over resource wealth, and on national scales of analysis and miss the important processes that 
take place in the pre-oil stage. I argued that it is important to focus on the interactions of a 
range of actors during the early stages of the industry to understand outcomes. This section 
outlines the key concepts that I draw on to explore the subnational dynamics of Uganda’s 
emerging resource frontier. I first outline recent scholarship on resource frontiers, which 
provides some insights to how resource frontiers have been conceptualised in the literature, 
before outlining the assemblage approach, through which I will explore the subnational 
dynamics of Uganda’s resource frontier.  
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2.5.1 Resource frontiers  
Uganda’s oil region is an emerging resource frontier, and this study seeks to understand and 
explain the processes taking place at the subnational level as it develops. A remote area 
becomes a ‘frontier’ when it encounters the attention of resource capture (Lund, 2019). What 
was previously a marginalised and peripheral area – the remote Albertine Graben - is now 
central to the vision of a modern Uganda, on the cusp of becoming one of the world’s oil 
producing nations.  
 
In the literature, central to the imagination of the frontier has been the idea of a wide empty 
space, an unpeopled and bountiful landscape ripe for investment and colonisation (Li, 2014, 
Tsing, 2003). The East African oil and gas frontier has been marketed in a similar way in the 
oil industry press; as a place of unique potential and opportunity, the ‘last energy frontier’ for 
the expansion of the global economy (DeLoitte, 2014). In political economy approaches, the 
resource frontier has been conceptualised in terms of a linear expansion of capitalist relations 
of production pushing forwards and absorbing outlying regions (Cleary, 1993). This takes place 
through the violent contestation between peasant and capitalist frontier actors (Foweraker, 
2002), and involves processes of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004).  
 
Whilst still emphasising the violence of these encounters, recent thinking on frontiers aims to 
go beyond this linear approach, and emphasises the uneven ways that frontier processes take 
place (Barney, 2009, Tsing, 2011). A key publication was Schmink and Wood’s longitudinal 
study of the Amazonian frontier, which identified “not a unitary process of change defined 
solely by the occupation of space and exploitation of resources but rather... a multiplicity of 
simultaneous overlapping contested frontiers, both palpable and abstract” (Schmink and 
Wood, 1992: 19). This recognition of multiple and overlapping frontiers, emphasised the 
complexity of how these spaces are shaped and the range of actors involved at multiple scales 
(Barney, 2009, Tsing, 2003, Li, 2001).  
 
This scholarship highlights the political dimensions of frontiers and the spatial dimensions of 
governance. Watts argues that frontiers are better understood as ‘frontier spaces’, and the 
resource frontier as a process (Watts, 2012). The frontier is not purely spatial, but also 
political, economic and social; it ‘takes place’ (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018); is characterised by 
social inequality, environmental degradation and conflict (Jepson, 2006); involves an 
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expansion of state power (Bridge, 2009), communal displacement and resource degradation 
(Tsing, 2003); it is a contested and complex empirical ‘reality’ (Barney, 2009). 
 
However, while work on resource frontiers flag the frontier as a site of encounters between 
knowledge practices, jurisdictions, and visions of modernity, development and progress 
(Rasmussen and Lund, 2018), the literature continues to emphasise domination, contestation, 
and social conflict as its main, defining characteristics. Ultimately, the frontier is “a zone of 
destruction of property systems, political structures, social relations, and life-worlds to make 
way for new ways of resource extraction” (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018: 389). Given the 
apparent hegemonic nature of oil (section 2.2), this would suggest that the oil frontier 
develops in a predictable way. Indeed, Watts has shown that oil frontiers are unique spaces 
that attract powerful global players and become shaped by a global regime of accumulation, 
which in the case of Nigeria, erased local rights to land in favour of oil extraction (Watts, 2012, 
Watts, 2004b). He argues that oil frontier spaces develop as violent and exclusionary corporate 
enclaves, subordinated by the ‘boom and bust’, militarised and hegemonic nature of globalised 
oil.  
 
Given the idea of oil’s dominant grip on development outcomes in the face of overwhelming 
evidence of social and environmental destruction in oil frontiers, it is no surprise that less 
attention is paid to the productive processes which take place in frontier spaces. Next, I draw 
on three concepts that emphasise the productive and agentive capacities of frontiers, in order 
to push the concept of frontiers making to include a broader range of processes. These are 
Dream Zones, Post frontier, and Carbonscapes.  
 
2.5.2 Dream zones 
Cross (2014) in his ethnography on Special Economic Zones in India argues that contemporary 
capitalism is built upon dreams as well as nightmares. Similarly, in her work on the 
Indonesian resource frontier, Tsing (2003) and (2011) notes that the frontier is a place of 
trauma for some, but potential opportunity for others. Both Cross (2014) and Tsing (2011) 
argue that dreams of improvement are an integral part of frontier making, not only for local 
people who are promised benefits, but for a range of actors, including those who propose to 
promote the interests of the vulnerable, such as NGOs or community representations, or local 
government officials. It is these dreamed-of-futures of a range of actors that have material 
effects and converge in frontier spaces, sometimes aligning and sometimes in conflict (Cross, 
 52 
2014). Cross (2014) argues that people’s responses in frontiers depend on a complex mix of 
factors, one of which is the ways in which different people imagine the future and it is these 
imaginaries of development that shape consent and conflict. It is the “divergent ways of 
knowing about, imagining and living towards the future that play out in these sites” (Cross, 
2014: 5) which help to understand how responses of conflict, resistance or consent are shaped.  
 
This conceptualisation of frontiers as spaces productive of aspirations and (positive) 
development imaginaries is overshadowed by a focus on the more destructive processes that 
take place. It is the accounts of domination and the ‘totalising logic’ of capitalism which Cross 
(2014) and Tsing (2011) argue limit the understanding of a range of processes in frontier spaces. 
This work informs my approach to explaining frontier dynamics in Uganda, as I aim to move 
away from the focus solely on the dissolution and disruption of social order and the creation 
of something new in its place by bringing in a focus on ideas and the ways that different 
imaginaries articulate in these spaces to shape outcomes. The key idea from this work is the 
role of aspirations in shaping development imaginaries and the way these influence the 
responses of actors in the frontier.  
 
2.5.3 The post frontier 
To emphasise the qualitative shift away from frontiers characterised by predatory extraction 
and destruction, Larsen has conceptualised the 21st century frontier as the ‘post frontier’ 
(Larsen, 2015). He points out that corporate domination as experienced in the 20th century 
frontiers of the Amazon and south East Asia, is no longer viable:  
“Whereas frontiers represented uncharted territory out of sight and control, the 
post-frontier is in narrative terms, visualised, inventoried and managed” (Larsen, 
2015: 7). 
 
Indeed, the 21st century frontier is also characterised and influenced by the language of 
environmental protection and sustainable development, what Tsing (2011) calls  the ‘salvage 
frontier’. Extractives corporations operate under increased scrutiny, under pressure from civil 
society groups to ensure the rights of local populations and that extraction is carried out with 
appropriate ‘best practice’ social and environmental safeguards. He argues that this is a post 
frontier, ‘re-ordered’ by new technologies, safeguard regulations, sustainable extraction and 
social change. Key post frontier devices in this new era are environmental and social impact 
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assessments (ESIAs) as standard, corporate community relations programmes and CSR 
(Larsen, 2017).  
 
The post frontier discourse suggests that the legitimacy of extractives companies cannot be 
taken for granted. Oil MNCs must make pro-active efforts to territorialise the project in a 
context of  ‘competing territorialities’ created by the existence of social movements and NGOs 
seeking to scrutinise corporate practices, if they are to ensure ongoing legitimacy, or earn a 
‘social licence to operate’ (section 2.4). Delaney (2009) outlines the concept of territoriality as 
the ideologies, discourses, and practices that are employed to make one development strategy 
prevalent over others. For oil MNCs, this is carried out through CSR and stakeholder 
engagement, which are now the taken-for-granted post frontier devices through which 
companies seek to establish legitimacy (Billo, 2012). These practices use ‘quieter’ forms of 
power, which Frederiksen and Himley (2020) note embody the shift from ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ in extractives frontiers towards more ‘productive’ forms of corporate control of 
space.  
 
Larsen (2015) does not present the post frontier as a utopia. Rather he draws attention to the 
paradox of the post frontier; the apparent contradiction of frontier dynamics taking place and 
even deepening at the same time as post frontier regulation increases. As the literature review 
demonstrated, the extraction model continues to be promoted along with new language 
promising win-win outcomes and measures which aim to address the negative impacts of 
extraction. The post frontier concept draws attention to these practices and expert 
knowledges that seek to territorialise a project, while emphasising those processes and 
practices that provide the counter territorialisation.  
 
2.5.4 Carbonscapes 
In their approach to studying energy systems, Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) outline the concept 
of Carbonscapes, through which they seek to challenge the path dependency common in 
studies of oil. As with other work in resource geography (section 2.2.3) they highlight the 
importance of the materiality of resources in determining outcomes but argue that the way 
materiality is conceptualised in the literature tends to overplay its stability and inertia. They 
adopt an assemblage approach to analyse carbonscapes, emphasising the capacities for change 
inherent in carbonscapes / assemblages. Because assemblages are composed of various 
interrelated parts, it is through their involvement with other assemblages that they are subject 
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to change and destabilisation (Delanda, 2006). I expand on the value of the assemblage 
approach to this study in section 2.5.5.  
 
Key to the carbonscapes concept are processes of territorialisation and deterritorialisation 
which compete to stabilise or destabilise an assemblage (table 1), mirroring those of Larsen’s 
post frontier concept. Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) argue that the materialities of 
carbonscapes are consequential for shaping these processes and in terms of oil extraction, 
these competing processes can make oil extraction sites inherently unstable and 
unpredictable. They show that it is through links to other assemblages that change 
(deterritorialisation) takes place, which they indicate as ‘assemblage converters’ in table 1 to 
demonstrate the built-in capacities for change in the carbonscape. In ‘extraction hot zones’, 
assemblage converters do not necessarily rupture the assemblage, but shape processes of 
destabilisation that can lead to change (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).  
 
Table 1. Example of territorialising, deterritorialising and assemblage converter processes in the oil 
assemblage. Source: Excerpt from Harstaad and Wanvik (2017: 445) 
 















• Social impacts 
• Climate discourse 
• Indigenous rights 
discourse 
• Market shifts 
• Changing global 
energy matrix  
 
• Sudden oil price 
changes 







My approach to studying Uganda’s oil assemblage draws inspiration from the carbonscapes 
concept, as it emphasises agency and capacities for change and as such challenges the 
assumed hegemony of oil (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).  
 
I now set out the conceptual framework for the study which adopts an assemblage approach 
and draws on key ideas from the dream zones, post frontier and carbonscapes concepts to 
broaden the conceptualisation of frontier making dynamics.  
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2.5.4 Assemblage approach  
Uganda’s oil frontier is developing in the era of the ‘post frontier’, where what is known about 
oil in the context of a post-colonial sub-Saharan African state promises to shape the processes 
of territorialisation and deterritorialization, as state and non-state actors seek to establish, 
manage and govern the oil project. It is the actors, practices, ideas and materialities that are 
involved in the territorialising and counter territorialising processes in a contemporary 
resource frontier that give insight into the dynamics of the subnational space during the early 
stage of the industry. These processes become part and parcel of the making of Uganda’s oil; 
of the ‘assembling’ of Uganda’s oil frontier and of Uganda’s oil resource. Before I outline the 
framework I use for the study, I discuss the assemblage approach and justify its use to explore 
Uganda’s emerging oil frontier.  
 
The origins of the assemblage approach are in social theory, developed as a way to analyse 
social complexity. The word assemblage is translated from the French word ‘agencement’ in 
social theory, a concept that was advanced by the philosophy of Deluce and Guattari and 
taken further by Michelle DeLanda (Delanda, 2006). ‘Agencement’, related to the word 
‘agency’, implies a capacity to act through the coming together – or assembling - of things. 
DeLanda built on Deluce and Guattari to conceptualise social formations as assemblages, 
composed of individual heterogenous components – both human and non-human - that enter 
into relations with one another. These social formations are not predetermined, but rather 
they are made up of complex assemblages that come together in certain configurations to 
function as a system or a whole (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2017). Because these social 
formations emerge through new associations and the substitution of elements, an assemblage 
approach provides a framework through which to analyse how particular social formations 
emerge or change over time (Schritt, 2016). What is significant for the purposes of exploring 
an emerging oil assemblage in a resource frontier is that the heterogeneous elements that 
come together are linked to other assemblages. The elements of an assemblage have the 
capacity to act in different ways, depending on the configuration of elements that come 
together. Delanda (2006) refers to these as ‘relations of exteriority’, and it is the relations of 
exteriority in assemblages that Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) build on to develop their concept 
of  carbonscapes. For the purposes of this study of a new oil frontier, another benefit of the 
assemblage approach is that it enables a focus on the multiplicity of actors, resources, ideas, 
technologies and different forms of power that come together in contingent ways. Using the 
assemblage lens to study the pre-oil stage of the industry in Uganda can shed light on the 
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emergence of these configurations of human and non-human elements, and how they play out 
in a local setting to shape outcomes. This allows me to explore Uganda’s oil assemblage as a 
novel configuration of a diverse range of component parts, including practices, ideas and 
materialities that have come together at a particular point in time, that make some outcomes 
possible and others not. 
 
2.5.5 The Assemblage conceptual framework 
The assemblage conceptual framework focuses attention not only on the range of actors in the 
oil assemblage but also the materiality of the resource, ideas about the resource, the 
technologies of extraction and the ideas, norms and values that inform actors and action, 
including the discourses and practices of resource governance. The aim is not simply to map 
out an extensive range of factors and processes, but rather to explore and understand the 
emerging and dynamic configuration of social actors and the material world they inhabit 
(Brown and Spiegel, 2017). I do this by drawing on the dream zones, post frontier and 
carbonscapes concepts to outline a framework through which I focus on ideas / knowledge, 
materiality, practices and agency.  
 
2.5.5.1 Ideas and knowledges 
 
Cross (2014) and Tsing (2011) draw attention to divergent ideas and ways of knowing in 
frontier spaces. The ideas linked to resources can be generative of aspirations and dreams of 
improvement, as they become associated with progress, modernity and improved wellbeing 
(Tsing, 2011, Cross, 2014). In a similar way, ideas about resources and an understanding of oils 
‘potentialities’ are translated into policy advice and blueprint approaches for managing 
resource outcomes (Weszkalnys, 2009). The idea of a resource curse has been influential in 
shaping these approaches to managing oil and has also played a role in shaping development 
imaginaries.  
 
Expert knowledge is mobilised in the extraction and appraisal of resources, as well as its 
governance (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). Local knowledge can be undervalued, but 
expert knowledge can be distrusted and even challenged by local ways of knowing 
(Bebbington and Bury, 2009). The importance of different ways of knowing is also relevant to 
how people understand a resource itself. Different resource ontologies can be in tension, for 
example the cultural attachments of some communities to water or land, what Conde has 
called a clash of metabolisms (Conde, 2017). Resources are known in different ways across 
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space and time, and as such, the uses and values attached to resources can vary between and 




The carbonscapes concept draws attention to how the materiality of a resource shapes 
processes of territorialisation and deterritorialisation. In a similar way, Mitchell (2009) has 
shown that certain resources are conducive to certain forms of social organisation, for 
example the infrastructures required to extract and process oil can shape social and political 
formations. This is seen most clearly in Nigeria where oil infrastructure has become key to the 
ways that struggle against the oil industry is waged (Watts, 2012). The materiality of the 
resource is also linked to its potentialities; its values and affordances. Oil’s status as a globally 
valuable and strategic asset at this particular historical conjuncture enrolls powerful actors 
across scales (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014, Watts, 2005). So, materiality refers not only 
to the physical properties of that particular resource which might mean that a resource is 
territorially grounded and requires physical infrastructures to process and transport it, but 
also to its affordances or potentialities and the processes and practices that emerge in 
response.  
 
2.5.5.3 Practices  
 
Work must be done to assemble, or bring together, the heterogenous interests and elements 
of any assemblage (Li, 2014). In the oil assemblage practices play a crucial role in 
territorialisation, by seeking to bring together elements that may be inherently in tension, 
especially in a new oil context where oil is at once a national strategic asset, a globally valuable 
commodity and a potentially ‘cursed’ substance (Weszkalnys, 2011). Efforts to territorialise are 
seen in the proliferation of post frontier practices including ESIAs, community agreements, 
consultation processes and CSR projects (Larsen, 2015, Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). As Li 
(2014) puts it, it is these practices which aim to make assemblage elements ‘cohere’. 
 
The social actors that aim to govern and manage a particular space draw on practices from 
other assemblages, and in this process alliances are forged and tensions emerge (Bueger, 2018). 
Li (2014) goes further to highlight not only the practices of territorialisation, but the practices 
which underly both territorialising and deterritorialising efforts of different social actors. She 
emphasises the importance to consider them as a political process. In her analysis of the 
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assembling of land as a resource, she identifies the practice of ‘rendering technical’, which 
aims to turn complex social processes into an intelligible field that can be managed; the 
practice of ‘compromise’ which is key to the legitimacy of assemblage practices, where 
contradictions must be managed and coercion is not an option, and finally ‘anti-politics’ as a 
practice by which political questions such as injustice and poverty are re-posed as ones 
amenable to technical solutions (Li, 2014). Li’s work draws attention to the importance of 
viewing practices in the assemblage as ‘practices of assemblage’ which, as Delaney (2009) 
argues, comprise certain ideologies, discourses, and practices employed to make one 




The assemblage approach emphasises agency, of both the human and non-human elements of 
assemblages. Rather than suggest ‘things’ have agency, the understanding here is that the 
material world does not provide a passive context within which people act, but rather the 
material interacts with people in producing the social world (Abrahamsen and Williams, 
2017). The material can constrain or enable social relations (Bakker and Bridge, 2006), and 
ideas can have material effects (Cross, 2014, Weszkalnys, 2011). As such, in addition to the 
‘hard work’ required by human actors to produce a resource, to ‘wrest it from its existing 
ecologies’ (Tsing, 2003) and to enable an assemblage to ‘cohere’ (Li, 2007a), agency also refers 
to the potentialities of the resource, which are linked to materiality and ideas about oil. Oil is 
seen as a ‘cursed’ substance and this idea about oil has real effects through the production of 
policy to manage oil (Weszkalnys, 2011). Sites of resource extraction and infrastructure can 
become sites of mobilization and facilitate the political agency of the powerless or 
disadvantaged in these sites (Sassen, 2000). Forms and scales of protest might differ 
depending on the resource in question (Mitchell, 2009, Brown and Spiegel, 2017). Processes of 
territorialisation and deterritorialisation which seek to establish or challenge the legitimacy of 
an oil project (Larsen, 2015) have agency due to their connections to other assemblages 
(Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).  
 
2.5.6 Contemporary applications of the assemblage approach, and its critics  
There is no single assemblage theory or methodology (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2017). On 
the one hand this makes setting out the parameters of the concept challenging, but on the 
other hand, it means that it is possible to draw on the diverse usages of the approach as I have 
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done to develop the framework set out above. The benefit of the assemblage approach is that 
it enables a focus on a multiplicity of actors, resources, ideas, technologies and different forms 
of power that come together in contingent ways. To this end, the approach has been usefully 
employed to study global governance, resource assemblages and policy formation.  
 
Abrahamsen and Williams (2017) analyse the dynamics of security at a resource extraction site 
in Tanzania using the concept of global security assemblages to show that transformations 
taking place locally and globally lead to novel security assemblages that reshape the practices 
and institutions of security in place specific sites. While Abrahamsen and Williams flag 
tensions in the assemblage, Bueger (2018) shows that the assemblage approach can highlight 
cooperation. He analyses the emergence of a counter-piracy assemblage and demonstrates the 
value of assemblage theory for understanding international cooperation in practice. For Li 
(2007a), the assemblage is essentially a governance assemblage. She identifies a number of 
practices that are identified in governance assemblages which enable global discourses and 
governance technologies to ‘cohere’ in the local setting (Li, 2007a, Li, 2014). The assemblage 
approach has proved fruitful for examining natural resources beyond their existence as 
commodities (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). A resource itself, such as land, is an 
‘assemblage’ of heterogeneous elements including material substances, technologies, 
discourses and practices (Li, 2007a).  
 
Recent approaches to studying emerging resource frontiers have also employed relational 
approaches to study “the intertwined materialities, actors, cultural logics, spatial dynamics, 
ecologies, and political economic processes that produce particular places as resource 
frontiers” (Cons and Eilenberg, 2019: 2). Cons and Eilenberg (2019) combine ‘frontiers’ and 
‘assemblage’ to come up with ‘frontier assemblages’ as a way to understand frontiers as sites of 
extraction and production in Asia. Although this approach takes on some of the main 
concerns that I discussed in section 2.5.1 to understand the frontier as not merely a site of 
capital and a zone of extraction, combining the two concepts risks bringing the assumptions 
inherent in much frontier thinking that I outlined above. While Cons and Eilenberg (2019) 
rightly point to frontier spaces as sites of creative production, this often implies the 
emergence of ‘new cultural imaginaries’ in ways that erase previous ones, rather than the 
possibility of new imaginaries articulating with existing ones. As Cross (2014) reminds us, it is 
important to look at the ways that divergent dreamed of futures articulate in these spaces 
which the combination of the frontier and assemblage concepts makes it less easy to do.  
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The assemblage approach has been critiqued on numerous fronts. Allen (2012) claims the 
assemblage is used in descriptive ways, for mapping out and describing, and as such provides 
little explanatory power. For Anderson and McFarlane (2011) it is limited in that it can mean 
‘everything and anything’. Friedman (2015) argues that the assemblage approach is inadequate 
to studying complex issues, such as those raised by oil politics, because it lacks the means to 
analyse global complexity by not allowing us to get past the messiness of the world. This 
contradicts Haarstad and Wanvik (2017)’s understanding of the assemblage approach’s ability 
to shake up the scholarship on oil that tends to stress path dependencies and inertia. For the 
purposes of exploring an emerging oil assemblage and its subnational effects, the approach 
permits us to see certain things and think in certain ways (Savage, 2019), and as such I argue 
that assemblage thinking has several advantages. It acts as both a heuristic to map and 
describe, and also as a tool to explore subnational dynamics. First, scales are not hierarchical, 
so the global or national is not privileged over the subnational. Second, it focuses on human 
and non-human agency, which means that materiality and ideas are consequential. Third, it 
enables the focus on an emerging order and how social formations are contingent and 
connected to other assemblages. Fourth, it welcomes a conceptualisation of power that is 
productive.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter reviewed several key literatures underpinning this thesis and outlined the core 
concepts that will be used. I argued for a relational approach which enables a focus on the 
subnational level during the early stages of the industry, and on a wider range of actors and 
interactions. The literature review also highlighted the importance of ideas and materiality, 
and I argued that the assemblage approach enables a relational approach while at the same 
time allows a focus on materiality and ideas in the analysis. The chapter then set out the 
conceptual framework for the thesis which uses the assemblage approach to explore Uganda’s 
oil assemblage as a novel configuration of a diverse range of component parts, including 
practices, ideas, technologies, materialities. To provide more conceptual depth to the 
framework I also draw from the critical development, social anthropology, political ecology 
and critical management literatures.  
 
Having reviewed the literature and set out my conceptual framework, I will now turn to 
discuss the research design and methodology for the study.  
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3.0 Chapter Three 
Methodology and research design 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The overall aim of the thesis is to explore and explain the dynamics taking place at the 
subnational level during the pre-oil stage in Uganda. In the previous chapter I set out the 
theoretical underpinnings of the thesis and argued for a relational approach using an 
assemblage conceptual framework. Researching the unfolding of power relations, as a global 
industry of considerable influence comes to a resource periphery in a post-colonial state in the 
global south, requires a methodology that can capture the complexities while remaining 
sensitive to the context. The assemblage approach enables a research design that allows me to 
capture a range of actors, interactions, perceptions and experiences, as well as identify 
narratives, materialities and practices.  
 
This chapter describes the methods and research design most appropriate for the research 
aims and objectives of this study:  
• Objective 1a: Map the key actors in Uganda’s oil assemblage and show how 
their interests are shaped during the exploration phase of the industry. 
• Objective 1b: Explore how the subnational level articulates with the emerging 
oil assemblage to shape outcomes. 
• Objective 2: Explore the role of oil MNCs in the oil assemblage and the 
significance of the subnational level in shaping and constraining their 
interests and activities.  
• Objective 3: Explore the role of civil society actors in the oil assemblage and 
the significance of the subnational in shaping and constraining their 
interests and activities. 
 
The chapter proceeds by introducing the Leeds Governance of Hydrocarbons in Uganda 
project, which was my introduction to studying oil in Uganda and provided opportunities to 
be immersed in the Uganda context and collect data. I then discuss the research design in 
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section 3.3, including the research philosophy underpinning the study, the case study 
approach adopted in the design of the research, and the location of the study. Next, section 3.4 
outlines the data and methods, which are discussed in relation to the research objectives, the 
data requirements, data sources, sampling and methods of data collection. Section 3.5 
describes the data analysis process for each research objective. Finally, section 3.6 reflects on 
some of the key challenges and limitations of carrying out the study including access to field 
sites, the positionality of the researcher and ethics.  
3.2 University of Leeds research project  
 
My introduction to researching oil in Uganda was through my involvement as a research 
assistant in the University of Leeds Governance of Hydrocarbons in Uganda project (the Leeds 
project). This was a four-year (2012-2016) project funded by the Democratic Governance 
Facility in Uganda. The project was carried out with Ugandan partners in Kampala and in the 
oil region and involved data collection in seven districts in the oil region, followed by multi-
stakeholder workshops to explore opportunities for community-driven accountability in the 
oil sector. I provide full details of the project in the appendices and I reflect on my 
involvement in the Leeds project and its contribution in relation to my PhD throughout this 
chapter.  
 
Involvement in the Leeds project immersed me in the Ugandan context, and I was able to 
combine visits for the Leeds project with PhD scoping and data collection as I outline in table 
2. Between 2012 and 2015 I travelled extensively in the oil region, I spent time with Ugandan 
colleagues from the oil region and took part in meetings and interviews with local government 
leaders, local community members and representatives of oil companies. I contributed to 
facilitating multi-stakeholder workshops and I also helped to convene a conference in 
Kampala as part of a small University of Leeds British Academy grant to bring together 
academics and practitioners working on oil governance in East Africa. The research I carried 
out for the Leeds project provided the inspiration for the PhD and much of the background 
context. Some of the data I collected personally in 2012 as part of the Leeds project is included 








3.3 Research Design 
The research design refers to the approaches taken in the research, which are dependent on 
the research questions, as well as the resources available for conducting the research and 
analysis (Williams, 2003). The aims and research objectives of this study, illustrated in table 4, 
require a research design and methodological approach that enables me to explore a range of 
interactions, perceptions and experiences of actors over a period of time, as well as capture 
narratives, practices and materialities. As such, the study adopts a qualitative approach with a 
case study method to explore the dynamics of a developing oil frontier over a period of several 
years.  
 
3.3.1 Qualitative approach  
Qualitative research offers an interpretation of the social world of the research participants by 
focusing on their experiences, perspectives and histories (Lewis et al., 2003). A qualitative 
approach enables the researcher to study people in their natural settings to identify how their 
experiences and behaviour are shaped by the context of their lives (Hennink et al., 2020). As 
Suter argues: 
“The search for an objective reality, favoured by quantitative researchers, is abandoned 
to the assumption that people construct their own personalized worlds” (Suter, 2011: 
344) 
 
A qualitative approach is the most appropriate approach for my research, which broadly aims 
to understand the emergence of the oil assemblage and consider how elements of the 
assemblage shape the interests of the various actors involved. Qualitative research allows the 
researcher to explore people’s experiences through in-depth interviews, focus group 
discussion, observation, content analysis and visual methods (Hennink et al., 2020). The 
research design evolves throughout the research process and requires creativity to analyse rich 
sources of data (Suter, 2011).  
 
3.3.2 Interpretive paradigm  
 
The underlying research philosophy of this study is informed by the ontological and 
epistemological inclinations of the researcher, who brings her own background, values and 
biases to the research both implicitly and explicitly. These assumptions inform the choice of 
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theories that guide the research (Creswell and Poth, 2016) and can be defined as a paradigm, 
or ‘worldview’ which defines the nature of the world and the individuals place in it (Guba and 
Lincoln, 2004). The researcher must be explicit about her choice of paradigm, as this informs 
and guides the researchers’ approach. Ontology sets out the nature of reality and asks what 
can be known about this reality. Epistemology is the relationship between the knower and the 
known, and asks what can be known in light of the constraints presented by the researcher’s 
ontological position. The methodology, by which the researcher goes about finding out what 
can be known, is in turn constrained by the answers to the two latter questions (Creswell and 
Poth, 2016).  
 
This research is informed by the interpretivist/constructivist paradigm, which I consider to be 
the most appropriate for the study and which will enable the richness and depth of data to be 
explored to address the research objectives. Interpretivist/constructivist approaches to 
research aim to understand “the world of human experience” (Cohen and Manion, 1994: 36), 
and hold that the researcher should attempt to understand the complex world of lived 
experience from the point of view of those who live it (Schwandt, 2000). From this 
perspective, reality is socially constructed (Mertens, 2014). The interpretivist/constructivist 
researcher tends to rely upon the “participants’ views of the situation being studied” (Creswell 
and Creswell, 2017: 8) and recognises the impact on the research of their own background and 
experiences. Specifically, I follow Jones (2002) in adopting a ‘moderate’ or ‘contextual’ 
constructionist position: 
“some forms of social constructionism enable us to simultaneously take on 
board the material conditions of our existence and its symbolic” (Jones, 2002: 
248). 
 
The importance here is that this approach allows for a degree of ontological realism by 
accepting the existence of a material world, while emphasising that people interpret that 
material world in different ways (Jones, 2002). Although I recognise that a material reality 
exists, my focus is on how people make sense of that reality through an interpretation of their 
experiences. So, although oil is real in a material sense, understandings of oil are socially 
constructed and subject to change over time (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). This differs 
substantially from the positivist approach of an ontological realism that can be known 
through objective, reductionist and rational enquiry (Jones, 2002).  
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Interpretivists believe an understanding of the context in which the research is conducted is 
critical to the interpretation of the data (Willis et al., 2007: 4). As such, in the 
interpretivist/constructivist tradition, the findings are interpreted by the researcher rather 
than represent a definitive capture of reality; instead, they shed light on a phenomenon. As I 
am drawing on perspectives rather than ‘truths’ an actor-oriented approach to research is 
adopted, which places actors at the centre of enquiry (Long, 2003, Long, 2004). This approach 
acknowledges the complexities of interactions between actors and disaggregates actors, 
recognising “the coexistence of different understandings and interpretations of experience” 
(Long, 2004: 15). This is useful for exploring global and local interactions, such as those 
encountered by local people in Uganda as they become connected to a global oil industry. The 
actor-oriented approach to research which disaggregates actors will enable me to unpack the 
varied experiences of actors within actor categories, which is important for my goal to capture 
a range of responses and perspective. This approach allows me to disaggregate oil MNCs as 
separate actors and treat them as agents of change (Bury, 2008).  
 
3.3.3 Case study  
Studying the dynamics of a developing oil frontier is complex and multi-layered, therefore I 
need to employ research methods to capture dynamism and change, and allow for 
contradictory, conflicting perspectives and processes. The case study was chosen as the best 
method to give insight into complexity and capture “the unfolding of social processes” (Van 
Maanen, 1979: 520).  
 
The study employs a bounded case study approach, in recognition that this is not a case study 
of the entire oil region but rather a snapshot, or microcosm of it. Because a case is a ‘bounded 
system’ (Creswell and Creswell, 2017), the researcher must be clear about the focus and extent 
of the research (Creswell and Poth, 2016). As such, the study is a bounded single case study of 
subnational oil dynamics in Hoima District in Uganda. There are a number of practical and 
opportunistic reasons for choosing Hoima District, which I outline in section 3.3.5, but one 
important reason is that this case allows me to address a significant research gap: the limited 
focus on the subnational level during the oil exploration period, both in Uganda specifically 
and in oil frontier contexts in general.   
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According to Yin (2009), a case study is the appropriate choice for “empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used” (2009: 14). For Stake (1995), the art of the case study is that it allows for the 
“study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity 
with important circumstances” (1995: xi). The case study is suited to capture the complexity of 
multiple variables and allows the researcher to use a range of methods and sources of evidence 
in order to shed light on the phenomenon being investigated. Case studies are not studied to 
understand other cases (Stake, 2005) but rather to gain a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon in question (Yin, 2011). As such, this case study is exploratory (Yin, 2011) in that it 
is not undertaken to try to understand something else, but will allow me to develop theory to 
generate new knowledge about the resource frontier in Uganda.   
 
Multiple levels of data collection and analysis were necessary to fully explore the subnational 
level dynamics of a globally connected industry (see section 3.4). The modern resource 
frontier is of interest to global actors, as well as those within Uganda. Further, change in oil 
company strategy is likely influenced by fluctuations in the global oil price as well as 
contestation at the village level and as well as national level policy. Similarly, the work of civil 
society organisations (CSOs) at the subnational level is influenced by international donors and 
agendas, as well as local level events.  
 
Figure 1. Multi-level data collection for the subnational case study 
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3.3.4 Ensuring rigour  
Denzin and Lincoln (2011a) argue that in interpretivist-constructivist enquiry trustworthiness 
and credibility is the goal; does the study accurately represent the realities of actors and 
contexts studied? The researcher must be able to provide evidence of the data collected and 
prove that findings are grounded in the data through the use of a consistent and coherent 
research design (Farquhar, 2012). The researcher must ensure that “data can be tracked to 
their sources, and the logic used to assemble interpretations can be made explicit in the 
narrative” (Mertens, 2014: 18). These goals replace more traditional measures of rigour in 
positivist science, which may focus on testing accuracy or validity (Maher et al., 2018). One 
critique of the case study method is the claim that case studies lack rigour and objectivity. 
However, in line with the philosophical perspective outlined above, I do not seek objectivity 
from the case study. Rather, an understanding of the case is reached through an interpretation 
of the data (Creswell and Creswell, 2017). For Yin, rigour can be ensured through 
‘triangulation’; using multiple sources of evidence to allow for the development of “converging 
lines of inquiry” (Yin, 2009: 120). I include how I aim to ensure rigour in table 4 where I 
present the data collected and analysed for each research objective.  
 
3.3.5 The location of the study 
The case study is a bounded study of subnational oil dynamics in Hoima District. Hoima 
District is located in Western Uganda, in the Bunyoro sub-region where oil deposits are 
confirmed. Hoima town is the main municipal, administrative, and commercial centre of 
Hoima District located approximately 230 kilometres northwest of Kampala, the capital of 
Uganda, along an all-weather road. At independence, Bunyoro was a Kingdom and Hoima was 
an entity within the Kingdom, becoming Hoima District in 1974, not long after the kingdoms 
were abolished (chapter four). Hoima District borders Kibaale in the south, Kiboga in the East, 
Masindi in the north-east and Lake Albert in the west. It has 13 subcounties, and oil 
exploration is active in two of these, Buseruka (Tullow Oil) and Kyangwali (CNOOC). People 
in Hoima District are mainly agriculturalists, and along the shores of Lake Albert people 
engage in subsistence fishing and in the fish trade. 
 
The map in figure 2 shows Uganda, Kampala, the seven study districts visited for data 
collection during the Leeds project between 2012 and 2014, and Hoima District as the case 




Figure 2. Location of Uganda in Africa (A), and the location of the 2012-2014 study districts (B), including 
Hoima, where the three 2014-2016 study villages were located and Kampala where interviews were conducted. 
Image sources (acquired August 2020): Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, 
USGS, AeroGRID, IGN, and the GIS User Community.  
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Hoima District was selected as the focus for the study for a number of reasons. Time, financial 
constraints and practical considerations required me to narrow down the study to a 
geographical location within the oil region. Hoima is the district where most of the oil related 
activity was taking place during the fieldwork period, and where the oil project was moving 
towards the development stage, at the ‘Kingfisher’ site in Kyangwali subcounty. Hoima town 
hosts the liaison offices of Tullow Oil and CNOOC, the offices of the District Local 
Government and the offices of numerous civil society organisations (CSOs). Hoima town is 
the seat of the Bunyoro Kingdom and the Palace is in the town. Hoima District is also the 
location of the domestic oil refinery, and is where two main roads have been constructed to 
connect Hoima to the oil sites at the lake. Tullow Oil has been carrying out exploration 
activities in the district since 2005. In sum, Hoima District provides an opportunity to capture 
a realistic snapshot of oil related dynamics and the social relations that are developing 
between actors in the pre-oil stage.  
 
Within Hoima District, I had to make decisions about where and how I could access the data I 
needed for the study. I based myself in Hoima town, which the media has dubbed the ‘oil 
capital’ of Uganda. A ‘frontier town’, described by the Bradts 2013 Uganda guidebook as “an 
unmemorable place to drive through on the way from Murchinson’s Falls National Park to 
Queen Elizabeth” (Briggs and Roberts, 2013: 350), Hoima was becoming a town buzzing with 
oil and gas related activity. In between my first and second visits to Hoima - December 2012 
and June 2013 – the town had grown; restaurants and hotels were springing up, new banks had 
opened, Tullow Oil had moved its office to the town and Kampala based CSOs were opening 
regional offices. By the time of my next research visit in 2014 Hoima hotels were busy hosting 
CSO oil and gas related workshops and oil company stakeholder engagement meetings.  
 
The majority of interviews were carried out in Hoima town. Here I was able to travel easily to 
the offices of the District Local Government, Kingdom, oil company liaison offices and oil 
company Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) partner offices. I was also able to interview 
local government leaders from the subcounty in Hoima town, where they resided. I was able 
to observe stakeholder engagement meetings and CSO workshops held in the town.  
 
The study also includes six villages in Hoima District that have experienced oil exploration 
activities since the early 2000s. All six villages were included in the Leeds project, and because 
I was restricted by time and finances, I selected just three of these villages to return to in 2014, 
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2015 and 2016 during the PhD fieldwork. I selected villages A, B and C because I knew from my 
previous interactions with key informants during the Leeds study that these villages had the 
most contact with industry (Manyindo et al., 2014). I was able to interview some residents 
from villages D and E at a workshop in Hoima town in 2015 (2 people from each village). 
Further, because villages A, B and C were also included in the Leeds study this presented me 
with an opportunity to collect data in these locations at different points in time. I decided to 
anonymise the villages in this study because of the need to anonymise my research 
respondents in light of the sensitivity of the topic. Table 3 shows the dates of visits to villages 
to collect data, and dates I interviewed respondents from the villages in Hoima town. 
 
Table 3.Village interviews and dates 
Village  Interviews in the village Interviews with respondents from the 
village in Hoima town 
Village A 2012, 2014, 2015 2015  
Village B 2012, 2014, 2015  
Village C 2016 2014  
Village D 2012  
Village E 2012 2015  
Village F 2012  
 
Five of the villages in the study lie in what is referred to as the Kaiso-Tonya flat, a valley 
located at the bottom of a steep escarpment on the central eastern shore of Lake Albert. The 
valley was difficult to access until oil exploration activities began and roads were upgraded.  
Villages A, B, C, D and E are fishing villages located on the shores of Lake Albert. There is 
limited official data on the villages in the study, but the communities are multi-ethnic and 
include migrant fishing communities that live between Uganda and DRC. The main economic 
activities of lake communities are fishing and livestock rearing. The exception is village F, 
which is located at the top of the escarpment and is one of the villages displaced for the oil 








Figure 4. Photo of boats at Lake Albert. Source: author 
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Figure 5. Photo of 'oil road' as it cuts through a village. Source: author 
 
 
In interviews in 2012 it was recorded that village A has approximately 900 households, village 
B has 400 households, village C has 420 households, and village E has 100 households (with no 
data from village D). Village F comprised 150 households prior to displacement for the refinery 
in 2013.  
 
Another location of data collection was Kampala, the capital city of Uganda. The offices of the 
national CSOs in the study are in Kampala and I carried out interviews with national CSOs 
there in 2012 and 2013. The headquarters of Tullow Oil, Total and CNOOC are in Kampala, and 
I interviewed Total’s social engagement team in Kampala in 2013 and Tullow Oil’s social 
engagement manager in Kampala in 2014.   
 
3.4 Data and methods  
3.4.1 Data required   
To address the research aims and objectives, I required qualitative data that would enable me 
to identify a range of actors in Uganda’s oil assemblage and understand and identify the 
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interactions between them. This was obtained from multiple primary and secondary sources 
to ensure that I captured a full picture. I also needed primary and secondary data about oil 
company activities in Uganda, including types of projects and activities, methods of 
implementation and partners used, to enable triangulation. Similarly, I required primary and 
secondary data on the activities and approaches of CSOs, including the partners, donors, and 
methods of implementation. Oil company CSR reports were useful secondary sources as were 
newspaper reports, and donor, International Non-governmental Organisations (INGO) and 
CSO websites and project publications. I also needed primary data to capture the perspectives 
of a range of subnational actors in relation to the dynamics taking place during the 
exploration period; including from oil MNCs and CSOs about their activities and interactions, 
and from a range of subnational actors in terms of their experiences of oil MNC CSR activities 
and / or CSO activities.  
Table 4. Data requirements, data collection, data analysis and strategy implemented to ensure rigour (presented by research objective)  
Research Objective  Data required Data collection methods Data analysis techniques Strategy to ensure 
rigour 
1 (a) Identify the key actors in 
Uganda’s oil assemblage and 
show how their interests are 
shaped by oil  
(b) Explore how the emerging 
oil assemblage shapes / 
influences the subnational level 
Actors involved in 
Uganda’s oil 
assemblage 
Primary and secondary 
sources 
Semi-structured interviews 
Focus group interviews 
Observations of CSO and oil 
company workshops / meetings 
Document analysis 
Involvement in University of 




Actor mapping and actor relationship 
mapping by hand and electronically 
Analysis against assemblage framework 
Unpacking changes in relationships and 
interests using Excel tables  
Validation of preliminary 
findings with select 
respondents 
 
2. Explore the role of oil MNCs 
in the oil assemblage and the 
significance of the subnational 
level in shaping and 
constraining this role 
Qualitative data about 
the activities, 
engagements and 
interactions of oil 
MNCs with a range of 
actors 
Qualitative data about 
the subnational 
dynamics and how they 
interact with oil MNCs   
Semi-structured interviews 
Focus group interviews 




Involvement in University of 




Writing detailed timelines  
Unpacking changes in relationships between 
industry and other actors using Excel tables 
Triangulation of 
interviews, corporate 
reports, news sources 
Validation of preliminary 
findings with select 
respondents 
 
3. Explore the role played by 
CSOs in the oil assemblage and 
the significance of the 
subnational level in shaping 
and constraining this role 
Qualitative data about 
the activities, 
relationships, practices 
and narratives and 
interactions of CSOs 
with a range of actors 
in the oil assemblage,  
Semi-structured interviews 
Focus group interviews 
Observations of CSO 
workshops  
Document analysis 
Involvement in University of 




Writing detailed timelines 
Mapping CSOs, partners, donors 
Detailed timeline of CSO events and 
activities  
Unpacking changes in relationships between 
industry and other actors using Excel tables 
Triangulation of 
interviews, CSO reports, 
donor reports 
Validation of preliminary 




3.4.2 Description of actors included in the data collection 
In this section I describe the actors that are included in the study dataset.  
 
Indigenous subnational actors 
The dataset includes interviews and focus groups with indigenous subnational actors in 
Hoima District. By subnational actors I mean local community respondents in the oil 
communities and in Hoima District, including village leaders, elders, women, youth, fishers, 
subcounty government officials, District Local Government leaders and staff (e.g. 
Environment Office, Education Office, Community Development Office, Commercial Office) 
Bunyoro Kingdom officials, subcounty leaders. (Some of these actors and their roles are 
explained in further detail in chapter four).  
 
Industry actors 
The dataset includes interviews with staff from three international oil companies Tullow Oil, 
CNOOC and Total. These included Community Liaison Officers for all three, social 
engagement managers for Tullow Oil and Total, and CSR managers for CNOOC. I also carried 
out an observation of an oil company stakeholder engagement meeting with Tullow Oil and 
CNOOC present, and an oil company presentation on local content by Tullow Oil’s National 
Content manager.  
 
National and subnational CSOs 
The dataset includes interviews with CSOs at the national level and the subnational level that 
are working on oil and gas issues. I carried out interviews and focus group interviews with 
subnational CSOs in Hoima District, which also include the Hoima-based offices of two 
national CSOs. The data includes an observation of a CSO capacity building workshop on oil 
and gas in Hoima town.  
 
Oil company CSR partners 
I carried out interviews with Hoima based organisations that are contracted by CNOOC and 
Tullow Oil to implement CSR and social investment programmes. These organisations are 
local organisations and were included to get different perspectives on CSR projects and their 




3.4.3 Access to participants 
My involvement in the Leeds project gave me access to key informants that would otherwise 
have been difficult to secure. Community Liaison Officers (CLOs), social engagement 
managers and CSR managers from Tullow Oil and CNOOC were happy to meet me due to my 
association with the Leeds project. Total on the other hand, while I interviewed them during 
the Leeds project in 2013, were unresponsive to the emails I sent to request interviews for my 
PhD research. My colleague in the Leeds study, a resident of Hoima town and well known in 
local government and CSO circles, provided me with a list of names and phone numbers of 
District Local Government and CSO contacts when I arrived in Hoima in 2014. This was my 
starting point for the fieldwork, and I believe it probably saved me weeks of time.  
 
While I benefitted from some familiarity with the field due to my previous visits to Hoima and 
from the support of my colleague, there were some challenges associated with access to 
participants. My colleague acted as a gatekeeper, ensuring that I could gain access to key 
respondents in the villages and facilitating my access in the town (Clark, 2011). However, this 
also meant there were some limitations, as this relied on her own contacts and her own 
perceptions and bias of who I should speak to. This was overcome by not relying solely on my 
colleagues’ recommendations; as I note below, I also employed different types of sampling. 
Nonetheless, I sometimes still needed to use gatekeepers given my lack of familiarity with the 
villages, and because there exists the custom of paying ‘courtesy calls’ to the village leaders on 
arrival in the community, which sometimes meant that the village leader had some say in 
which people in the village I spoke to. The inability to access village C during my first 
fieldwork visit also presented a challenge and required me to use someone to mobilise 
research respondents and bring them to meet me in Hoima town, which I discuss in more 
detail in section 3.6.1 (McFadyen and Rankin, 2016). 
 
3.4.4 Data sources 
In order to gather a range of data on the emerging industry to meet my objectives and ensure 
rigour, I needed multiple data sources from multiple levels. My main source of data was face 
to face interviews with research respondents in the field at the subnational and national levels. 
Information on the international actors involved such as donors and NGOs – i.e. the global 
level - were gathered using desk research.  
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Focus is direct on the topic, 
insightful (Perceptions, 
attitudes, meanings) 













Stable, can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
Unobtrusive 
Specific and broad 
Retrievability  
Biased selectivity  
Reporting bias 
 
While recognising the weaknesses of each of the evidence sources (table 5), semi structured 
interviews provided the most appropriate data, and aligned with the research approach. 
Observations were also carried out where possible to gather evidence about key processes 
(CSR and CSO activities).  
 
Documents were used to augment evidence from other sources and some documents were 
used as a means to triangulate data (Patton, 2014). For example, corporate reports helped to 
compile the lists of CSR projects, document the changing approaches to social engagement 
and capture the changing narratives around corporate engagement, and also as a means to 
triangulate with data about CSR collected from interviews. NGO and CSO reports were also 
used to obtain evidence about the types of projects being carried out, and the donors and 
funders involved. I am aware of the bias in corporate reporting of CSR (Rost and Ehrmann, 
2017) and the documents were analysed with this in mind. I am equally aware that NGO / CSO 
reports can present a biased view of the topic to justify further funding (Banks and Hulme, 
2012). The use of these documents was also interesting as a way to compare this printed 
representation of the issues to external audiences, in comparison to what I observed and 
found from my own interviews with the companies and organisations, and with those people 
who experienced the activity. So in addition to augmenting and corroborating evidence (Yin, 
2009), in this situation, oil company and CSO reports also helped to identify power issues and 
dominant narratives. News sources were also valuable, and since Uganda has a relatively 
reliable and free press, news sources from national newspapers were used for triangulation. 
Oil industry press were a useful source to understand how narratives of oil in Uganda have 
changed over time. Internet sources were also used to gather and supplement information 
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about key timeline events, including CSR projects, government speeches, and key conferences 
and meetings. Secondary sources were also an important way to build the context of the oil 
industry for the study, and triangulate key timeline events and industry developments.  
 
3.4.5 Sampling 
I used non-probability sampling in the selection of research participants. Purposeful sampling 
is widely used in qualitative research to enable the researcher to identify research participants 
that are especially knowledgeable or experienced in the phenomenon of study (Creswell and 
Creswell, 2017). Bernard (2017) also points to the importance of the availability of identified 
respondents to participate in the research, and their willingness to do so. In order to fulfil my 
research goal, it was important to achieve depth of understanding of the topic and this 
required a range of perspectives from an array of respondents (Patton, 2014). I drew up a list of 
actors that I wanted to interview. Many of these I was already aware of due to my involvement 
in the Leeds project, which had introduced me to some of the actors and actor groups I 
needed to interview. However, I also wanted to make sure I added actor groups that were not 
included in the Leeds project, such as national and subnational CSOs and Bunyoro Kingdom 
respondents. One starting point was my Ugandan colleague who provided me with a list of 
contacts, as I noted above.  
 
I also employed other sampling strategies. Snowball sampling was useful (Blackstone, 2018); in 
interviews with national and subnational CSOs, respondents signposted me to other CSOs 
working on oil and gas. Similarly, District Local Government respondents gave me the names 
of organisations working on oil issues, or of those working with oil companies on CSR projects 
in the district. My budget and time restraints meant that I was limited in how far I could travel 
to reach participants. This was one reason I was only able to travel to three villages at the 
Lake; this required me to pay for a taxi for a full day, to take me to the study site and wait for 
me. As such, my aim to interview as wide a range of people as possible within my constraints 
meant I also relied on opportunistic sampling, taking advantage of opportunities to interview 
people as they arose (Patton, 2014). As it turned out, there were several instances where I was 
introduced to good data sources from such an approach. For example, after our interview one 
district government leader said, “you really need to speak to xx and xx” and introduced me to 
other colleagues in the same building; I met a former Tullow Oil consultant staying in my 
guest house and was able to interview him; and walking around Hoima town one morning I 
came across a CSO workshop and was invited in to observe for a full day. Convenience 
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sampling was also important given my travel constraints, and so I interviewed subcounty 
leaders who resided in Hoima town in the town rather than at their offices. I also interviewed 
the Bunyoro Gender Minister, whom I was unable to meet in Hoima, at her home outside 
Hoima town on my way back to the airport. Together, these strategies provided the 
opportunity to compare, contrast and identify a range of important themes until I was sure I 
had reached saturation, indicated by no new substantive information being acquired (Miles et 
al., 2014).  
 
3.4.6 Interviews  
I used semi-structured interviews to collect data during face-to-face interviews in local and 
informal settings. Interviews are "negotiated accomplishments of both interviewers and 
respondents that are shaped by the contexts and situations in which they take place" (Fontana 
and Frey, 2000: 633). My goal in the interviews was to create a relaxed and informal 
atmosphere for the respondents. I tried to interview community members in their own 
communal setting in the villages, for example sitting outside the home of the respondent. I 
interviewed industry actors and CSOs in their offices or in local hotel meeting areas. I 
interviewed local government and Kingdom officials in their offices or in local hotel meeting 
areas.  
 
Interviews were loosely structured; I relied on guiding questions that were open ended (Ayres, 
2008), and used probing and asked for clarification where necessary. I tried to use the 
conversational method of interviewing where possible, which enables the researcher to 
generate verbal data through talking about issues in an informal and conversational way 
(Given, 2008). I wanted my research participants to feel at ease, and I was aware from my 
involvement in the Leeds study that oil is a potentially controversial and political issue. After 
initial introductions and gaining verbal consent for the interview, I asked broad questions that 
formed the basis of the interview, and then I let the respondent speak. More often than not, 
respondents were eager to talk about their experiences of oil, and many interviews flowed like 
conversations and included many topics of interest and new information. Some of the new 
information I decided to follow further with other participants.  
 
My aim was to get the respondents to speak about their experiences and perceptions of oil and 
the emerging industry. However, I also needed some specific information from some actors 
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about oil company CSR and civil society activities, so the guiding questions of the interviews 
were adjusted depending on the actor. Due to the political nature of the topic, it was not 
appropriate or acceptable to record the interviews. During the PhD scoping study where I 
interviewed national CSOs, I recorded some of the interviews with respondents. However, in 
one interview, although the respondent agreed to be recorded, the discussion in the interview 
moved on to concerns that the Government was ‘clamping down’ on CSOs working on oil, and 
I was aware that he had become uncomfortable with the presence of the recorder. Half-way 
through the interview I switched off the recorder and the interview continued in a more open 
and relaxed manner. Therefore, during fieldwork, instead of recording I took longhand notes 
which I then typed up as transcripts. It was important to add to the interviews immediately 
after the interviews, filling in the gaps from memory in a different coloured pen (Gorden, 
1998).  
 
The complexity of the interview process is often underestimated (Roulston et al., 2003). 
Indeed, social science investigations rely heavily on interview data, yet few researchers receive 
formal training in interviewing (Ibid). The focus of the research can get lost due to the 
behaviour of participants, distractions in the interview settings, poor phrasing and delivery of 
questions. This is even more challenging in a cross-cultural situation where English is used as 
an additional language to local dialects. I used English to speak to people who also spoke 
English as an additional language, and this was for the majority of interviews, using a 
translator only when necessary in villages. My research experience during the Leeds project 
helped to prepare me for some of these pitfalls, and one area I worked to improve on was my 
use of probing in interviews. During the interviews I practised active listening, along with the 
challenge of writing notes whilst remaining present in the interview. Table 6 shows the 
timeline of data collection for the thesis, over a four-year period. 
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Table 6. Timeline of fieldwork and data collection  
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Subnational actors (Local communities, DLG, Kingdom)       
  
                              
Oil companies (Tullow Oil, CNOOC, Total                                         
Civil Society organisations (national CSOs and subnational 
CSOs)                                         
Oil company CSR partners and organisations                                          
Oil company CSR reports and sustainability reports                                         
Civil Society documents (INGOs, national & subnational 
CSOs                     
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3.5 Data analysis 
The dataset consists of 137 interviews, focus groups and meeting observations (appendix I), in 
addition to CSO and CSR documents and news sources. Analysing qualitative data requires 
getting to know the data intimately through immersion, coding the data by organising it into 
themes and identifying patterns, and interpreting the data by writing it up into a meaningful 
story (Rossman and Rallis, 2003). A benefit of being involved in the Ugandan context over 
time during the pursuit of a part time PhD meant that I was able to immerse myself in the 
data for a prolonged period. Maher et al. (2018) argue that it is through deep and insightful 
interactions with the data that the researcher is able to maximise interaction with the data 
and generate understanding and theory. 
 
Initial analysis of the data began during fieldwork. Miles et al. (2014) instruct that analysis 
should be concurrent with data collection, which enables the researcher to cycle back and 
forth between thinking about existing data and generating strategies for collecting new data. 
It was useful for me to have time in between fieldwork periods to analyse and think about the 
data and how it was developing. As I read my interviews and wrote fieldnotes, I began coding 
and following up on certain threads (Check and Schutt, 2011). All the interview notes were 
then transcribed into MS word, a process which Davidson argues is part of the analysis, since 
“transcription is a representational and interpretive process” (Davidson, 2009: 39). The 
researcher makes choices about what to record and how in transcripts, and the fact that I was 
not using recordings of interview made it more important to reflect on what I chose to write 
down as notes. What I focused on determined what I followed up, and also what came out in 
the transcript.  
 
I used inductive analysis to explore and unpack my findings (Blaikie, 2007). Strong 
constructivist research requires inductive data analysis to ensure that theory is grounded and 
interpretations of findings are contextual (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011b). Collins and Stockton 
(2018) note, however, the importance of the theoretical framework to assist with the ‘sense-
making’ of the data, and to search for the ‘unexpected finding’ in the inductive approach:  
“Our analysis and interpretation—our study’s findings—will reflect the 
constructs, concepts, language, models and theories that structured the study 




Inductive coding then, takes place within the system of concepts, expectations, assumptions, 
and beliefs that inform the researcher’s work (Maxwell, 2012). However, while I was guided by 
initial concepts, my theoretical framework evolved and developed alongside data analysis over 
the period of study.  
 
I started with open coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2014), which involved breaking the data into 
small parts for deep analysis. Inductive coding is a process of conceptual abstraction by 
assigning general concepts (codes) to singular incidences in the data (Vollstedt and Rezat, 
2019). I read through the transcripts using a highlighter pen to highlight key words, concepts, 
important issues and made margin notes to form initial codes. I made a list of codes and then 
uploaded all the transcripts into Nvivo software (version 10), coded using these codes, and 
then coded again to generate another layer of codes. Bong (2007), among others, claim that 
the benefits of using such software include speeding up potentially mechanical tasks such as 
coding and retrieving, allowing for more rigorous, thorough and creative data analysis. 
However, other scholars have argued that it can lead to ‘dehumanisation and mechanisation’ 
(Weaver and Atkinson, 1994). I found that coding in Nvivo, while useful for the initial process 
of generating codes and chunking data, was indeed quite mechanical. As a visual learner, it 
was important for me to ‘draw’ the data and map out connections, ideas, narratives, 
influencing and contextual factors. This became a messy process as I used post-it notes and 
flip chart paper and pens to hand draw maps and timelines, but this was an important part of 
working with the data and helped me to incorporate situational and contextual factors 
(Denzin, 1994). 
 
The data went through a number of iterations of coding, an example of which is shown in 
table 7.  I coded for indexical and non-indexical material, whereby indexical material is 
descriptive, focusing on ‘who did what’ and was particularly important for understanding 
activities and interactions for research objectives 1a, 2 and 3, and non-indexical material 
focuses on judgements, concepts, opinions and theories about events (Jovchelovitch and 
Bauer, 2000). I then used axial coding to explore the relationships between concepts and 







Table 7. Coding example 
Coding example from interview with two female residents in 
village A July 2014  
Codes 
There are no meetings with Tullow now, they are not as active. We 
have no clear picture, the local government or central government 
don’t come here, only CSOs.  
 
I am afraid, I saw what happened to Nigeria and afraid it will happen 
here. People are scared that once drilling starts they may be evicted 
and may not be compensated and have nowhere to go.  
 
[This woman] has been here for 20 years and produced children one is 
in senior 4. She is afraid. She is scared the oil extraction will disrupt the 
fish and they depend on fish for their livelihoods. The fish catch has 
reduced because of oil.  
Lack of information  
 
Lack of leadership  
 
Fear, uncertainty  
 
Comparisons with Nigeria (CSOs work) 
 
Oil’s impacts on livelihoods, actual, 
perceived, anticipated  
 
 
The analysis of the data to capture the range of interactions and the change over time in terms 
of actors, interests, practices, narratives and ideas was a huge task carried out over a number 
of years. The process has been one of layering as well as unpacking, meaning that the story 
became richer the more I delved into the analysis and tried different ways of presenting the 
data and writing the story. 
 
The key theme emerging from the coding was change over time, and distilling this change 
over time into three phases became a way to organise the empirical story of thesis. Emergent 
themes were ‘changing relations’, ‘new actors, new interests’, ‘alliance-making’, ‘power re-
configurations’, ‘livelihoods transformations’. Seemingly contradictory themes of ‘fear of oil’ 
and ‘hope for benefits’ were also evident. Figure 6 presents an example of theme development 





Figure 6. Example of theme development 
 
In addition to thematic coding, techniques such as actor mapping, timelines, thematic content 
analysis and data displays were used for different research objectives. Miles et al. (2014) 
encourage creating displays of data during the analysis process, which they argue adds to the 
credibility and trustworthiness of the analysis when arranged to answer the research 
objectives.  
 
For research objective one (chapter five), mapping of actors, interests and interactions was 
important, and this benefitted from the initial hand drawings onto flip chart paper. I used an 
approach to actor mapping developed from techniques used in conflict analysis (Fisher et al., 
2000). This involves drawing out the key actors in bubbles on the page and then making links 
between them with a pen and labelling the character of the interaction. In this case, I 
expanded this process to consider the quality and quantity of the interactions and / or 
relationships between the actors. From an initial sense of drowning in the data, it turned out 
that the more I was immersed in the data the clearer the story became. Crucially, being 
involved in the literature alongside the data analysis through a process of ‘zigzagging’ 
(Riessman, 2008) between the data and theory was important to bring new insights to the 
‘story’. The distinction of the three phases was a way to show the increasingly complex oil 
assemblage configuration over time through the actor mapping technique (chapter five). The 
themes from the analysis were then used to explain the configuration in the narrative.  
 
For research objective two (chapter six), I developed a detailed timeline of key industry 







information   
Oil company 
presence at local 
level   
Exclusion of actors 











engaged by state-oil 
nexus
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company events, and changes in relation to the historical timeline key events affecting oil 
companies and the industry. I coded all of the CSR reports for Tullow from 2006 to 2014, and 
the available ones for CNOOC and Total from 2012 to identify any mention of Ugandan 
activities and CSR projects. I coded the interview transcripts to identify interactions with oil 
companies and experiences or perceptions of CSR. The data analysis for this objective helped 
to inform the phases in chapter five, so the analysis was then focused around identifying and 
explaining the key changes over time through these phases and how the activities, narratives, 
practices interactions and contextual and situational factors changed over time. I coded the 
interviews, oil company CSR reports and news sources for indexical material which I 
developed into the figure displaying the CSR activities of three oil companies between 2005 
and 2016 in chapter six.  
 
For research objective three (chapter seven), I coded interviews and key CSO documents for 
indexical and non-indexical material. I wrote out the storylines of subnational and national 
CSOs and coded them. I was able to identify changes in narratives over time and identify CSO 
activities. I developed a timeline of key events relating to CSOs from the data and from 
secondary analysis (the historical timeline) which enabled me to see the development of CSO 
activities over time. I made several data displays, eventually compiling a large table showing 
CSOs, activities, funding sources, involvement in networks, links to partners / donors / CSOs 
in the assemblage.  
 
3.6 Considerations and limitations 
 
3.6.1 Access to field sites 
Access to the oil region is controlled by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. 
Researchers are required to get permission from the Ministry to conduct research in the 
region, which is a notoriously difficult and time-consuming task for individual researchers. I 
was fortunate that the permission for my presence in the oil region as a researcher was 
covered by Dr Van Alstine’s research permit for the Leeds project, which was ongoing during 
the course of my PhD fieldwork. 
 
I was required to attend the Resident District Commissioner’s (RDC) office in Hoima District 
when I arrived in Hoima with my passport and proof of research permission. The RDC 
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assigned one of his deputy Security Officers to keep an eye on me and I was also followed 
around briefly during my second research visit by a Security Officer from central government. 
As I reflect in section 3.6.2 however, I believe that my status as a white female westerner 
suggested I did not present any threat and I was left alone to carry out my research without 
much interference.  
 
Physical access to one of the field sites was an issue. Village C in the study is close to CNOOCs 
area of operation, is very isolated and located down a steep escarpment with no access by road 
(photograph in figure 3). I was advised by a number of locals that I should not go there, and if 
I really wanted to go, I might be able to go for a day if I made an early start and hiked down 
the steep 2km escarpment before it got too hot. The people I spoke to in Hoima warned that 
the conditions at the landing site where village C is located were not good; cholera outbreaks 
were frequent due to bad sanitation, and there were no suitable places of accommodation. I 
planned to hike and spend the day interviewing in the village in August 2014, however, the day 
before I was due to travel, heavy rain wiped out the road and the taxi refused to take me the 
first leg of the route (approximately 80km). I had to wait until the road was completed one 
year later to access the village. Instead, my colleague phoned the Local Council (LC1) 
chairperson in the village on my behalf, and he put me in touch with a fisher who travelled 
regularly to Hoima town to sell fish. The fisher spoke English and so I interviewed him. He 
then agreed to arrange for a group of respondents from village C to travel to Hoima town to be 
interviewed, and I paid for their travel. Again, I was reliant on him selecting respondents for 
me, so I requested that he ensured a mix of gender and ages which he did; two women, a 
village elder and two male youths (one of whom was his brother).  
 
3.6.2 Positionality  
Conducting fieldwork in the global south requires careful consideration of the positionality of 
the researcher and the research process. Denzin and Lincoln emphasise the importance of the 
researcher to consider herself as ‘multicultural subject’ as a key step in the research process 
(2011: 12). This is especially pertinent for conducting research in Uganda, a post-colonial state 
with its present still shaped by colonialism (see chapter four). Indeed, politics in the region of 
study continue to be shaped by colonial discourses of injustice around land and resources. As 
a white, British researcher, I have to critically consider issues of power and positionality. As 
Sultana (2007: 375) explains: “Conducting international fieldwork involves being attentive to 
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histories of colonialism, development, globalisation and local realities, to avoid exploitative 
research or perpetuation of relations of domination and control”. Yet, not all of this can be 
decided before the fieldwork, nor can it be controlled; rather it is a process of everyday 
negotiation in the field (Sultana, 2007). The interface between myself as a researcher and the 
context I am studying determines the outcomes of the research. As such, it is important to be 
aware of power relations and how they influence methods, interpretations and knowledge 
production.  
 
In line with the aim of the research and the interpretivist-constructivist tradition that 
underpins it, one of my concerns in the field was to capture the perspectives and stories of 
actors based on their own experiences (Guba and Lincoln, 2004). However, actor perspectives 
were influenced by these power interfaces. Some respondents made requests for resources and 
funding for projects. Some women in the village refused to speak to me. My translator and 
colleague explained it as an ‘inferiority complex’, because of my status as a white, western 
woman and their position as illiterate rural women. But in refusing to be interviewed the 
women exercised their power and agency to not be involved in the research (Scott, 2008). I 
was very much aware of my status as an outsider. My involvement in the Leeds project had 
prepared me for some of the challenges of fieldwork, and I was aware of the importance of 
paying courtesy calls to the village chairperson on my arrival in the villages and how to dress 
appropriately for the rural setting. But I also realised there is no way of ‘blending in’, and 
perhaps counterintuitively, the more time I spent in Uganda the more I realised that my 
knowledge was only ever partial; there was information, subtleties and cultural dynamics that 
I would never understand as an outsider. 
 
Being aware of my position in relation to the research setting, I was also ‘othered’ in the field. 
The word “Muzungu” (white person) was shouted at me daily by children as I walked to and 
from my guest house in Hoima town. Because I am white, some research participants in the 
villages assumed I was from an oil company, so I had to be very clear that I was in the village 
as an independent researcher and not an industry representative. I was also aware of my 
position as a lone female. This proved interesting in the situation where I was meant to be 
‘monitored’ by the deputy of the Resident District Commissioner. Instead of checking up on 
me to ensure I was not adventuring to places I should not, he instead contacted me repeatedly 
to ask me out on a date. Indeed, power relations can work both ways (Sultana, 2007).  Being a 
female in a patriarchal field context, and the way I was treated by some men in the field, 
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highlights the issue of reverse power relations. I was made even more aware of this seeing a 
British male colleague treated as a ‘VIP’ by a district official in contrast to my own experience 




Research and research practices must be ethical, and this is especially important in a cross-
cultural setting where a potentially sensitive topic such as the oil industry is being discussed. 
The researcher must be reflective and highly aware of and sensitive to her impact on the social 
situation under study. The University of Leeds has a comprehensive ethical clearance 
procedure through which this research was vetted and granted ethical approval in July 2014. A 
copy of the ethics application and confirmation of approval can be found in the appendices. 
 
Sensitive information includes material that could be considered to be of a political nature 
(Harrison, 2006) and ‘oil’ falls into this category. Even what might appear to be general 
discussions about local people’s experiences of the exploration period from the perspective of 
the researcher can lead local people to discuss issues relating to land, employment and / or 
interactions with oil companies that can be considered controversial topics locally. Here there 
is the risk that research respondents could be put into a compromising position. As such, the 
need to ensure the safety of the research participants was key. I was followed by security 
officers, which did not seem threatening to me, but I was made aware in interviews with 
certain CSO respondents that there were cases of people being arrested for speaking to 
journalists about oil. The levels of repression and threat appeared to fluctuate throughout the 
four years I was involved in the context, and at times the subnational CSO respondents I 
interviewed were visibly concerned. I was reminded of how little awareness I had personally of 
this securitised context when I was told by a plain-clothed security officer that I must delete 
the photographs I had taken of boats at the fish landing site during one of my first research 
trips to a village. My Ugandan colleague explained there was increased surveillance in the 
villages.  
 
Informed consent was extremely important to build trust and ensure that research 
participants became involved in the research voluntarily. Ensuring anonymity of the interview 
respondents was also important to build trust and ensure the safety of participants in the 
context of heightened security around oil issues. I provided information to the research 
participants before the start of each interview and guaranteed their anonymity by assigning a 
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code for the interview and a pseudonym in my notes. Depending on the respondent, informed 
consent was gained by explaining my research aims and the process of informed consent 
verbally, or where appropriate by providing written information outlining my research aims 
and my contact details before the interview. The written material about my project and the 
informed consent process and right to withdraw was given to the village leaders and to 
respondents at the district level. In acknowledgement of the sensitive nature of the topic as 
well as being respectful and as unintrusive as possible, I did not record interviews. 
 
Cultural sensitivity is also important and can impact on the research, meaning that the 
researcher has to be sensitive to the cultural context (Desai and Potter, 2006). This relates to 
positionality outlined in section 3.6.2 above and an awareness of the position of the researcher 
within patriarchal or post-colonial power relations. Of course, the nature of development 
research often means that fieldwork is carried out over short periods of time which makes it 
challenging to understand the local context (Harrison, 2006). In this respect I think I had time 
to get to know the local context more than had I only carried out one fieldwork stint, as I was 
able to continue to read up on history and politics in between visits. An understanding of the 
history of the Bunyoro region in relation to land and identity, for example, became 
increasingly important as the research progressed and helped me to be more aware of these 
issues in the field. However, I remained very much aware that I was an outsider and would 
never have a full grasp on local power dynamics.  
 
I made sure that I dressed appropriately for different interview settings (Brydon, 2006). In 
Hoima town, while interviewing government officials I dressed in smart attire; in the villages I 
followed the culturally appropriate dress code for females, which requires a skirt to cover the 
knees. I tried to sit down at the same level as my research respondents in the villages during 
interviews because I thought this was a way to try to address any power imbalance, but this 
was sometimes difficult because I would be provided with a chair while the research 
participants sat below me on the floor. At first, this made me feel uncomfortable and that I 
was not practicing good ethics by perpetuating a power divide, but on reflection I realised that 
this was the communities’ approach to receiving foreign guests, and a refusal of the chair 
would be more inappropriate than sitting at an elevated level. This made me aware that what I 




3.6.4 Limitations  
One limitation to data collection was due to the sensitive nature of the topic which meant that 
I was unable to record interviews with national CSOs and district actors. At the village level, I 
believe that recording would not have been appropriate anyway, but this did mean that I 
missed some of the detail of the interviews that perhaps seemed less important at the time, 
but might have been important later during analysis and write up. In particular, I was unable 
to capture very long quotations. However, I am confident that my approach to writing notes 
during the interviews, probing, and writing notes immediately following the interview helped 
me to address this challenge.  
 
Another limitation to data collection was my inability to stay in the villages for any length of 
time given my position as a sole female researcher and the lack of facilities in the villages at 
the lake. An ethnographic approach would have required me to immerse myself in the context 
and would have generated deeper insights about the experiences and relationships at this 
level. However, my ability to visit the three villages at least two times over the course of the 
research enabled me to capture different insights and highlight the changing experiences of 
the villages vis-à-vis the industry over time. I also interacted with some of the respondents 
from the villages in Hoima town which provided me with additional updates.  
 
Another limitation was due to one of the oil companies refusing to let me interview staff for 
the PhD research. This meant I had to rely on the data from the Leeds study and secondary 
sources. However, I was able to capture the experiences of other actors in relation to their 
interactions with the company. Plus, their refusal to meet me contributed to building a 
picture of the character of the company.  
 
Other limitations were related to my financial situation which restricted what I was able to do 
in the field. All of my flights to Uganda between 2012 and 2015 were funded by the Democratic 
Governance Facility (DGF) through the Leeds project. The longer PhD fieldwork visits were 
funded by two small grants from the Sustainability Research Institute at the University of 
Leeds, which meant that I had a small budget and was unable to employ a research assistant 
or hire a vehicle and driver. However, I believe that I did not require a research assistant; due 
to my involvement in the Leeds study and my engagement in the context over a period of 
time, I was able to carry out all the data collection and only required a translator for my visits 
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to the villages. The majority of the interviews for the study took place in Hoima town with 
respondents who spoke English.   
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4.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a brief background to contemporary Uganda and the key developments 
in Uganda’s oil industry to date that are relevant to the thesis. The chapter also looks at the 
Bunyoro region where the oil is located, which is one of Uganda’s five Kingdoms. This region 
is one of poorest in Uganda with a complex history and a complex land tenure system. The 
region is now ‘hosting’ the oil industry and as such, it is important to provide some context for 
the empirical chapters, especially in relation to the roles of subnational level authorities and in 
relation to land issues. First, I introduce Uganda, and then in section 4.3 I discuss Uganda’s 
transition from a British protectorate to an emerging oil state. Section 4.4 describes key oil 
industry developments, 4.5 looks at the character of state-society relations in Uganda, 4.6 
discusses the decentralised system of government in the country. Section 4.7 introduces the 
Bunyoro region and the Bunyoro Kingdom and discusses land tenure in what is now known as 
the oil region.  
4.2 Uganda  
Uganda is a landlocked country in Eastern Africa that lies across the Equator. Uganda’s 
landmass covers an area of 236,000 km2 of which 82% is dry land, 14% is open water and 4% is 
a permanent swamp (UNDP, 2017). The vast majority of Uganda’s population of 42 million 
resides in rural areas (88%). The country is endowed with a great diversity of animal and plant 
species and ranks among the top ten most bio-diverse countries in the world (UNDP, 2017). 
The largest proportion of Uganda’s economy is heavily dependent on biodiversity including 
the fishing industry, tourism (from wildlife biodiversity), livestock industry, commercial and 






Figure 4.1. Map of Uganda. Source: nationsonline.org.
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Uganda is a multi-ethnic country and multilingual country, with English as a main language, 
inherited from colonialism. The country is comprised of four administrative regions, fifteen 
sub-regions and 121 districts. The UN Human Development Report places Uganda in the low 
human development category, positioning it at 159 out of 189 countries on the 2018 Human 
Development Index (UNDP, 2019). The report states that in 2016, 55.1 percent of the 
population were multidimensionally poor in relation to health, education and standard of 
living, while an additional 24.9 percent were classified as vulnerable to multidimensional 
poverty (UNDP, 2019). GDP per capita in 2014 was US$726.9, and Uganda’s population growth 
is one of the fastest in the world.  
 
4.3 Uganda’s transition: from British protectorate to an emerging oil 
state 
 
Uganda was ruled as a British protectorate from 1894, gaining independence in October 1962. 
The years after independence were marked by violent military rule, including the notorious 
brutal eight-year dictatorship of Idi Amin in the 1970s. In the mid to late 1980s Uganda 
emerged from decades of military rule a deeply divided and traumatised society. Extreme 
identity-based violence, economic decay and near state collapse was the legacy of the Obote 
and Idi Amin regimes (Dicklitch, 1998). The new government, the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) under Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986 after a five-year 
revolutionary bush war, and promised to unite and stabilise the country, rid Uganda of ethnic 
divisions and repair the economy (Sjögren, 2013a). Transformational achievements were made 
during Museveni’s first years. Uganda’s economy grew at an average rate of 7.7 percent a year 
from the time Museveni took power and poverty fell sharply, even as the population grew 
(Ssewanyana et al., 2011) . A decade later, by the late 1990s, Uganda was held up by Western 
donors as a model of African Renaissance, a success story on the continent and “a governance 
showcase attracting attention and resources” (Sjögren, 2013a: 3).  
 
Thirty-four years later and Museveni remains in power, having recently changed the 
constitution again in 2017 to lift presidential age limits. Many of the early successes of the 
NRM government have been erased in a gradual slip backwards towards tendencies of 
militarism and authoritarianism (Lynch and Crawford, 2011). Uganda is a classic hybrid 
regime, whereby “many democratic institutions have been introduced, often to be subverted 
for nondemocratic ends simply to keep Museveni’s government and party in power” (Tripp, 
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2010: 3). President Museveni and his NRM party, on taking power in 1986, had established 
Uganda as a “no-party” state, with political candidates to be elected on merit rather than 
sectarian support. In 2005, the government abandoned the movement system in favour of a 
multiparty state—officially by public referendum, unofficially in exchange for the abolition of 
presidential term limits (Tripp, 2010). Kagoro (2016) argues that the Ugandan regime is a 
tripartite one, in which the government, NRM party, and the military function as one and the 
same. This has important consequences for the democratic process, particularly during 
elections. Over the past several years, Uganda has continued to backslide into a system of one-
man rule (Mwenda, 2007). The country’s political, economic and democratic ratings, including 
rankings on freedom of the press have been in steady decline in recent years (Kantel, 2019). 
 
Oil now presents a further incentive for Museveni to stay in power. The President has played a 
paternalist role in oil developments to date, referring to the resource as “my oil” (Anderson 
and Browne, 2011). Uganda opened to international oil investment in the late 1990s and by 
2014 had attracted an estimated $2.8 billion investment from international oil capital,  
promising a new era for Uganda (Smith and Van Alstine, 2018). However, as I discuss in 
section 4.4 Uganda’s progress towards first oil has been painfully slow, and whether the 
country will ever become an oil state still remains an open question.  
 
4.4 Oil industry developments  
Oil seepages were discovered around Lake Albert in the remote Western Uganda region 
during the 1920s, and oil surveying has taken place sporadically since then, with any serious 
exploration efforts curtailed due to the two World Wars and then the political instability in 
the country since independence. Exploration efforts seriously got underway in the late 1990s 
in the Bunyoro region of Lake Albert, with major finds in 2006. Exploration efforts then 
expanded North, close to the border with Sudan, and south to Lake Edward close to the DRC 
border (Anderson and Browne, 2011).  
 
The Albertine Graben area where oil exploration has been taking place is an area that forms 
part of the western arm of the Great Rift Valley system in East Africa. Oil exploration in the 










oil exploration companies in 1997. These are small, risk-taking oil and gas exploration 
companies, UK's Heritage Oil, Australia's Hardman, and South Africa's Energy Africa. Energy 
Africa drilled the first well in 2002 (Anderson and Browne, 2011), and UK Irish company 
Tullow Oil took over Energy Africa in 2004 and continued exploration. In 2006, Hardman 
Resources found oil in three wells in block 2 (figure 3). Tullow then purchased Hardman 
Resources in 2007 and began to develop block 2 on its own and blocks 1 and 3a alongside 
Heritage Oil in a Joint Development Agreement. Tullow enjoyed an astonishing run of success 
from early 2006 and planned an Early Production Scheme for 2009.  
 
After the successes of initial ‘wildcatter’ exploratory activity came investment from major 
players in the oil industry. The industry consolidated after Tullow’s purchase of Hardman and 
the subsequent acquisition of Heritage Oil’s interests in 2010, and Tullow planned to bring in 
French oil major Total SA and Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC). However, due to a dispute over unpaid capital gains tax from the Heritage sale, and 
accusations of bribery by MPs, the industry became mired in controversy and setbacks. The 
Uganda Revenue Authority pursued Tullow for Heritage’s unpaid tax bill of $434million and 
withheld the expired Kingfisher license in block 3a until Tullow paid. Tullow settled the bill 
and proceeded to sue Heritage Oil in a London court to recover the money in a case which 
dragged on for much of 2011 and 2012 (Patey, 2015).  
 
 
In 2011, the agreement to bring in the two oil majors Total and CNOOC in a ‘farm down’ deal, 
as part of the Heritage purchase agreement with the government, was finalised. Tullow sold 
two-thirds of its Uganda interests to the two companies; Tullow, Total and CNOOC each 
shared a third operating interests in all three blocks, with Total lead operator in Block 1, 
Tullow in Block 2 and CNOOC in block 3a. CNOOC was awarded the production licence to 
develop the Kingfisher basin in 2013, but due to ongoing negotiations in the context of a 
falling oil price (figure 4), Total and Tullow Oil did not receive their licences until three years 
later, in August 2016 (Smith and Van Alstine, 2018).  
 
By the time of Total and CNOOCs arrival, President Museveni was taking direct personal 
responsibility for all decisions relating to the oil industry and was directly involved in 
negotiations with oil companies (Anderson and Browne, 2011, Hickey and Izama, 2017). There 
were a number of contentious issues about industry developments that perpetuated the delays 
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to first oil. First was the government’s plan to build a large domestic oil refinery, which the oil 
companies thought uneconomical and unfeasible. President Museveni determinedly rejected 
the advice of the oil companies and pushed hard for Uganda to develop its own refining 
capacity (Anderson and Browne, 2011). Then was the pipeline question. Due to Uganda being a 
landlocked country and its oil being a waxy crude, the oil has to be piped some 1,300km to the 
Indian Ocean in a heated pipeline. There were plans for a route through Kenya, connecting 
with the pipeline from South Sudan and ending at the port of Lamu. However, regional 
politics and negotiations with oil companies led to the government deciding on a route 





Figure 8. Graph showing oil price drop in 2014 and 2015 (macrotrends.net) 
 
 
In the meantime, the government and the oil companies agreed to a small domestic refinery, 
with a 60bpd capacity, and Russia’s RT Resources became the successful bidder to construct 
the project (Biryabarema, 2015). The refinery Resettlement Action Plan to displace, 
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compensate and / or resettle 7192 people from the site in Hoima District began to be 
implemented in 2012, by a Ugandan firm called Strategic Friends International. This 
compensation and resettlement process became mired in controversy (chapter seven) and was 
still ongoing as I completed the final field visit to Uganda in 2016. In a further delay to the oil 
project, RT Resources pulled out of the refinery deal in July 2016 forcing the government to go 
back to its second choice, a South Korean firm. This deal also fell through and the government 
finally reached an agreement in April 2018 with an international consortium, including US 
firm General Electric, to construct and operate the refinery (Biryabarema, 2018). Then, in early 
2017 Total announced the purchase of a further 21.75% interest from Tullow Oil for 
$900million, making Total the lead partner in the project and confirming rumours that Tullow 
may be planning to leave Uganda (Smith and Van Alstine, 2018). Tullow sold its remaining 
stake in Uganda to Total for $575 million in April 2020, marking its complete exit from the 
project (Nasralla, 2020).  
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Table 8. Oil industry timeline 
Phases of the 
pre-oil stage in 
the thesis 
Key industry timeline events Key events in historical timeline 





2006 Hardman Resources finds oil  
 
2007 Tullow Oil purchases Hardman Resources 
 
2007 Tullow Oil joins FTSE  
 
2008 Tullow ESIA for the Early Production Scheme 
 
 
2005 Norway’s support grant to GoU for $4.2 million through the Oil for 
Development program 
 
2006 President Museveni “thanksgiving ceremony” for the discovery of oil 
 
2008 National Oil and Gas Policy drafted with Norwegian financial aid and 
technical support 
 
2008 Civil society activists show Nigeria video in oil region 
 





2010 Tullow Oil acquires Heritage’s Ugandan assets for $1.35 
billion 50% interests in Blocks 1 and 3A 
 
2010 GoU demands $434 million tax from Tullow (to be paid 
on Heritage’s behalf) 
 
2010 Gov refuses to give back Kingfisher licence during tax 
dispute 
 
2010 MPs make allegations of Ministers taking a bribe from 
Tullow Oil 
 
2011 Tullow agrees to sell interests in Uganda assets to Total 
and CNOOC for $2.9 billion  
 
2012 Tullow Oil signs two new PSAs with GoU  
 
2012 Tullow Oil completes farm-down deal to bring in Total 
and CNOOC 
 
2010 Feasibility study on domestic oil refinery carried out by UK consultant   
 
2010 Civil society organisations dispute draft Petroleum Bill claiming lack of 
checks and balances 
 
2011 Museveni wins the election  
 
2011 MPs vote for a moratorium on awarding oil contracts until further laws 
passed 
 
2012 Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production) Bill passed into law 
 





2013 – 2016  
 
Industry is 
delayed due to 
ongoing 
negotiations and 
oil price drop 
2013 The High Court in London rules in favour of Tullow 
Uganda Limited in the proceedings against Heritage Oil and 
Gas Ltd 
 
2013 CNOOC acquires the first ever oil production license in 
Uganda for the Kingfisher Well 1A in Hoima District 
 
2013 Tullow Oil hosts stakeholder visits to oil wells in Kaiso 
Tonya 
 
2014 Hoima to Kaiso-Tonya in Tullow Oil’s area of operation 
is completed 
 
2016 RT Global Resources pulls out of negotiations to 
construct the oil refinery in Hoima District 
 
2016 Uganda and Tanzania enter a deal for oil pipeline of 
crude oil from Hoima to the Tanga port in NE Tanzania 
 
2016 Hoima to Buhuka road giving access to CNOOCs area of 
operation is opened to the public 
 
2016 Tullow sells interests to Total  
 
 
2013 Petroleum (Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage) 
Bill passed into law 
 
2013 Public Order Management Bill passed preventing meetings of more than 3 
persons on issues deemed ‘political’ 
 
2013 GoU starts the compensation process for the 7118 residents in the 
proposed refinery area 
 
2014 GoU announces increase in oil reserves from 3.5 billion to 6.5 billion 
barrels 
 
2014 Global oil price plunges by 40% to below $50 a barrel  
 
2015 Norway commits an additional 6.5 million dollars to support Uganda’s oil 
and gas sector  
 
2015 NGO Bill passed aiming to monitor the activities of CSOs 
 
2015 Public Finance Management Act passed into law, providing a legal 
framework for oil revenue management 
 
2016 Museveni wins the election 
 




4.5 State-civil society relations in Uganda  
The nature of state-society relations in Uganda has significance for the discussion of civil 
society’s role in oil the oil assemblage in chapter seven of the thesis. Ugandan civil society is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, promoted by international donors in the 1990s as part of 
democratisation efforts on the continent (Hearn, 2010). During the turbulence of Uganda’s 
post-independence period, mass-based membership organisations of workers and peasants 
were decimated by authoritarian governments (Robinson and Friedman, 2007). Due to the 
state’s withdrawal from service delivery, Uganda’s citizens became preoccupied with economic 
survival, and community-based organisations were geared towards economic and social 
survival strategies (Dicklitch, 1998). In the post-1986 period, in the context of Uganda’s ‘no-
party’ political system, CSOs focused on service delivery and poverty alleviation with the 
support of international donors, and were marginal to the sphere of public policy (Hearn, 
2010). Indeed, as Hearn (2001) argues, for much of the post-1986 period civil society in Uganda 
has played a reactionary and mostly marginal role, “not as a force for challenging the status 
quo, but for building societal consensus and maintaining it” (2001: 43).  
 
Although a small number of donor-supported civil society organisations existed in the 1990s 
that worked in areas of advocacy, it was not until 2006 that civil society in Uganda began to 
step into the public policy terrain. The 2007 civil society struggle to save the Mabira Forest 
Reserve stands out as a significant moment as the first time that civil society had managed to 
galvanise public support for an issue of national concern. Due to pressure from an array of 
civil society actors, the government was forced to backtrack on its plan to degazette the Forest 
reserve and hand it over to the Sugar Corporation of Uganda to grow sugarcane (Child, 2009).  
 
Oil politics have been taking place in the country in the context of increasingly poor relations 
between Uganda and Western donors. Uganda was the poster child for western donors’ ‘good 
governance’ agenda of political and economic reform during the 1990s, during the structural 
adjustment period. Uganda has relied heavily on donor support since Museveni came to 
power, becoming one of the world’s top foreign aid recipients during the late 1990s / early 
2000s, with up to 40 and 50% of the state budget funded externally. Despite a number of 
democratic transgressions over the years, including the jailing of the main opposition 
politician and presidential candidate, Dr. Kiiza Besigye ahead of the 2006 election, donors 
have tended to more lenient towards Uganda, in comparison to other African states (Fisher, 
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2011). However, relations have soured in recent years, first due to the ‘homosexuality bill’ 
introduced in 2010, which proposed a punishment of life sentence and death penalty. Then, in 
2012 with the alleged embezzlement of $11million aid funds by the Office of the Prime Minister 
(OPM). Donors responded to these events with aid cuts, and Museveni began to build 
relations with non-Western allies including Iran and Russia (Hickey et al., 2015).  
 
4.6 Uganda’s decentralised system of government  
Uganda carried out one of the most radical decentralisation programmes in Africa in the 
1990s. After the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986 it suspended all 
party political activity, with the stated aim to end ‘sectarianism’ (Sjögren, 2013b). A five-tiered 
system of ‘Resistance Councils’ (RCs) from village to district was established, linking the rural 
population to the state, and anchoring the NRM among rural communities (ibid.). The RCs 
were later renamed Local Councils (LC) and became a uniform five-tiered local government 
structure from the district to the village level, as shown in figure 9. The LC system involved 




Figure 9. The local government structure in Uganda (Turyahabwe et al., 2006) 
 
 106 
The idea of decentralisation was that it would better respond to local needs and priorities 
(Green, 2015). As such, Uganda’s decentralisation programme was ambitious and extensive, 
with the aim to promote service delivery at the local level, ensure accountability for 
government resources by local leaders, and involve local people in the planning and 
implementation of government programmes.  
 
The NRM’s decentralisation programme has to be seen in the context of the problematic 
central-local relations that the NRM inherited on taking power. Crook (2003) argues that one 
objective of decentralisation was to fragment and weaken sub-national political entities that 
had been exploited and exacerbated by colonial rule. As Mamdani (1996) has argued, political 
fragmentation was a result of the colonial state in Africa, leading to what he calls the 
‘bifurcated state’; urban areas ruled by civil law and rural areas by customary law. This system 
was reproduced after independence by which the authority of the leaders was reproduced 
through vertical ties, through political alliances and patronage meaning certain parts of 
Uganda benefited at the expense of others in a classic ‘gatekeeper state’ situation (Cooper, 
2005). In Uganda, the decentralised government system enabled Museveni to remove the 
power of local tribal chiefs (Green, 2015) 
 
The district planning system involves the creation of five-year District Development Plans that 
are developed in consultation with the five tiers of local government. However, scholars have 
pointed out that the decentralised planning system has largely failed in terms of improving 
quality of service and local accountability (Ojambo, 2012). Green (2015) claims that a lack of 
funds, a lack of competent staff, corruption and an obsessive focus on the creation of new 
local government units are the biggest impediments to the effectiveness of the decentralised 
system. He argues:  
“it has become obvious that the Museveni government's main interest in the LC system 
has not been to provide good public services but instead to maintain the ruling NRM’s 
network of power at the local level, especially after electoral party politics was 
legalized again in 2005” (Green, 2015: 6) 
 
Indeed, from 2005 the central government started to take back some of the local government’s 
powers (Green, 2008). Two key district level leadership posts, the Resident District 
Commissioner (RDC) and Chief Administrative Officers (CAO), are appointed by the 
President and report directly to the centre, meaning that two powerful district leaders are 
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assigned rather than elected. New districts have been created out of older districts on a semi-
regular basis every few years since the early 1990s under the pretence of bringing services 
closer to local people. Both of these trends have enabled the centre to maintain control of 
local government, and as Green (2015) argues, decentralisation has been transformed into a 
patronage-based political machine to ensure NRM votes in the rural areas.  
 
4.7 Where the oil is: the Bunyoro region  
Uganda’s oil deposits lie in the Bunyoro sub-region in Western Uganda, which includes the 
five districts of Buliisa, Hoima, Kibaale, Kiryandongo and Masindi. The area is also the 
location of the traditional Bunyoro Kingdom, which has its seat in Hoima District. This means 
that in addition to the five-tiered decentralised government structure in those districts, there 
is also the traditional authority of the Bunyoro Kingdom.  
 
Prior to colonisation, the Bunyoro Kingdom was one of the largest and most powerful 
Kingdoms in East Africa. Kingdoms were abolished by the Milton Obote government in 1967, 
and reinstated by Museveni in 1993 with the status of cultural authority. Traditional rulers in 
Uganda are politically limited, but are extremely important and command loyalty and respect 
from local people. The Bunyoro King or Omukama, is constitutionally forbidden from 
engagement in matters of politics, and therefore is restricted to cultural and development 
advocacy matters. The Kingdom’s role has been to promote poverty reduction in the Bunyoro 
region, which has the highest poverty rate in western Uganda at 10.4 percent (World Bank, 
2018). Doyle (2006a) argues that traditional leaders in Bunyoro feel frustration at their low 
status and lack of influence and wealth vis a vis other Kingdoms in Uganda, such as Buganda 
and Tooro, and this has links to Bunyoro’s colonial experience.  
 
Bunyoro suffered considerably under British colonial rule. Its fierce resistance against the 
British caused what Doyle has referred to as an ecological and demographic disaster, from 
which the region has never fully recovered (Doyle, 2006b). This colonial experience is 
entrenched in the collective memory. The loss of land, taken by the British to subdue the 
Bunyoro and given to the rival Kingdom of Buganda, remains part of contemporary Bunyoro 
identity and discourse about the ‘lost counties’ and ongoing marginalisation of Bunyoro 
(Doyle, 2006a). What is significant is that the contemporary history of Bunyoro has involved 
lobbying for compensation for colonial injustices and the preoccupation with reconnecting to 
 108 
a past golden era. Oil is now being linked to colonial suffering and injustices. As Sjorgen 
states, the Kingdom’s agitation for a share of oil wealth (12.5 percent originally demanded) is 




Figure 10. Map showing the Bunyoro region. Source: Bunyoro-Kitara.org 
 
Politics in Bunyoro include continuation of historical grievances and contemporary struggles 
over land ownership. Land issues have heightened since the discovery of oil in the region, 
which has added to existing pressures and tensions in relation to land. The British created a 
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highly unequal land tenure system in 1900 that gave large tracts of land to the political elite in 
Buganda (Green, 2006). At the end of British rule in 1962 only 5 % of land in Uganda was 
turned into freehold (Batungi, 2008). Bugandan landlords have been one of the strongest 
forces to oppose attempts at land reform by the government (Green, 2006). The system of land 
rights in Uganda remains complicated today, with four different systems working on top of 
each other: customary, freehold, mailo and leasehold. The mailo system closely represents a 
feudal system and historically was a way for Buganda kings to control their subjects. Bunyoro 
is one of the few places in Uganda that still has some land under the mailo system, but the 
majority of land in the region is under customary tenure. Customary tenure is a complex land 
ownership system, in which rights are derived from being a member of a community, and 
within that community land can be owned by a family, individual or traditional authority 
(Kinyera, 2019). Customary tenure is managed by the local community, and in many cases the 
guiding laws are not written but are in oral form (Batungi, 2008). Uganda’s constitution, 
under Article 237, grants ownership of land to the citizens and recognises the four land tenure 
systems. Further, the Ugandan constitution states that any community, person or family 
holding land under customary tenure can apply for a certificate of customary ownership of the 
land, by approval of a District Land Board (Coldham, 2000). For Kinyera (2019), complex 
relations to land in Uganda stem from this constitutional recognition that every Ugandan 
belongs to a group that owns land, meaning that land is more than a tradeable commodity. 
The state plays a custodian role, however, is constitutionally entitled to acquire land for 
development, such as oil infrastructure.  
 
Unsurprisingly, oil discovery has been associated with an increase in land-related disputes in 
the Bunyoro region. Uganda Land Alliance reports that land disputes and land grabbing 
increased in the oil region after the oil discovery, and new land transactions were mostly 
acquisition of land from people outside the region from local land holders (Uganda Land 
Alliance, 2011). There are also numerous reports of land grabbing in the region by local 
government and other officials through gaining control over community land, obtaining land 
titles in their own name, and then selling the land (Ogwang and Vanclay, 2019). These recent 
pressures and tensions over land ownership are adding to the politics of identity and territory 




5.0 Chapter five 
Uganda’s emerging oil assemblage 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis seeks to contribute to our understanding of frontier dynamics during the pre-oil 
stage of the oil industry by exploring the subnational level within Uganda’s emerging oil 
assemblage. Chapter two highlighted the need for a multi-actor, relational approach to 
studying oil, and I made the case for an assemblage approach, given its usefulness to capture 
emerging configurations of human and non-human elements and identify agency and change 
(Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). Because the particular properties of resource assemblages are 
especially dynamic at the beginning of an assemblage (Schritt, 2016), the approach is useful to 
analyse dynamics in the making of Uganda’s oil during the exploration stage of the industry. 
The approach also expands the conceptualisation of resource frontiers as spaces of destruction 
and domination to include a diversity of processes, experiences and imaginaries (Cross, 2014, 
Tsing, 2011).   
 
This first empirical chapter employs the conceptual framework developed in chapter two to 
analyse the emergence of Uganda’s oil assemblage between 2005 and 2016. It uses the 
assemblage as a heuristic to map the changing assemblage configuration over three phases 
identified in the analysis (figure 11) and employs the conceptual framework to analyse how the 
assemblage configuration is shaped by non-human elements of the assemblage; ideas / 
knowledges, materialities, and practices.  
 
In doing so the chapter addresses research objective 1 a: Map the key actors in Uganda’s oil 
assemblage and show how their interests are shaped during the exploration phase of the 
industry, and contributes to research objective 1 b: Explore how the subnational level 
articulates with the emerging oil assemblage to shape outcomes. The chapter draws on 
primary and secondary data to analyse the emergence of Uganda’s oil assemblage over three 
phases of the exploration period. For each phase I show how the assemblage configuration is 
influenced by elements of the assemblage through a discussion of analytical themes. I also 
consider the material implications of the assemblage at the subnational level, and show how 





       




Figure 11. Assemblage configuration over time through three phases of the pre-oil stage
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Figure 11 presents the assemblage diagrams which visualise the changing assemblage 
configuration over time and orient the discussion. Each diagram is presented in turn in this 
chapter. Phase one (2005-2008) captures the early exploration period during which time there 
were major oil discoveries, and the Uganda project went from high risk to commercial 
viability. Phase two (2009-2012) shows the period of industry consolidation and 
professionalisation in anticipation of first oil, controversies in the sector as the stakes in the 
industry were raised, and interests of external actors concerned about oil management and 
governance. In phase three (2013 to 2016) there is growing interest in governance and human 
rights issues as the impacts of the project increase, and oil company CSR and civil society 
activities begin to focus on the subnational level, key events and new narratives shape the 
assemblage and new alliances form among actors with shared interests.  
 
The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that the oil assemblage is shaped not only by oil 
capital and the project cycle, but by the materiality of oil, ideas about oil and the associated 
practices which aim to facilitate and govern extraction. The interests of actors are shaped by 
these assemblage elements, and interests align and shift over time as new elements become 
part of the assemblage. The chapter shows that the assemblage has material impacts in the 
pre-oil stage, not only due to the materiality of the resource but also ideas about oil. The 
subnational space, which is active and dynamic, becomes a constitutive part of the oil 
assemblage as the assemblage develops over the three phases. 
 
5.2 Phase one 
Phase one (2005-2008) was characterised by the pre-commercial threshold for oil and few 
actors in the assemblage in this phase, with control of oil centralised by the state and oil 
exploration companies engaging at the local level. The following analysis is structured 
thematically, with themes distilled from primary and secondary data. The first three themes 
explain the configuration of actors in the assemblage in figure 12. The first theme highlights 
the shift that takes place from the Albertine Graben as ‘high risk’ to one of considerable 
national and global value and interest. The second theme discusses the implications for 
existing local authorities given the increasing importance of this previously peripheral region, 
the centralised control of oil by the state, and the dominant role of industry in this space. The 
third theme relates to the role of external expertise in guiding the development of the 
industry, given Uganda’s position as a post-colonial state which it is assumed by external 
actors lacks the technical and institutional capacity to develop and govern the oil resource.  
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The fourth and final themes show the material implications of the assemblage at the 
subnational level, including the imaginaries of development, the enclosure of land and 






Figure 12. Phase one configuration of assemblage actors 
 
 
5.2.1 High risk frontier to globally valuable resource 
The assemblage configuration in phase one is partly explained by the remote nature of the 
Albertine Graben and the commercial and security risk involved in exploration during phase 
one. None of the oil majors were involved in this phase; Uganda’s Albertine Graben was 
considered a ‘high-risk outlier’ by the industry (Energy Intelligence, 2008). The international 
companies in the assemblage in phase one were independent exploration companies - 
Heritage, Hardman, Energy Africa and Tullow Oil - known as ‘wildcatters’ for their ability to 
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explore for oil in high risk, challenging and politically volatile locations and then sell on to 
bigger companies to develop, if oil is found. 
 
The materiality of the resource contributed to shaping the assemblage. Oil is a point source 
resource and territorially grounded, meaning “you’ve got to go where the oil is”, as Dick 
Cheney famously said (Denning, 2010). As such, one risk of exploration in Uganda was due to 
unproven reserves within the tricky geology of the Graben. The remote location added to the 
considerable operational challenges; interview respondents in villages A and B located on the 
shores of Lake Albert note that equipment was brought by boats down the lake to exploration 
sites that could not be reached by road. Further, security risk was high given the location of oil 
in a conflict hot zone, straddling the disputed border between Uganda and DRC. As a result, 
the military was a key actor in the assemblage at the local level in phase one, justified by the 
ongoing security risk that was affirmed in 2007 by the shooting of a British oil worker in a 
skirmish with DRC troops on Lake Albert (Bavier, 2007). 
 
The military and security presence in the oil region also reflected the value of Uganda’s oil to 
the Ugandan state and the growing interests of powerful global players. In 2006, when 
Hardman found commercially viable oil deposits in the Graben, these were the largest onshore 
oil finds in sub-Saharan Africa in over two decades. These finds were instrumental in shifting 
the narrative of oil in East Africa from “sleepy backwaters to bonanza” (Deloitte, 2014: no page 
). Uganda was now the ‘hottest inland exploration frontier’ (Energy Intelligence, 2008) and 
other international exploration companies rushed to take up concessions (Anderson and 
Browne, 2011). Uganda’s oil was of “intense interest” to the industry (Deloitte, 2014) with 
predictions that the country could be in the top fifty of world producers, demonstrating the 
close link between risk and opportunity in frontiers (Tsing, 2011).  
 
The strong interaction between the state and oil affected communities illustrated in figure 12 
was through the military and security arm of the state. Interview respondents in villages at the 
lake noted the increased presence of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), and new 
rules being enforced by security forces. As one village elder noted: “when we try to access our 
land, we are asked for identification papers” (COMA02, 2012). Other respondents noted being 
fined for letting livestock roam near oil sites “we are not used to these kinds of things, this is 
our communal land” one said (COMA04, 2012). These quotes indicate that local communities 
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were experiencing the state in a new way, in a region where state presence has historically 
been very minimal.  
 
This evidence suggests that the role of the Ugandan state in the oil assemblage in phase one 
was ‘re-regulatory’; to assign rights to international oil exploration companies through 
licencing, provide security for the oil sites and manage processes of enclosure for oil 
infrastructure (Bridge, 2014). Interview respondents in communities noted very minimum 
contact between local people and Government officials, however. Despite oil exploration 
taking place onshore, on land that is communally owned and used by fishing communities 
along Lake Albert, respondents noted that no meetings with government had taken place to 
discuss issues of community concern: “The government has not been here to sensitise us... we 
want to know if we should leave our homes before the land is no longer able to sustain life” 
(COMA07, 2014). Another commented “The government has not been to inform us, will we 
stay like this, or will oil benefit others?” COMA06, 2014). The quotes reveal issues of 
community concern that are discussed further in section 5.2.5. Data show that meetings 
during phase one were directly with oil exploration companies, organised through the village 
leaders, and involved oil companies providing information about operational activities. Only 
one village at the lake reported that the district leadership had been to tell them that they 
must cooperate with oil companies, and “leave the companies alone to do their work” 
(COME01, 2012). Village F on the other hand was one of the villages earmarked for 
displacement for the oil refinery site, and respondents noted meetings with Government 
officials. However, respondents claimed that these meetings were about ensuring community 
support for the ‘government project’ rather than providing information to address issues of 
community concern. This evidence suggests that the ‘oil affected communities’ in the 
assemblage in phase one were seen as important actors by the state and oil companies to the 
extent that they were occupying land and using resources that the industry required.   
 
5.2.2 State-oil-community nexus and the exclusion of local authorities 
Oil discoveries in a remote corner of Uganda shaped power relations in the assemblage, 
leading to a new configuration between the state, international oil companies and oil affected 
communities, which effectively excluded other actors at the subnational level (figure 12). The 
Bunyoro region is now central to the future of Uganda as an oil state and an integral part of 
the oil assemblage; of strategic interest to the Government of Uganda and the global oil 
industry. As a result, Uganda’s oil was centrally managed and controlled by the Government of 
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Uganda, and oil MNCs were given rights to access land at the local level through licensing 
agreements with the Government (Bridge, 2014).    
 
The centralised control and management of oil by the Government had implications for 
existing authorities in the oil region. As I discussed in chapter four, the Bunyoro region has 
local authorities through the five-tier decentralised government structure and the traditional 
authority of the Bunyoro Kingdom. It was clear from the data that these local authorities in 
Hoima District were excluded from involvement in oil development in the region. Focus group 
discussions with District Local Government officers revealed that they were physically 
excluded from accessing the oil sites: 
“To visit the oil fields you need to seek permission from MEMD and Tullow which is in 
Kampala” (DLG05, 2014).  
 
District leaders felt particularly undermined by the new rule to control access to and within 
the oil region. As one respondent noted:  
“[The oil companies] went directly to central government at all the stages. We would 
see on the TV ‘big people’ coming to the area” (DLG07, 2014). 
 
This meant that district officials were excluded from information and access to the 
developments taking place in the district in relation to oil, as one leader noted: “I am 
supposed to have all the information, but I don’t” (DLG08, 2014).  
 
As a further indication of the centralised control of oil, the Government gave authority to oil 
companies to negotiate access to land directly with communities at the local level. This 
reinforced the exclusion of the subnational government structure and exposed the shifting 
power dynamics at the subnational level. One district respondent explained:  
“The companies go from the centre (Kampala) directly to the grassroots (villages) and 
bypass the district. They meet only the LCI (village) and COA (District Administrator) 
and think it's representative of the community” (DLG01, 2012).  
 
District respondents claimed that this exclusion prevented them from informing communities 
in the oil region what was taking place:  
“We have no facilities to visit the communities and no information to tell them. We 
have no mandate to move around” (DLG02, 2012).  
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The exclusion of subnational government from information and access partly explains why 
there was evidence of minimum interaction between local communities and government 
officials during phase one, as noted in section 5.2.1. In focus group interviews in 2012 district 
technical officers expressed concern that they were prevented from doing their jobs due to a 
lack of guidelines and budget. For example, environment officers were prevented from 
carrying out ‘spot-checks’ at the oil drilling sites, and noted the different way that oil was 
being managed:  
“The wetlands protection programme is linked with the district and linked with the 
community. There are guidelines. Not same has happened for oil... Monitoring is so 
difficult, there are no roles defined, no checklist and no budget...and no spot checks 
allowed” (DLG03, 2012). 
 
The quote highlights the ‘special’ status of oil in relation to other less strategic natural 
resources that involved district management, and demonstrates not only the centralisation of 
control, but also the active marginalisation of subnational authorities from oil developments. 
The dynamics in this early phase also reflect that policy development was lagging behind 
industry development at this stage, especially in terms of environmental monitoring (Patey, 
2015). 
 
Bunyoro Kingdom representatives spoke of similar marginalisation to district officials during 
phase one, in the region that is considered “the King’s former hunting grounds” (MED01, 
2014). Kingdom respondents claimed that they had been side-lined from a project of 
considerable importance in their region: “No meeting with local government, no clear 
communication, nothing with central government” (KGD01, 2012); “We’re here just to watch 
things move” (KGD02, 2012), one said. The exclusion was presented by respondents as 
contrary to the King’s role of “trustee of the land” in Bunyoro, for “everything from 5 feet up, 
for all the resources on the land”, as one respondent explained (KGD03, 2014). This position is 
in direct tension with the government’s ownership of resources below 5 feet down - the oil 
resource - once again drawing attention to the implications of the territorial nature of oil on 
land with other uses and values (Bridge, 2009).  
 
The King is constitutionally forbidden from involvement in politics as I noted in section 4.7, 
yet oil in Bunyoro poses a challenge to the Kingdom’s apolitical role, since the issue has 
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become a hot political topic and the King’s subjects “look to the King for guidance” (KGD03, 
2014). As one respondent explained:   
“People think the King can solve things, problems such as roads, blasting etc. … the King 
can’t do much but people go to him with their problems. People are excluded from the 
cultural sites, they can’t go there anymore because of the oil wells” (KGD06, 2015).  
 
The quote also draws attention to the different knowledges about resources and the tension 
between the cultural and economic value of resources (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). 
Kingdom respondents discussed many of the impacts being experienced by local people at this 
stage, some of which they claimed could have been avoided by the oil companies working 
closely with the Kingdom:   
“There are many things that oil companies didn’t know because of [the exclusion of 
the Kingdom]. Oil wells are discovered at burial sites, which are a major issue, they are 
sacred sites, the King is buried with his whole palace buried inside. People go there to 
worship and ask for rain, and before they go on the lake to fish” (KGD01, 2012).  
 
It was clear from the data that oil in the Bunyoro region exposed the inequities of power 
between the Government and the Kingdom in a similar way that it exposed them between the 
centre and the subnational government. The King’s secretary recalled a discussion in which 
the oil companies said: “we can listen but at the end of the day we are dealing with the 
Government of Uganda” (KGD04, 2014). As such, the Kingdom, District Local Government 
and subnational government respondents all claimed that they and people in the Bunyoro 
region had become mere ‘spectators’ to oil-related developments in the region.  
 
These findings suggest that oil has made more visible the ways in which decentralisation and 
devolution processes in Ugandan politics conceal processes of re-centralisation (Kantel, 2019). 
Oil is now central to the dreamed of futures of the Ugandan state (Cross, 2014). As such, when 
Uganda’s decentralisation is viewed in terms of its function as increasing the power and reach 
of the centre as discussed in section 4.6, it is not surprising that subnational government is 
side-lined from a project of considerable national interest and strategic importance. So, rather 
than produce power asymmetries, oil has exposed them and made them matter more.  
 
However, data show that these dynamics shifted over time. In comparison to the experiences 
of district respondents in 2015 in phase three (section 5.4), by which time there was greater 
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efforts for inclusion by both the state and oil MNCs, it appears that the exclusionary effects of 
the central control of oil were experienced more acutely in phases one and two. As I note in 
section 5.4, stakeholder engagement by oil MNCs addressed some of the perceptions of 
exclusion by selectively including subnational actors as stakeholders in phase three and 
providing opportunities for some district actors to engage through CSR. By this time the 
Government had also begun to selectively include the district and Bunyoro Kingdom through 
plans for future revenue sharing. 
 
5.2.3 External expertise and ‘good’ oil management 
Uganda’s oil discoveries mobilised the interests of actors from outside Uganda with ‘expertise’ 
in oil management, meaning that external actors and expert knowledge became part of 
Uganda’s oil assemblage, indicated by ‘donors’ in figure 12. The oil sector is developing from 
scratch in Uganda, requiring the Government to put in place the necessary policies and 
institutions to guide and manage the sector. In 2006, the year that commercial quantities of 
oil were confirmed, Norway began a programme of funding and support to Uganda through 
The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), under the title ‘Strengthening 
the State Petroleum Administration in Uganda’. The Ugandan Government also engaged the 
services of Swiss oil consultants and an American legal team to provide further guidance 
(Patey, 2015). The support of external experts enabled the Government to put in place the 
institutional framework to manage and regulate this new sector of development in Uganda 
(MEMD, 2015). By 2007 Uganda was a ‘core’ country in Norway’s Oil for Development (OfD) 
programme, the programme which channels Norway’s petroleum related aid programmes to 
several countries in the global south.  
 
The OfD programme reflects Norway’s international standing as a success story and an ‘expert’ 
in oil governance. Indeed, the export of the ‘Norwegian model’ to nascent oil states is a key 
foreign policy objective for Norway (Thurber et al., 2011).  OfD’s stated goal is to ensure that 
petroleum resources are administered in a way that contributes to sustainable development of 
the national economy and welfare of the people in Uganda. Through this type of support, 
external actors played an important role in territorialising the oil project in phase one by 
helping the Government of Uganda to establish institutions and policies to manage and 
govern oil (Delaney, 2009). Central to the programme is the acknowledgement of the threat of 
the resource curse, which Norad notes can affect “poor states with weak governance systems” 
(Norad, 2012: xvii). As such, it was through this support that narratives linking effective oil 
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management and good governance became part of Uganda’s oil assemblage, and led President 
Museveni to link Uganda’s success to following the path of Norway (Miirima, 2008).  
 
Uganda’s involvement with the OfD programme and the engagement of external expertise 
draws attention to four key features of Uganda’s emerging oil assemblage. The first is the 
status of Uganda’s oil as a globally valuable commodity of interest to powerful global actors; 
the second reflects the concerns of western organisations and donors about Uganda’s ability to 
manage the resource  in a context of “corruption and political governance” (Norad, 2012: 61) 
which is directly linked to the ideas of the resource curse and oil’s potentialities (Weszkalnys, 
2008). Third is the role of external expert knowledge, the mobilisation of which reflects the 
position of Uganda in the global political economy; a post-colonial country lacking the 
technical and institutional capacity to manage an oil industry. Fourth, is the ‘blueprint model’ 
of oil governance, identified in section 2.2, underlying which is the idea that lessons of success 
can be implemented in new extractives contexts to shape governance outcomes (Logan and 
McNeish, 2012a).  
 
However, while the terms of Norwegian engagement point to the power imbalance in the 
relationship between global north expertise and the relative incapacity of the global south, the 
data show that links between Uganda and Norway in terms of oil development go back to the 
mid-1990s. At this time Petrad, a Norwegian foundation providing capacity building support 
for managing petroleum resources, worked to build the Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Department’s (PEPD) capacity, and helped  to establish an ‘island of effectiveness’ 
in the Ministry of energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) (Hickey et al., 2015). This 
suggests that a relationship with Norway was strategically crafted by the Ugandan state with 
the aim of managing its future oil industry prior to oil discovery, demonstrating agency 
through the President’s aim to build Ugandan expertise. This close cooperation between 
Western donors and the Ugandan state is in contrast to the role of Western donors in phase 
two (section 5.3), where donors went around the state to empower CSOs to challenge the 
Government in relation to the development of oil legislation (chapter seven).  
 
5.2.4 Development imaginaries  
There was evidence that ideas and narratives of oil in Uganda’s oil assemblage had material 
impacts at the subnational level in phase one. While expectations of development shifted over 
the three phases identified in this thesis, it was in phase one that ideas about the ‘promise’ of 
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oil and the ‘peril’ of oil fostered imaginaries of development that were simultaneously positive 
and negative (Weszkalnys, 2011).  
 
Links between oil and poverty reduction were made by President Museveni in numerous 
speeches during phase one in which he promised oil would bring prosperity to Ugandans. The 
President used the resource curse ‘blessing / curse’ dichotomy to emphasise Uganda was on 
the path to modernity: “Definitely oil discovery in Uganda is going to be a blessing”, he said in 
2006; “Uganda can firmly wave goodbye to disease, hunger, poverty, and donor dependency” 
(Miirima, 2008: 31). In 2009 he promised that oil would put Uganda on the path to “middle-
income country status in the near future” (New Vision, 2009: no date). These narratives of 
prosperity and improvement play an important role in the oil assemblage at the local level, 
shaping development imaginaries and enrolling local people to support the industry in the 
present through the promise of a better life in the future (Cross, 2014). 
 
The presence of international oil companies also brought the promise of modernity to a region 
experiencing high poverty levels and lacking social infrastructure (chapter six). The promise of 
development through CSR also played a role in shaping development imaginaries and 
ensuring support for the industry. As chapter six discusses in depth, oil exploration companies 
directed some CSR towards improving the welfare of local communities by bringing social 
amenities to people at the lake in phase one. As one subnational CSO observed: “the oil areas 
used to be no go zones, you have to appreciate the benefits (SCSO03, 2014). 
 
At the district level, oil shaped the aspirations of local authorities, even as they were excluded 
from information and decision making on oil. “Oil revenues are vital to the rebirth of the 
Bunyoro nation”, the Kingdom’s official website proclaims (Bunyoro-kitara.org). One 
Kingdom respondent, describing the Bunyoro Kingdom as a “bruised institution with its foot 
in the colonial past” noted the potential for oil revenues to transform the marginalised and 
impoverished region, and “address a historical injustice” (KNG04, 2014). This ambition 
translated into demands for 12.5 percent of oil revenues to go to the Bunyoro Kingdom: “we 
are demanding revenue sharing to reduce poverty in the region” (KNG02, 2012). Respondents 
discussed an agreement with Tullow Oil to support cultural development in Bunyoro and 
boost tourism in the region. Tullow had agreed to provide $100,000, and at the time of our 
interview in 2012, a Kingdom respondent noted that $50,000 of this had been received as part 
of Tullow’s CSR contribution to Bunyoro (KNG02, 2012).  
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District Local Government respondents expressed similar aspirations and discussed their 
ambitions for oil to boost business in the region and open up markets for local people. 
Individual departments in the district noted that they had made requests to oil companies for 
support, for example, for transport and for ‘exposure visits’ to other oil producing countries 
(which were denied). “We are hosting the oil industry and the oil companies, so what can we 
learn from other areas where oil extraction has been successful?” one respondent explained 
(DLG09, 2014). These examples demonstrate the potential for CSR to shape aspirations and 
open up possible avenues for exclusion of marginalised actors (chapter six).  
 
Among people in the oil communities, the hope for jobs was expressed by many respondents; 
“it is the only available opportunity nearby” as one respondent noted (COMC01, 2014). 
However, an interesting finding was the way that ideas of oil and ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ 
were also manifest in local people’s expressions of concerns about the future. The analysis of 
the data suggests that within this narrative of a modern future, the self-awareness of people at 
the lake as “uneducated fisherfolk” (COMA09, 2014) did not seem compatible with the vision 
of a modern oil future. Although local people in the villages reflected on the oil future in 
which “we expect houses, electricity and other benefits” (COMA06, 2014) they were unsure 
about their place in it. “We are not educated, so how can we benefit?” (COMA10, 2014) was a 
typical comment. In this way the imaginaries of oil also shape people’s concerns in the 
present. Many respondents in the oil communities talked about the uncertain future and 
expressed concerns of being left behind, at the same time as they expressed hopes for benefits. 
 
Concerns about the oil future were fuelled by ideas about oil that were brought to the local 
level by national CSOs in phase one and became part of the oil assemblage. The link between 
CSOs and oil affected communities illustrated in figure 12 is not strong in terms of the 
quantity of interactions, because the data show only two CSOs visited the oil affected 
communities at this time. However, in terms of material impacts, the interaction was 
significant. It was through national CSOs, supported by international activist groups that the 
narrative linking oil to potential environmental despoliation and social harm travelled to the 
local level through the oil assemblage. Through this narrative, the potentialities of oil were 
connected to the idea of a resource curse. Interview respondents in villages during fieldwork 
in 2012, 2014 and 2015 recalled powerful imagery of the Niger Delta: 
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“They had a video of what had happened in Nigeria and that it might also happen here. 
There was no food, no road, no good water, no education” (COMC04, 2014).  
 
There was a lack of clarity about where the video had originated from, with some CSOs I 
spoke to claiming there were two videos in circulation, one which showed both the ‘good and 
bad’ sides of oil (Botswana and Nigeria) and one which only showed the bad (Nigeria). 
Nonetheless, the narrative of oil and its negative potentialities, through the connection to the 
Niger Delta, had captured the imaginations of some local people and became a means through 
which they discussed oil.  
 
The images from Nigeria contributed to concerns about the impacts of oil on land. During 
interviews in 2012 and 2013 throughout the oil region, a common theme was oil causing the 
land to dry up: “I am concerned that the land will dry up, and no food and no water” was a 
typical quote (COMD01, 2012). These concerns were further compounded by the lived realities 
of some people in the oil region who were experiencing exclusions and restrictions and 
negative impacts on livelihoods, especially at the lake. As one female respondent noted:  
“I am scared the oil extraction will disrupt the fish, the fish catch has reduced because 
of oil already, and we have no idea of what to do” (COMA12, 2014).  
 
Other respondents expressed concern that oil would benefit others “we feel we could be 
pushed out of [village A]” (COMA05, 2014). Indeed, people’s expectations in relation to the 
industry are also mediated by historical state-society relationships in this region. As chapter 
four noted, the region is historically marginalised, poor and isolated; “Big men will come 
because of oil” (COMA06, 2014), was a phrase mentioned by a village leader during an 
interview in 2014, hinting at Uganda’s existing way of doing politics. This type of response was 
not only expressed at the village level, but was a frequent comment made in relation to 
Uganda’s politics and the concern that oil will feed into ‘business as usual’ and “benefit others” 
(COMB05, 2014); in other words, Uganda’s system of patronage politics. It is these existing 
concerns that provide the fertile ground for other ideas about oil in the assemblage, such as 
the resource curse, to resonate with local people and provide a counter narrative to state and 
industry narratives about oil and prosperity. It is these divergent development imaginaries in 
the assemblage that shape the complexities and range of perspectives, concerns and 
aspirations among subnational actors.  
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5.2.5 Livelihoods impacts of exploration, enclosure and restrictions 
 
The material impacts of the oil assemblage were also evident in the physical impacts on the 
lives and livelihoods of people in the oil region. These impacts were related to the materiality 
of the resource and the territorially grounded nature of oil, access to which required the 
temporary and permanent use of communal land and resources. Restrictions and enclosures 
were put in place by oil companies and enforced by state security and military as noted in 
section 5.2.1. Local people talked about areas previously used to access resources for 
subsistence livelihoods now being restricted due to industry use: “We can now access the 
areas two days in a week whereas before it was free every day” (COMA02, 2012). Another 
female respondent noted:  
“We had access to the wildlife reserve, to collect firewood and grass for houses and 
local herbs for treating children and sickness. Now they have fenced off areas, access 
routes have been diverted” (COMA03, 2012). 
 
The quotes highlight the important role that nature plays to support livelihoods and wellbeing 
among rural communities in Uganda. Natural resources are important for subsistence and 
economic survival, they are used as materials, for example, to make grass-thatched houses and 
herbs are used for natural medicine by most rural Ugandans (Child, 2009). A CSO respondent 
noted “local people sell grass for money, and can’t get enough grass now to buy foodstuffs” 
(CSO04, 2014). Respondents highlighted the gendered dimension of the changing frontier, as 
women are ones who traditionally collect fire and grass, “up to an hour of walking now for 
some women to collect resources” (CSO04, 2014). 
 
The lake was significantly impacted. Respondents in the villages who rely on the lake for 
subsistence livelihoods noted the implications of oil exploration activities on the lake for local 
people: 
“During Tullow surveys in the water, residents were not allowed to carry out fishing in 
the lake for one week, many people suffered and slept without eating because the lake 
is a source of food” (COMB02, 2012).  
 
The data show that fishers had been told by oil companies not to fish for up to four weeks 
during seismic testing: “They tell us to stop fishing for a whole week, even more, without 
compensation” (COMD01, 2012). Further, the space for fishing was reduced due to industry 
operations and it was believed by local people that seismic activity had disturbed the fish:  
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“The fishing ground has reduced, some of the landing site is reduced, we can’t go close 
to materials and no compensation has been given” (COMC07, 2015). 
 
The issue of no compensation was raised by respondents in all the villages at the lake and it 
was clear that the livelihoods implications of restrictions to fishing had not been considered 
by industry or Government. Cultural values of resource were also disregarded: 
 “In Ngasa 1 area (the name of the oil well) “Muisege” is its nickname, oil is there. It 
was a meeting point for fishermen who could sell fish in Congo, they’d wait there for 
the wind. Before Ngasa” (COMB05, 2014).  
 
This quote, by a fisher, reflects on an important cultural site where local people used to pray 
before going to fish, now the site of an oil well. The interruptions to fishing without 
compensation suggests that this local industry and its related social and cultural practices are 
valued less, highlighting competing resource ontologies, as land and resources with cultural 
value are overturned for the industry (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). The experiences of 
local people resonate with Bridge (2009)’s assertion that in resource frontiers the future 
transformational possibilities of oil become valued greater than the current uses of nature. 
The restrictions to resource use and access show that land and resources that support local 
ecosystems and livelihoods must also support the industry, demonstrating that oil, even in its 
‘not yet’ state has far reaching implications for local actors, ecologies and natures (Tsing, 2011). 
 
5.3 Phase two 
In phase two (2009 to 2012) the assemblage configuration was influenced by the surpassing of 
the commercial threshold in 2009 and the consolidation of the industry, which signalled that 
Uganda’s oil project was moving towards the development phase. This mobilised the interests 
of new actors including global oil majors and international NGOs, donors and civil society 
actors concerned about governance issues. As shown in figure 13, new actors emerged (circled 
in blue), and existing actor groups increased in number (represented by blue circles). The first 
theme in the analysis relates to the tensions emerging between industry actors and the 
Government, which demonstrates the importance of Uganda’s oil both to the global oil 
industry and the state. This increased importance led to contestations and controversies in the 
sector which delayed ‘first oil’. The second and third themes demonstrate that growing 
concerns around oil governance mobilised the interests of CSOs, increased the influence of 
external actors and ‘expert’ knowledge and facilitated alliance making between actors with 
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similar interests in oil governance. The fourth theme discusses further material impacts 
experienced at the local level as the industry project cycle progressed and infrastructures 
needed for the industry opened up the region. The final theme discusses the pockets of 




Figure 13. Phase two configuration of assemblage actors 
 
5.3.1 Industry consolidation, negotiations and controversies 
In 2011 France’s Total E & P and China’s CNOOC entered Uganda’s oil assemblage, 
demonstrating the global significance of Uganda’s industry with the arrival of these two major 
players with the finance and expertise required to further develop the industry. However, the 
data show that as the stakes in Uganda’s industry became higher, the sector became mired in 
legal problems and corruption allegations and drawn-out negotiations which delayed the 
move towards ‘first oil’.  
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The Ugandan Revenue Authority insisted that Tullow Oil pay Heritage Oil’s unpaid capital 
gains tax bill from the sale of its assets to Tullow in 2010. Interview respondents noted that the 
government had withheld the expired Kingfisher license until Tullow paid, which forced 
Tullow to pay $434 million to the Government. This was seen as an indication that the 
Ugandan government was re-asserting its authority in light of revelations that Uganda was not 
getting a good deal in the previous Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) (MED01, 2014). 
Indeed, the Ugandan Government’s demand for taxes from Tullow Oil was interpreted as 
‘hard bargaining’ and not what was usually expected of a developing country government vis-
a-vis global oil (Hickey and Izama, 2017). According to some of my interview respondents, the 
tax disputes were also seen as an indication of the growing importance of oil revenues to the 
President in the run up to the 2011 election. As such, President Museveni’s patronage needs 
became part of the oil assemblage in phase two.  
 
Any optimism about an early production scheme was dampened as the elements and interests 
in Uganda’s assemblage shifted. Negotiations about the best way to process and develop 
Uganda’s oil revealed the tensions between the profit margins of international oil companies, 
and Uganda’s own energy security (Vokes, 2012); a reflection of the wider tensions between oil 
as a national endowment and a globally valuable commodity. Uganda has long been reliant on 
Kenya’s old Mombasa refinery for oil imports and so President Museveni began to push – 
against the wishes of the oil companies - for a large domestic oil refinery (Anderson and 
Browne, 2011). As will become clear throughout this thesis, the determination on the part of 
the Ugandan government for a domestic oil refinery, and the realisation of that plan, has 
significantly shaped the oil assemblage. Then, corruption allegations emerged in 2011 when the 
Ugandan Parliament established a committee to probe reports that three Ministers took 
bribes from Tullow Oil. Tullow claimed that the documents were false (Edwards, 2012), but 
these allegations resonated with ideas about oil and corruption, and fuelled the concerns of 
Ugandans and the wider international community about the pitfalls of oil in Uganda. The 
emergence of allegations, disputes and legal challenges in phase two speaks to the rising 
stakes in Uganda’s oil industry and the lucrative potential of Uganda’s oil even in the pre-oil 
stage (Behrends et al., 2013).  
 
5.3.2 ‘Expert’ knowledge and oil narratives  
Section 5.2 noted that actors from outside Uganda with ‘expertise’ in oil management became 
part of Uganda’s oil assemblage by providing assistance to the Government in efforts to 
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territorialise the oil project (Larsen, 2015) through the development of oil institutions and 
policies. In phase two, ‘expert’ knowledge from external actors continued to be a key feature of 
Uganda’s oil assemblage with the increase of interests from donors and INGOs concerned 
about good governance of oil. A key difference was that this expert knowledge was focused on 
good governance of Uganda’s oil and aimed to influence the practices of Ugandan CSOs in the 
assemblage. As chapter seven shows, this support in phase two acted as a ‘counter 
territorialising’ process by challenging the Government’s oil legislation (Larsen, 2015).  
 
Donors and INGOs expressed concern about the introduction of oil in the context of Uganda’s 
“deteriorating governance environment” (Global Witness, 2010: 3). These concerns influenced 
the oil assemblage not only in terms of actors and partnerships in the assemblage (as 
discussed in section 5.3.3), but also in terms of knowledge and ideas about oil which brought 
new narratives to Uganda’s oil assemblage around oil and corruption, transparency and good 
governance. A significant event which influenced oil narratives in Uganda was the leaking in 
2010 of the Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) signed between the early exploration 
companies (Hardman, Heritage and Energy Africa / Tullow) and the Government of Uganda. 
In 2008, two journalists and two CSOs had attempted to make the documents public by 
launching separate legal challenges against the government to obtain copies of the PSAs, using 
the 2005 Freedom of Information Act, without success (NSCO03, 2012). The petitioners drew 
on the discourse of the National Oil and Gas Policy (NOGP), citing principle 3 of the Policy, 
which provides for a ‘transparent and open oil sector’ (MEMD, 2008), demonstrating the 
ability (and willingness) of civil society to challenge the government using oil legislation. 
What is interesting is that the court ruled that the government had the right to withhold 
information which it deemed could jeopardise national security (NSCO01, 2012). This ruling 
demonstrates the status of Uganda’s oil as a strategic national resource and highlights the 
tension in the assemblage between oil’s status as an issue of national security and the stated 
aims of the NOGP for transparency.  
 
The leaked PSAs raised concerns among donors and INGOs, not only that Uganda was getting 
a ‘poor deal’ in the agreements, but also about weak environmental safeguards and the 
accountability of security forces in the oil regions (national CSO interviews, 2012). An 
international oil and gas advocacy NGO called PLATFORM carried out a legal analysis of the 
leaked documents and in February 2010 published the report “Contracts Curse” in cooperation 
with Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas (CSCO), one of the Ugandan civil society networks 
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on oil. The report noted that the terms of the PSAs promised “huge profits for the companies 
while placing risks and responsibilities on the Ugandan government” (Lay and Minio-Paluello, 
2010: 6). The use of the term ‘cursed’ drew on and linked to the discourse of the ‘resource 
curse’. The partnership between CSCO and an experienced international advocacy-oriented 
organisation contributed to the increasing profile and impact of CSCO in Uganda and 
demonstrates the effectiveness of global-national alliances in the assemblage and their 
counter-territorialising role.  
 
Following the 2010 PLATFORM report, there was increased vigilance among INGOs and 
Uganda’s donors about Uganda’s oil legislation, which as I discuss in chapter seven, linked to 
the transparency agenda. In 2010, a publication by the INGO Global Witness implored 
Uganda’s donors to coordinate to ensure good resource governance in Uganda (Global 
Witness, 2010). This type of external intervention played a significant role in producing 
knowledge about oil; both ‘expert’ knowledge, in terms of the technical aspects of oil and gas 
and how oil should be governed and managed, and also knowledge that reflected dominant 
ideas about oil’s link to development in the context of weak governance, i.e corruption. 
Consequently, the term ‘resource curse’ or ‘oil curse’ began to frame a number of CSO reports 
and briefings about oil and gas, for example the 2010 report of one prominent national CSO 
‘Escaping the resource curse and making poverty history’ (Bainomugisha et al., 2010). Chapter 
seven shows how these dominant resource governance norms in the assemblage determined 
the types of practices and activities CSOs engaged in. Activities became focused around the 
transparency agenda in relation to avoiding the resource curse, and thus contributed to 
shaping development imaginaries at the local level through the resource curse narrative.  
 
5.3.3 Civil society prominence in the assemblage  
Another key shift in the assemblage configuration occurred in phase two due to an increase in 
the number of CSOs working on oil and gas issues in Uganda. The key difference in 
comparison to CSO activity in phase one was that in phase two CSO activity was largely 
directed at the national level around oil legislation, in contrast to the CSO intervention in 
phase one which involved activism at the village level (with the Niger Delta video). The 
mobilisation of civil society interests in phase two was a reflection of the growing concerns 
about ‘good governance’ of Uganda’s oil among donors, meaning that funding for oil related 
work flowed to the oil assemblage and built the capacity of national CSOs to engage on oil 
issues (section 7.2). Many of the CSOs were already part of the transnational development 
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architecture, connected to donors and INGOs and with experience of policy and advocacy 
work mainly related to social service delivery. A number of global to national civil society 
networks on oil and gas were established in this phase, which further facilitated the flow of 
ideas, narratives and resources to Uganda’s oil assemblage.  
 
In 2012, national CSOs played a crucial role in pushing for accountability in the process of oil 
legislation development. Uganda’s donors were concerned that a clause in the proposed Oil 
Bill gave licencing powers to the Minister and created opportunities for corruption. Although 
the Oil Bill was designed on similar lines to other legislation in Uganda, for example where the 
head of the Uganda Revenue Authority and head of the Bank of Uganda are appointed by the 
president via the Minister, oil was different. As section 2.2 showed the ‘resource curse’ is 
believed to be facilitated by clientelism, patrimonialism and corruption, and so the 
development of oil cannot be left to chance. Donors and INGOs trained CSOs to scrutinise the 
Bills and lobby MPs to challenge Clause nine.  
 
One outcome of the Oil Bills challenge in 2012 was a more prominent role for CSOs in oil 
governance in Uganda’s oil assemblage, and ‘expertise’ on oil in relation to other sections of 
Ugandan society. National CSOs then began to engage in the oil region to ‘build capacity’ of 
subnational CSOs and communities in the oil region, thus contributing to the increased 
profile of subnational CSOs in the assemblage. The inclusion of subnational CSOs was a 
logistical necessity for national CSOs seeking to work in the oil region, given the remote 
location of the oil communities and restrictions to access put in place by the state, but also 
reflected the weak links between national CSOs and communities in the oil region. However, 
as I show in chapter seven, contrary to the data from national CSOs, it was revealed that 
subnational CSOs also had weak links to communities in the oil region. Indeed, what is 
notable in figure 13 is that while the number of CSOs working on oil issues increased and civil 
society networks to engage on oil issues were established, there are not yet links to 
‘community’. This is to demonstrate the weak links to community in terms of interactions in 
phase two and emphasise that CSO activity was focused mainly at the national level.  
 
Another outcome of the Oil Bills challenge was that the political space for CSOs to operate in 
was further restricted by the state (chapter seven). The intervention of donors and INGOs via 
Ugandan CSOs and MPs is an example of counter-territorialisation that sought to craft a 
different vision of oil development (Delaney, 2009). In doing so, it exposed the tension 
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between the different imaginaries of the oil future in the assemblage; one in which oil’s 
potentialities, in the context of ‘neo-patrimonial’ Uganda, (corruption, patronage etc), 
requires expert intervention by the international community to avoid a resource curse. The 
other is one in which oil provides Uganda the possibility to gain autonomy and independence. 
As such, the reconfiguration of the relationships between donors, the Ugandan state, and civil 
society through the Oil Bill contestations became part of the resource-making process. Oil 
contributed to an already changing constellation of transnational alliances, by which from the 
mid-2000s the influence of Uganda’s traditional state donors was in decline, and the influence 
of China as an ‘investment partner’ in Uganda was on the rise (Hickey et al., 2015).  
 
5.3.4 Opening up to the outside 
As the project cycle progressed, the materiality of the resource continued to shape the daily 
lives of people in the resource space. In phase two, as the project cycle progressed, the 
industry required infrastructures of access and transportation to further develop the resource 
in the remote Albertine Graben. Analysis of the data shows the significant transformational 
effects the construction of roads by industry had on the lives of people in villages; some of 
which became connected to the rest of Uganda for the first time.  
“There have been a lot of changes, we were land locked, now they’ve opened us up to 
access and people to come” (COMA05, 2014)  
 
The 90km road built from Hoima town to the shores of Lake Albert is a tarmacked road to 
replace a substandard mud road. Known locally as the ‘oil road’, the road has reduced travel 
time from the lake to Hoima town by up to two hours. Before the tarmac road that was built 
to reach the Kingfisher site, the villages in the area were cut off from the rest of the district by 
the steep escarpment, which no vehicles could pass, so “merchants struggle up carrying things 
on their heads” (DLG03, 2014).  
 
As one respondent exclaimed: “The road has put us on the map…the place is now known due 
to oil!” (COMC04, 2014). The quotes demonstrate that communities not connected to the 
nation state by roads consider themselves as marginalised (Harvey, 2018). As such, the roads 
are both a tangible and symbolic indication of the promised modernity and progress of oil and 
contribute to shaping development imaginaries (section 5.2.4).  
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The road has brought other indications of a modern future; “Fridges have arrived at the lake” 
(COMA05, 2014) one respondent noted; “Businesses are taking more”, commented another, 
“Prices are increasing, there are already more people which is good for the market” (COMA11, 
2014). Respondents spoke about travel times to hospital and other services reduced; “We used 
to have to walk 9km to get a boda (motorcycle taxi) to Hoima” (COMA06, 2014); “The sick can 
get to hospital easier” (COMA07, 2014); “We can access food from the outside” (COM08, 2014).  
 
Yet for some, opening up to the outside had brought challenges. “Commodities have gone so 
high due to the improved road. Fish can go to Hoima, it’s not cheap locally anymore” 
(COM09, 2014). Respondents noted that although they benefited from improved accessibility 
and some benefited from increased opportunities, other respondents associated the road with 
the population influx and an increase in the cost of living. “There are more people in (village 
C), many people” (COMC01, 2014). The village leader in village B noted that the population of 
the village had doubled, but government service provision had stayed the same, leading to 
more demands on basic services (COMB05, 2014). During a field visit to village A I observed a 
large, refrigerated truck at the lake shores, which respondents pointed out was taking the fish 
from Lake Albert to Kampala.  
 
Indeed, there was the perception expressed by some respondents that people from ‘outside’ 
were able to benefit more than people in the villages: “Oil is good if you have money” 
(COMC01, 2014) was a phrase often heard in reference to people from Hoima town and 
Kampala. “People are not doing as well as they were, (local) fish traders and trade in the fish 
industry is not doing well” (COMA07, 2014). One canteen owner in village B explained the 
implications of the higher price of fish locally: “I’m not making much profit. I can’t increase 
my prices of food or people won’t eat here.” (COMA08, 2014). These findings provide further 
evidence to show the uneven ways oil was beginning to impact local people’s lives and 
livelihoods in the pre-oil stage at the local level. In addition to the restrictions and enclosures 
that had livelihoods impacts for some, oil infrastructures also exacerbated the uneven 
distribution of costs and benefits of oil prior to oil existing as a resource.  
 
5.3.5 Pockets of discontent at the subnational level  
During phase two, grievances relating to land, compensation and opportunities in the industry 
increased. The construction of oil infrastructure opened up the region and shaped the 
aspirations of some, however, for others it meant the loss of land and resources with 
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considerable economic, cultural and future value. People in Hoima District were due to be 
compensated for permanent and temporary land acquisition during construction for roads, 
and for property destroyed during exploration activities. During data collection in 2014 and 
2015 these issues were still being contested.  
 
Evidence shows that some respondents whose land and crops were assessed in 2009 during 
the Hoima to Lake Albert road construction had not received payment at the time of the 
Leeds study in 2012 and 2013. For those who had received compensation, the amounts received 
were believed to be much less than the value of land and property. The people displaced by 
the ‘oil road’, cited numerous examples from their communities where land and property had 
been undervalued, “somebody has a property that’s worth 20 million and is being 
compensated 45,000 shillings” (COMA13, 2015). Losses for crops and property were paid 
according to rates set in previous years and did not reflect current values. The compensation 
rates for land and crops were set by the government, while the oil companies had the on-the-
ground presence and were responsible for payments. Grievances relating to compensation 
tended to be directed at oil company Community Liaison Officers, as the most visible actors at 
the subnational level. A Total CLO explained: “The district sets the compensation rate, which 
is often too low and doesn’t take into account inflation” (TOT03, 2013). Indeed, the advent of 
oil in Bunyoro had led to land speculation and inflated land rates. “People in the communities 
are suffering, 4 million shillings compensation won’t even buy a plot” one local consultant 
noted (CNS02, 2015). In village C, “Compensation has not been enough. For each tree 5000 
shillings is given but this doesn’t cover the costs” (COMC07, 2014). And while companies were 
aware of this and were prepared to pay higher rates, they claimed to be constrained in doing 
so because the costs of compensation payments for land were recoverable costs to be claimed 
back from the Government from future oil revenues, and the Government’s objective was to 
keep these recoverable costs to a minimum (COM01, 2014. MED01, 2014).  
 
In some cases, there was a general lack of awareness about the processes involved in acquiring 
communal land and the state’s right to acquisition. “When did the government buy this land 
from us?” (COME02, 2012) one village respondent asked. In the Multi-Stakeholder Forum 
(MSF) meetings for the Leeds Governance of Hydrocarbons research project in 2013, the lack 
of clarity between the District Land Boards and the Ministry of Land was evident. There were 
contestations between levels of Government in relation to rates, responsibilities and 
mandates, as one CSO noted:  
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“It is not clear who Tullow is supposed to pay; the subcounty, the district or central 
Government. The sub-county chief is asking these questions, saying that we are the 
first custodians of the place” (SCSO03, 2014). 
 
The politics around land and compensation reveal that the state is not a coherent and unified 
entity (Cross, 2014). Land issues further exposed the challenges of centralised control and the 
decentralised governance system. Indeed, in the MSFs in 2013 one outcome of the dialogues 
was local communities realising the different roles and agendas of district and central 
government in relation to oil, and between district and lower levels of government in relation 
to land issues. The grievances also demonstrate the government’s interests to push through 
the land and resource acquisition in a way that did not respect the rights of local people, and 
in a way that conflicted with the oil companies’ aims to manage community relations, as I 
discuss further in chapter six.  
 
Other grievances emerged around opportunities in the industry. During fieldwork in 2012, 
interview respondents raised issues about the employment practices of the industry. Some 
respondents had benefitted or knew of those who had benefited from casual jobs during phase 
one of the exploration phase. However, these jobs were short term, insecure and low paid, as 
one respondent in Tullow’s area explained: “We asked for jobs, but got only short-term 
contracts, so after three months you come back and to what?” (COMA06, 2014). A woman in 
CNOOC’s area reported that “There are some temporary jobs in [the village] – casual works 
and then they stop. They are only for men not women” (COMC05, 2014).  
 
The promise of potential benefits from the new industry plays an important role in ensuring 
support for the industry, and jobs are one of the key expectations of local people in resource 
frontiers (Himley, 2010). This presents a challenge, since the oil industry is predominantly a 
capital-intensive industry requiring mainly skilled labour. As some communities are displaced 
from traditional or previous sources of livelihoods as the industry develops, as I showed in 
section 5.2.5, there are few alternative sources of economic activity (Li, 2010); “we are fishers, 
what else can we do?” as one respondent noted (COMD02, 2012). Grievances about 
employment can be seen therefore as concerns about future livelihoods. This also led to 
concerns among respondents that others were benefitting because oil companies were 
bringing workers from ‘outside’ or ‘up the top’ (of the escarpment) region to do jobs that local 
people could do.  
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“They give us casual work only, they bring people from up the top and whites. We 
want our people to enjoy so that we benefit” (COMC10, 2015).  
 
This narrative of ‘outsiders’ featured frequently in interviews in relation to the discussion of 
the benefits and impacts of industry, and this narrative about ‘what is local’ is discussed 
further in chapter six in relation to the local content agenda. Local content emerged partly as 
a way to address the tendency of oil to generate few opportunities for unskilled employment. 
As I discussed in section 4.7 the narrative of ‘outsiders’ in this region is not new, but rather has 
come to have a new meaning with the advent of oil (Sjögren, 2013b).  
 
The emerging grievances during the exploration stage are significant for a number of reasons. 
They highlight the ongoing importance of alternative or co-existing resource ontologies 
(Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). Complaints about technical assessments disregarding 
crops and nature valuable to communities challenges the status of oil and the 
commodification of nature. It also demonstrates that post frontier measures, such as 
compensation schemes, meant to recognise the rights of local people, are themselves subject 
to contestation. The destruction of what are considered the cultural aspects of land have wide 
reaching implications; these are deeply embedded cultural practices “things [the industry] 
didn’t know” (KGD01, 2012) and heighten local people’s perceptions of being “spectators” 
(KGD01, 2012). The contestations also point to the importance of the agency of local actors as 
they mobilise around shared interests to address grievances (such as compensation, 
displacement). The experiences, and responses, of industry actors to land and compensation 
grievances calls into question the dichotomy between the state-industry nexus on the one 
hand and the local communities on the others. The evidence suggests that on the ground, this 
distinction is more blurred.  
 
5.4 Phase three 
Phase three (2013-2016) was characterised by post frontier practices of oil management by oil 
MNCs and oil governance by CSOs. There was an increasing number of actors and interactions 
in the oil assemblage as the project progressed, the interests of more actors were mobilised 
across scales, and the impacts of the exploration phase increased and became known to a 
wider number of actors. Analytical themes for phase three demonstrate the increasing 
importance both of global assemblages and the subnational level in shaping Uganda’s oil 
assemblage as the project cycle progressed. The first theme discusses the geographical shift of 
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engagement by oil MNCs and CSOs to the district level, and the selective inclusion of district 
actors, which is in contrast to the exclusion of district level actors in phase one (section 5.2) 
and phase two (section 5.3). This shift indicated the changing needs of industry and the 
increasing importance of the subnational level in terms of the impacts of oil. The second 
theme demonstrates the importance of key events in the project timeline that shaped political 
action and brought new actors and narratives to the assemblage, and the third theme shows 
that new narratives and new alliances emerging in the assemblage provided new avenues for 
the inclusion of marginalised groups. The final theme refers to the way the boom-and-bust 
nature of the industry shaped the assemblage as industry scaled back at the subnational level 
due to the fall in oil price, while at the same the activities of CSOs increased. The themes in 
phase three are picked up in greater detail in chapter six, which looks at the role of oil MNCs 
in the assemblage and in chapter seven, which looks at the role of CSOs.  
 
 
Figure 14. Phase three configuration of assemblage actors 
5.4.1 Focus of oil governance shifts to the subnational level 
In phase three there was a geographical shift in engagement to the district level by oil MNCs, 
CSOs and INGOs which demonstrated the increasing importance of the subnational in 
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Uganda’s oil assemblage. For CSOs, greater engagement at the district level during this phase 
was due to the donor emphasis on engaging the communities in the oil region and a growing 
awareness of the need to address the local impacts of oil. As chapter seven discusses in detail, 
partnerships between national and subnational CSOs became a key feature of the assemblage 
during phase three due to the challenges national CSOs faced to engage in the oil region and 
their reliance on subnational CSOs to mobilise people at the local level. Further, the 
increasing impacts and grievances in relation to land and compensation at the local level in 
this phase focused CSOs and INGOs increasingly on subnational issues. Logistically, the 
district (especially Hoima town) was the preferred place for CSOs to hold meetings and 
workshops, and some national CSOs set up local offices. As such, along with oil MNC 
stakeholder engagement meetings and the establishment of oil company liaison offices by 
Tullow and CNOOC in the town, CSO activities increased the salience of the district level in 
the oil assemblage.  
 
For oil companies, engagement at the district level in phase three contrasted with phases one 
and two when companies were “confined to the Graben” during exploration activities 
(SCSO04, 2014). The shift to the district took place at the same time as the project cycle 
moved further towards production, indicating that companies needed to seek legitimacy from 
a wider range of stakeholders to ensure the ‘social licence to operate’ (Joyce and Thomson, 
2000). This shift in approach, which is discussed in more detail in chapter six, began to shift 
social relations in the assemblage, as those actors excluded in the earlier phases were now 
selectively included through formalised stakeholder engagement. Indeed, analysis of the data 
reveals that the outright exclusion of District Local Government, traditional authorities and 
subnational CSOs was more apparent during the first two phases of exploration, and by phase 
three, engagement at the village level had reduced in Tullow and Total’s area. In 2014, during 
follow up interviews with district leadership and key technical staff, there had been a change 
towards pro-active (albeit selective) engagement at the district level by the oil MNCs. For 
example, the district leadership had received letters just days prior to our interview in July 
2014 inviting them to meet the ‘Joint Venture Partners’ (Tullow, CNOOC and Total).  
“They went to the central government at all stages, but now look, look at this letter! 
Now at this stage they want to engage. They are asking how can we work together in 
partnership.” (DLG04, 2014). 
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As I discuss in chapter six, this shift in phase three is directly related to the increasing 
pressures on oil MNCs to address subnational issues and effectively manage the impact of 
operations. This shift was driven by the oil MNCs and as such, it was on their terms. The 
district leadership noted that they had written to the oil companies several times over the 
previous years requesting meetings, but were told “we only deal with the Ministry of Energy”. 
However, by phase three, local authorities were configured as ‘stakeholders’ and potential 
‘partners’ in the project as industry needs changed. As I discuss in chapter seven, a similar 
change took place with subnational CSOs, who noted that previous exclusion and dismissal of 
requests for meetings had changed towards greater inclusion and recognition of CSOs as 
“serious stakeholders” (SCSO06, 2014). As such, in phase three selective inclusion of district 
actors by oil MNCs began to take place as the project cycle progressed, project needs changed 
and legitimacy concerns increased.  
 
5.4.2 Key events at the subnational level  
In phase three, a significant driver of change in the assemblage was the state-managed 
displacement and resettlement of over 7000 people for the domestic oil refinery in Hoima 
District. According to Larsen, in the post frontier era resettlement for oil infrastructure 
constitutes ‘accumulation by repossession’, taking place through participatory processes 
which protect rights. However, the data show that the poor handling of this process by the 
government created a crisis that national and subnational CSOs responded to, leading to 
closer connections between CSOs and oil affected communities. Further, the framing of the 
plight as a ‘human rights’ issue mobilised actors at the global level and connected Uganda’s oil 
assemblage to human rights assemblages, thus providing opportunities for change in Uganda’s 
oil assemblage (chapter seven).  
 
The refinery resettlement planning process began in 2012 through the Refinery Resettlement 
Action Plan (RAP). The government exercised its constitutional right to compulsorily acquire 
29.5 square km area of land for the oil refinery site in Hoima District and contracted a 
Ugandan organisation called Strategic Friends International to coordinate the resettlement 
and compensation process, in accordance with international guidelines (SCSO08, 2014). As 
noted in sections 4.4 and 5.3 the pursuit of a domestic oil refinery became President 
Museveni’s personal project, which he made central to the imaginary of Uganda as a modern, 
oil producing nation. The refinery is an important means of achieving energy security and 
boosting Uganda’s power in the wider East Africa region. The site of the proposed refinery, 
 139 
however, is on land which supports the livelihoods of several hundred families. The 13 villages 
comprise communities that have lived on and farmed the land for generations; cultivation is 
an important source of income to pay for school fees and healthcare (KNG04, 2015). Already 
there is a tension which reflects competing resource ontologies.  
 
The experiences of the respondents facing displacement for the refinery reflect the centralised 
control and management of oil, and the importance of the refinery to Uganda as an oil state. 
During research in 2012, I interviewed respondents in one of the villages earmarked for 
displacement and there was a general lack of clarity about the process of resettlement.  
Although respondents noted a number of meetings with the government, they claimed that 
they were unclear about the ‘roles and responsibilities’ and had only been told “not to plant 
crops” due to the imminent move. They had been visited by the Resident District 
Commissioner and other government officials: “they said the refinery is a government project 
and you cannot stop it” one respondent reflected (COMF01, 2012). Respondents claimed that 
their questions about the refinery were interpreted as opposition to it. The villagers also noted 
a visit from a CSO from Kampala in 2012, who advised them to negotiate on compensation 
rates. Only 29 families opted for resettlement, while the rest would receive monetary 
compensation. Respondents said they were in a state of limbo, having been told not to plant 
crops as they awaited the resettlement process. Respondents claimed they were “fenced off 
from benefits” and could not get jobs with the oil companies due to their imminent departure 
from the site. District leaders noted their exclusion from the RAP: “the (government 
appointed) consultancy did everything in the refinery resettlement, the District Local 
Government were spectators”. One result is “this (compensation) money has been wasted. The 
resettlement action plan should not have involved giving cash but should have involved giving 
land and building homes”.  (DLG09, 2014).  
 
Consequently, as respondents noted, the outcomes of the refinery process had been 
catastrophic for some local people. The compensation money, reportedly given to the male 
head of household without requiring the wife to sign, and given without any financial 
management advice, had been frittered away in many cases. In interviews with subnational 
CSOs, DLG and Kingdom in 2014 and 2015 the refinery issues was dominant, and respondents 
noted knock-on effects of domestic violence, families abandoned by husbands, impacts on 
education, and impacts on food production in the wider area.  
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Not all families received compensation in a timely manner, which created additional negative 
impacts at the community and household levels. The resettlement process was done in stages 
and the timeframe dragged on for years, leaving some families behind while others left. Those 
residents still awaiting resettlement at the time of interviews in 2014 and 2015 reported 
overgrown plots which are not being worked because the government ordered them not to 
plant.  
“[The people displaced for the refinery] are scattered, they’re facing challenges. Food 
shortage is a problem because people can’t cultivate, but even if they were allowed to 
keep cultivating, now the wild animals are eating the food” (NCSO10, 2014). 
 
As Global Rights Alert reports: “what were once vibrant communities appear deserted today” 
(Global Rights Alert, 2015: 5). The outcomes of the RAP highlight the failure of 
implementation of post frontier measures, which were meant to recognise the rights of 
residents to compensation and resettlement in guidance with national and international laws 
and norms (Larsen, 2015). As the resettlement processes continued, and problems with the 
delays in compensation were increasingly voiced, local people began to organise around their 
shared interests. The plight of the displaced people attracted the interests of a range of actors, 
both within and outside the region, and led CSOs to organise to support the refinery 
residents. The refinery – at the time only a promise of industry infrastructure – became a key 
site on which ‘assemblages of  protest’ developed (Brown and Spiegel, 2017).  
 
The plight of local refinery residents became known to global activist organisations through 
national CSOs connected to global networks. The failings of the RAP gave CSOs the 
opportunity to provide support to local communities seeking help and restitution; they 
connected local people to lawyers and Parliamentarians. Prominent national CSOs framed the 
issue as human rights violations and the plight of the refinery reached a global audience. 
Many of the refinery residents rejected the compensation rates offered and with the support 
and encouragement of CSOs some of the refinery residents created an organisation of 
aggrieved residents and made petitions to district and national government. They received 
funding and resources from international donors via the national CSOs, for example, for video 
recording equipment to record their plight and upload to YouTube and NGO webpages (CSO 
interviews, 2014).  
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The oil refinery became the actual and symbolic site which brought together actors with 
similar interests (Brown and Spiegel, 2017). Subnational CSOs included support for refinery 
residents in their work plans, and the DLG and Bunyoro Kingdom also became involved. The 
refinery became a symbol to highlight the state’s exclusion of important actors and issues in 
oil development, and shaped political action across scales. However, in response, the state 
acted in a repressive manner and accused the CSOs of conspiring to stall the oil project. 
Subnational CSOs, who played a role in mobilising refinery-affected people for meetings with 
national CSOs, lawyers and MPs were targeted by state security forces and interview 
respondents noted that colleagues were threatened with arrest (SCSO04, 2014, SCSO08, 2014). 
Surveillance of CSOs increased and organisations were required to submit work plans to 
district security to be scrutinised and ensure work was not ‘political’.  
 
The wider effects of this event mobilised (non-state) actors across scales and brought new 
narratives around human rights to the oil assemblage. This demonstrates the ways that the 
materiality of the resource can shape social relations and political action, and also the ideas 
about oil which mobilised the human rights advocacy network. The ability of CSOs to gain 
support from external actors was due to the framing of the refinery displacement as a human 
rights issue, something which resonated with external actors concerned about the links 
between oil and human rights and demonstrating the significance of external relations to 
influence the assemblage configuration, in this case acting as assemblage converter (Haarstad 
and Wanvik, 2017). 
 
5.4.3 New narratives and new alliances 
The refinery displacement event and the resulting mobilisation of actors across scales 
demonstrates the ability for local level struggles to connect with global assemblages which in 
turn shaped Uganda’s oil assemblage. This event also provided opportunities for some 
Ugandan actors to make connections with other actors sharing similar concerns and interests, 
both within and beyond Uganda. As a result, the narrative of human rights became a key 
narrative in Uganda’s oil assemblage, in addition to the dominant ones of transparency and 
good governance.  
 
The capacity of the human rights narrative to create opportunities for change in the oil 
assemblage was demonstrated in 2014, after a land eviction of almost 1000 people in Hoima 
District was tied to plans for an oil industry waste management plant to be set up by American 
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oil and gas service firm McAlster. A national CSO respondent explained that McAlster 
apparently had received a permit from the National Environment Management Authority 
(NEMA), and this had “fuelled the forced eviction because of money” (NCSO14, 2015); in other 
words, the potential for local elites to profit from the lease of land to the company. CSOs were 
able to frame this as a human rights issue which raised concerns among the oil companies: 
“We approached Tullow and Total to ask about this. They sent a letter to say they will 
not deal with McAlster, they said they will not tolerate human rights abuses” (NCSO14, 
2015). 
 
While the oil companies did not intervene in relation to the refinery displacement, which was 
a government project, the waste plant eviction was directly linked to them. This clear 
distancing from an issue that could potentially damage their reputation demonstrates the 
influence of the ‘human rights’ advocacy network and the importance of ‘social licence’ issues, 
which chapter six shows became increasingly important in phase three. McAlster left Uganda 
and the event opened up dialogue between national CSOs and the oil companies on a matter 
that had the potential to act as a deterritorialising force given the connection of Uganda’s oil 
assemblage to assemblages of human rights. As the CSO respondent further reflected “[The 
companies] have learned to hear and be responsive and improved their communication with 
CSOs” in contrast to phase one during which “there was antagonism between CSOs and oil 
companies, no proper channels of communication and limited responsiveness” (NCSO14, 
2015). As chapters six and seven discuss in more detail, this indicates the changing 
relationship between oil companies and CSOs which was influenced by changing industry 
needs to craft legitimacy and ‘manage’ project impacts.  
 
Closer connections developed between other actors in the assemblage and enabled some 
actors excluded by dynamics in phases one and two to be included in different ways. For 
example, while the Bunyoro Kingdom also began to be included in formal stakeholder 
engagement meetings by industry in phase three, in 2014 interviews the perception of 
exclusion and marginalisation among Kingdom respondents remained: “We have no serious 
relationship with the oil companies…they pay courtesy calls or when they have a problem” 
(KGD03, 2014). However, through links to national CSOs the Kingdom exercised agency by 
commissioning a national CSO to carry out a study on ‘cultural sites’ in the Bunyoro region 
and published a joint report on Sacred Natural Sites. One CSO Project Officer explained how 
the importance of traditional customs to preserve the “sacred natural sites” (NCSO10, 2014) 
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were now under threat due to oil. This study fed into the work being done in partnership with 
Friends of the Earth and Gaia foundation, and connected the Kingdom with international 
partners working on indigenous rights. The ability for the Kingdom to frame challenges in the 
oil region as ‘indigenous’ issues demonstrates the importance of global linkages and gave the 
Kingdom a means of inclusion through this marginal yet powerful narrative. This example also 
illustrates that actor positions in the assemblage are not always easily categorised (Cross, 
2014). While working with the global alliance ‘Keep the oil in the soil’, the Kingdom was at the 
same time petitioning the government for a share of oil revenues to ‘develop’ the region. This 
apparent ambivalence was also evident within civil society. Chapter seven notes that the 
narrative ‘Say no to oil’ which came out of the work of the national CSO and the Kingdom was 
not supported by the locally based officers of the CSO as they claimed it contradicted the 
perspectives of local people who “say they want the industry but with safeguards” (SCSO10, 
2015).   
 
During phase three, although the grievances in relation to oil had increased significantly, 
there remained considerable hope for benefits from the industry. There was also evidence of a 
shift in narrative towards how people could benefit from the industry. Among district actors, 
there was growing awareness that “jobs are not coming” (DLG07, 2014), and the best way to 
benefit was through ‘indirect benefitting’; as one CSO said “we are encouraging people to grow 
tomatoes, they can put up a stall at the side of the road” (SCSO04, 2014). Industry also began 
to draw on a similar ‘local content’ narrative2, as a way to address the local pressures for 
opportunities and benefits from the industry. In 2014 the ‘Joint Venture Partners’ (Tullow, 
Total and CNOOC) released a report about opportunities for local people in the industry. 
Benefits were to be ‘indirect’, with the report indicating that up to 150,000 opportunities 
would be available through ‘indirect and induced opportunities’. At a local content 
presentation in Hoima town that I was invited to attend by Tullow Oil’s Social Engagement 
manager, I observed Tullow’s National Content manager explain that Ugandans could benefit 
from the industry through participating indirectly. The presentation took place in the 
crowded conference hall of a hotel in Hoima town, with approximately one hundred religious 
and cultural leaders in the audience. This was one of a number of times the same presentation 
would be given to different subnational stakeholders.  
 
2 Local content, also known as national content is defined as the value added or created in the Ugandan economy 
through the employment of Ugandan workers and the use of goods produced or available in Uganda and services 




Tullow’s National Content manager presented the results of the JVP report - and explained in 
detail how indirect and induced opportunities worked. It was clear that the responsibility was 
placed in the hands of local people to take advantage of what was on offer. For example, the 
national content manager relayed some advice he had recently given to a group of young men 
who complained to him they had lost their jobs with Tullow: 
“I said ‘this is the best opportunity for you, go back and in the next six months or 1 year 
go acquire the skills for brick layer and craftsperson because in 2 years from now you’ll 
be who we want, we won’t want slashers’” (JVP02, 2014).   
 
Indeed, the loss of casual work for ‘slashers’ (those who clear grass and bush to make way for 
construction of access roads) or ‘lifters’ (those who remove rocks or carry heavy materials), 
which was available to local people during phases one and two, was framed as a positive 
through the local content narrative. The loss was a chance for local people to retrain and skill-
up to ensure that they could benefit in the future. In this way the local content narrative 
reframed the idea of benefits as something that should not be expected without some 
commitment from local people to acquire the necessary capacity. The local content narrative 
was a new way to promise benefits in the future as a way to encourage people to support the 
industry in the present (Cross, 2014).  
 
5.4.4 Boom and bust in the frontier 
In mid-July 2014, the global oil price fell dramatically to below $50 per barrel. As a clear 
demonstration of the ways in which oil has material effects prior to any oil being produced 
(Weszkalnys, 2008), the oil price drop considerably impacted Uganda’s oil assemblage. The 
low oil price shaped negotiations between the government and oil MNCs and shifted the 
balance back towards the companies, who attempted to re-negotiate PSAs to get improved 
terms in light of the lower oil price (Patey, 2015).  
 
The oil price also affected operations within Uganda, as Total and Tullow reduced staff further 
(TUL08, 2016). Tullow, the smaller company of the JVPs, was particularly affected by the price 
drop, which compounded the financial difficulties Tullow was already experiencing from the 
Heritage / Uganda Revenue Authority tax battle, as well as the ongoing delay to receiving the 
Uganda production licence. Tullow had already reduced workers in the oil camps, which had 
knock-on effects for the Traidlinks agriculture supply chain project that had started to supply 
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the camps (chapter six). From the optimism of phase one and two, during which time Uganda 
was the cornerstone of Tullow’s success in Africa, by the time of the 2015 fieldwork trip during 
phase three, there was widespread belief among respondents that Tullow might leave Uganda; 
“we hear they’re packing off” one district government respondent claimed (DLG08, 2014).  
 
Indeed, the low oil price meant further delays to production and raised a question mark over 
the viability of the project, demonstrating the potential for dramatic oil price changes to 
disrupt the oil assemblage (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017) (and which certainly contributed to 
Tullow’s decision to sell the majority of its Uganda assets to Total in 2016). At the local level, 
this meant the presence of Tullow Oil and Total reduced even further as the number of CLOs 
was scaled back. However, it was during such a period of uncertainty that questions about the 
industry that was promised as a means of progress and prosperity to Ugandans were 
increasing. In a follow up interview with one of the two remaining Tullow CLOs in 2016 the 
CLO explained: 
“Community engagement is more important now, as communities are used to seeing 
the presence of CLOs and interacting with them. The non-technical risks are so 
important...” (TUL08, 2016). 
 
The quote demonstrates that while oil MNCs are waiting for the industry to be profitable to 
ensure a return on their investment, the material impacts of the oil assemblage in the pre-oil 
stage create the need for greater engagement. As I discuss in chapter six, it is these non-
technical risks that are less of a concern in the pre-oil stage of the industry yet are a crucial 
part of the oil assemblage. Both Tullow and CNOOC CLOs noted during follow up interviews 
in 2016 that issues and grievances relating to land acquisition had come to dominate their 
work. It is in this context that stakeholder engagement at the subnational level became an 
important tool for managing community relations (chapter six).  
 
While the industry presence scaled back at the local level in phase three, the activities of CSOs 
and INGOs increased in relation to industry impacts, further shaping the oil assemblage 
configuration. While the importance of the transparency agenda remained, donor funding 
became increasingly geared towards addressing the problems affecting refinery residents and 
on land issues more generally, as I show in chapter seven. Donors began to encourage 
coordination between the various organisations receiving funding. For example, a 
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representative of one organisation noted that her group had begun to work with other 
organisations working on oil and gas in the region: 
“Donor funding has caused an expansion, we were brought together, due to funding 
requirements we had to expand into the sub-county – so we approached Tonya parish, 
we strengthened through networking with [prominent national CSOs]” (SCSO11, 2015).   
 
This is one example from the data that highlights how donor-funded CSO activity began to 
provide opportunities for subnational CSOs to build their capacity and networks in phase 
three, indicating a deepening of alliance-making between global and subnational actors. In 
contrast to phase two, by the end of phase three there was evidence of international donors 
directly funding subnational CSOs. The oil assemblage had changed considerably from phase 
one prior to any oil being produced.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter showed the emergence Uganda’s oil assemblage over three phases of the oil 
exploration period, between 2005 and 2016. These phases are categorised as pre-commercial 
threshold (2005-2008), industry consolidation and progression to oil (2009-2012), post frontier 
practices of oil management and oil governance (2013-2016). In each phase, the configuration 
of actors in the assemblage changed and the interests of actors in each phase were shaped, 
mobilised and influenced by different elements of the oil assemblage.  
 
In phase one, there were few actors in the oil assemblage and the control of oil was centralised 
around the state, with oil exploration companies dealing directly with oil communities, 
relatively out of sight in the Albertine Graben. In phase two, commercial discoveries attracted 
the interests of global oil players and mobilised the interests of civil society actors. It was in 
this phase, when Uganda’s oil was progressing towards production, that tensions arose 
between Uganda’s oil as a globally valuable commodity, and its use as a national endowment. 
It was also in phase two that links developed between actors with shared interests in the 
governance of Uganda’s oil. Oil narratives, funding and practices from resource governance 
assemblages became part of Uganda’s oil assemblage. In phase three the assemblage 
configuration was characterised by more actors and considerably more complex interactions. 
The focus of oil management by oil MNCs, and oil governance by CSOs began to draw on post 
frontier narratives and practices, and engagement shifted to the subnational level and 
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selectively included actors previously marginalised in phases one and two. Key events shaped 
social relations and mobilised political action across scales and human rights narratives 
became part of the assemblage, providing opportunities for agency.  
 
The focus on the subnational in this chapter reveals insights into the role of the subnational 
within the oil assemblage. The subnational level is not a passive recipient of a global oil 
project but plays an active role in shaping the assemblage. The findings show that the 
assemblage is not only shaped by oil capital, but the materiality of the resource and ideas 
about oil are part of the assemblage and these have material implications at the subnational 
level. The material impacts of oil influence subnational dynamics, leading to pockets of 
discontent. Ideas about oil in the assemblage influence development imaginaries, 
simultaneously shaping aspirations and uncertainty about the oil future. Chapters six and 





6.0 Chapter six 
 
CSR and stakeholder engagement in Uganda’s oil assemblage 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the contemporary era, extractives companies are operating in a context of a proliferation of 
international and national standards to guide their operations in countries of operation 
(Gilberthorpe and Hilson, 2016). Larsen (2015) refers to these as ‘post frontier regimes’ which 
aim to transform frontier practices of extraction and corporate predation into sustainable and 
positive outcomes for localities. It is in such a context that CSR and stakeholder engagement 
are used by oil companies as key strategies to manage subnational extractives spaces, build 
relationships and provide benefits to local people, with the wider aim of maintaining 
legitimacy (Larsen, 2017, Billo, 2015, Dolan and Rajak, 2016).  
 
While CSR employed by oil companies is now a-taken-for granted measure, less is understood 
about the complexities of the legitimacy-seeking process in extractives contexts, and especially 
about how and why different companies go about implementing post frontier measures in the 
early stages of industry. Understanding these processes is especially pertinent in a new oil 
frontier in which the industry is starting from scratch and with no legacy of extractives 
industry. Further, Uganda’s oil sector is being developed by three multinational oil companies 
with markedly different backgrounds and experiences and as such it is important to analyse 
them as separate entities rather than together as ‘oil capital’ (Bury, 2008). This chapter builds 
on the discussion in chapter five in relation to engagement by oil MNCs in the oil assemblage, 
and the way modes of engagement (CSR, community engagement and stakeholder 
engagement) articulate with the subnational level.  
 
In doing so it addresses research objective 2 of the thesis; to explore the role of oil MNCs in 
the oil assemblage and the significance of the subnational in shaping and constraining this 
role and also contributes to the overarching research objective 1b which is to explore how the 
emerging oil assemblage articulates with the subnational level to shape outcomes.  
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This chapter draws from data collected during field visits to Uganda between 2012 and 2016. As 
described in section 3.5, the primary data includes 137 semi-structured interviews, 
observations from oil company stakeholder engagement meetings, multi-stakeholder forums, 
and validation interviews, including with industry actors. The chapter also uses secondary 
data, including newspaper articles, information from Uganda’s Ministry of Energy, and oil 
company CSR reports (see chapter three for more detail on methods).  
 
The chapter is structured according to the key findings which emerged from thematic 
analysis. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 explore the strategies and rationales for CSR and community and 
stakeholder engagement of the three oil majors in the Bunyoro region during the exploration 
period, over time (6.2) and across companies (6.3). Section 6.4 discusses the extent to which 
subnational dynamics shape and constrain this engagement.  
 
6.2 Change over time   
In chapter five I showed how the oil assemblage began to emerge and take shape over three 
phases during the exploration period. In this section I discuss in more depth how this shifting 
context influenced how and why oil MNCs engaged at the subnational level.  
 
6.2.1 Frontier engagement in phase one 
One of the main reasons for oil companies to engage with local communities in the oil region 
during the exploration period is to ensure access to land and resources. In an interview in 
2012, one of Tullow’s social engagement team summed up the implications of the point source 
nature of Uganda’s oil resource: “We can’t avoid the community, we are working on their 
land” (TUL02, 2012). In an interview in 2015, a CNOOC Community Liaison Officer (CLO) 
reflected that exploration activities often had gone ahead before compensation payments were 
made to local people, meaning that negotiating access to land was a key driver of corporate 
engagement during the exploration phase (CNC03, 2015). However, while gaining access to 
land remained important throughout the three phases identified in chapter five, as the project 
timeline progressed industry priorities shifted, and how access was maintained changed and 
differed between companies.  
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In phase one (2005-2008), during which time ‘wildcatter’ companies carried out exploration, 
relationship building with the ‘host’ communities was an important part of engagement. The 
companies required the permanent and temporary use of community land, for example to 
build company worker compounds, construct access roads to oil sites and carry out seismic 
surveys. As I showed in section 5.2.1, the state was present through its military and security 
arm to provide security for the oil sites, and companies were left to negotiate with community 
leaders for land, meaning that arrangements were made between the companies and local 
leaders.  
 
In return for access to and use of land “Tullow mangers gave handouts (of money) in [village 
A], the LC1s (village leaders) were earning 150,000 shillings a month” (GOV01, 2014). This 
suggests an informal relationship between Tullow workers and village leaders in a frontier 
context that was temporary and ‘out of sight’ (Barney, 2009). Given the location of the oil 
drilling sites close to villages along the shores of Lake Albert, oil company workers lived in 
close proximity to local people: 
“We feel we’re part of them, we occupy community land. Relationships are 
maintained… our workers sleep in (village A), use the canteens, we share boreholes” 
(TUL02, 2012). 
 
Interview respondents in the villages also reflected on the close relationship between the 
community and oil company workers that developed during this phase; “We are your 
neighbours” oil companies told local leaders. Respondents considered the oil companies to be 
part of their community, sharing resources and space, and it was in this context that local 
people believed that CSR was done to improve the welfare of the community; “They said you 
can’t see a neighbour suffering… this was for our development”, one elder recalled being told 
by a Tullow manager (COMA06, 2014). Indeed, relationship building was driven by industry 
needs to access and, but the material conditions of the Albertine Graben were also influential. 
Heritage Oil, Hardman Resources and Tullow Oil were hosted by villages that are fish-landing 
sites on Lake Albert, places where fish are collected and traded. Sanitation is poor, outbreaks 
of cholera are frequent and social infrastructure is very minimal; “It is so isolated, no food 
supplies, conditions are so bad” as one civil society interviewee noted (SCSO03, 2014).  
 
Companies contributed to improving social amenities in their respective areas: Hardman gave 
a small wooden building (a former mess hall for workers) to village B to use as a school, 
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Heritage Oil built a primary school and a health clinic in village C. In interviews in 2012, 
community respondents noted other support from oil exploration companies during phase 
one, including bore holes, and donations of educational and medical supplies.  
 
While village leaders benefited from being on the payroll, a practice which Tullow CLOs noted 
they inherited from Hardman Resources, local people in the villages benefited in other ways: 
“[Tullow management] hired locals as porters, they were getting food and good money, 
they were looked at as saviours. They created roads, at the time no vehicles could get 
there” (GOV01, 2014). 
 
The exploration companies were responding to the immediate needs of accessing the land, 
and the material reality of the Albertine Graben, but through this engagement they brought 
material improvements to marginalised communities in a region with high poverty levels. 
Some interview respondents noted in 2012 that seeing vehicles and large trucks was itself a 
benefit, however, what this represented was a promise of progress in a region that was 
previously isolated (Anand et al., 2018). This shaped perceptions of the industry: “whoever 
makes a road is a hero” as one district leader pointed out (DLG03, 2014). This evidence shows 
the role played by industry in fostering the imaginary of development in phase one through 
these interactions (Tsing, 2003). The presence of industry was not only a promise; there were 
tangible opportunities and financial benefits for certain community members during this 
time. This type of corporate engagement reflects the paternalism of an ‘old’ style of CSR where 
companies would gain loyalty and support in exchange for ‘gifts’ (Rajak, 2017). ‘Frontier 
engagement’ during phase one was not guided by the industry norms and standards for CSR 
that would shape engagement in the later phases, but rather by the material reality of the 
frontier and the territorially grounded nature of oil which shaped industry needs (Bridge, 
2009). 
 
Tullow Oil went further than providing philanthropy and ‘gifts’ by implementing several 
explicitly ‘development’ focused CSR projects in phase one. This intervention was unusual for 
a small independent oil exploration company needing to negotiate land and resource use, and 
reflects Tullow’s ambitions to become Africa’s leading independent oil company (Tullow Oil 
plc, 2010). This also provides an indication that Tullow had a longer-term aim in Uganda, that 
is not the case for ‘wildcatter’ exploration companies, whose goal it is to find oil and leave 
(Anderson and Browne, 2011). The vision of Aiden Heavey, the founder of Tullow Oil and CEO 
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during this time, was to ensure that CSR was a core Tullow value. Heavey aimed to harness the 
entrepreneurial spirit of Tullow Oil to ‘make a difference’ in its countries of operation, and 
embraced a challenge set by the CEO of international development charity GOAL in 2005, for 
companies to use business solutions to address poverty (Tullow Oil plc, 2006 ). In a newspaper 
interview in 2007, Heavey explained this in relation to the Albertine Graben: 
"You find there are 30 people a month around the lake dying of cholera and you can do 
something by drilling a well for water. On average, 25 per cent of the babies would die 
at birth due to lack of hygiene, but it was the simplest thing in the world to solve: we 
built a little clinic" (Northedge, 2007: no page).  
 
In addition to the maternity clinic, Tullow constructed a primary school in the same village, 
and built a health centre, a primary school and a lifeboat station in the neighbouring village. 
International NGOs were brought in to deliver health interventions and to train a number of 
local women in a selection of villages to become peer educators in the communities. In 
interviews in 2012 the women in village D showed us Tullow branded ‘peer educator’ T-shirts 
and explained their role to deliver HIV awareness and distribute condoms. Global 
development discourse of ‘help communities to help themselves’ (Billo, 2015) was also evident. 
Tullow implemented several enterprise projects in one village, which were intended to 
become self-sustaining and provide income generating opportunities to the local community 
to address the lack of a regional economy (Tullow Oil plc, 2010). Projects included a vegetable 
garden, an apiary, and a women’s sewing project. Through these interventions Tullow Oil 
became a development actor in the region (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014), and through its 
connections to global development actors and use of development discourse, linked Uganda’s 
oil assemblage to global development assemblages.  
 
A complex mix of motives are evident in Tullow’s engagements in the oil communities in 
phase one. As Garriga and Melé (2004) show, philanthropic CSR can be driven by an 
underlying profit motive, or can be driven by a fundamental moral belief in the right to 
development. Heavey’s strategic and moral vision for Tullow in Africa suggests a combination 
of the two. In interviews in 2012 community members in Tullow’s area of operation discussed 
benefits from Tullow’s arrival in the region, especially in improving access to health services. 
These benefits from the enterprise projects played an operational and strategic function for 
Tullow also; in the EIA for the ‘early production scheme’, benefits from the CSR enterprise 
projects in the villages are listed as part of negotiations (ERM, 2008), demonstrating their 
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instrumental use to territorialise the project. This suggests the ‘modern’ CSR guided by global 
development principles still has the underlying logic of the ‘gift’ in terms of buying support for 
the company at the local level (Rajak, 2017). The CSR investments also contributed to Tullow’s 
strategic goal to gain competitive edge through ‘Making a positive impact in Africa’ and ‘doing 
things differently’ (Tullow Oil plc, 2010) in an industry notoriously criticised for its negative 
impact. Tullow won an international CSR award for the projects in 2010, indicating the 
important role the CSR projects played in shaping Tullow’s international reputation 
(Nakaweesi, 2010).  
 
6.2.2 Professionalisation of the project in phase two 
In 2009 Tullow surpassed the threshold for commercial oil, signalling with greater certainty 
that Uganda was on the cusp of becoming an oil state. It was in this phase that corporate 
engagement changed further, reflecting the shift in the project cycle, changing industry needs 
and pressures, and the rising stakes in Uganda’s oil. Tullow’s CSR shifted from the 
‘paternalism’ and ‘voluntarism’ that characterised CSR in phase one (Rajak, 2017) to a more 
strategic approach, which demonstrated Tullow’s longer-term vision and aims (Porter and 
Kramer, 2006). 
 
The industry consolidated with Tullow’s purchase of Hardman and then Heritage, and Tullow 
was briefly the only remaining company as a deal was negotiated with the Government of 
Uganda to bring in oil majors CNOOC and Total (chapter four). As I discussed in section 5.3.1 
the plan to ‘farm down’ to oil majors Total and CNOOC signalled the need for greater capital 
investment and technical expertise that Tullow lacked, and also spoke to the profit-making 
potential of Uganda’s oil finds.  
 
Tullow’s transition from an oil exploration company to a producer had a number of 
implications for the company. Tullow was dealing with an increasingly demanding operational 
environment in Uganda and greater visibility of the company, which meant in contrast to the 
informal approach in phase one, Tullow was now subject to international industry standards, 
as a government respondent noted:  
“Tullow brought in a professional as manager, and things had to be done to acceptable 
international standards of working” (GOV01, 2014).  
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The shift to a ‘professional’ approach in phase two also influenced Tullow’s approach to CSR 
and community engagement. Data show that Tullow restructured the corporate engagement 
function within the company, which became directed towards ensuring the ‘social licence to 
operate’, indicating the need for Tullow to seek wider societal approval for its operations  
(Joyce and Thomson, 2000). Whereas in phase one a key driver of engagement was access to 
land and build support at the local level through relationships with local leaders (LC1s), the 
explicit focus on ‘social licence’ indicated Tullow’s shifting priorities and the importance of 
establishing a longer-term presence in Uganda.  
 
One of the key tools used to establish this presence was Community Liaison Officers (CLOs). 
CLOs are Ugandan nationals originating from the Bunyoro region who possess in-depth 
knowledge of the local area, cultural and social practices, and local languages (in addition to 
English). Through CLOs, Tullow aimed to better manage the territory and address grievances 
over land, compensation and other complaints relating to the impacts of exploration activities 
that increased during this phase (chapter five). In our interviews CLOs explained their role as 
“to improve community relations” (TUL06, 2014), but it was clear that CLOs were an 
important part of territorialising the oil project through professionalising corporate 
engagement and implementing industry norm and standards (Larsen, 2015, Haarstad and 
Wanvik, 2017). CLOs noted a number of international industry standards and norms they 
draw on to guide this work, including IFC standards, UN guidelines and social performance 
norms. The evidence demonstrates an increasing reliance on expert knowledge from global 
assemblages of CSR to inform local engagement (Rajak, 2011).  
 
The use of global norms to guide CSR went hand in hand with the shift to strategic CSR from 
2009. In interviews Tullow’s social engagement team emphasised the importance of CSR to 
create long-term value. They explained that CSR had moved away from CSR as ‘one off’ - 
because “all communities want something, they all want a health centre” (TUL04, 2014) - 
towards a “collaboration and partnership approach” (TUL04, 2014) which would be about 
“creating value” (TUL05, 2014). There was further evidence that Tullow was drawing on 
external knowledge and expertise to guide its strategy:  
“Social Investment is providing lasting benefits. This is an approach we are seeing in 
other places such as Australia” (TUL04, 2014). 
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In 2012 Tullow contracted a UK based international development consultancy, Montrose, to 
review and restructure its local level CSR and help it make the transition from ‘one off’ CSR to 
‘social investment’. Montrose “made recommendations on [the CSR projects’] quality, 
relevance, value for money and shared value” (Montrose, 2012: no page). This also “included 
“retro-fitting” exit strategies to several of the larger projects” (Ibid.). In practice, this meant 
helping Tullow to disengage from the village CSR enterprise projects, which villagers claim 
“disappeared, they took away the projects without informing us” (COMA02, 2014). The local 
level CSR projects (which Tullow expected to become self-sustaining but in reality, had 
continued to rely on Tullow CLOs to support), were no longer part of Tullow’s vision for social 
investment. As such, Tullow’s ‘professionalisation’ and longer-term strategy had implications 
for local level social relations between Tullow and the oil communities.  
 
In phase two, Tullow’s corporate engagement strategy was influenced further as a result of 
Tullow becoming embroiled in the politics of Uganda’s oil (sections 4.4 and 5.3.1). This series 
of crises was the context in which Tullow shifted its focus more explicitly onto reputation 
management and ‘stakeholder’ engagement. The accusations of bribery and corruption were a 
considerable blow to a company attempting to establish a competitive edge through CSR. 
Tullow’s 2010 CSR report refuted the corruption claims and noted: 
“We must think about our good reputation in everything we do and engage a lot more 
with external stakeholders” (Tullow Oil plc, 2010: 4) 
 
The exposure to Uganda’s oil politics emphasised the importance of relationship building with 
powerful stakeholders on whom Tullow was increasingly reliant to ensure the company’s long-
term viability in Uganda (Beddewela and Fairbrass, 2016). As such, Tullow’s priorities shifted 
away from the local level rural communities and ‘community engagement’ towards fostering 
relationships with stakeholders though ‘stakeholder engagement’.  
 
The shift to the stakeholder model  meant the inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders 
(Mitchell et al., 1997), many of whom Tullow had overlooked in phase one. For example, to 
address concerns that the industry was operating in secret, Tullow responded to requests from 
subnational actors to visit the oil sites. Group visits were organised for district leaders and 
representatives of community organisations and religious and cultural institutions:   
“Tullow made tours for groups down to the wells. There were a lot of rumours about 
what was going on… 60-70 people went, each bus had 18 people. There was a 
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presentation, they took us to see the wells and the waste management, the storage, 
they were open about it. The crude is sealed – the keys are with the government – 
Tullow can’t touch it” (SCSO08, 2014).  
 
This gesture was significant in that it opened the ‘enclave’ to (mainly district based) local 
elites and demonstrated Tullow’s commitment to building wider relations and challenging the 
common perceptions of ‘oil and secrecy’, and indeed, the charge that Tullow engaged in 
corrupt practices. This also marked a geographical shift from Tullow’s previous concentration 
in the villages towards establishing a presence in Hoima District. In 2012 Tullow opened a 
‘liaison office’ in Hoima town, 90km away from the villages and this became the base in the oil 
region for Tullow’s CLOs, enabling informal engagements to take place at the district level.  
 
Tullow’s response in terms of establishing the Hoima office and organising visits to the oil 
wells demonstrates their commitment to ‘doing things differently’ and sits in contrast to the 
strategy of Total, who remained based in Kampala and was largely unresponsive to 
stakeholder requests for information (interviews with CSOs, Kingdom and DLG). This also 
highlights that Tullow – a small company much less experienced and established than Total 
and CNOOC - perceived reputational issues to be of considerable importance during its 
transition to an oil production company, and closely linked to its continuing success (Joyce 
and Thomson, 2000).  
 
6.2.3 Oil majors and the shift towards ‘post frontier’ extraction in phase three  
Corporate engagement changed again with the arrival of CNOOC and Total to the oil region 
in phase three (2013-2016). The emphasis was on ‘managing the impacts’ of the project through 
strategic CSR and putting post frontier measures in place to territorialise the project (Larsen, 
2015, Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). In interviews all three companies discussed the use of post 
frontier devices such as Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA), baseline 
studies, grievance mechanisms, and local employment strategies. Some examples I observed in 
the Hoima liaison offices of Tullow and CNOOC in 2014, and in the offices of some district and 
subcounty leaders during fieldwork in 2013 and 2014 were small booklets; to introduce the oil 
project and outline land acquisition procedures (Tullow and CNOOC); to explain company 
employment hiring practices (Total); and to explain how the company grievance mechanism 
works (Tullow, CNOOC and Total).  
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CSR became explicitly tied to ‘supporting operations’ and managing risk. For example, Total’s 
2013 CSR report notes the importance of ‘minimising impact’ in Uganda (Total S.A, 2013). In 
interviews Tullow CLOs explained:  
“CSR is driven towards impact mitigation, towards social issues management, 
environment, health; geared towards addressing impacts” (TUL04, 2014). 
 
CNOOC CLOs also emphasised managing impacts:  
“Our social investment focuses on managing the impact, for example the social 
impacts; how can we manage the influx of people? We focus on health and social 
amenities (CNC01, 2014).  
 
The narrative shift from CSR as providing benefits to ‘minimising harm’ in phase three 
indicates industry needs moving towards reducing the negative externalities associated with 
oil operations (Frynas, 2005). The greater focus on engaging district stakeholders in this phase 
can be seen as part of this shift and the goal to sustain wider legitimacy for the project as it 
moved closer to the development and production stages. From 2013 formal stakeholder 
engagement meetings were held quarterly at the district level and included a wider range of 
district actors, such as the District Local Government officers, Bunyoro Kingdom, subnational 
CSOs and some community leaders who were excluded in phases one and two. CNOOC 
opened a Liaison Office across from Tullow’s office in Hoima town which allowed for ‘ad hoc’ 
district level engagements in the same way as Tullow.  
 
Figure 15 shows an illustration of the subnational resource space. The key relationship in this 
space is between the state, oil MNCs and ‘affected communities’ with whom oil MNCs must 
engage to ensure access to land and resources, as noted in section 5.2. The figure shows that 
those actors excluded from the resource space in phases one and two are now selectively 




Figure 15. Selective inclusion of subnational actors into the resource space 
 
The shift towards greater stakeholder inclusion at the district level must also be seen in 
relation to the increasing pockets of discontent at the local level in phase three, which created 
a more complex operating environment for the companies. Grievances relating to land 
acquisition and compensation as people failed to receive adequate compensation for land and 
crops began to present a tangible challenge to efforts to territorialise the project (Larsen, 
2015). CLOs note the increasing demands on the Social Engagement teams as complaints and 
disputes over land and payments began to embroil the companies:  
“The biggest challenge is the land related matters. There are so many speculators that 
came with titles on community land so, it is not straightforward…. What we have done 
is engaged the communities to give us consent to go ahead with our activities and also 
got consent from the title holders… then in time if the government finds that the titles 
were not got in the right procedure they can cancel so they don’t get the money” 
(CNC05, 2016) 
 
The data show that industry activities are going ahead before compensation payments are 
made to local communities. As the quote explains, companies gain the consent of whom they 
believe to be the rightful owner of land, but the compensation payments are not always made 
if disputes arise. The CLO continued:  
“Because of unclear land boundaries and unclear guidelines of ownership, this is 
leading to land pressures and land conflicts” (CNC05, 2016) 
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As the day-to-day managers of the space, the oil companies were seen by communities as the 
ones who had mishandled the compensation procedures: 
 “We have lost hope of gaining from Tullow after they didn’t compensate us for our 
crops” (COME01, 2012).  
 
The loss of ‘hope’ indicates the potential loss of support for the project (Cross, 2014), as one 
local consultant explained: “Issues of compensation were really handled not very well, and as a 
result most people feel cheated” (CNS02, 2015). When grievances relating to the use of 
communal resources were not addressed by CNOOC, the members of village C sued the 
company. CNOOC CLOs claimed in interviews that CNOOC wanted to pay for the road 
construction materials. The murram, an iron-rich clayey topsoil used for covering road 
surfaces, is a communal resource which the community claimed CNOOC should be paying 
80,000 ug shillings (approx. £20) per truck load to the community. The village leader reported 
that “[CNOOC] said the government says they can’t pay for the murram because they are 
communal resources” (COMC02, 2014). In other words, CNOOC claimed it was the 
government’s refusal to pay for the murram in order to keep the recoverable costs of the 
project low. In this context, the support of district leaders became a crucial part of companies’ 
efforts to territorialise the project and maintain legitimacy.  
 
The data show that formal stakeholder engagement was used to enrol district actors to 
support companies in managing community relations. The half-day Stakeholder Engagement 
meeting in Hoima District that I observed in 2014 provided an important platform for oil 
companies to share the challenges and responsibilities of community relations with 
community leaders and religious leaders from Hoima District. Tullow and CNOOC CLOs 
addressed approximately sixty religious and community leaders at the meeting. The CLOs 
recounted many of the problems with compensation for land acquisition, including financial 
mismanagement, wives excluded from payments, domestic issues and resistance to advice, 
revealing the extent to which the process had lacked the necessary support of the state and 
local leaders: 
“People say, why are you telling us how to behave with our money? You’re almost 
coming to tell us how to sleep in our beds with our wives. People almost fought 
[District Chairman] when he said they have to be paid through the bank and release 
the money little by little, people got up in arms “we want our money it is our money”, 
 160 
those who drunk, now they are drinking great, then they marry a third wife…” (JVP01, 
2014). 
 
The CLOs explained the oil company land acquisition and compensation procedure in detail, 
including every effort they had made to ‘sensitise’ local people according to national and 
international guidelines. They also reminded leaders of the improvements that oil companies 
made to the oil regions through CSR, again indicating the use of CSR in negotiations around 
the industry. They then implored the leaders to work together with industry:   
“We need to sensitise our people, compensation is a very tricky thing… so it’s going to 
be upon all of us as religious leaders, as the oil companies, as community leaders to 
assist in whatever way we can. You support us to make sure that couples get the 
money and it is used very well, to improve the life situation in the homestead other 
than destroying it” (JVP01, 2014). 
 
The crafting of a sense of togetherness in the oil future was very clear at the meeting. “We are 
all part of the impact of oil” another CLO said. In the context of increasing grievances and 
industry delay and scale back noted in section 5.4.4, the support of community leaders can be 
seen as a crucial part of sustaining community relations as part of the legitimacy seeking 
process. At the time of the stakeholder meeting (which the Total CLOs did not turn up for) 
there were only four Tullow CLOs in the region, down from eleven, which had further reduced 
to two CLOs by the time of a follow up interview in 2016.  
 
The use of stakeholder engagement to gain support of local leaders demonstrates the 
importance of risk mitigation and ‘managing impacts’ in phase three. While these efforts 
demonstrate commitment of the JVPs to develop the Uganda oil project in accordance with 
international industry guidelines and post frontier measures, the different approaches to 
corporate engagement and varying levels of commitment to CSR during the exploration 
period as I discuss in section 6.3 emphasise the selective use of these measures to support 
operations and demonstrate the overriding role of the business case for CSR.  
 
6.3 Differences between companies  
Strategic concerns to territorialise the project and craft legitimacy drove the CSR and 
engagement of all three companies in phase three. There was evidence that all three 
companies drew on global norms to guide corporate engagement and each company 
 161 
employed post frontier devices to manage the resource space. However, in terms of 
approaches to implementation, there were considerable differences between the three 
companies, signalling variations in the legitimacy-seeking processes and different assemblage 
relations as a result.  
 
6.3.1 CSR themes and activities  
All three companies carried out CSR in the pre-oil stage under similar themes. Tullow, 
CNOOC and Total’s CSR projects are captured in figure 16, which shows the projects, theme, 
level implemented and approximate timeframe. CSR projects fall under the broad themes of 
education and health, which are typical for the oil sector (Frynas, 2009). The theme of 
environment reflects Uganda’s status as a biodiversity hotspot; and Tullow and Total also 
include ‘enterprise’ demonstrating their engagement with the contemporary CSR agenda 
(Rajak, 2017). All companies were explicit that CSR projects should fall within the themes; “we 
have three areas of CSR, it must be in these three areas, education, health and environmental 
protection”, as a CNOOC respondent stated (CNC01, 2014). Circumscribing themes for CSR 
serves a purpose of enabling companies to deflect requests for support that are inevitably 
likely to arise (Imbun, 2007). A former Tullow CLO emphasised the importance of this for 
managing community expectations; “The community would come asking for money for 
burials, weddings, to build churches” he explained (TUL06, 2014). A subcounty local 
government official noted that their request for money to support orphans had been denied: 
“CNOOC are very clear, they tell you exactly what they will do and what they will not do” 
(SLG02, 2015).  
 
The themes of education and health for CSR suggest a commitment to social development and 
community improvement, given that projects within these areas are likely to be compatible 
with the development goals of a developing country such as Uganda. Yet they are broad 
enough to ensure that a number of different interventions can fall under these themes. As 
Frynas (2009) has shown, great diversity in investment levels and project types under these 
broad themes is typical of the oil sector and has led to inconsistency and poor impacts in  
terms of development. Indeed, in Uganda there is considerable difference between the 
companies’ CSR. The only similarity is in national level CSR, which involved awarding 
educational scholarships to Ugandan students to study at Universities in the home countries 
of the respective companies. The study scholarship CSR aims to fulfil the national content 
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requirement (MEMD, 2008), for industry to skill up and support Ugandans to be employed in 
the industry.  
 
Subnational CSR projects on the other hand, while sharing common themes, differed widely 
between companies in terms of project type and level of investment. Under health and 
sanitation initiatives the support ranged from CNOOC providing ‘cleaning kits’ in its host 
village and funding HIV testing in the villages surrounding the workers camp during road 
construction, to Tullow constructing health clinics and a hospital, and to Total planning to 
locate boreholes needed for industry close to villages to hand over at a later date. Under the 
stated aim of ‘supporting education’, in addition to the national level scholarships, CSR 
projects included giving cash awards to high achievers at primary level by CNOOC amounting 
to a few thousand US dollars, and in contrast, Tullow’s investment in the construction of 
primary schools in the oil region and financial support for teacher’s salaries. Indeed, there was 
a considerable difference in the level of investment in CSR between companies. In their 2012 
CSR report, Tullow Oil reported expenditure of $4.8 million on social investment in Uganda 
since 2006 (Tullow Oil plc, 2012). Total does not disclose their CSR spend, but it can be 
surmised that financial investment in Uganda was considerably lower than Tullow’s given the 
smaller scale of CSR and smaller number of projects (and shorter amount of time in the 
country). From reports of individual project spend in CNOOC’s CSR reports, it is estimated 
that CNOOC’s spending on CSR in Uganda between 2012 and 2016 was less than $250,000 
(CNOOC Ltd, 2012, CNOOC Ltd, 2013, CNOOC Ltd, 2014). Seen in relation to the annual 
revenues of CNOOC and Total, which in 2014 were $44.7 billion (macrotrends.net) and $212 
billion (macrotrends.net) respectively in comparison to Tullow Oil’s $2.2 billion (Tullow Oil 
plc, 2015), it is clear that CSR investment from the ‘oil majors’ up to that point was very 
minimal.  
 
The lower levels of investment in CSR during the exploration period by CNOOC and Total can 
be explained in two ways. The first is their approach to CSR; Total was explicit about a 





Figure 16. CSR activities by company over time  
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“minimum”. The second is that evidence suggests that Total and CNOOC view CSR 
investment to be for the production phase of the industry. In comparison to Tullow Oil, this 
suggests considerably different approaches to crafting legitimacy in the pre-oil stage.  
 
6.3.2 Comparing the approaches  
Approaches to CSR differed between companies. In interviews in 2013, Total’s Social 
Engagement team explained their cautious approach which aimed to ensure “we do not raise 
expectations” (TOT03, 2013). Total is a global oil and gas major operating in over 130 countries 
and has considerable experience of CSR. The company also has past experiences of negative 
publicity, including accusations of human rights violations in Myanmar, meaning that a key 
focus of Total’s companywide CSR strategy is upholding human rights. The cautious approach 
most clearly reflects what Rajak (2016) terms ‘carefully crafted’ CSR, which seeks to avoid the 
critique that oil companies are patrons. Interview respondents stressed the importance of CSR 
to “avoid giving things…we want to be a partner with communities, not build dependency” 
(TOT03, 2013). As the Total team further explained: 
“We push people to understand we are an accelerating factor. Total will not give you 
something, if you make it you own it” (TOT03, 2013) 
 
Total’s main CSR activity in Uganda, the Awanga solar lamp project is one implemented in a 
number of other countries in which Total operates in the global south (Total S.A, 2013), and 
embodies this contemporary ‘self-help’ approach to CSR (Banks et al., 2016). The project 
requires local businesses to purchase the lamps from Total at a subsidised rate and sell in 
communities. The ultimate aim of this approach is to reduce risk by minimising Total’s 
involvement and placing more responsibility onto communities for the success of the CSR 
(Shever, 2010).  
 
CNOOC’s CSR was deliberately minimal, as the CSR manager explained: “CSR is not so much, 
it is just for starters, to gain access to the community” (CNC02, 2015). He noted explicitly that 
CNOOC’s CSR aims to be “support but not involved” (CNC02, 2015). However, while Total’s 
approach was about reducing risk to Total, and reflected reputational concerns, CNOOCs 
approach was more pragmatic and linked to supporting operations. In other words, CSR was 
used instrumentally by CNOOC to build relationships and gain access to carry out activities 
on the ground, an approach which resonates with that of the exploration companies in phase 
one (section 6.2.1), and the ‘old’ style of CSR (Rajak, 2017). CSR was to ensure community 
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safety during road construction, and to monitor the increase of HIV in and around the 
construction workers camp (where the organisation carrying out the study on behalf of 
CNOOC found there to be a 12% infection rate, higher than the usual local rate of 5%). 
Donations, such as school materials, medical and cleaning supplies were given in villages “as a 
tool for mobilisation to implement other messages such as operations information or HIV 
awareness” (CNC01, 2014). This was still about risk, but CNOOC’s focus was more on 
operational risk, where Total was more concerned with reputational risk to Total Global, 
reflecting the different pressures facing a Western oil major in comparison to a Chinese state 
oil company.  
 
Tullow, on the other hand, continued social investment throughout the exploration period 
and evidence shows that investment began to focus on local content; “building capacity in oil 
and gas” (TUL04, 2014) so that local people can be involved in the oil and gas supply chain. In 
2011 Tullow CEO Heavey met with the King of Bunyoro during the King’s visit to London and 
talked about the potential for local people in Bunyoro to produce food for the oil camps: “He 
said they would need 4 million eggs” (KDG03, 2014) the King’s secretary recalled: 
“He talked about doing lots of interesting things to empower, local content… they were 
going to get local enterprises producing goods for the industry” (KGD03, 2014). 
 
In 2012 the majority of Tullow’s CSR spend was invested in setting up the agricultural supply 
chain project with Irish NGO TraidLinks. The project involved training local farmers to build 
their capacity to supply produce to the oil worker camps. Interview data show that Tullow was 
providing 100% of the project funding for the first three years. Tullow invested in an 
Enterprise Centre on the edge of Hoima town, in buildings purchased from the Catholic 
Diocese, which served as a training centre for farmers and a collection and distribution point 
for locally grown produce. In our interview in 2014 the TraidLinks project officer claimed that 
after six months of training local farmers “about supply chain and how to plan, how to use 
chemicals and compliance to standards” some local farmers were successfully supplying farm 
produce the oil camps:  
“It was a big headache to convince the catering companies to stop sourcing from 
Kampala… I asked them to give us a three-month trial…the fruit and veg they’re 
sourcing is 90% local, cereals 50% local” (TULPTN01, 2014) 
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While the TraidLinks project did not survive Tullow’s financial struggles in Uganda, what the 
example serves to demonstrate here is the considerable effort Tullow put into social 
investment prior to oil production – and profit generation - in Uganda.  
 
6.3.3 Anticipating the impacts 
The lower levels of investment and commitment to CSR by Total and CNOOC reflect the idea 
that CSR is for the production phase of the industry. CNOOC’s ‘minimal’ and Total’s ‘cautious’ 
approaches to CSR suggest that longer-term CSR commitments do not take place during the 
exploration phase. While all three companies talked about ‘managing the impact’, Tullow was 
the only company aiming to do this through social investment during the exploration period. 
For Total and CNOOC it was clear that ‘impacts’ referred to anticipated future impacts and 
mitigation of these was closely related to managing risk (with managing risk a concern for all 
three companies). For example, in an interview in 2012, a Total CLO said that community 
expectations could not be addressed because “operations are still at the exploration stage” 
(TOT02, 2012). CNOOC’s CSR manager explained that the company was looking at longer 
term projects for the production stage (CNC03, 2015). Although CNOOC’s CLO said, in 
relation to mitigation, “we permanently take land, what about livelihoods?” (CNC01,2014) 
CNOOC had no ‘livelihoods’ related programmes in place. Rather, CNOOC and Total 
respondents talked about scaling up ‘local content’ for the production phase. This plan to scale 
up investment during the production stage reflects the ‘business case’ of CSR; CSR is tied to 
profitability and profitability is when the oil is being extracted. So, while CNOOC and Total 
discussed ‘managing the impacts’, it was clear that this was not to be achieved through social 
investment in the pre-oil stage.  
 
While Tullow continued to commit to CSR during the pre-oil stage there is evidence that as 
Tullow’s approach became more strategic, CSR became more closely linked to supporting 
operations and to the business case (Porter and Kramer, 2006). Tullow continued with the 
construction of the infrastructure projects in the oil region (villages A and B and other 
locations) throughout phase two, and the hospital in the next district was finally 
commissioned by the government in 2015. However, what changed was the way Tullow framed 
these projects; they were now to “serve our operations” (TUL04, 2014). As one CLO said: 
“We don’t want our workers to contract HIV, we want them to have a fully equipped 
medical facility” (TUL05, 2014).  
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This demonstrates that in line with the shift in Tullow’s CSR narrative in phase two to 
‘sustainability’ and ‘value for money’, the wellbeing of the community had also to benefit 
Tullow. This reflects both the need for Tullow to effectively manage the impacts of the project, 
and the pressure to demonstrate the business case for CSR to its shareholders (Porter and 
Kramer, 2006). The oil price drop in 2014 to below $50 per barrel significantly impacted 
Tullow’s CSR investments. The TraidLinks project, which relied 100% on funding from Tullow, 
suffered from the drop in the oil price and Tullow’s financial difficulties. In 2014, the project 
officer, hopeful for more funding, explained that Tullow had promised 5 years “but it has 
stopped at 3 because of the ups and downs for Tullow” (PTNTUL01, 2014). In a follow up 
interview in 2016 the project officer explained with regret that the project had finished: 
“It’s the trend of oil and gas, it’s too challenging to keep injecting money, we can’t give 
you more they said, the coffers are drying up” (PTNTUL05, 2016).  
 
The business case for CSR meant that the CSR implemented in the pre-oil stage was short 
term and as a consequence, its impact was limited. In interviews, CNOOC respondents 
specifically referred to the ‘win-win’ approach, and it was clear that this approach had shaped 
CSR. In interviews with CNOOC’s Hoima-based CSR partners (the road safety and vocational 
skills projects in 2014 and the HIV organisation in 2015), respondents all noted that the 
projects were ‘on hold’ waiting for review. The road safety project officer said: “It was a 2-
month pilot to run in February 2014… we submitted a final report to CNOOC and they have 
promised phase two so we are waiting” (PTNCNC04, 2014). The organisation that 
implemented the HIV testing project in 2013 also explained that the project is delivered in 
stages: 
“We made recommendations after the first stage, we recommended supporting 
treatment, because what happens to those who test positive?” (PTNCNC05, 2014).  
 
The weak commitment to CSR in the pre-oil stage by Total and CNOOC demonstrates the 
limits of the business case for CSR, which is tied to profitability. However, in spite of Tullow’s 
commitment to invest during the pre-oil stage, the uncertainty of the frontier and 
vulnerability to the oil price revealed that ultimately Tullow’s CSR was also tied to 
profitability.   
 
 168 
6.3.4 Legitimacy seeking and assemblage relations  
Different approaches to CSR can be seen in terms of the varied approaches to legitimacy 
seeking in the pre-oil stage by the three companies. While all three companies drew on global 
CSR discourse and used post frontier devices that are crafted by experts in the global north 
(Rajak, 2011), how these were used in the legitimacy seeking process at the subnational level 
varied. Further, the analysis shows that different approaches to legitimacy seeking shaped 
assemblage relations in different ways.  
 
Total’s approach to legitimacy seeking in the pre-oil stage was through ‘social management 
plans’ with which they aimed to minimise industry impacts at the local level. Total’s area of 
operation in Uganda also extends into the Acholi region, which is a post conflict context 
having been the location of the conflict between the government and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army that ended in 2006. Total employed ‘experts’ including an international organisation 
called The Corporate Engagement Project (CEP) with experience of working in conflict zones 
and supporting companies and NGOs to “Do no harm” (Anderson, 1999). CEP developed 
Total’s approach to sourcing local employment – a ballot box system – which Total 
implemented in local communities with the aim of transparent hiring practices. Total also 
used International Alert, an international peace and conflict NGO with many years of 
experience working in Uganda. Total’s choice of partners reflects Total’s past experiences of 
working in sensitive environments, and the emphasis on human rights across the company. As 
such, Total’s local engagement was shaped by Total Global’s company-wide CSR approach as 
well as local conditions as interpreted by conflict management experts. Through their 
approach, they connected Uganda’s oil assemblage with global assemblages of human rights 
and conflict management.  
 
CNOOC’s emphasis was on local level “community engagement” to achieve the “social licence 
the operate” (CNC01, 2014). CNOOC received the production licence for the Kingfisher site in 
2013 and moved on in the project cycle before Tullow and Total, who remained in negotiations 
with the Government of Uganda until 2016. CNOOC’s CLOs described a comprehensive 
community engagement strategy that involved regular engagement with 11 villages at the lake, 
7 at the top of the escarpment, 3 in the sub-county, as well as the District Local Government 
leadership. CNOOC created an oil and gas advisory committee made up of 10 community 
representatives “so we move with the community” (CNC01, 2014): 
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“We involve the community in activity, we move with the committee to seek consent 
in getting the social license to operate…there must be a structure in place when 
working with people on the ground. Political and opinion leaders are a good 
machinery to reach the grassroots” (CNC01, 2014).  
 
This committee of ‘political and opinion leaders’ meant that CNOOC developed close links 
with influential people in the community. This is in contrast to Tullow and Total’s approach to 
organising village level meetings through the LC1s at the village level.  
 
CNOOC’s approach to implementing CSR also differed in that they engaged only with district 
level actors. They worked with the District Local Government in Hoima to organise CSR and / 
or implement some CSR projects, and also contracted local partners based in Hoima town. 
The ‘Best Performers’ school project was in coordination with the District Education Office. A 
‘pop up’ health clinic in Hoima town which brought Chinese doctors to give consultations to 
local people, was coordinated with the district leadership. As such, while CNOOC draws on 
international discourses of sustainable development and CSR like Tullow and Total, its 
approach to implementation points to the preference of a state-owned Chinese oil company to 
link with government bodies rather than international non-state actors. CNOOCs engagement 
with district actors to implement CSR meant a new role for the district in the oil assemblage.  
 
Tullow’s approach changed from dealing exclusively with global development partners for CSR 
in phase one, towards the inclusion of national and subnational actors through its local 
content focused CSR in phases two and three. This reflected its aim to be the “partnership 
broker” (TUL04, 2014). Tullow’s shift to include local content demonstrates their ongoing goal 
to use CSR to build and sustain legitimacy, both in Uganda and beyond. Local content was 
being pushed by the Government, was the latest ‘buzzword’ among development 
professionals, and also met local demands for opportunities. The TraidLinks agriculture 
supply chain project, “the initiative of the owner of Tullow” (TUL06, 2014), brought together 
international and national NGOs, the Uganda Revenue Authority, the Hoima District Local 
Government's Commercial Office, a UK based catering contractor, Hoima-based farmers 
associations, and local farmers. Through this project Tullow aimed to meet local content 
targets, and potentially provide benefits to a wide range of stakeholders.  
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In summary, while the three companies – joint venture partners in Uganda – shared similar 
aims, drew on similar global narratives and employed similar post frontier measures to 
manage the space, approaches to implementation differed, with implications for social 
relations in the assemblage. The next section demonstrates how dynamics at the subnational 
level articulated with these efforts and processes of legitimacy seeking to further shape 
outcomes in the frontier.  
 
6.4 Subnational dynamics and corporate engagement 
The findings in this chapter have demonstrated the changing approaches to CSR over three 
phases of the pre-oil stage, the differences between the companies in terms of approach and 
implementation of CSR in the legitimacy seeking process and the ways this shaped relations in 
the assemblage. While a key driver of CSR and community and stakeholder engagement was 
legitimacy seeking and territorialisation of the project, how this played out at the local level 
was influenced by subnational dynamics.  
 
6.4.1 Industry impacts and ‘affected communities’  
The findings show that the notion of what is an ‘affected community’ or ‘project affected 
person’ was determined by the industry and influenced which local actors gained rights and 
recognition in relation to industry impacts. The findings in section 5.3.5 showed that some 
crops and resources were excluded from valuations by the state which led to grievances in 
relation to compensation. The findings also show that a range of direct, indirect and perceived 
impacts of the industry were not acknowledged due to the delineation of ‘affected community’ 
by industry, meaning that some claims were legitimate, and some were not. Figure 17 
illustrates findings distilled from the data of the high / direct and low / indirect impacts and 
those impacts which are included for industry designated ‘affected communities’ and excluded 







Figure 17. Impacts of oil from indirect to direct and demarcation of 'affected communities' by industry
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One issue raised in interviews was the real and perceived impacts of oil on the lake. Local 
leaders, District Local Government and subnational CSOs talked about the impacts of climate 
change and over-fishing, leading to declining fish stocks in the lake. However, at the village 
level, these changes were becoming tied to oil exploration: “The oil companies did surveys on 
the lake and the fish catch reduced” (COMA07, 2014), was a typical comment by local people 
who made a link between seismic surveys - ‘bombs’ – on the lake and reduced fish. 
 
There was evidence that in the context of many changes taking place at the local level, some 
existing issues became reframed in terms of oil impacts. A local consultant, who had worked 
for a Norwegian company contracted by Tullow Oil to investigate the claims, said:  
“[Communities] were complaining about machines at the oil sites drilling, claimed 
there was noise, pollution, fumes from trucks, that there was a loss of rain since oil had 
started… that their houses had got cracks in them from vibrations in the land and 
there were increased diseases – coughs, flu, that temperatures were high” (CNS02, 
2015).  
 
The consultant, speaking from his subject position both as an expert and someone indigenous 
to Bunyoro, highlighted the issue: “the problems communities were facing weren’t carrying 
much weight”. However, he further explained that this did not matter. These perceived 
impacts of oil were important because of the potential to shape responses to the industry: 
“[the communities] have a right (to complain). They actually believe these things”.  
 
These findings demonstrate the ways that changes taking place at the local level can become 
caught up with the experiences of oil and lead to pockets of discontent at the local level. In 
addition to the ‘real’ ways that industry shapes lives in material terms, it is also the belief that 
the industry is making impacts that can influence acceptance. These lived experiences are 
exacerbated by the development imaginaries at the local level which are shaped by the ideas of 
a resource curse (section 7.3).  
 
The anticipated impacts of the industry were also consequential. During my fieldwork 
respondents linked what had happened with the refinery compensation process to the 
upcoming stages of the industry: “People are scared that once drilling starts, they may be 
evicted and may not be compensated, and have nowhere to go” (COMA08, 2014). This 
suggests that even for those with only indirect experiences of oil, the anticipated impacts of 
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the industry can create uncertainty (Limbert, 2008). And in a context in which claims are 
legitimatised through a stakeholder engagement approach by industry, there is the potential 
for these pockets of discontent and uncertainties about the future to impact the legitimacy of 
industry in the longer term (Heikkurinen and Bonnedahl, 2013).  
 
6.4.2 Social expectations of reciprocity  
As section 5.2 showed, imaginaries of development became a key feature of Uganda’s oil 
assemblage in phase one, fostered and sustained by the presence of the industry as well as CSR 
interventions by oil companies. Analysis of the data shows that an underlying notion of 
reciprocity was also important in shaping the expectations of local communities and 
influenced how they engaged with, and perceived, oil companies. While the immediate 
concern for relationship-building to ensure access to land and resources was a key driver of oil 
company approaches to CSR, communities engaged with the expectation of longer-term 
relationships (West, 2006).  
 
The material conditions of the resource periphery played some role in local expectations of the 
industry: “the needs are great and the demands [for support] are many” as one subcounty 
government leader explained (SLG01, 2015). Section 6.2.1 notes the early wildcatters and 
Tullow’s response to the frontier challenges in an area of high poverty and limited social 
services. CNOOC also responded to frontier conditions when it arrived in village C: “The 
landing site was prone to cholera, CNOOC provided cleaning kits, it is in much better shape 
now” (SCSO03, 2014). Even Total, with its ‘cautious’ approach to CSR and mandate to “not give 
things” (TOT03, 2013), responded to community needs by donating materials and rebuilding a 
school and health centre roof after a severe storm (TU08L, 2016). These responses to 
challenges in the frontier demonstrate that oil companies, as social actors in the region, had 
engaged in local development. However, overall, the evidence has shown that CSR 
interventions to gain access to land and resources were considered by oil MNCs to be short 
term, or ‘for starters’.  
 
Communities on the other hand, engaged with oil companies from a different perspective, 
demonstrating that CSR is a social relationship. Rather than conceive demands to oil 
companies for CSR as simple demands for companies to fulfil state services in a resource 
periphery (Cash, 2012), the findings show that this is more complex. Communities have given 
oil companies communal land on which to build oil company camps and facilities, leading to a 
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certain social expectation of reciprocity: “the community gave them the land in expectation of 
other things to come” (COMA01, 2014). Further, companies were using other communal 
resources such as ‘murram’ (material for road construction) and water, in the context of local 
people experiencing challenges to water access:  
“We are telling [CNOOC] about our drinking water. The taps were put in by Heritage, 
but the Hippos broke it. [CNOOC] are taking samples from the lake but not providing 
any water for us” (COMC03, 2014). 
 
Indeed, these suggestions of a notion of reciprocity have also to be understood in the context 
of the challenging material context of the Albertine Graben. Local people link CSR to the 
negative impacts that communities are experiencing. A subcounty government leader 
commented: 
“They are interrupting communities. They improve on the road, but they are 
benefitting from the road and the communities are prohibited from using it” (SLG01, 
2015).  
 
In this way, CSR is considered as a form of compensation for the perceived sacrifices local 
people are making as they adjust their daily lives for the industry, and for the negative impacts 
local people were experiencing. In this regard, village level actors claimed that CSR had not 
gone far enough in what was perceived as a reciprocal relationship. “What they are giving, 
when I weigh it up, the companies should add more compared to what they’re receiving” 
(SLG01, 2015) was a typical comment. 
 
The community expectations regarding reciprocity for the use of land and resources do not 
suggest a transaction as in ‘what can I get from you when I give to you’, but rather reflect the 
expectation of an ongoing social relationship with a company represented by oil men who told 
them “we are neighbours” (COMA06, 2014). Local people often allow the use of land because it 
is part of an exchange relationship in which ‘outsiders’ can use land in exchange for the “social 
relations of development” (West, 2006: 134). Whereas companies see land as a commodity to 
be traded, the responses of local people suggest the value of land to communities goes beyond 
the economic (section 5.2.5). For the companies, the notion of responsibility is not rooted in 
community, but rather reflects the reworking of CSR as sustainable development and win-win 
outcomes (Rajak, 2011). The Tullow CLO claimed: “We are not obliged to look after people, but 
we must be a responsible operator” (TUL04, 2014). While ‘responsibility’ for Tullow 
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encompassed community wellbeing, one issue is that ‘social improvement’ tends to be defined 
by the oil company and not in accordance with contextual needs (Frynas, 2010, Rajak, 2017). I 
have already demonstrated in section 6.3.1 that it is the companies that provide the 
parameters for community development initiatives based on general themes, and these vary 
widely. There is a tension then between community expectations of longer-term relationships 
(West, 2006), and the strategic nature of CSR (Porter and Kramer, 2006). This is important 
because it led to claims by respondents in host villages that companies were not addressing 
community concerns, which has implications for trust and legitimacy so important for the 
social licence to operate (Wilson, 2016). As one female respondent explained:  
“People are crying ‘at least service the roads in the village’, but they do nothing, and 
vehicles pass and destroy the roads. Time and time, we are asking but they don’t do it, 
they do just what they want” (COMC04, 2014) 
 
Such responses of local actors to industry do not take place in a vacuum, but rather should be 
seen in light of the transformational changes taking place in this context, demonstrating the 
ways in which CSR becomes part of local development imaginaries (Banks et al., 2016). Rather 
than community requests for CSR being a shopping list of demands (Imbun, 2007), instead 
they are better explained by an underlying notion of reciprocity which shapes the expectations 
of communities and influences how they engage with extractives companies (West, 2006, 
Dolan and Rajak, 2016, Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). What this demonstrates is that these 
expectations and imaginaries become part of subnational dynamics which shape perceptions – 
and ultimately the acceptance – of the industry during the exploration period.  
 
The analysis suggests that contrary to the idea that CSR has the tendency to foster a 
relationship of dependency that is in some way damaging for local people (Rajak, 2011), seen 
from the perspective of local people, a relationship with industry might be something that 
local people pursue. Respondents in villages A and B linked the deterioration of their 
relationship with Tullow to the welfare of those communities. While this does suggest 
dependency (and an entanglement which Tullow then sought to break), from the perspective 
of the community their ‘dependence’ on Tullow for their welfare was seen to be in exchange 
for the community hosting the industry, and as a way to navigate the changing context: “big 
men will come because of oil and if we are living like this in grass houses it will be bad for us” 
(COMA06, 2014). A relationship with Tullow was seen as vital to improve the community and 
ensure they were not “left behind” because of the industry. A relationship that was described 
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by one of ‘neighbours’ by the previous oil men in phase one, was now replaced by a more 
formalised structure in which local people are ‘stakeholders’ and “told to contact Hoima, but 
we are not with the Hoima people, we are with the Tullow people here” (COMA06, 2014). This 
indicates that rather than provide greater clarity for relationships, the professionalisation of 
engagement created increased uncertainty. 
 
6.4.3 A local push for inclusion in oil  
Throughout the research, the issue of local benefits from oil was raised by a range of different 
actors, and the idea of how local people can benefit had shifted over time. A quote from a 
Tullow CSR partner sums up the shift:  
“The natives thought they would get money, but that didn’t come. Then they thought 
they would benefit from a bit of business, but that didn’t happen. The oil companies 
were getting produce from Kampala, and they were asking oil companies how they can 
benefit” (PTNTUL01, 2014). 
 
There was evidence that sensitivity to the expectation of local inclusion had informed oil 
company approaches to managing the space to a degree. Tullow’s agriculture supply chain 
project to provide opportunities to local farmers was one of the clearest examples, along with 
CNOOC’s vocational skills support and Total’s employment ‘ballot box’ system. The shared 
underlying concern about ‘impact mitigation’ meant an awareness that local people should 
benefit from the industry in some way, even though as section 6.3 noted, for Total and 
CNOOC this plan to include local content was for the later stage of oil production.  
 
In the rural context of Hoima District where the majority of people farm, one of the main 
demands raised among local level actors during interviews in 2014 was related to supplying to 
the industry 
“There is such enormous need to reduce poverty, for markets for produce. People want 
to know how they can benefit” (SLG01, 2015).  
 
There was a common perception that this was the way that local people could benefit: 
“supplying our goods and services to the industry is all we have” (SCSO07, 2014) was a 
comment from one subnational CSO. Expectations among district level actors such as DLG 
and CSOs had shifted from phase one, as one leader put it “we know now that jobs are not 
coming”, and the narrative had changed to one of ‘indirect benefits’: “We are wanting the oil 
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companies to empower farmers on the more serious note, they should be supplying to the 
region” (DLG05, 2014).  
 
The quote is one indication of the aspirations for the development of the district among 
district leaders that had been fostered by the industry in the region and the existing work 
Tullow was doing on the TraidLinks agriculture supply chain project. However, among local 
level actors in village C there were still expectations of jobs: “We are hopeful for jobs and other 
benefits” (COMC09, 2016) a youth respondent noted. Respondents in the same village noted 
that young men in the community had left fishing to seek casual work with CNOOC. 
However, respondents in village A and B expressed frustration that they were no longer 
benefitting. This was an indication of the different stage in the project cycle, meaning there 
was little activity taking place in villages A and B at the time of interviews in phase three, in 
comparison to phase one, and also demonstrates that the boom and bust during the pre-oil 
stage of the industry had impacted the local level. Another village leader noted: “There are two 
employees out of our six thousand doing a maintenance job at Tullow now” (COMB03, 2014). 
Many respondents talked about the unskilled jobs that a number of people from the villages 
had during phases one and two that had dried up by phase three. So, while the demand for 
jobs remained at the local level, the push for indirect benefits appeared to be coming largely 
from district level actors and was driven further by the government’s national content policy. 
As the Tullow CLO noted, the TraidLinks project “was as a result of a stakeholder push to 
participate in oil and gas…[TraidLinks] are helping us to realise what we advocate for, local 
content” (TUL04, 2014).  
 
However, the issue of ‘what is local?’ was something which emerged over the three phases and 
became entangled with and exacerbated by oil company efforts to address ‘local content’. The 
tension between the government’s notion of ‘national content’ and the perceptions of ‘local 
content’, was exacerbated by the interchangeable use of the terms. Some local people began to 
use the term “local local content” to refer to the local level, and in interviews many 
subnational actors stressed that ‘affirmative action’ was needed for the oil region. “Lacking a 
definition of local content, people are coming from outside” (SCSO10, 2015) as one CSO 
explained. This is a concern which feeds into existing narratives in Bunyoro of “bafuriga” or 
‘outsider’, referring to the  historical encroachment on land and resources by migrants from 
other parts of Uganda (Sjögren, 2013b).  
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The concern about outsiders was seen most clearly in the grievances around employment. 
Respondents in all villages expressed their perceptions that oil companies were employing 
people from ‘up on the escarpment’. In the Leeds project, we found that Total’s employment 
ballot box initiative, which was crafted by ‘experts’ to ensure a transparent process and avoid 
such contestations (section 6.3), was critiqued by respondents who claimed it was hand-
picked employment and was unfair because it included people from other villages (Manyindo 
et al., 2014). The grievances demonstrate the challenges of getting local acceptance of 
externally developed initiatives. Respondents claimed the usual practice of the village LC1 
recommending workers to the company was the preferred and ‘fair’ method of recruitment. 
Similar issues were raised about Tullow’s grievance mechanism, which did not reflect the local 
cultural approach to resolving grievances. Some respondents claimed that ‘grievance cards’ 
given out by CLOs remained at the LC1s office and were not given back to the company. These 
examples suggest local incompatibility with post frontier devices. Indeed, Total’s ballot box 
project and Tullow’s grievance mechanism reflect a problem of ‘translation’ of practices from 
global assemblages to the local level (Lewis and Mosse, 2006). 
 
The TraidLinks project faced an additional challenge of implementing global industry 
standards locally. The project officers talked about the challenges of training farmers to 
required industry standards, getting certification “in accordance with a standard called ‘Global 
Gap’, which is an international standard” (PTNTUL02), convincing local farmers to invest in 
their own development by paying a small fee, ensuring consistency and timely supply, 
ensuring quality fruit and vegetables, keeping records: 
“Even the technical people didn’t understand, they said ‘we eat it so why can’t they?’ 
They were using chemicals that were 5 years out of date” (PTNTUL02, 2014).   
 
The project officer explained further challenges:  
“[Catering company] said they (farmers) would not be effective; standards were not 
enough, they were worried that locally produced food may cause sickness in the 
camps” (PTNTUL01, 2014).  
 
What the industry saw as ‘lack of capacity’ however, the local people viewed as industry 
standards excluding people. As one CSO explained: 
“The communities’ education is low, how can you tell a rural woman to wash and 
package the cassava, and then pay a price less than local markets?” (CSO20). 
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And one farmer that had participated in TraidLinks said: “There is such a cost to what they 
want, and they don’t pay you for 2 weeks. This is a different system. Locals don’t understand” 
(BENTUL02). Conversely, local content had emphasised these differences and was “a 
disadvantage for some… it is the middle (class) man who has the capacity to grow. These men 
have never seen a watermelon, only fish and cassava” (DLG09, 2014). 
 
Unfortunately, the challenges of ‘capacity’ for many local people meant that efforts to produce 
for the TraidLinks project were in vain. “They say they want a quality pig, but what is a quality 
pig?” Some of the famers I interviewed locally claimed “we are finished with them”. Another 
said: “[TraidLinks] said one of them (vegetables) was damaged, and to take it back, but take it 
back to where?” (BENTUL02).  
 
So, while local content was, in theory, a way for local people to benefit, and approaches were 
shaped by local demands to participate, it fostered grievances and risked creating further 
divisions. There was evidence that those with existing ‘capacity’ were the ones to benefit:  
“There are 3 categories of people, those who don’t know quality, those who know but 
can’t afford, and those who know and can afford” (DLG05, 2014).  
 
The politics of local development planning also shaped and constrained CSR and had the 
potential to impact oil MNC legitimacy. In general, MNCs operating in the oil sector in the 
global south have tried to ensure that CSR relates to local needs in light of sustained critiques 
that CSR in global south contexts often fails to adequately address issues of local development 
(Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). Indeed, in interviews with Tullow, Total and CNOOC, 
respondents stressed the importance of CSR being needs driven. However, in practice, 
navigating the politics of how this played out in the subnational context was a challenge. In 
interviews in 2012 and 2013 a range of non-industry respondents raised concerns that CSR 
carried out in phase one (2005-2008) and phase two (2009-2012) was concentrated too heavily 
in the oil communities. Further, respondents critiqued Tullow’s CSR in particular as not being 
implemented in a participatory way: “Community consultation was not that good. The 
beneficiary must be consulted but they are not” (SCSO04, 2014).  
 
There was the perception among a number of respondents that oil company CLOs were 
“conniving” with certain local leaders to ensure that CSR was invested in some geographical 
areas and not others, and focused on certain needs and not others (SCSO04, 2014). 
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Respondents claimed that Tullow had not coordinated with District Development Plans 
(DDPs), which they said would help to ensure that CSR was tailored to the development needs 
of the district. The DDPs are five-yearly development plans for the districts, which in theory 
are developed through a series of consultations with community representatives at village and 
sub-country levels (interview with DLG). Instead, some projects were said to reflect the 
priorities of leaders or a small elite and as a result had led to inappropriate or poorly planned 
projects: 
“[Tullow] did CSR without consulting the key decision makers. The school is heavily 
invested, next to a government school, without strategies for kids to go to school 
(DLG05, 2014). 
 
The hospital built by Tullow was widely seen to be as a result of negotiations with district 
leaders in the neighbouring District of Buliisa (on the edge of Murchinson’s Falls National 
Park), and as a result, was situated far away from villages. Another contentious CSR project 
was a ‘resource centre’ of computers and books:  
“The resource centre is for elites, people are illiterate or speak local languages, there 
was no consultation, only the District Local Government” (SCSO02, 2014). 
 
What this demonstrates is the power relations and diversity of interests at the subnational 
level that oil company CSR became entangled with. As I noted in chapter five, the arrival of 
the industry in the wider district shaped the aspirations of a range of actors and played an 
important role in enrolling actors to support the industry, however it was also the case that 
these aspirations meant that oil became caught up in the politics of local development. There 
was evidence of tension between district actors, including the Kingdom and CSOs, who 
believed that CSR should benefit the wider district, and people in the oil communities who 
expected CSR to address issues at the village level. In our interviews, district leaders explained 
that they also had ambitions for CSR to benefit the whole district, but it was also clear that 
some leaders had tried to capture CSR benefits to benefit a narrow few. This also 
demonstrates that CSR by oil companies is one of the few tangible benefits of the industry in 
the pre-oil stage, and this raised the stakes in local development politics. Whereas oil 
companies aimed to address ‘local needs’, district level planning for local development and the 
politics around this shaped and constrained the extent to which it could do so.  
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Total, explicitly aiming to avoid Tullow’s early mistake of not consulting the community on 
CSR, aimed to closely follow the DDP to implement the water borehole project. As one DLG 
leader commented: “Total will not go outside what is in the (DDP) plan” (DLG03, 2014). The 
issue, however, was the contested relevance of the DDPs in terms of representing community 
needs:  
“The oil companies come to the District to get copies to identify that investment 
projects are in the DDP. But some of the plans are out of date, they were done pre-oil, 
the DDP is a five-year plan. It’s not enough just to look at the DDPs, it’s just a 
framework and may not include issues of oil and gas” (DLG10, 2014). 
 
Further, politics around the DDPs meant that Total was unsure how to proceed, as it was 
unclear which department was responsible, and as such, this constrained Total’s water project. 
Total's approach to CSR meant that at the time of our interview the company was still waiting 
for this to be resolved. So, while the DDPs provided oil companies with the possibility for 
participatory CSR, in practice, this was constrained by the politics of the district planning 
system. This meant that although Tullow aimed to follow this from 2012, the ‘participatory’ 
nature of Tullow’s CSR remained in question. In line with the ‘cautious’ approach, Total’s CSR 
was delayed as the company continued to consult with local government. CNOOC’s method of 
working closely with the District Education Office and the district leadership to implement 
CSR appeared to have avoided the need for CNOOC to decipher DDPs. And interestingly, 
despite considerably less investment than Tullow, respondents from DLG and CSOs claimed 
that CNOOC’s CSR addressed local needs better than Tullow and Total. 
 
The important observation for this chapter is that while the local push for opportunities 
influenced CSR, contestations about ‘what is local’ impacted trust, with implications for long 
term legitimacy (Wilson, 2016). What the findings demonstrate is the tendency of CSR and 
‘social management’ plans to feed into and exacerbate local divisions. The lack of 
understanding of the complexities of local politics is also evident, and the diverse approaches 
from three different oil companies adds further complexities. It also raises the issue that global 
norms and post frontier measures to manage the space become shaped by the local politics in 
that space (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2017). The geographical shift in company engagement 
as well as the shift towards strategic CSR influenced which groups benefited from CSR, 
something which I expand on in the discussion chapter. The contestations about the local also 
points to a bigger question of how global assemblages, which are standardised and generic, 
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become implanted and ‘translated’ in local contexts, what Tsing terms the ‘friction’ in these 
global to local encounters (Tsing, 2011).  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the CSR and community and stakeholder engagement practices by three 
international oil companies in Uganda’s emerging oil frontier through the lens of the 
assemblage. First it explored how and why companies engage, identifying changing drivers 
and approaches to CSR and engagement over time and between companies. It then considered 
the factors which shape and constrain corporate engagement, drawing attention to the role of 
the subnational.  
 
The chapter showed that post frontier narratives and practices become increasingly important 
as the project cycle progressed, however it was not until phase three, when the oil majors were 
established and the move towards first oil appeared imminent that companies turned towards 
pro-actively anticipating the impacts of the project. This focus on impact at this time is closely 
linked to risk, and in turn this is linked to the question of ensuring and maintaining 
legitimacy. The shift towards formal and pro-active stakeholder engagement at the district 
level is another indication of the importance of this wider legitimacy and shifted the focus 
away from a one solely on local communities in the oil region, with implications for relations 
in the assemblage.  
 
The comparative analysis showed that while all three companies draw on global standards and 
norms, how they are implemented varied between companies and influenced outcomes in 
different ways. Although Tullow aimed to address social development needs during the 
exploration period, Total’s cautious approach and CNOOCs pragmatic approach to CSR and 
engagement, combined with Tullow’s scaling back from 2014, meant there was weak 
commitment to CSR investment in the pre-oil stage.   
 
The need for social licence to operate to ensure ongoing legitimacy in the context of 
grievances relating to industry impacts, compensation and inclusion in benefits demonstrates 
the importance of subnational dynamics in shaping the legitimacy seeking process. The 
companies reached out to include local actors in addressing the impacts of industry. While 
this demonstrates the productive power of CSR and stakeholder engagement to enrol support, 
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it also demonstrates the potential for agency to shape the legitimacy seeking process in the 
pre-oil stage. The chapter generates insights into the complexities of the legitimacy seeking 
process and the various processes taking place which suggest the need to consider CSR as a 




7.0 Chapter seven 
CSOs in oil governance 
7.1 Introduction  
Civil society, including NGOs, social movements and indigenous groups across the globe have 
been at the forefront of challenging predatory forms of resource extraction over the last 
decades, in the both the global north and global south (Schmink and Wood, 1992, Sawyer, 
2004, Gedicks, 2001). These actors and organisations have contributed significantly to our 
understanding about the environmental and social implications of extractive industries for 
local populations and ecologies (Szablowski and Campbell, 2019). During the 1990s 
transnational NGOs played an important role in developing international norms around 
human rights, transparency and corporate practice in extractives contexts. As such, civil 
society came to be seen a crucial actor in the extractive industries governance in terms of 
driving accountability politics and representing the interests of communities negatively 
impacted by extractives projects.  
 
In much of the literature on resource frontiers an often-conflictual relationship is assumed to 
exist between corporate power on the one hand and communities supported by civil society 
actors on the other. There has been less focus on everyday interactions between these actors 
(Logan and McNeish, 2012a, Larsen, 2017), especially in contexts where industry is at the early 
stages (Behrends et al., 2013). This is especially important in a Sub-Saharan African context, 
such as Uganda, with no prior experience of large scale extractive industries in the region and 
no existing social movement vis-à-vis extractive industries (De Waal and Ibreck, 2013). In such 
a context, it is important to consider how these processes of oil governance take shape and 
what the constraining or enabling factors are.  
 
Chapter five demonstrated that oil discovery in Uganda mobilised the interests of civil society 
actors both internal and external to the country.  Existing knowledge about oil’s link to poor 
development outcomes in the context of post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, coupled with 
concerns about Uganda’s deteriorating governance environment among donors and INGOs, 
raised the importance of oil governance in Uganda (section 5.3.3). The chapter showed that 
over time, through the three phases of the exploration period, links between donors and 
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INGOs and Ugandan civil society organisations increased and shaped the oil assemblage, not 
only in terms of the actors involved but also knowledge, ideas, resources, and practices.  
 
This chapter adds greater depth to the discussion in chapter five by unpacking the role of 
CSOs in Uganda’s oil assemblage to consider the activities they carry out at the subnational 
level and their role in oil governance during the pre-oil stage of the industry. In doing so, the 
chapter addresses research objective 3: Explore the role played by civil society actors in the 
governance of Uganda’s oil; and contributes to addressing objective 1-part b: Explore how the 
emerging oil assemblage articulates with the subnational level to shape outcomes.  
 
This chapter draws from data collected during field visits to Uganda between 2012 and 2016. As 
described in section 3.5, the primary data includes 137 semi-structured interviews, 
observations from civil society workshops, oil company stakeholder engagement meetings and 
multi-stakeholder forums. The chapter also draws on data from CSO, INGO and donor 
reports.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 highlights that the type of civil society 
organisations engaging on oil issues were predominantly professionalised organisations from 
the CSO sector; activities were influenced by the connections of these CSOs to international 
donors and had a national level focus. Section 7.3 shows that CSO activity shifted to the 
subnational level and began to include organisations in the oil region, however challenges at 
this level constrained efforts to engage oil communities. Section 7.4 shows that subnational 
dynamics impacted the work of CSOs over time, due to changing corporate engagement 
strategies, increasing industry impacts and key events, providing opportunities for CSOs to 
support local people. Section 7.5 draws on these findings to discuss the character of CSOs and 
oil governance in Uganda.  
 
7.2 CSO activity and the oil governance assemblage  
As the commercial threshold for oil production in Uganda was surpassed in 2009, signalling 
the reality that Uganda was next in line to become one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil producers, 
the interests of civil society internal and external to the country mobilised. Donors and INGOs 
concerned about the potential impacts of oil on governance moved to support Ugandan civil 
society to address these challenges and help prepare the country to become an oil state. This 
external support considerably shaped the character of oil governance during the pre-oil stage 
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of the industry by bringing funding, knowledge and practices to the oil assemblage, and 
influencing the political context in which CSO activity was to be carried out. 
 
7.2.1 National CSOs move into oil   
As Uganda was poised to become an oil state there was a section of Ugandan civil society, 
already connected to external donors and INGO partners, that began to work on oil and gas 
issues. As is typical of ‘actually existing civil society’ (Mamdani, 1996) in Uganda, these are 
formalised organisations in the ‘CSO sector’. These organisations are mainly urban, Kampala-
based professional civil society organisations (CSOs), some of which became increasingly 
active in policy and advocacy work on energy, environment and human rights issues in the 
early to mid-2000s. A key characteristic of this section of civil society is their dependence on 
external donors for funds, and competition between organisations for this funding (Deniva, 
2006). Table 9 shows some of the prominent national CSOs in Uganda which began to include 
oil as a core issue in their work during phase two of the exploration period identified in 
section 5.3 (2009 – 2012).  
 
Table 9. Prominent national CSOs in Uganda working on oil and gas 
National Civil Society 
Organisation  
Area of work  Date 
established 
Advocates Coalition for 
Development and Environment 
(ACODE) 
An independent public policy research and 
advocacy think tank 
1999 
Greenwatch Improved environmental protection and 
management in Uganda 
1995 
HURINET A network of human rights organizations in 
Uganda working to promote and protect the rights 
of citizens 
1994 
The National Association of 
Professional Environmentalists 
(NAPE) 
Sustainable solutions to issues of environmental 
and economic growth in Uganda. Conducts 
research and advocacy for best practices in natural 
resource management 
1997 
Water Governance Institute 
(WGI) 
A membership organisation which engages 
government and other stakeholders on policy, 
governance and development issues related to 
water. 
2008 
AFIEGO Public policy research and advocacy to influence 
energy policies to benefit the poor and vulnerable 
2004 
Global Rights Alert (GRA) Established specifically to promote good 
governance of Uganda's natural resources 
2007 
 
Source: websites and policy documents, selection based on participants observed workshops 
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In addition to these Ugandan organisations, Kampala-based offices of international NGOs 
working in Uganda such as International Alert, WWF and Action Aid, also began to work on 
oil and gas issues, and some began to channel funding for oil related work to national CSOs. 
International NGOs established local chapters of global advocacy networks which many of the 
national CSOs joined, for example a Uganda chapter of Publish What You Pay (PWYP) (which 
campaigns on revenue transparency and of which Global Witness is a co-founder) was 
established in 2008. Another network called Oil Watch Network (OWN) was established by 
Oil Watch International, a global network supported by Friends of the Earth and part of the 
global movement ‘Keep the Oil in the Soil’. National CSOs also established their own umbrella 
organisation called Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas (CSCO), which is referred to as its 
members as a ‘platform’, aiming to bring together Ugandan CSOs working on oil and gas. Data 
show that CSCO began to include subnational CSOs and by 2014 had more than 30 members 
(national CSO interviews, 2012; CSO website analysis, CSO document analysis).  
 
Crucial to civil society engagement on oil in Uganda was the support of a ‘resource governance 
assemblage’; a global assemblage of organisations, actors, knowledge and practices related to 
extractive industries governance, which shaped the trajectory of oil governance in Uganda in 
the pre-oil stage. As section 5.2 notes, data show that there was some initial activity in the oil 
region by two CSOs in the villages during phase one (2005-2008), supported by international 
activists on oil, which brought narratives of oil and environmental despoliation to the local 
level through a video on the Niger Delta. However, during phase two (2009-2012), civil society 
engagement on oil and gas was influenced by Uganda’s state donors, international grant-
making organisations and INGOs, and the focus was predominantly at the national level.  
 
It was in phase two that the interests of donors and INGOs mobilised in relation to Uganda’s 
oil discovery and concerns about governance of the sector. International organisations such as 
Global Witness, Publish What You Pay, Revenue Watch Institute and Platform, as well as the 
World Bank, began to organise meetings and workshops in Kampala to discuss the 
governance-related challenges it was believed oil posed to Uganda. Global Witness raised 
concerns about oil in the context of a deteriorating governance environment in Uganda and in 
2010 urged Uganda’s state donors to coordinate efforts to establish the necessary checks and 
balances as “a critical test of their commitment to transparency, accountability and long-term 
wealth creation in Uganda” (Global Witness, 2010: 3). A key development towards this aim was 
the establishment in 2011 of the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) by eight of Uganda’ 
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donors - Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and the European Union. Funding for oil governance-related work began to be channelled to 
national CSOs through the DGF’s ‘Voice and Accountability’ programme3.  
 
There was clear evidence that Ugandan CSOs’ work on oil and gas was shaped by expert 
knowledge about oil and gas from the global resource governance assemblage that these 
actors were part of. Many of the national CSOs I interviewed in 2012 had been working closely 
with donors and INGOs on oil governance related training and capacity building, as one CSO 
respondent explained: 
“Us CSOs in Kampala we don’t have capacity, that’s why...we’ve been working with our 
donors, especially Revenue Watch that has serious expertise on extractives. So, they 
would fund experts to come here and facilitate meetings” (NCSO05, 2012). 
 
National CSO representatives talked about the expertise that was passed from INGOs, donors 
and foreign advisers to build their understanding of the ‘technical’ oil industry, as well as the 
‘right’ conditions of governance needed for a successful oil sector. Revenue Watch Institute 
provided training on contract monitoring; USAID provided funding to do “capacity building 
on EIA aspects” (NCSO04, 2012) and brought experts from USA Universities and industry to 
talk about “different aspects of resource governance” (NCSO04, 2012); Revenue Watch also 
provided educational fellowships to members of CSOs. Professor Paul Collier, an influential 
figure in policy development around natural resource governance and a proponent of the 
‘resource curse theory’ (section 2.2), delivered lectures in Uganda in 2011 and in 2013 on 
managing Uganda’s oil wealth, in his capacity of advisor to the Africa Region of the World 
Bank (CSO documents).  
 
Knowledge practices about oil became a key part of Uganda’s oil assemblage through links to 
this assemblage of knowledge, expertise, practices and narratives about oil governance 
(Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). This assemblage was itself shaped by experiences of 
extractive industries from other contexts, in other words, what is known about oil. For 
example, Global Witness’s work in Angola in the 1990s had helped to establish the links 
between corruption and poor development outcomes in the extractives sectors and push the 
agenda of ‘good extractives governance’ around the issue of transparency. Within this focus on 
 
3 The University of Leeds Governance of Hydrocarbons was one project funded by DGF under this programme, and 
part of this PhD research was carried out with financial support from this project.  
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transparency and good governance is the assumed role of civil society as a key actor to drive 
forward this agenda (Weszkalnys, 2011). In interviews with national CSOs in 2012 and 2013, 
respondents presented their role as self-evident: 
“I’ve seen in other countries, where the NGOs do a lot of highlighting that, then 
making it blown out if there is a case of violation... the fact that there is someone to 
investigate and find the truth is important” (NCSO01, 2012).  
 
The data show that capacity building for Ugandan CSOs focused on distilling lessons learned 
from other contexts. INGOs brought representatives from other oil producing countries, such 
as Nigeria and Chad, to speak at meetings and training workshops in Kampala. ‘Exposure’ 
visits were organised for some CSO and government representatives to visit the exemplar oil 
country, Norway. The aim was to show Ugandans the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ examples of resource 
management and also to promote the importance of Uganda joining the Extractives Industry 
Transparency Initiative.  What these interventions and training sessions reinforced therefore, 
was the idea of good oil management as a choice to make, rather than something political 
which might emerge through struggle (Logan and McNeish, 2012a). These trends in Uganda 
had parallels with efforts to shape oil governance outcomes in Sao Tome and Principe, prior to 
it becoming an oil state (Weszkalnys, 2008) and show that this is the same resource 
governance assemblage. In addition to the technical preparations, these include the same 
INGOs (International Alert, PWYP) laying the groundwork for Uganda’s EITI membership, the 
‘exposure’ visits to Norway for civil society and government elites, visits by international 
professors, foreign advisers, consultants and other experts (national CSOs interviews, 2012); 
civil society workshops sharing knowledge from other oil producing contexts.  
 
The global resource governance assemblage and its associated knowledges and practices had 
material impacts in Uganda. In addition to perpetuating the idea that resource governance is a 
technical process, another outcome of this intervention was that CSOs in Uganda adopted 
narratives and roles that reflected these dominant narratives and practices. This meant that 
CSO activities became shaped by dominant knowledge about oil and how to address its 
challenges, thus delimiting oil activities with implications for the ability of l0cal concerns to 
be addressed, as section 7.3 of this chapter shows. Another implication was that ‘resource 
curse’ narratives were reinforced in Uganda’s oil assemblage and became a way for people in 
the oil region to frame experiences and express concerns about oil.  
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7.2.2 National level focus of activities  
During phase two of the exploration period (2009 – 2012) funding, expert knowledge and 
governance practices relating to oil and gas began to be channelled through Uganda’s existing 
development architecture featuring national CSOs, meaning that national CSOs in the 
professional CSO sector became ‘experts’ on oil and gas. Capacity building training and 
workshops were held in Kampala, where the majority of INGOs and CSOs are based and 
where it was possible to engage other key national stakeholders such as MPs and Ministers. 
The national focus of oil governance work was considered a priority by donors and INGOs 
throughout most of phase two, because at this time important oil legislation was being 
developed. The emphasis on promoting transparency in Uganda’s oil industry meant a key 
role for Ugandan CSOs to influence outcomes.  
 
A major concern among donors was the development of oil legislation in the context of 
Uganda’s “deteriorating governance environment” (Global Witness, 2010: 3). The 2012 
Petroleum Bill (oil bill) raised concerns among experts and was one of the ‘early warning signs’ 
that Global Witness identified as signalling problems for the sector. The oil bill is the primary 
law for governing Uganda’s oil industry and was being updated from its 1985 version. In early 
June 2010, a draft copy of the bill was shared with Ugandan civil society and international 
NGOs (national CSO interviews). Global Witness’s analysis found that the oil bill “does not 
provide sufficient checks and balances to safeguard against the obvious risks of high-level 
corruption” (Global Witness, 2010: 5). The main controversy was clause 9 in the bill, which 
gave powers to the Oil Minister to negotiate, grant and revoke exploration and production 
licences, and to issue policy and regulations. This was seen as allowing for the politicisation of 
the sector and an obstacle to transparency (national CSO interviews). Discussions with 
national CSOs about their work on the bill during our interviews reflected this analysis: 
“We think it will be very difficult for this country to avoid the much touted resource 
curse, because you are literally giving the oil and gas sector to two individuals to 
govern, that is the Minister and the President, so we are particularly not very 
comfortable in that” (NCSO01, 2012) 
 
Consequently, the efforts of donors and INGOs began to focus on building the capacity of 
national CSOs and the Ugandan parliament to understand the Bill and challenge clause 9. 
Professors from Harvard University in the USA provided CSOs with detailed input into the 
bill, which was then discussed at CSCO meetings: 
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“We would meet in the day and we sit and then we handled different aspects [of the 
bill], different chapters, chapter by chapter, clause by clause of the bill” (NCSO05, 
2012) 
 
Donors then spent millions of shillings on training workshops and seminars, including a 
retreat at a five-star resort in Kampala for CSOs and 40 MPs to scrutinise the oil bill (national 
CSO interviews 2012).  
 
MPs amended controversial clause 9 to improve accountability by awarding licencing powers 
to the Petroleum Authority rather than the Minister. President Museveni reacted strongly 
against what he saw as the betrayal of NRM MPs and held an unprecedented number of eight 
caucus meetings to push through the clause unchanged. The President directed his wrath  at 
national CSOs and MPs whom he claimed were working for foreign interests and were bribed 
to fail the bill (Bukenya and Nakaiza, 2018). He interpreted the challenge to clause 9 as a 
challenge to the success of the industry and donor and INGO intervention was framed as a 
threat to the progress oil promised: “they don’t want our oil sector to succeed because this will 
mean financial independence for Uganda” (Daily Monitor, 2012) . As I noted in section 5.3.3 
whereas regime survival has depended on donor funding since the 1990s, oil promised a new 
revenue stream by which the regime can reproduce its power, and move away from its heavy 
reliance on, and interference from, western donors (Mwenda and Tangri, 2005, Hickey et al., 
2015).  
 
The oil bill intervention pushed CSOs’ work into the political arena in a context where the role 
of CSOs in Uganda has since the 1990s been to play a supportive and complementary role to 
the state rather than engage in issues deemed ‘political’ (Sjögren, 2013a). And while there have 
been exceptions to this norm in recent years, as chapter four showed, the role of the donor 
funded CSO sector has been to provide stability to the state and act as a vehicle for service 
delivery in the context of structural adjustment. The President therefore made attempts to re-
emphasise what the government believes is the role of CSOs in Uganda’s oil assemblage, as 
one respondent explained:  
“Oil is a very sensitive subject. The President made it clear and even MEMD did – that 
oil is not for CSOs. They should work in education not oil” (NCSO07, 2012). 
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There was clear concern among CSO respondents I interviewed in 2012 that government 
scrutiny of their activities was going to increase: 
“If it were not for us pushing MPs to stand their ground there would be no discussion, 
so now the President thinks that actually we CSOs are making it very hard for him to 
get his way, so he’s going to harden on us, there’s no doubt about that, he’s going to 
harden on us” (NCSO04, 2012). 
 
The result was a more restrictive space for CSOs. A handful of prominent CSOs were subject 
to government investigations, and legislation was passed to restrict meetings on issues 
deemed ‘political’ (Bukenya and Nakaiza, 2018). As I show in section 7.5, this had more serious 
repercussions for subnational CSOs in the oil region with less visibility than the high profile 
national CSOs. 
 
What is clear from the intervention on the oil bills is that Ugandan CSOs gave donors the 
opportunity to influence Uganda’s oil industry from the ‘outside’. The support from external 
actors during this phase was notably different from the technical support provided to the 
Ugandan government from Norad and consultants during phase one of exploration (section 
5.2.3). In this second phase, external support was channelled around the state by donors, 
INGOs and ‘experts’ to strengthen institutions and foster democratic oversight. This 
highlights the clear donor concerns about oil governance in light of trends I noted in chapter 
four, especially the embezzlement of aid funds by the Office of the Prime Minister. Whereas 
the Ugandan state’s democratic transgressions had been overlooked before, oil was a different 
matter. Here, the ideas about oil and oil’s potentialities (Weszkalnys, 2008) including the 
position of oil as a globally valuable and strategic resource (Watts, 2005), had a clear influence 
in the assemblage. The advent of oil and the incentives oil is believed to provide for elite 
corruption required strengthening countervailing power to the state due to concerns about 
the concentration of state power, to try to redress this balance.  
 
What is also clear is that through their interventions around the state, in the efforts to 
improve accountability in the sector and avoid the ‘resource curse’, Uganda’s donors 




7.3 CSO activity shifts to a subnational focus  
After the oil bill contestation, which reached its climax in 2011, the focus of donor and CSO 
attention shifted to the subnational level and began to involve subnational CSO partners. This 
shift began towards the end of phase two, and intensified during phase three of the 
exploration period (2013-2016). Donor and INGO funding to involve and support the 
‘grassroots’ required national CSOs to partner with CSOs located closer to the oil region, and 
so cross-scale CSO partnerships became a key characteristic of the oil assemblage. However, 
previous CSO activism in some communities during phase one and prevailing power relations 
at the local level presented challenges to CSOs’ ambitions to represent the grassroots. The 
‘expertise’ of civil society, seen from the global and national viewpoint as an essential part of 
ensuring good governance of Uganda’s oil, was contested by oil companies, the state and the 
oil-affected communities in the subnational space.  
 
7.3.1 Partnerships between national and subnational CSOs 
The activities of national CSOs shifted to the subnational level4, to focus on “strengthening 
capacity of the local communities and the [subnational] CSOs to be able to advocate for these 
oil and gas issues” (NCSO02, 2012). In doing so, this shift brought important new actors into 
the assemblage – subnational CSOs. Partnering with subnational CSOs became a logistic and 
strategic necessity for national CSOs to implement oil activities at the subnational level. The 
reason for partnering was twofold; the national CSOs were geographically distant from oil 
communities and had little legacy of interaction with local people in the oil region (Odora, 
2007):  
“We work with locally rooted CSOs because they have a much more closer bond with 
the local communities since we are nationally based” (NCSO05, 2012). 
 
Data show that partnering with subnational organisations was not only to ‘build capacity’ of 
local organisations but also a way for national CSOs to reach the oil communities. Restrictions 
put in place by the government presented additional barriers to national CSOs:  
“When we went [to the oil region] on our own it wasn’t very easy for us to get into the 
villages because I think you’ve heard of the directive that the Ministry of Energy gave 
 
4 An exception to this is MYJ who worked in the oil region with the University of Leeds during phase two 
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that no one should reach out into the villages in the oil producing areas without any 
permission from the Permanent Secretary” (NCSO03, 2012). 
 
According to national CSOs, partnership working enabled national CSOs to work in the oil 
region despite the lack of organic connection to the oil communities. Two national CSOs 
established local offices in Hoima town and hired staff to be permanently based there. As a 
result of this geographical shift of focus to the subnational level, several subnational CSOs 
began to include oil and gas issues in their work and began to receive subgrants from 
international donors and INGOs through national CSO partners, thus changing the 
assemblage configuration.  
 
Table 10. Subnational CSOs working on oil and gas issues 
 
Subnational Civil Society 
Organisation  




Kitara Heritage Development 
Agency (KHEDA) 
The development of the Bunyoro 
region  
2006 
(MIRAC) Member organisation to address 
issues of corruption and promote 
democratic empowerment 
2008 
Navigators of Development 
Association (NAVODA) 
Socio-economic transformation of 
communities through 
environmental conservation  
2005 
Lake Albert Children Women 
Advocacy (LACWADO) 
(Buliisa) 
Women and Children’s rights  2004 
Kakindo Orphans Care 
(Buliisa) 
Children’s rights  2008 
Kwataniza Farmers Group 
(Hoima) 
Women’s community savings and 




The subnational civil society organisations working with national CSOs are relatively new, 
having formed in the mid to late-2000s, and are based in Hoima town. As table 10 shows, they 
include one organisation working on women’s issues formed in 2004; one working on 
environment issues formed in 2005, one working on livelihoods-related issues formed in 2006; 
and another working on corruption, formed in 2007.  While smaller than the national 
organisations, these CSOs are also classed as formal, professional CSOs in contrast to other 
subnational civil society groups at the local level that include associational groups and 
societies (CNS01, 2015). These subnational organisations were brought into the oil assemblage 
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and through links to national CSOs and their donor and INGO sponsors, were connected to 
global governance assemblages. Figure 18 shows some of the key civil society organisations 
and the types of activities they carried out in the oil region over time. Prior to 2014 (at which 
time there is evidence of direct links between donors and subnational CSOs), the role of 
subnational CSOs was mainly to mobilise local people to meetings that were facilitated by 







Figure 18. CSOs activities on oil at the subnational level through three phases of the pre-oil stage
 197 
 
7.3.2 CSO activities, donor agendas and resource curse narratives 
Partnership working established specific roles for national and subnational CSOs, which 
reflected that national CSOs had become ‘experts’ on oil and gas through the capacity building 
training of the resource governance assemblage and work on the oil bills:  
 “[The subnational CSOs] would do all the mobilising ‘cause they know the people in 
the areas, they would do all the mobilising, and then we would go as experts, as 
facilitators to facilitate these dialogues” (NCSO04, 2012) 
 
The role of subnational CSOs was to ‘mobilise’ local people to attend workshops and meetings, 
often held at the subcounty or district level but also sometimes in selected villages, and 
national CSOs would deliver ‘sensitisation’ on oil, which means to make someone highly 
aware, or ‘sensitive’ about an issue (national CSO interviews 2012 and 2013; subnational CSO 
interviews, 2014). National CSOs presented themselves not only as experts on oil and gas 
issues, but the crucial vehicle through which oil communities could reach the attention of the 
government in Kampala: “the views that will be picked out of those community meetings can 
find a way through the civil society organisations and into parliament” (NCSO01, 2012), the 
director of one CSO explained. 
 
Data show that CSO activities involved ‘sensitisations’ on oil and gas and capturing 
community voices through workshops (figure 18). This format adopted the typical model of 
CSO work in Uganda in relation to delivering development interventions; CSOs play the role 
of information provider and of capturing voices of the rural poor to feed into policy (Odora, 
2007). Oil governance work by CSOs was following a similar model. Analysis of CSO workshop 
reports shows that sensitisations on oil were largely one-directional meetings, at which 
national CSOs played the role of educator about the impacts of oil and the importance of local 
people to have knowledge about the industry. The ‘voices’ captured were used to justify the 
need for CSOs and secure further funding, for example, a workshop presentation by a national 
CSO to the World Bank in 2011 discussed ‘poverty’ and ‘high expectations’ among local people 
in the oil region. These findings show that oil governance work was channelled through the 
existing development architecture in Uganda and consequently empowered a section of 
Ugandan civil society – the professional ‘CSO sector’ at the national and subnational levels. As 
Kothari (2005) and others have argued, it is the perceived closeness of these ‘local’ actors to 
subaltern groups (in this case the rural poor in the oil regions) which legitimises and 
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authorises their interventions. However, as I demonstrate in this chapter, the resource 
governance assemblage enabled national CSOs to claim expertise on oil through a certain 
framing of oil. At the local level, this expertise was contested; subnational dynamics presented 
a barrier to the perceived legitimacy of CSOs as the representatives of local people.  
 
The data show that oil narratives in the assemblage were influential in shaping CSO work in 
this initial period of subnational CSO activities during phase two, as I discussed in chapter 
five. CSO activity on oil at the subnational level was shaped by the dominant ideas and 
narratives of oil governance, which focused on ‘information access’ and ‘transparency’, 
echoing the narratives of the resource governance assemblage and the ‘formulaic’ 
prescriptions seen in other contexts (Weszkalnys, 2011). This close correlation of donor 
funding, agendas and narratives are typical of donor funded work, and local agendas can be 
side lined (Banks and Hulme, 2012). This meant that CSO activity at the subnational level - 
especially during phase two of the exploration period – addressed issues that did not always 
resonate with local people. Indeed, although there was evidence of interactions between CSOs 
and local people, it did not appear that issues of local concern were shaping CSO agendas: 
“The CSOs come here but they talk about other things, how to improve community” one 
community respondent noted (COMA11, 2014).   
 
The underlying assumption of the CSO approach was that people in the oil region lacked the 
capacity to understand and respond appropriately to the changes taking place “because you 
are dealing with someone who has only gone to school up to senior four (16 years old)” 
(CSO04,2012). As another national CSO respondent commented:  
“The districts for example cannot tell, members of the community can’t tell that this is 
pollution, they wouldn’t even have seen it” (NCSO01, 2012).  
 
As the quotes suggest, the focus on national CSOs as experts also perpetuates the idea that the 
communities or subnational CSOs are not able to engage on their own merit, “because, you 
know oil and gas are a little too technical” (NCSO05, 2012). National CSOs have taken on the 
role as the interlocutor and experts on oil, when in fact the industry is new to all Ugandan 
actors. CSO activity at this time consisted of national CSOs bringing information to the oil 
region about the potential impacts of oil and gas and educating local people on the need for 
transparency and accountability. However, at this time there were oil related impacts taking 
place in communities, many of which were captured in the extensive community interviews in 
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the oil region in 2012 and 2013 for the Leeds project (Manyindo et al., 2014). These include 
concerns about the lake and pollution, missing or incorrect compensation payments for land, 
exclusion from communal resources, livelihoods challenges, increased dust, noise and traffic, 
most of which were not being addressed by the government or industry.  
 
While national CSO work in phase two was focused on sensitisations, there is evidence that 
other work was being done by international and national CSOs to document oil related 
changes at the subnational level, for example the impacts of oil on land, conflict and women 
(national CSO interviews, CSO documents). However, there was little coordination between 
organisations prior to 2014, despite the CSO networks that had formed. The competitive 
nature of CSOs in Uganda was one reason for this, and another reason was lack of 
coordination among donors, leading for example, to the same donor funding two different 
national CSOs to carry out ‘baseline’ studies in the oil region (national CSO interviews). CSOs 
tended to engage on their own issues, so land CSOs documented land issues, peace and 
conflict CSOs carried out conflict assessments, gender-focused CSOs engaged on women’s 
issues. It was not until 2015 that one national CSO began a study to document the various CSO 
interventions at the subnational level and address the problem of duplication (CNS03, 2015). 
While these issues about land, conflict and gender gradually found their way onto CSO 
agendas by phase three (figure 18), during phase two when CSO intervention was directed at 
the subnational level, local experiences were not informing CSO ‘sensitisation’ activities. This 
shows the way in which the dominant narratives of oil delimited the types of activities that 
were being done to address the issues.  
 
One outcome of the partnerships between national CSOs, subcontracting to subnational 
CSOs, was that the dominant narratives in the assemblage around the resource curse and 
technical approach to manage oil also became reflected in subnational CSOs work. This 
reflects the ways in which ideas about oil have material effects (Weszkalnys, 2011). One 
implication of this was that while subnational CSOs talked about the salient issues facing local 
people, the funding from donors meant a different focus for projects that did not always 
address these issues. For example, in our interview in 2014 one subnational CSO respondent 
discussed concerns about the environment and about the impacts of the refinery resettlement 
process:  
“Only 52% of people have been compensated in 2 years. Developments have halted, no 
permanent crops have been grown, this breeds resentments” (SCSO07, 2014). 
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However, the funding the organisation received from the Revenue Watch Institute reflected 
the transparency agenda:  
“We got money to empower people, to demand transparency. To ensure that the oil 
money is going to be used prudently” (SCSO07, 2014).  
 
There appeared then to be a disconnect between the salient local issues and the types of 
projects and narratives that were shaping subnational approaches. There was a similar finding 
from a focus group interview with a subnational CSO in 2014, where respondents discussed 
concerns about the increasing prevalence of HIV in the oil region and food shortages due to 
the refinery. However, the project they had funding for was to support local businesses: 
“We are working with communities around Hoima preparing them for business 
opportunities, through workshops, to improve their business, branding, and business 
health” (SCSO04, 2014).  
 
While the issues being addressed through donor funded projects may be relevant, they were 
not being shaped by the current and salient needs and concerns of local people. Further, what 
is reflected in these agendas provides further evidence that the focus is on oil as revenue, or at 
a later stage of the project cycle, typical of the mainstream ideas about oil and development 
(section 2.2).  
 
The character of the CSO projects being implemented at the subnational level demonstrates 
the effects of dominant oil narratives in shaping assemblage practices. However, there was 
also a further effect. Not only did dominant discourses of oil and development lead to a focus 
on some issues over others, but the ‘sensitisation’ on the potential impacts of oil reproduced 
the narrative of a ‘resource curse’ at the local level (Weszkalnys, 2013). Interviews with 
respondents in the oil region tended to frame their concerns in terms of the resource curse, 
which was presented as something intrinsic to Africa: “In Africa, we have what is known as the 
resource curse” one elder commented (COMA09, 2012).  
 
While initial activism had established these concerns with images of the Niger Delta, 
subsequent ‘sensitisations’ on the impacts of oil continued and perpetuated this narrative. 
Witte (2018) comments on the antagonistic language and the powerful imagery of degraded 
landscapes used in some of the CSO workshops and meetings she observed during 
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ethnographic research in the oil region in Uganda in 2012. CSO leaders referred to oil as a 
‘time bomb’, and the oil companies and government as ‘thieves’ (Witte, 2018: 114). Images I 
observed on leaflets and posters left in communities (for example in the village LC1s offices) 
depict a degraded oil environment. One CSO poster uses an image of gas flaring in Nigeria to 
ask, ‘Can this happen in Uganda?’. Through this type of activity, CSOs in Uganda have 
contributed to an imaginary of oil in which oil’s potentiality is to breed conflict, induce 
poverty and degrade the environment. A version of the Niger Delta is envisaged to potentially 
take place in Uganda’s Albertine Graben. This captured the imaginations of local people. 
Almost all community members I interviewed throughout the period of study raised the 
example of Nigeria:  
“I am afraid. I saw what happened to Nigeria and afraid it will happen there, the 
pollution. I saw pictures of an old woman carrying babies that were so dirty, and men 
very dirty!” (COMA04, 2014). 
 
These narratives played a consequential role in the assemblage, especially at the subnational 
level. They differed from the dominant state and industry narrative which presented oil solely 
in a positive light, and as such provided an important counter-narrative in the assemblage. On 
the other hand, the CSOs introduced the idea that the resource curse could become a reality 
in the Albertine Graben, and this idea mixed with existing ideas and experiences at the local 
level, serving to stoke and exacerbate people’s fears. The idea of a ‘resource curse’ resonated 
with the concerns and lived experiences of local people in the context of transformation in the 
oil region and their awareness of politics in Uganda – “big men will come because of oil” 
(COMA06, 2014), was a common comment in interviews. In this way, CSO narratives fed the 
prevailing sense of uncertainty at the local level. This demonstrates the way that dominant 
narratives are not imposed, but rather mix with existing ideas (Tsing, 2011). However, while 
the ‘resource curse’ presented an alternative future scenario, through the resource curse 
narrative and the solution proposed - ‘good governance’ through transparency - CSOs actually 
supported the idea perpetuated by industry that oil was something that could be effectively 
managed into a ‘blessing’.  
 
7.3.3 Subnational CSOs face challenges to access and legitimacy 
National CSOs framed the partnerships with subnational CSOs as a way to reach the 
‘grassroots’, however interviews with subnational CSOs revealed numerous challenges which 
posed obstacles to them effectively reaching and representing people in the oil region. First, 
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because of the re-regulatory state and centralised control of oil, government remained hostile 
to CSOs that it claimed were “inciting communities” (SCSO05, 2014). The early activism by 
CSOs noted in section 5.2 led to the perception among government – both national and 
subnational – that CSOs were ‘disorganising’ communities and attempting to turn them 
against the oil project. Subnational CSOs, through their partnerships with national CSOs, 
were tarnished with the same reputation. As one consultant explained, due to the lack of 
resources and reliance on national partners “the subnational [CSOs] are being overpowered by 
the national and providing one sided information about the oil curse” (CNS02, 2014). The 
subnational CSOs interpreted this differently however; as the government wanting to ensure 
its monopoly over the narrative of oil as promising a positive future: 
“The Government doesn’t want us talking to communities, they accused us of inciting, 
they see us as a threat. They want us to say only positive things, the excitement about 
oil” (SCSO07, 2014).  
 
This demonstrates the tensions in the assemblage between the competing ideas about oil and 
the possibility of these ideas to influence expectations about oil in different ways. District 
officials and Kingdom respondents were also critical that they had to address the negative 
information being given to communities without the material resources to do so: “CSOs have 
the money to disorganise and we don’t have the money to organise” as one DLG respondent 
put it (DLG09, 2015). This also indicates that it is not only a case of the re-regulatory central 
state clamping down on CSO activity, other local actors also claimed that CSO activity was not 
in the interests of local people.  
 
The restriction put in place by the re-regulatory state to control who entered the oil region 
was not the only challenge to CSO access to the communities. Like national CSOs, 
subnational CSOs also lacked organic connections to the oil communities. Many of the 
subnational organisations were relatively new in the region, and most were part of the 
professionalised CSO sector rather than originating from the oil region; “organisations that 
put smart reports on the table” as one respondent described them (SCSO16, 2016). Further, the 
location of the subnational CSO offices was in Hoima town, some 90km distance from the oil 
region and the ‘grassroots’ level.  Another respondent raised the additional point that there 
are difficulties for truly ‘grassroots’ based organisations to legally form CSOs, due to a complex 
registration process requiring funds and a written constitution; a level of bureaucracy that is 
beyond the capabilities of some of the truly ‘community based’ groups (CNS01, 2015). So, 
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although the nationally directed CSO programmes around community monitoring, 
information provision and ‘raising voices’ required local CSOs to be engaged in the 
communities, ‘local’ CSO partners based in Hoima without organic connection to the 
grassroots struggled both to access communities, and to be seen as legitimate representatives 
of the communities. 
 
An additional challenge was the lack of recognition of subnational CSOs by other actors at the 
subnational level. Indeed, the ‘expertise’ of CSOs on oil and gas issues was contested by the 
state, oil companies and communities in the oil region. Processes and dynamics already taking 
place in the oil region that had shaped power relations, as noted in section 5.2, had excluded 
subnational CSOs as well as DLG and Kingdom. The data show that industry actors were in 
closer contact with local people than were CSOs. As chapter five showed, Tullow Oil had been 
working in the oil regions since 2006 (in phase one), and CNOOC began carrying out 
extensive engagements in villages towards the end of phase two (around 2012). This meant 
that the oil companies did not recognise subnational CSOs – relative newcomers to the scene - 
as the representatives of communities in the oil region:  
“The oil companies were saying that CSOs are concocting ideas that aren’t there on 
the ground ...they would tell us that we are not representative of the grievances, they 
don’t exist – the companies were not hearing the grievances themselves they said” 
(SCSO05, 2014). 
 
The lack of recognition by industry meant that subnational CSOs were frustrated in their 
attempts to hold meetings with oil companies (subnational CSO interviews). Prior to 2013, oil 
companies only engaged national CSOs at the national level, as one CSO noted: “Oil 
companies used to overlook the regional level and only talk to national CSOs” (SCSO03, 2014). 
National CSOs were invited to national level stakeholder meetings during phase two, but 
subnational CSOs were unable to attend due to resource constraints and lack of visibility. As 
was the case with other subnational actors in the earlier stages of the industry as I discussed in 
chapter five (phase one and phase two) subnational CSOs were side-lined by the centralised 
control and management of oil: 
“We didn’t know how to access the oil companies, Total and Tullow. To access staff 
they need two weeks advance communication, a letter to their office in Kampala and 
then they decide” (SCSO12, 2015).   
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The inability for CSOs to engage with oil companies to find information and address local 
problems impacted the perspectives of local people that CSOs could not represent their issues, 
as another CSO noted:  
“We called [the oil company] for dialogue but they didn’t turn up. The community was 
taking us for jokers” (SCSO05, 2014) 
 
The data show that subnational CSOs had a similar challenge with their efforts to get District 
Local Government to attend meetings, which impacted their ability to show they can support 
local people:   
“We went to the community to get their power...It was hard, when they came to 
educate the communities for compensation, the government wanted facilitation from 
us” (SCSO07, 2014). 
 
This suggests that the lack of legitimacy of CSOs in the eyes of oil companies and local 
government during phase two further compounded the struggle to be seen as relevant to 
communities. Local government officials expected to be paid travel allowances to attend 
meetings, which initially subnational CSOs did not have the resources to provide, and oil 
companies simply would not turn up to meetings.  
 
In sum, the data suggest that while the resource governance assemblage discussed in section 
7.2 constructed CSOs as ‘experts’ on oil and gas, this idea was contested at the subnational 
level where existing power dynamics meant that the oil industry was in closer contact with 
local people. Indeed, while subnational CSOs claimed to be the ‘eyes and ears’ of 
communities, this was not reflected in the relationship between subnational CSOs and 
communities in the oil region. CSOs struggled to access the oil regions due to frontier making 
dynamics and the re-regulatory role of the state.  This was also due to the fracture between 
state and CSOs which was further exacerbated by donor interference on the oil bills; and 
because CSOs had no previous track record of working in communities and as a result had not 
developed the connections to be seen as their representatives.  
 
7.4 Role of the subnational in shaping CSO activity 
The previous section showed that subnational dynamics in the frontier constrained CSO oil 
related activities in various ways. However, while initially subnational dynamics constrained 
CSOs work, over time the ongoing material impacts in the region, changing corporate 
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engagement strategy and the influence of donor support during phase three began to shape 
CSOs work and improve legitimacy and impact.  
 
7.4.1 Changing subnational power dynamics  
In phase three (2013-2016), coinciding with the arrival of CNOOC and Total in 2012 and the 
progression of the project cycle, oil companies’ stakeholder engagement strategy changed to 
one of increasing openness and inclusion of district actors, which had an impact on 
subnational CSOs. With the opening of the Hoima liaison offices by Tullow and CNOOC in 
this phase (chapter six), CSOs were able to get information directly from oil company CLOs, 
which improved perceptions among local communities and local leaders that CSOs could play 
a useful role.   
 
As the previous section noted, during phase two, attempts by subnational CSOs to engage 
with international oil companies at the subnational level were frustrated; requests for 
meetings went unanswered and this impacted the ability of CSOs to address issues of 
community concern. Due to state-CSO tensions and the centralised control of oil information 
which excluded local government, the oil companies were a key source of information for 
subnational CSOs:  
“The information on oil is classified, the local government tell us they know little, they 
tell us we should ask the oil companies and the Ministry” (SCSO04, 2014).  
 
While it had not been possible for CSOs to access this information during phase two, in our 
interviews in 2014 CSO respondents reported that oil companies had recently started to 
engage with subnational CSOs:  
“The companies have begun to see that there is some use in communicating with 
[CSO] and getting the message to communities” (SCSO02, 2014). 
 
Most CSO respondents interpreted this change as a result of the companies’ realisation that 
CSOs were an important connection to communities. A member of the subnational CSO 
network BAPENECO claimed that CSOs were responsible for the improving relationship with 
oil companies, due to their effective lobbying at an oil company engagement meeting they 
attended with CSCO in Kampala in late 2013:  
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“They [oil companies] used to overlook the regional level and only talk to national 
CSOs. So, we named and shamed them, we went to the national meetings and we 
blasted them” (CSO08, 2014). 
 
While the increasing visibility of subnational CSOs thanks to BAPENECO’s membership in 
CSCO could have played a part in this change, the most obvious explanation for the reason oil 
companies began to see CSOs as “serious stakeholders” is that this shift coincided with the oil 
companies changing engagement strategy in phase three:   
“Originally the companies were confined in the Graben, but now they come to Hoima 
and involve CSOs...it’s to get their social licence to operate” (SCSO04, 2014).  
 
Indeed, given the changing approach to stakeholder engagement in phase three within the 
wider context of industry delay and reduction of CLOs in the communities, as noted in 
chapter six, building a relationship with subnational CSOs was a strategic move. As one CSO 
noted: 
“Oil companies have realised that things could no longer be done the old-fashioned 
way. They have to work with civil society and local experts” (CSO08, 2014). 
 
At the same time, subnational CSOs noted that they had adapted their own approach to the 
industry. Facing criticisms of ‘inciting communities’ by local and national government, they 
had to ensure the government and oil companies that “we are complementing your work” 
(SCSO06, 2014). As such, they had to change from a stance of antagonism to engagement:  
“We came to realise we cannot get the expected outcome in isolation of the oil 
companies and government” (SCSO06, 2014). 
 
All subnational CSO interview respondents noted that a more cooperative relationship was 
developing between CSOs and oil companies, which some even claimed was mutually 
beneficial:  
“The oil companies have learnt to trust us. They understand that we need information 




The geographical shift to Hoima had helped; Tullow and CNOOC’s liaison offices were now in 
close proximity to the offices of CSOs. Informal as well as formal engagements had become 
more frequent: 
“We get updates from oil companies and information about their activities. It’s good to 
have the liaison offices in Hoima, you can go and you can call and they give 
information and are open.” (CSO04, 2014). 
 
Yet, although CSOs framed the relationship with oil companies in a positive light, some CSO 
respondents reflected on the power relationship, and when dealing with a more powerful 
entity there was the need to “dance to their tune” (CSO05, 2014). However, there seemed to be 
an acceptance that this power relationship was inevitable, and that the industry was by its 
nature ‘secretive’, indicating another dominant idea about the nature of oil. CSOs were aware 
that information was limited and controlled by the Ministry of Energy. While CSOs had 
changed their ‘adversarial stance’ – by which they referred to the activism in phase one in 
villages by certain national CSOs – out of necessity in order to gain credibility and shake off 
the image of ‘saboteurs’ of the oil project, the somewhat neutral position on the industry 
indicates a lack of a critical stance taken by CSOs. The livelihoods concerns of people in the 
villages discussed in chapter five, which certainly had not reduced by phase three of the 
exploration period, were not being tackled by CSOs at this point. “The companies are here for 
business only” was a phrase repeated by several subnational CSO respondents. Rather, the 
subnational CSOs were passing information from the oil companies to communities in 
relation to the oil project and indirect opportunities on oil and gas, promoting the ‘local 
content’ narrative. Nonetheless, at this stage, due to improving relations with oil companies, 
CSOs were in a better position to engage.  
 
While donor agendas were influential in terms of shaping activities and narratives of 
subnational activities, it was also the case that donor funding proved crucial in enabling 
subnational CSOs to increase their visibility and credibility at the local level. During an 
observation of a CSO capacity building workshop, one CSO representative commented 
“Stakeholders didn’t used to respect us, now they recognise us because of donor funds” 
(SCSO07, 2014). While the comment was tongue-in-cheek, there was some truth to this; donor 
funding had in fact enabled subnational CSOs to ‘facilitate’ meetings, by which they mean 
provide travel reimbursements to participants to encourage their attendance. This is 
important because some participants, especially local government representatives as noted 
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above, do not attend meetings without such ‘facilitation’. As was the case with the oil 
companies, the ability for local CSOs to now get local government to attend community 
dialogues to discuss land and compensation issues had improved the credibility of CSOs 
among local people and raised their importance in the assemblage.  
 
7.4.2 Industry impacts and community agency 
Weak connections to the oil regions and the character of the CSO sector working on oil and 
gas meant that local experiences were not shaping CSO work during the initial period of CSO 
activity in phase two. The picture emerging from the analysis of national and subnational 
CSOs’ work on oil is of a fragmented and poorly organised approach, with donor agendas 
dominant, and ‘sensitisations’ on oil and gas reproducing oil curse narratives. CSOs were 
spread thinly, and some were having to deal with numerous donors in terms of reporting 
requirements, as one national CSO explained with exasperation: 
“Some groups have like ten donors, getting small money form then and every donor is 
asking you this or that…the amount of time we spend on reporting it’s not an easy 
thing.. you have to be in Kampala because that’s where the power is very constant” 
(NCSO02, 2012).  
 
This required CSOs to be in an urban setting with reliable communications infrastructure; 
even in Hoima the power was not always reliable. The material reality of the Albertine Graben 
meant that some locations were physically difficult to access, and the remote nature of villages 
and lack of basic services there meant that CSO officers from Kampala preferred to remain in 
the relative comfort of Hoima town or even Kampala. The completion of the road to village A 
had eased access to this village by phase three and the data show that most of the CSOs I 
interviewed included this village in their programmes, whereas in contrast my data show only 
one national CSO had visited village C.  
 
In the meantime, the impacts of oil exploration such as the loss of crops, restrictions to 
communal resources, displacement from land for infrastructure, increases in dust, noise and 
in-migration as noted in chapters five and six, were ongoing at the local level. Chapter five 
noted the increasing grievances of local people in relation to some of these impacts. Indeed, 
there is evidence that some local people in the oil regions were beginning to respond to, or 
attempt to address, these impacts and challenges associated with oil in various ways. Data 
reveal several examples of communities or individuals (for example community leaders) 
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taking action to address issues of concern, some of which are captured in table 11 below. These 
are individualised examples, but what they demonstrate is community agency in response to 
oil that is taking place outside of, but parallel to, formal CSO activities.  
 
Table 11. Examples of community responses to oil industry 
 
Example of response Actors identified  Exemplar quote 
Creation of community 
groups (e.g. Land 
Association, Saving 
and Credit groups) 
Community members and 
village level leaders in oil 
affected villages 
“The Land Association formed because of 
oil, we hold meetings with CNOOC. 
CNOOC has already given out papers on 
accountability, how much money has 
been paid for Murram” (LC1) 
Letter writing and / or 
petitioning the 
government and / or 
industry 
Sub-country level leadership, 
district level leadership, 
communities in oil affected 
villages, Bunyoro Kingdom 
“We wrote to [oil companies] as a District 
Council 18 months ago to ask them to 
show us what is happening, and for the 
first time they accepted and took leaders 
to the oil areas.” (DLG) 
 
Threats of roadblocks / 
disturbances  
Some community members in 
Hoima District (as reported 
by district government and 
Kingdom) 
“There are groups which want to start 
protesting, blocking roads with logs due 
to lack of jobs and benefits” (Kingdom) 
 
The Land Association created in village C, close to CNOOC’s workers’ camp was in response to 
the increasing pressures of land speculation and land grabbing in the area. Respondents 
explained that CNOOC frequently meets the Land Association to negotiate use and access to 
the communally owned land. However, there had recently been a lengthy dispute over a 
CNOOC contractor’s use of ‘murram’ for covering road surfaces (section 6.2.3). The murram is 
a communal resource which the community claimed CNOOC should be paying 80,000 ug 
shillings (approx. £20) per truck load to the community. CNOOC on the other hand, claimed 
the government prevented CNOOC from paying for it because it is considered a communal 
resource. The community began a court case against CNOOC to recover the monies for 
murram. During follow up interviews in village C in 2016 I was told that:  
“The money has been released, but the process was too long. We didn’t go to court it 
was solved out of court. CNOOC met last week, and the contractor delivered the 
money via CNOOC” (COMC12, 2016).  
 
This is one example, albeit an isolated one, of successful community action to redress 
perceived injustice in industry developments. This also highlights the competing resource 
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ontologies noted in chapter five, by which different values are placed on resources by 
communities, industry and state. It also shows the interests of the state in minimising the 
amount of compensation paid for resources. While CNOOC was prepared to pay the 
community for the murram, this would be a cost that CNOOC recovers from the government 
at a later stage. It furthermore points to the difficult question of ownership of the land vs the 
subsoil, which is a common source of contestation in extractives contexts (Bebbington and 
Humphreys Bebbington, 2011).  
 
While the examples above may contradict the narratives of national CSOs that local people 
are unable to effectively organise without support, there were also examples of oil-affected  
communities needing support. It became clear from interviews that the community 
sensitisation workshops and ‘dialogues’, while mainly one-sided as noted above, also provided 
a space in which over time CSOs became aware of salient local issues and began to take action 
to address some of them. As land and compensation issues became increasingly prevalent in 
phase three, subnational and national CSOs became a vehicle to link some local people to land 
advocacy organisations or lawyers. Figure 18 in section 7.3 shows the CSOs that are working in 
the Bunyoro region and the issues they address. What the figure illustrates is that the issues 
focused on by subnational CSOs changes over time. It shows the gradual influence over time 
of some of the salient local level issues that become incorporated into ‘sensitisations’, such as 
land and women’s issues, and then from 2013 there is ‘refinery advocacy’, which became a key 
focus. There are the externally derived narratives on oil, for example business preparedness 
and transparency.  
 
7.4.3 The role of key events 
Two key events at the subnational level, both involving the displacement of local people for oil 
infrastructure, revealed the lack of support preparing local people to cope with such serious 
impacts of the industry. The first event was the government-managed displacement for the oil 
refinery in Hoima District through the Refinery Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), noted in 
chapter five, which affected over 7000 people and left many destitute. The second event 
following this in 2014, was the forced eviction of 200 people for an oil waste plant, during 
which people lost their homes, land and livelihoods.  
 
The poor handling of the RAP process by the government contractor Strategic Friends 
International (SFI) left hundreds of people in precarious situations, unsure about the 
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compensation and resettlement process, and in need of support. Chapter five noted the 
complex social issues caused by the displacement of more than 7000 people from the site, 
which began during phase two in 2012. In 2014, my interviews with respondents in Hoima 
District (CSOs, DLG and Kingdom and others) were dominated by discussions of refinery-
related problems in terms of food shortages, domestic violence, destitution of some families 
and inadequate compensation. The refinery RAP was a clear failing of the state to adhere to 
post frontier measures (such as IFC guidelines for involuntary resettlement) to ensure timely 
compensation and resettlement. The fall-out from the refinery displacement process also 
revealed the lack of support local people had from CSOs in terms of upholding their rights 
prior to the RAP taking place. 
 
The initial focus of CSOs on the transparency agenda (and only later on documenting 
individual cases of land grabbing), and on ‘sensitisations’ on oil’s impacts, meant that there 
was not any pro-active CSO engagement to address the anticipated impacts of displacement, 
such as support for livelihoods, education, financial management and alternative housing 
during the transition period. Respondents from the refinery village noted in 2012 that CSOs 
had been to the village “to tell us to negotiate on compensation” and “demand transparency in 
the RAP” (COMF01, 2012). The focus of CSO support began to be around encouraging refinery 
residents to contest compensation rates and refuse payments. While this was also an area of 
concern for refinery residents, many of whom considered their land to have been undervalued, 
there lacked a focus on wider support for other issues. As such, CSO support for refinery 
residents was reactive and uncoordinated. As figure 18 shows, ‘refinery advocacy’ comes onto 
the agenda after the RAP process is already underway in 2013. Interview data show that the 
role of subnational CSOs in refinery advocacy was to mobilise the refinery affected people to 
attend meetings with national CSOs to discuss issues about compensation and displacement. 
Sensitisations on the impacts of oil that had been taking place at the subnational level prior to 
the refinery eviction clearly had not involved preparing people for displacement and 
supporting them to ensure human rights violations did not take place and to provide 
accountability. The lack of organic connection between CSOs and people in the refinery 
villages was one of the reasons, another was that as I argued above, the agenda for 
sensitisations during phase two had not been driven by community-led concerns. 
 
However, the refinery event brought diverse actors together to deal with the issues posed by 
the refinery and as such, considerably shaped the assemblage in phase three. Data show that 
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gender concerns, violence concerns, financial management concerns, livelihoods concerns, 
food shortages, increasing animal-human conflict, pastoralists invading the partially vacant 
lands – these issues were now on the agendas of district and subcounty leaders, and Kingdom 
actors as well as CSOs. The materiality of the oil resource, in terms of the infrastructure 
needed for processing the resource, shaped social relations in the assemblage and mobilised 
responses from a range of actors across scales (Mitchell, 2009). The Bunyoro Kingdom 
directed its resources towards helping those affected; connections were made between the 
Kingdom and DLG and joint meetings were held and reports written. New narratives emerged 
in the assemblage due to the refinery displacement being framed in terms of ‘human rights’, 
thus linking to global assemblages. The refinery plight was reported in international press and 
the webpages of ‘business and human rights’ and activist organisations, thus forging new links 
across scales. While the RAP was a clear example of a failed post frontier measure, CSOs were 
able to link to post frontier discourse about rights to fair and timely compensation to 
challenge the government. What is notable however, is that the oil companies stayed quiet 
during the process. While they were also dealing with land and compensation issues for oil 
installations and the roads, the refinery was seen as a government project.  
 
Another outcome of the refinery event was increasing cooperation between CSOs and 
communities in the oil region, once again demonstrating the ability of oil’s materiality to 
shape social relations. The fallout from the RAP was something tangible that CSOs could focus 
on and provide support to local people for. Some national CSOs began to work almost 
exclusively on the refinery issue during phase three, and donor funding became directed to 
address some of the refinery-related issues. One national CSO helped a group of refinery-
affected people to form a resident’s community group and stage protests at the refinery site, 
which were videoed and uploaded to the internet to reach a wider audience. Data show that 
another national CSO convened a ‘high level’ meeting in Kampala bringing together 
government Ministers, MPs, donors, INGOs, CSOs, Bunyoro Kingdom representatives and 
some of the people from the refinery-affected villages to critique the RAP and discuss the 
challenges. Subnational and national CSOs worked together to arrange meetings with 
refinery-affected people to link them to lawyers in Kampala, to prepare court proceedings to 
challenge low compensation rates. With the support of CSOs some refinery residents refused 
to accept compensation, contesting the low rates. MPs and Parliamentarians visited some of 
the refinery-affected people in Hoima District to hear their stories. National CSOs worked 
with actors in the oil region including the Bunyoro Kingdom to compile research reports 
 213 
documenting the impacts on women, livelihoods and youth. The outcomes of the refinery in 
terms of shaping the assemblage and the interests of actors suggests its role as assemblage 
converter (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).  
 
Then, in 2014 a second key event occurred when two hundred people were forcibly and 
violently evicted from their land in Hoima District by an individual claiming to own the land 
and have sold it to an American company for an oil waste plant. The residents were displaced 
and forced to live in temporary camps. CSOs immediately provided support, linking those 
affected families to lawyers to begin court proceedings and highlighting the issue at the 
national and international levels. These key events at the subnational level demonstrate the 
significance of the materiality of the resource and the role of infrastructure in shaping social 
and political relations (Mitchell, 2009). This also demonstrated how these events, which 
resonated with existing concerns of oil’s relation to human rights for example, mobilised 
actors connected to other assemblages (human rights), linking local issues to global issues of 
concern. It is these relations of exteriority (Delanda, 2006) – the connections to other 
assemblages – that facilitated alliance-making and led to change in the assemblage, not only 
in the configuration of assemblage actors but in terms of new narratives to challenge and 
potentially destabilise the assemblage (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017).  
 
The materiality of the resource had increased the relevance of CSOs to local people at the 
subnational level (Bridge, 2009). In contrast to phase two where CSOs had to work to 
convince communities they could represent their interests, CSOs could now show the ability 
to provide tangible support through legal help and connections to powerful actors. The 
national CSOs, with connections to lawyers, MPs, Ministers and know-how of the advocacy 
process had become relevant to local people affected by the impacts of the oil, demonstrated 
by two key events which were directly related to oil’s material qualities.  
 
7.5 CSOs and oil governance in Uganda 
Events at the subnational level in phase three related to the materiality of the resource and 
ideas about oil linked to human rights, were instrumental in shaping the relations between 
communities and CSOs in Uganda’s oil assemblage. As a result of these events, the work of 
CSOs became more closely aligned to and informed by what was taking place in the oil region. 
In contrast to the earlier phases when “[CSOs] were not very well versed, saying that Uganda 
may begin the story of Nigeria” (SCSO07, 2014), respondents in follow up interviews in 2016 
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reflected that CSOs were increasingly attuned to local issues and relationships with oil 
communities was changing:  
“The relationship has changed, the refinery residents reached out... organisations like 
[national CSOs] have given them legal help” (MED03, 2016).  
 
However, it was made clear that this was due to the agency of local communities, and that 
communities remained sceptical about the CSO sector. As one district respondent explained:  
“CSOs have supported communities but they don’t see them as their voice. They have 
helped, but the community knows there are those in CSOs who want to make a case 
where there is no case” (DLG14, 2014).  
 
CSO work on Uganda is complex, focusing on some issues and not others, driven and shaped 
by a range of factors. At times it may appear contradictory; CSOs oppose the state and seek 
justice for some issues, for example compensation for displacement, and at the same time 
facilitate the industry by providing a vehicle for industry information to local communities 
and uncritically promoting the local content agenda (rather than critiquing and demanding 
accountability for local content CSR projects).  
 
CSOs are constrained on various fronts. National and subnational CSOs are constrained by 
their reliance on donors, many of whom are dependent on external funds for up to 90% of 
their budget, and so are bound up with the donor tendency to focus on apolitical issues and 
those aligned with promoting a stable business environment. Witte (2016) notes that DGF had 
to ‘tone down’ its support for CSOs in areas deemed too political after the oil bills 
contestation, including those in relation to land. My respondents reported in interviews in 
2015 that a high-profile meeting on oil related land conflict that was due to take place in 
Hoima days earlier was closed down by the government just four hours before it was due to 
start, demonstrating oil and land is a hot political topic for the government.   
 
Subnational CSOs are restricted in their activities in the oil region by the re-regulatory state, 
the power of which is levied against the subnational CSOs rather than national ones. 
Repression by state security forces increased after CSOs became involved with exposing the 
refinery issues, and according to one respondent a subnational CSO representative was 
detained (SCSO13, 2015). However, these were not the national CSO representatives, some of 
whom are lawyers, and many of whom are well connected in political circles in Kampala. 
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Rather, those targeted are the subnational CSOs with less visibility, as one national CSO 
explained “If they arrest me there would be public outcry, so instead they arrest our local 
partners” (NCSO03, 2012).  
 
The repression is a serious concern for CSOs, but in keeping with Uganda’s hybrid political 
order it is not consistent. At the time of my visit in 2015 the situation was calmer after the 
Interior Minister had stepped in to caution subnational security forces to “let CSOs do their 
work” (SCSO08, 2015). Nonetheless it has implications for social organising and interview 
respondents noted that the subnational branches of national CSOs have more freedom to 
work on ‘advocacy’ than do subnational CSOs. The subnational project officers of national 
CSOs have more confidence in dealing with the repressive state: “We distract the RDC in a 
meeting at the district and then we run to the oil region” one explained (SCSO10, 2015). On 
the other hand, subnational CSOs without these links speak about “disguising meetings” 
(SCSO08, 2014) and being obliged to present their work plans to district security for approval.  
 
The political context explains why subnational CSOs have tended to remain as ‘mobilisers’ for 
refinery meetings while national CSOs are the ones lobbying government and mounting legal 
challenges. The move to ‘local content’ for subnational CSOs; “promoting opportunities in oil 
and gas” (SCSO04, 2014) in addition to being a donor priority, is also a more comfortable 
space for subnational CSOs to engage in as it carries less risk. However, this means that 
subnational CSOs remain in their apolitical role of not challenging the state or oil companies, 
and promoting the ‘positives’ of the industry, as the government stated should be the role for 
CSOs.  
 
Narratives about the ‘resource curse’ continue to be used to frame Uganda’s impending oil 
experience. However, I found negative perceptions of oil to be stronger among national civil 
society actors in Kampala. One respondent noted:   
“It’s not like there’s a discussion about will it be a curse or will it be a blessing going 
on, many people have already decided that it’s damnation” (CSO06, 2013).  
 
This quote suggests that for national CSOs, closer to the knowledge production of the 
resource governance assemblage, this narrative feeds into their ongoing concerns about 
Uganda’s bad governance and corrupt polity that many national CSOs want to challenge. The 
analysis of the interviews at the subnational level, in contrast, reveals more optimism. In 
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chapters five and six I showed that there were mixed responses and often there was an 
ambivalence about the industry; subnational actors had not ‘decided’, and the situation was 
dynamic. There were expectations for benefits and opportunities as well as uncertainty in the 
resource frontier.  
 
There was further evidence of this tension between national and subnational CSO agendas, 
notably between a national CSO that adopted the agenda of its global partners to ‘Keep the 
Oil in the Soil’, and its subnational office who did not agree due to the position of local people. 
The local CSO officer commented:  
“I really don’t think that local people will support that, they say extract the oil but with 
careful management” (CSO04, 2015).  
 
This example shows the assertion of subnational agency. The global to national agenda of 
‘Keep the Oil in the Soil’, is not being imposed on local people, demonstrating that the 
community work being carried out by subnational CSOs is allowing local perspectives to 
influence the CSOs’ stance (Westoby and Lyons, 2016). However, by the same token, the 
national CSO and the more pessimistic (and activist) approach, provided space and 
opportunity for the Bunyoro Kingdom to link to their own agenda of ‘cultural custodians’. In 
this case, the idea of ‘Keep the Oil in the Soil’ resonated with the Kingdom’s concerns about 
oil in the region. The partnership between the Kingdom and a national CSO, supported by a 
global social movement, involved a joint report on protecting cultural sites from the oil 
industry in the Bunyoro region and a platform to present the report to a national and 
international audience in July 2014. In assemblage terms this illustrates not only the global 
shaping the local by providing narratives to frame local issues and gain support (or jump 
scale), but also local events which are needed to reinforce global narratives of oil’s impacts 
upon indigenous people (Sassen, 2008).  
 
While there is evidence that some subnational CSOs began to be funded by donors directly 
from 2015, and so are more ‘visible’, they are still linked to donor agendas that ultimately aim 
to promote stability for the industry (Weszkalnys, 2011). This chapter has demonstrated the 
importance of subnational CSOs in terms of a supportive and facilitating role for oil 
communities, however, in the restrictive political context, if communities decide not to 





This chapter analysed the role of civil society in oil governance in Uganda’s oil assemblage, 
which has been undertaken largely by urban-based professional CSOs. The role of the CSO 
sector in oil governance was strengthened by the support, both financial and discursive, of a 
governance assemblage of actors, expert knowledge and practices that aimed to encourage 
good governance of Uganda’s oil. The intervention of the governance assemblage in phase two 
of the exploration period demonstrates that Uganda’s donors and INGOs were primarily 
concerned with management of the industry to prepare for oil as revenue (Mitchell, 2009). It 
was once Uganda’s industry began moving towards production in phase two that these 
concerns were mobilised, along with a new role for CSOs in the oil assemblage. This meant 
that initial work by CSOs in the oil regions was driven by the practices and narratives of 
international oil governance, rather than by concerns raised within Uganda’s oil regions.  
 
The challenge of CSOs to represent the interests of those communities in the oil regions was 
further compounded by dynamics taking place in the oil region which reconfigured power 
relations. However, over time the changing engagement strategy of oil MNCs, CSOs 
responding to and incorporating local issues into activities, key events in the oil region and 
the agency of local communities, further shaped the role played by CSOs leading to closer 
engagement with local struggles. Overall, CSO work on oil and gas has been ad hoc, 
fragmented, and reactive to human rights and justice issues taking place in the oil region. The 
chapter raises the question of the challenge of governance in a new oil context in Sub-Saharan 
Africa where there is no existing social movement or community organising to provide the a 
priori counter movement to the extractives industry that is often assumed to exist. In light of 
calls for CSOs to facilitate social movements involving subnational CSOs at the local level in 
the oil region (Westoby and Lyons, 2016) it is important to recognise that subnational CSOs 
are enabled and constrained in various context-specific ways. The assumptions inherent in 
global narratives on oil may not only be out of sync with local perspectives but may also 
narrow the space available for subnational CSO-led advocacy by reproducing the expectation 
of social conflict in the sector before it has even arisen. 
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8.0 Chapter eight  
Discussion 
 
8.1 Introduction  
In the three previous chapters I analysed the subnational within Uganda’s emerging oil 
assemblage using an assemblage conceptual approach which brings together a focus on 
materiality, ideas, practices and agency. In this chapter I draw on the findings from these 
chapters to conceptualise Uganda’s oil frontier and discuss the implications for equitable 
outcomes in the frontier, for extractives relationships and for resource governance during the 
pre-oil stage of Uganda’s industry. In doing so I address the main aim and subsidiary aim of 
the thesis.   
 
First, I discuss the importance of the research in relation to the gaps identified in the literature 
and show how I sought to address them. In section 8.3 I draw together the findings from the 
empirical chapters to conceptualise Uganda’s emerging oil frontier in relation to the enclave 
and post frontier concepts. In 8.4 I address the subsidiary aim of the thesis by discussing what 
the findings mean for equitable outcomes in the pre-oil stage of the industry. In 8.5 I consider 
some insights from the findings for extractives relationships, and in 8.6 I consider some 
insights from the findings for resource governance in Uganda.  
 
8.2 Importance of the research 
The focus of this study is on the subnational dynamics taking place during the emergence of a 
new oil frontier in Uganda. A gap identified in the literature is the tendency for studies on oil 
to adopt a national focus for analyses, examining the subnational only in relation to the 
national. Further, in the academic and policy literature oil is discussed as revenue, that is, 
when oil is already a resource, and the struggles that surround this resource. Studies also tend 
to present oil solely as a hegemonic force (Behrends et al., 2013), which obscures a focus on a 
broader range of dynamics taking place prior to oil existing as a resource (Mitchell, 2009, 
Haarstad, 2016). As Bridge (2008), Watts (2009a), Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) and other 
scholars have argued, the relational aspects of oil are important to interrogate, in order to 
 219 
move beyond the narrow focus on oil as revenue, the behaviours of national elites, and on 
national levels of analyses. 
 
The thesis addresses these gaps by focusing the analysis on the resource making process at the 
subnational level, that is, on the social and political processes taking place as oil becomes a 
resource and prior to oil as revenue (Mitchell, 2009, Haarstad, 2016). In order to do this, the 
study develops a framework based on an assemblage approach (Delanda, 2006) and drawing 
from the ideas of the post frontier (Larsen, 2015), dream zones (Cross, 2014)and carbonscapes 
(Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017) concepts in order to expand the frontiers literature beyond a 
focus on the destructive processes in frontiers and a focus on oil solely as hegemonic. This 
approach enables a focus on the emerging properties of Uganda’s oil assemblage and the role 
of the subnational in the pre-oil stage of the industry, as it is in the early stages that an 
assemblage is especially dynamic (Schritt, 2016). The thesis addresses an additional gap in the 
literature by bringing oil company actors and civil society actors into the same study and 
exploring their activities at the subnational level in the early stages of the project cycle. The 
importance here is the focus on a broader range of actors and interactions, without starting 
from the assumption of a conflictual or adversarial relationship existing between these actors.  
The findings highlight complex dynamics taking place at the subnational level during the pre-
oil stage of the industry and show that the subnational space is not a passive recipient of a 
hegemonic oil project.  
 
8.3 Conceptualising Uganda’s frontier  
In this section I bring together the findings from the empirical chapters to consider how 
Uganda’s oil frontier can be conceptualised in relation to two concepts in the literature; the 
enclave and the post frontier. As in other contemporary African extractives contexts, enclaving 
processes are evident in Uganda, however, the complexities of subnational dynamics and links 
to global assemblages challenge the idea of an enclave that is disembedded from the local 
surroundings. I also show that although Uganda’s oil frontier is developing in the era of the 
post frontier, the atypical actor positions in the oil assemblage, and fragmented and ad hoc 
approaches to resource governance and management challenge the idea of a coherent post 
frontier to mediate extraction.  
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8.3.1 A contemporary African enclave  
Resource frontiers have been conceptualised in the literature as spaces characterised by 
accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004) and the dissolution of social order, as new 
relations and forms of authority are established (Rasmussen and Lund, 2018, Tsing, 2011). Oil 
frontiers in particular have been conceptualised as enclaves, in which existing rights are 
erased (Watts, 2004) authority is passed to oil MNCs which self-rule (Watts, 2005) and 
selectively link with the local surroundings to mediate access to services while remaining 
detached (Appel, 2012b, Gardner et al., 2012). While the findings in Uganda show enclaving 
tendencies, the subnational focus through the assemblage conceptual framework provides 
insights to the literature on contemporary African enclaves. My findings show that oil MNCs 
in Uganda do not completely ‘self-rule’ in the frontier space, nor do they seek (or manage) to 
completely ‘disembed’ from their surroundings. I argue that the re-regulatory role of the state, 
grievances relating to land and resources, and the need for oil MNCs to craft and maintain 
legitimacy created complex ties to the local level and embedded the resource space in 
assemblages of global governance.  
 
Throughout this thesis in chapters five, six and seven I have demonstrated some key features 
of Uganda’s developing oil frontier that resonate with the literature on extractives enclaves. 
The enclosure of communal resources that support subsistence livelihoods and the acquisition 
of community land for industry (Harvey, 2004, Glassman, 2006), whilst providing minimal 
opportunities for local people for jobs and minimal links to local economies (Ferguson, 2006), 
are the most obvious examples that were evident throughout the three phases of the 
exploration period. The findings also noted the new rules in the resource space which 
prevented local authorities from accessing the oil sites, exposing, exacerbating and 
entrenching unequal power dynamics (Watts, 2009c). Companies maintained spatial 
separation from the local space, creating ‘zones of standardisation’ (Barry, 2006). During a 
fieldwork visit I experienced the inside of a securitised oil company camp; the comfort of air-
conditioning, hot water and familiarity of western food, contrasting with the life outside the 
gates in what is one of the poorest regions of Uganda. This was a technological zone (Barry, 
2006), with company branded posters outlining company procedures, health and safety 
guidelines and industry good practice on almost every wall (Appel, 2012b). Further evidence is 
seen in the state designating authority to the oil companies to manage the resource space, 
negotiate access to land, and implement CSR projects, which overlap with the remit of the 
state (Appel, 2012b, Cash, 2012). 
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However, the state’s re-regulatory role to manage displacement and compensation for people 
losing land to oil infrastructure complicated the authority of the oil MNCs in the resource 
space. The analysis in the empirical chapters of the study shows that grievances arising in 
relation to compensation for crops and land were related to the lack of recognition by the 
state of the values of land and crops to local people. Because issues of land and resource access 
were not settled prior to exploration, oil MNCs became embroiled in local politics (Bridge, 
2008). This was not a straightforward case of oil MNCs imposing their authority on local 
people.  
 
The state’s centralised control of oil, which excluded subnational leaders and cultural 
authorities and disregarded rural oil communities, impacted the legitimacy of the oil 
companies. The companies were perceived by some to be the ones ‘cheating’ local people; in 
one case, CNOOC was sued by the host community. The insights from the findings show that 
the state is an important mediator of corporate authority in the resource space, in this case 
undermining oil MNC-community relations. Contrary to the idea of the weak state facilitating 
enclaves in resource peripheries (Maconachie and Hilson, 2011, Stevens and Dietsche, 2008), in 
Uganda the presence of the state in its re-regulatory role has in fact contributed to 
subnational dynamics which compromises the ability of companies to maintain distance and 
disembed from the local space. These findings resonate with the arguments of Bebbington 
(2000), that it is the character of the state that prevents debates over how extraction occurs, 
and in the case of a hybrid regime such as Uganda (Tripp, 2010), the state’s pursuance of its 
own interests shaped the relations between oil MNCs and local communities. 
 
The need to maintain access to land and ensure legitimacy entangled the oil companies in the 
local space. Oil MNCs reached out to engage with local leaders in phase three to assist them in 
managing community relations and ensure ongoing support for the project, as chapter six 
showed. These subnational leaders were excluded by the centralised control of oil by the state 
and oil companies in phases one and two, as I discussed in chapter five. These findings 
contribute insights to the literature on oil frontiers by demonstrating that actor responses in 
these spaces can be atypical, and relations are not solely characterised by clear positions of 
domination and resistance. The analysis in chapter five shows that the interests of oil MNCs to 
maintain legitimacy was in tension with the states interests to maximise profit and push 
forward the oil infrastructure projects. The social licence to operate concerns of oil MNCs 
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aligned their interests more with local actors in this case (Cross, 2014). That the oil MNCs 
reached out to local actors for support demonstrates responsiveness to subnational dynamics 
and the willingness to make local connections in pursuit of legitimacy (Wilson, 2016). 
 
Oil MNC’s efforts to craft legitimacy and effectively manage the resource space also created 
linkages to global assemblages. The findings in chapters five and six showed that global norms 
and standards became increasingly important to inform practices of corporate engagement as 
the industry consolidated and professionalised and the project cycle moved closer to the 
production stage. By engaging in local development (Tullow) and implementing ‘social 
management’ plans (Total), either directly or in partnership with international development-
focused NGOs and conflict management specialists, corporate strategy became mixed with 
development and human rights aims (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2010). As such, corporate 
engagement practices linked the resource space to global assemblages of extractives 
governance, transparency, human rights and development. As Haarstad and Wanvik (2017) 
argue, it is these assemblage linkages that provide opportunities for change and agency in 
Uganda’s oil assemblage. As chapter five showed, due to the significance of the global human 
rights assemblage, the oil companies distanced themselves from the American oil service 
company after the land grab in Hoima district. As such, the pursuit of legitimacy in the local 
space opens up opportunities for change through connections to assemblages of global 
governance.  
 
The assemblage conceptual framework and subnational focus in this study provides novel 
insights that are not captured by privileging the enclaving tendencies of oil. The findings 
challenge the  idea of an enclave that is socially disembedded; these findings support those of 
Abrahamsen and Williams (2017), to show that while spatially separated, the resource space 
becomes embedded in global governance through its links to human rights, development and 
CSR assemblages. My findings contribute to the work on contemporary African extractive 
enclaves by showing that oil MNCs in Uganda do not completely ‘self-rule’ in the frontier 
space (Watts, 2004), nor do they seek (or manage) to completely ‘disembed’ from their 
surroundings (Appel, 2012b, Gardner et al., 2012). The need for oil MNCs to craft and maintain 
legitimacy in the context of grievances about land and resources creates ties to the local level 
and links the resource space to assemblages of global governance. 
 
 223 
8.3.2 A post frontier in the making  
The contemporary resource frontier has been characterised as a post frontier; an ‘inventoried 
and negotiated frontier’ that recognises the rights of extractives communities and aims to 
resolve sustainability issues (Larsen, 2015; Tsing, 2011). This concept has relevance to Uganda’s 
oil industry, which is emerging in a context of global norms and standards to inform practices 
which manage and govern extractives projects (Gilberthorpe and Hilson, 2016). Oil MNCs and 
CSOs alike draw on post frontier narratives and practices to emphasise rights, inclusivity and 
transparency and these play a role in territorialising oil projects (Larsen, 2015, Haarstad and 
Wanvik, 2017). Indeed, the ‘post frontier paradox’ (Larsen, 2015) is that extraction takes place 
in the context of a regulated and protected space (Larsen, 2017, Tsing, 2011).  
 
However, the subnational focus in this study highlights that the complexities of the ‘local’, 
which global norms and post frontier practices seek to manage and regulate, challenge the 
idea of a coherent post frontier in place to mediate extraction. Rather, I argue that Uganda’s 
emerging frontier is better conceptualised as a post frontier in the making. This is due to the 
fragmented, ad hoc and selective way that post frontier institutions and practices are 
employed to manage and govern the resource space, the atypical actor positions in the 
assemblage and no clear distinction between territorialising and deterritorialising processes.  
 
Post frontier measures (for example social management plans, community liaison officers, 
ESIAs) were not in place to recognise the rights of local communities and protect local 
ecologies as exploration began. This was in part due to the remote frontier nature of the 
Albertine Graben, and that ‘wildcatter’ exploration companies in phase one were not under 
scrutiny to uphold international standards of engagement as were oil majors in phase three. 
Chapter six showed the ad hoc and informal nature of relationship building that was not 
guided by post frontier frameworks for engagement in phase one. Rather, post frontier 
measures began to be implemented as the project professionalised and impact mitigation 
became a concern in phase three.  
 
A further reason for these measures not in place was the lack of engagement by CSOs at the 
local level in the exploration period to oversee, negotiate or implement post frontier practices. 
In the post frontier context, the position of civil society as the representative and conduit for 
local community voices is taken for granted (Larsen, 2015, Sawyer, 2004, Gedicks, 2001). As 
chapters five and seven show, there were complex reasons for the weak presence of CSOs at 
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the local level, including restrictions to access and the national focus of international donor 
and CSO activity (in phase two). However, a key reason was the lack of organic connection 
between CSOs engaging in oil governance and communities in the oil region; Ugandan CSOs 
were not the representatives of local communities in the oil region. These findings challenge 
the assumptions in the literature that CSOs are the natural representatives of local 
communities. Rather the findings showed that this was a role assigned to them by the 
resource governance assemblage.  
 
An additional challenge to CSOs representing local voices was the reliance on expert 
knowledge to inform oil governance activities. Indeed, a common theme throughout the 
thesis is the ways in which what is already known about oil in the context of post-colonial 
Africa shapes the practices which seek to govern and manage Uganda’s oil (Weszkalnys, 2011). 
Chapter seven showed the influence of a resource governance assemblage which shaped CSO 
activities, especially in phase two of the pre-oil stage. By privileging expert knowledge and 
lessons from other contexts, the findings show that dominant ideas about oil constrained the 
ways in which local knowledge was able to shape post frontier practices (Li, 2007b, Tsing, 
2011).  
 
The idea of a negotiated post frontier is also challenged by the findings which show that the 
positions of actors were not in conflict in the pre-oil stage, nor were actor categories 
homogenous. Whereas in the Latin American context (Peru), post frontier institutions were 
“negotiated outcomes of social contestation by indigenous and environmental organisations 
claiming rights and calling for environmental protection” (Larsen, 2015: 156), in the Ugandan 
context, there is a less clear position between industry on the one hand and communities and 
civil society on the other. Nor was there community ‘resistance’ to the industry as is common 
in other contexts (Watts, 2004a, Sawyer, 2004). As the empirical chapters show, responses to 
the industry varied among actors and within actor categories. In general, in the pre-oil stage 
there was the acceptance of the new industry in the region because of the promise of 
development that the industry represented (chapter five). Grievances against the industry and 
state did increase as the project cycle progressed however, and these grievances elevated the 
importance of post frontier measures to manage the space.  
 
As such, Oil MNCs drew on post frontier measures, but they did so in a selective manner. For 
example, the comparative analysis in chapter six shows that the three oil companies used post 
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frontier measures in ways that forwarded their own aims, leading to different approaches and 
varying levels of commitment. Further, while oil MNCs distanced themselves from the forced 
displacement of 200 families for the waste plant, which they linked to ‘human rights’ 
violations, they were silent on the human rights issues associated with oil refinery 
displacement because this was a government project and did not directly implicate them.  
 
This selective drawing on post frontier narratives and practices suggests that post frontier 
devices might work for industry more than for local people. Chapter seven shows that CSOs 
were able to draw on post frontier devices, for example, IFC guidelines for land acquisition 
and resettlement and human rights claims, to challenge the Government’s handling of the 
refinery resettlement process and gain recognition for refinery-affected communities. These 
findings point to the important role CSOs play in raising local issues to the national and 
international levels (Geddicks, 2001). However, contrary to the idea of a coherent post frontier, 
the findings show that this was reactive engagement. CSOs did not engage to prepare local 
people prior to the refinery displacement to ensure rights were protected. 
 
These findings challenge the idea of a coherent post frontier in place to guide and mediate the 
industry. Indeed, the assemblage conceptual framing shows that it is the ‘local conditions of 
possibility’ (Savage, 2019) that influence how post frontier practices play out in the resource 
space and these are context specific. For example, oil MNCs efforts to manage the resource 
space were shaped and constrained by subnational dynamics (chapter six). The findings in 
chapter seven show the complexities around CSOs being able to promote the interests of oil 
communities which were further compounded by ongoing subnational dynamics. These 
findings suggest that the clear distinction between ‘territorialising’ and ‘deterritorialising’ 
processes in frontiers as articulated by both the post frontier and carbonscapes concepts are 
blurred in reality.  
 
These insights suggest that dynamics in the subnational space during the pre-oil stage are 
shaped by oil, but at the same time are continually shaping the context into which oil 
becomes inserted (Watts, 2009b, Logan and McNeish, 2012a). Such complexity and ambiguity 
in the emerging Ugandan oil frontier highlight a limitation of applying a concept developed in 
a Latin American context to a case in post-colonial Sub Saharan Africa. The findings provide 
further evidence of the need to look at the African cases of extractives governance differently, 
and in the context of the hybrid political orders that characterise many post-colonial African 
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states. These are not ‘behind’ Latin America, in terms of a linear progression towards social 
movement consolidation vis a vis extractives projects, because the forms of political 
organisation and responses have a different historical basis (Bebbington et al., 2018, De Waal 
and Ibreck, 2013). The cases of Latin America do show the importance of external support for 
local struggle (Gedicks, 2001), however, my findings show that in Uganda, this external 
support played a significant role in shaping local narratives in the early stages of extraction, 
rather than local issues shaping governance narratives (chapter seven). This points to the 
importance of careful comparative analysis of the African and Latin America cases, with 
attention to explaining the different trajectories of struggle without seeing Latin America 
further along a spectrum of social organisation vis a vis extraction, (De Waal and Ibreck, 2013) 
or without romanticising the role of external NGO / donor support (Banks and Hulme, 2012).  
 
Uganda is a post frontier in the making not in the sense that it is ‘catching up’ with other 
contexts, but rather that the post frontier institutions are developing in a different way, with 
and through resource making dynamics. The assemblage lens sheds light on the emergence of 
this configuration which resonates with frontier, with enclave, and with post frontier thinking 
at the same time. We do not only see struggle and rights claims being made, we do not only 
see negotiation between industry and political actors, but also dynamics that suggest complex 
hybrids between these; the ‘grey’ areas (Logan and McNeish, 2012a, Larsen, 2017).  
 
8.4 Implications for equitable outcomes  
A subsidiary aim of this thesis is to consider the implications of the social and political 
processes taking place during the pre-oil stage for equitable outcomes. The question of ‘who 
benefits?’ from extraction is an important one and is frequently at the centre of discussions in 
the natural resources and development literature. Yet, as I have argued in this thesis, the focus 
in the literature tends to be on the later stages of the project cycle (Mitchell, 2009). The 
findings in this study show that the processes taking place in the pre-oil stage have a 
significant bearing on equitable outcomes. It is at this stage that exclusionary dynamics 
increase vulnerabilities for some, and opportunities arising through oil MNC and CSO 
engagement tend to exclude some and benefit others with existing capacity.  
 
Dynamics of exclusion were set in motion in the pre-oil stage of the industry and increased 
the vulnerabilities of some local actors. Chapters five, six and seven highlight processes of 
exclusion, restriction, accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004) and repossession through 
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post frontier measures (Larsen, 2015) taking place through all three phases of the exploration 
period, as communal land and resources became enclosed and / or acquired for industry use 
(Glassman, 2006). 
 
These processes increased the vulnerabilities of certain communities in the oil-bearing region 
that relied on communal land and resources for survival. The findings draw attention to the 
issue of different resource ontologies at the local level that were not recognised by the state 
and industry (Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). As chapters five and seven demonstrated, in 
some cases the losses experienced by local people were not compensated for, such as the 
fishers on Lake Albert and some people whose crops were not recognised as valuable. For 
those who did receive compensation, the manner in which compensation was distributed and 
handled led to considerable social impacts as noted in chapter five, with concerns that much 
of this money had found its way into the hands of others (e.g. local businesses, local elites in 
Hoima town). The findings support those of other studies that show that it is often those who 
are the most impacted by exploration dynamics that do not benefit (Maconachie, 2014, 
O'Faircheallaigh, 2013, Acuña, 2015).  
 
A novel finding from this study is that dominant oil narratives shaped and constrained 
equitable outcomes at the local level. As I argued in section 8.3.2 there was no pro-active CSO 
intervention at the local level to support local communities in the pre-oil stage of the industry. 
CSO intervention was reactive and involved dealing with the aftermath of refinery 
displacement in phase three, rather than preparing local communities in advance and 
protecting the vulnerable. Of the various and complex reasons for this, one significant reason 
is that dominant ways of knowing about oil shaped what was focused on by CSOs and as a 
result, influenced which actors benefitted from CSO intervention. Chapter seven showed the 
close link between donor agendas and CSO activities, meaning that oil governance work 
became shaped by dominant understandings of oil and a pre-occupation with preparing 
Uganda for transparency and good governance in the production stage. This not only reduced 
the possibility for local issues and concerns to inform CSO interventions, but also limited the 
types of activities that were focused on. As such the role of CSOs was to ensure good 
governance of oil, reflecting the focus on oil in the later stages of the industry rather than 
address vulnerabilities occurring in the pre-oil stage. These findings provide insights to the 
literature by showing that oil governance norms, shaped by dominant ways of knowing about 
oil, play a role in influencing equitable outcomes in the pre-oil stage.  
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CSR by oil MNCs also influenced which actors benefited, and this was dependent on the 
project cycle. The findings show that CSR was used instrumentally by oil MNCs to gain access 
to land and ensure support for the industry during the exploration period, rather than to 
ensure ‘benefits’. In some extractives contexts CSR is used by companies to ensure that 
benefits are channelled to local populations impacted by projects. Chapters five and six 
showed that there were some benefits from CSR during phase one of the exploration period in 
the oil region, however, as the project progressed and professionalised, the focus of CSR 
shifted to ‘strategic CSR’ (Porter and Kramer, 2006) which reduced a focus at the local level. 
While Tullow’s infrastructural investments in the oil communities remained, CSR became re-
focused to support operations and ‘manage the impacts’ in line with the approach of CNOOC 
and Total. The findings in chapter six shows that the ‘impacts’ oil MNCs referred to however, 
were essentially the future impacts of the project. 
 
The focus on anticipating the impacts of the project meant that impacts in the pre-oil stage 
were not addressed. The idea that CSR investment was for the production phase is closely 
linked to the business case for CSR, by which CSR and profitability go hand in hand. This 
meant that there was minimal CSR in phases two and three during the industry delays, and 
the CSR that was implemented was short term and vulnerable to the ‘ups and downs’ of the 
industry. Further, because CSR was tied to the idea of ‘win-win’, this justified the wait for the 
production stage to ‘scale up’ investment. CSR was on hold when oil MNCs perceived nothing 
to be happening, even though as this study has shown, oil was having material effects 
(Weszkalnys, 2011). This privileging of the business case meant that those experiencing 
increased vulnerabilities in the pre-oil stage were not a target for CSR.  
 
Benefits that did accrue from the local content focus of Tullow Oil’s CSR in phase two tended 
to benefit those with the existing ‘capacity’, due to the standards required to engage with the 
local content project, in this case the TraidLinks agriculture project. Chapter six shows the 
contestations that emerged around this project as local people claimed CSR was benefitting 
others, especially those from ‘outside’. This finding supports the literature in which CSR is 
critiqued as differentiating access to benefits (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). However, it was 
also the case that during the exploration period few benefits accrued from CSR at all, due to 
the emphasis on CSR as being for the production phase.  
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A novel finding in this study is that in the pre-oil stage of the industry it is the idea of 
benefitting that plays an important role. As I have argued throughout this thesis, it is the 
promise of future benefits that enrols people to support the industry during the exploration 
period (Cross, 2014, Himley, 2010). Although CSR did not provide many lasting material 
benefits to local people, chapters five and six showed that the promise of CSR contributed 
significantly to the imaginaries of development. As I showed in chapters five, six and seven of 
the thesis, it is the lack of recognition by state and industry that land and resources have value 
beyond the economic and immediate that cause people to lose hope that they will benefit 
from the industry. This means that the failure of the state and industry to adequately account 
for the losses of local people calls this promise into question and jeopardises support for the 
industry. These findings provide further evidence for acknowledging the importance of the 
pre-oil stage of the industry and recognising that it is during this time, from the very start of 
the industry, that processes are set in motion that shape people’s acceptance of the industry in 
the future. It is no surprise that people used the example of the failure of the state and 
industry to adequately compensate people for land and crops to express anxiety about the 
upcoming pipeline.  
 
8.5 Implications for extractives relationships  
Through the focus on a range of actors and interactions in this study, and the conceptual 
framing which focuses the analysis on materiality and ideas, the thesis generates insights into 
extractives relationships in the pre-oil stage of the industry. Subnational studies of extractive 
industries have highlighted the diverse ways in which impacts of extractives create inequitable 
outcomes and exacerbate poverty (Gamu et al., 2015). Studies on oil have tended to focus on 
subnational impacts during the production stage of the industry, through grievances over the 
impacts of oil (Watts, 2004b, Watts, 2012, Idemudia, 2012, Ackah-Baidoo, 2013).  
 
This study generates insights into discontent and grievances in relation to the impacts of oil in 
the pre-oil stage of the industry and the implications for community-industry relationships. 
Throughout the study I have raised the issue of competing resource ontologies. This refers to 
the different ways of knowing about resources and the different values placed on resources by 
different actors, which findings show led to industry not recognising the cultural importance 
of some oil exploration sites, and some resources important to local people not being 
considered as valuable for livelihoods. The failure of the state to include key crops and the use 
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of old rates to calculate compensation also demonstrated the lack of recognition of the future 
value of land and the importance of land beyond the economic.  
 
The findings contribute to the existing broad literature that shows the complex 
transformations of social, political, and economic life in extractives context (Hinojosa et al., 
2015) and also expands studies of oil to show that there are complex processes, increasing 
vulnerabilities and pockets of discontent in the pre-oil stage. These are emerging due to 
different and competing resource ontologies and the failure of post frontier measures to 
adequately recognise and address them. The findings across the empirical chapters show that 
oil exploration does not only have adverse impacts on livelihoods in the present but also in the 
future, which amounts to a dispossession of futures. Post frontier measures of compensation 
and resettlement schemes do not account for these futures invested in land, even when they 
are implemented following international norms. It is this context that the ability of local 
people to see an oil future in which they are included and in which they might benefit 
becomes important. It is the small pockets of discontent in the pre-oil stage that are important 
for understanding how struggle emerges later.  
 
The findings of this study reveal insights into the processes that emerge in the pre-oil stage 
that might work to undermine legitimacy in the long run. Chapter six showed that oil MNCs 
reached out to subnational leaders to gain support with improving the way that local people 
engaged with land acquisition and compensation. The use of CSR and stakeholder 
engagement to establish corporate presence demonstrates the productive power of CSR in 
extractives contexts (Frederiksen and Himley, 2020). This power lies with the ability of CSR to 
align with and feed into the aspirations of local people for improved wellbeing and increased 
opportunities in the frontier (Barney, 2009, Cross, 2014). However, the findings point to the 
limits of this productive power to effectively manage relations in ways that avoid social 
conflict in the long term. The delimitation of ‘affected community’ through stakeholder 
engagement meant that local people who perceived themselves to be impacted by industry 
were excluded from any consideration of industry impacts on their lives and livelihoods. This 
demonstrates a further limit of post frontier measures to recognise the rights of local people 
through stakeholder engagement.  
 
Oil MNCs become social actors at the local level through CSR and this shapes the responses 
and expectations of local people. Through the use of CSR as a tool to gain acceptability, oil 
 231 
MNCs establish a social relation at the subnational level (Rajak, 2011). And while CSR is used 
strategically by oil MNCs, the findings in chapter six show that local people have a different 
understanding of this relationship. Oil MNCs in Uganda are the face of the industry, and 
benefits from CSR are some of the few tangible benefits from the industry that has been in a 
‘not yet’ stage for over ten years (Tsing, 2011). Further, local people in the oil region enter into 
a social relationship with industry through sharing land and resources and this shapes their 
expectations (West, 2006). The communities at the bottom of the escarpment see their future 
as being tied to the industry, not only through the promise of modernity brought by the 
industry and the road, but also because of their sacrifice of communal land and resources. The 
experience of village A and the removal of CSR projects, which the community saw as 
negatively impacting their ‘development’, demonstrates the way the short termism of CSR can 
undermine legitimacy in the longer term.  
 
The focus on community perspectives in this study reveals that local people are not passive 
recipients of corporate domination, but rather actively seek to influence industry outcomes 
through their agency. The findings demonstrate that some local people seek a relationship 
with industry even though this relationship is inherently unequal (Ferguson, 2013). The CSR 
literature shows that the practice of contemporary CSR has shifted to avoid such relations of 
dependency, through a focus on ‘empowering’ CSR that emphasises community self-reliance 
(Shever, 2010, Billo, 2015). The comparative analysis in chapter six shows that both Tullow and 
Total engaged in this type of CSR as a way to ensure sustainability (Tullow) and manage 
expectations (Total). For the community, the CSR literature argues that dependency is 
negative because it perpetuates neo-colonial type relationships between communities and 
powerful external actors (in this case oil MNCs) (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012, Rajak, 2017). 
These findings add insights to understanding community-company relations in the pre-oil 
stage. Community expectations of industry and CSR in the pre-oil stage have to be seen in 
light of these wider social affects and expectations of reciprocity that shape the responses of 
local people.  
 
Rather than see grievances about CSR as resistance to industry, chapter six argues that this is 
rather a push to be included in decisions affecting the lives of people that are already in 
precarious situations and have their futures invested in land and resources (Bebbington, 2010). 
The findings highlight the importance of analysing CSR not in terms of discrete projects but 
rather in terms of its wider social effects (Rajak, 2011). The findings also support studies that 
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aim to shift the dominant corporate-centric view of CSR in extractives contexts towards a 
consideration of the community perspective (Banks et al., 2016, McLennan and Banks, 2019) 
 
The relationship between oil MNCs and CSOs is one that is often presented in the literature as 
being in tension (Watts, 2004a, Sawyer, 2004). The incorporation of both industry and CSO 
actors into this study reveals some insights into this relationship and how it evolved 
throughout the pre-oil stage. The findings show that over time, the relationship became 
increasingly cooperative with CSOs providing a vehicle through which oil MNCs could give 
information to communities, and oil MNCs including the (subnational) CSOs as ‘serious 
stakeholders’ and increasing their relevance to local communities at the subnational level. 
One implication of this collaborative relationship is that in extractives contexts, accountability 
politics rests on the ability of civil society actors to take a critical stance against industry 
actors as well as the state (Newell, 2005). One constraint is that in the context of Uganda’s 
hybrid regime and a dominant industry narrative about win-win benefits from oil, some CSOs 
engage with this narrative uncritically to ensure ongoing acceptance by industry actors and 
avoid state repression. Chapter seven showed that this was mainly the case for subnational 
CSOs which faced the greater threat from the state. Their role became one of information 
conduit for oil companies and promoting the local content agenda, supported by a 
mainstream donor agenda around managing and governing the industry. Some CSO 
respondents raised concerns about the power of oil MNCs at the local level, and yet others 
claimed that oil MNCs had a right to be secretive, are “here for business only”, and generally 
viewed them as entities that should be left alone to get on with their work. It was clear that oil 
companies were not viewed by CSOs as ‘development agents’ or having obligations through 
reciprocity as they were by local communities, raising questions about CSOs ability to hold 
industry actors to account. 
 
8.6 Implications for resource governance 
A key finding in this study is that materiality and ideas both shape and constrain possibilities 
for agency in the oil assemblage in relation to resource governance. The assemblage 
conceptual framework revealed the importance of the materiality of the resource and ideas 
about oil to mobilise the interests of actors in the assemblage. For example, the materiality of 
the resource played an important role in realigning social relations in the assemblage and 
facilitating political action in relation to the oil refinery displacement. In line with other 
studies, chapter five and seven showed that it was the site of extraction, in this case the oil 
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refinery, that became a focal point for CSO activity (Watts, 2009c, Brown and Spiegel, 2017). 
This key event led to a change in the relationship between local communities and CSOs, as 
CSOs were able to provide tangible support to refinery-affected communities. Further, the 
refinery event created what Brown and Spiegel (2017) call ‘spaces of convergence’ between 
local struggles and universal ideals such as human rights. As chapter seven showed, this 
enabled the inclusion of excluded groups and facilitated marginalised actors (for example the 
Bunyoro Kingdom) to exercise political agency (Sassen, 2000), demonstrating the importance 
of links to global assemblages to provide possibilities for change and agency in Uganda’s oil 
assemblage (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). 
 
However, it was the ideas about oil that mobilised the support of international actors and 
elevated the issue to one of global concern. The links between oil and human rights – what is 
known about oil - enabled Ugandan CSOs to mobilise global support for the local struggle 
around the refinery. Although material impacts related to the materiality of the resource had 
been ongoing throughout the pre-oil stage, it was in phase three and through the refinery 
displacement event that CSOs were able to mobilise action across scales. These findings 
provide further evidence to demonstrates that oil shapes the frontier in certain ways because 
of dominant ideas about oil (Weszkalnys, 2011). 
 
The findings show that claims to human rights are crucial to gain support for local struggles 
but can also shape and constrain what is focused on. The refinery event was important for 
mobilising political action across scales by making claims to universals (Tsing, 2011). However, 
in contrast, the plight of fishers that were restricted from livelihoods activities and denied 
compensation was not one that gained the attention and support of CSOs, nor the attention of 
international actors. One reason was the focus of CSO activity at that time was not at the local 
level. However, the findings raise the importance of considering the extent to which local 
struggles that cannot appeal to universals or connect to global assemblages become side-lined.  
 
In a similar way, the study reveals that dominant ideas about resource governance may limit 
the potential for CSOs to drive an accountability politics in Uganda’s oil industry (Newell, 
2005). Chapter seven showed that the role of CSOs in Uganda’s oil assemblage was largely 
shaped by a resource governance assemblage which focused on transparency and the lessons 
of success from other contexts (Weszkalnys, 2011). Due to the professionalised nature of 
Ugandan CSOs and their reliance on donor funding, the findings show CSOs working with 
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several donors and partners. This dependence on donors helps to explain why CSO work on 
oil can appear contradictory – CSOs can pursue ‘activism’ on the dangers of oil, while at the 
same time prepare local people to benefit from opportunities. While the findings in chapter 
seven show that local issues began to influence CSOs work, the reliance on donor funding 
means that CSOs work continues to be shaped and constrained by what donors are willing to 
fund (Banks and Hulme, 2012). Often these align with local issues, but it is also the case that 
donor agendas often define which issues matter. The findings in chapter seven showed that 
because of the dominant ideas about oil’s link to corruption, CSOs were implementing 
programmes to promote transparency and good governance. In this way resource governance 
norms can delimit what is known about oil and the practices that become possible as a 
solution (Li, 2007b).  
 
The promotion of local content by CSOs tapped into an issue of local concern, but rather than 
hold industry and the state to account for delivering local content, CSOs uncritically 
promoted the narrative of ‘benefiting from the industry indirectly’. The findings appear to 
align with those of (Weszkalnys, 2011) and (Phillips et al., 2016), that donor funded CSO 
programmes are part of the efforts “to reduce risk and provide relative stability and security, 
which will allow capital investment and extraction to occur uninterrupted” (Weszkalnys, 2011: 
349).   
 
The findings of the study also point to barriers to the mobilisation of popular struggle in 
Uganda capable of driving an accountability politics vis-à-vis the industry. Given the weak 
connection between CSOs and the grassroots as shown in chapter seven, it is important to 
consider the opportunities for social organisation at the local level. The study revealed 
instances of community action to contest the impacts of industry outside of professionalised 
CSO activity, however there was no evidence of organised community mobilisation in the pre-
oil stage. Reasons for this are that the industry is new, there is no prior social movement in the 
oil region, and generally the industry is accepted by local people hopeful of opportunities in 
the pre-oil stage. However, a potential constraint for social organising to drive accountability 
politics in the future is due to the hybrid nature of the contemporary state. This means that 
Uganda’s citizens have not succeeded in building social movements capable of maintaining a 
balance and check upon power thus far (De Waal and Ibreck, 2013). This is a trend across 
Africa, whereby social movements tend to be either co-opted into political systems or mirror 
their violent logic. The pro-democracy movement in Uganda is a case in point (Dulani, 2011). 
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The example of the CSOs engagement on the Oil Bills and the response of the Government, 
discussed in chapter seven, shows that the Ugandan state can unleash its repressive force 
when the interests of the state are challenged.  
 
Uganda’s hybrid political order constrains resource governance by CSOs and is likely to 
prevent social mobilisation at the local level also. Nonetheless, Child (2009) shows that broad-
based civil society mobilisation is possible in Uganda, through the case of the civil society 
struggle to save Mabira forest. In 2007, a broad coalition of civil society forced the President to 
reverse the decision to give away part of the forest reserve to the Sugarcane Corporation of 
Uganda. However, the convergence of interests of actors across scales, issues and politics that 
characterised the Mabira forest struggle is unlikely to be replicated with oil. This is due to the 
vested interests of powerful national and international players and the status of oil as a 
globally valuable commodity (Watts, 2009c). As this study has shown, the work of donors and 
INGOs has been predominantly about ensuring stability and good management of the 
industry. Activism on oil has been taking place, with challenges around the Production 
Sharing Agreements and efforts to access information. Generally, however, opposition against 
extraction has come from the relatively marginal ‘Keep the Oil in the Soil’ movement. 
 
One of the key aims of this study is to challenge the idea that oil has a hegemonic grip on 
development outcomes (Haarstad, 2016), and show the possibilities for agency and change in 
the oil assemblage. Since data collection for this studied ended, the oil project has moved on 
to a new phase with Total’s purchase of Tullow Oil’s Uganda assets in 2019 and preparations 
being made for the oil pipeline. Uganda finally joined the EITI in 2020. In 2019 there were 
emerging contestations from international and national civil society actors due to concerns 
about the potential environmental impacts of the pipeline. Total was taken to court in France 
by Friends of the Earth, with Ugandan CSOs and local community representatives testifying 
(Reuters, 2019). By September 2020, online petitions protesting the project had gathered 
almost one million signatures (Waruru, 2020). This development chimes with many of the 
conversations I had with local people in Hoima in 2015 and 2016, during which they told me 
that the bad experiences of the refinery residents would most likely inform the responses of 
local people to the pipeline. It is the increasing global to local connections in Uganda that 
were catalysed by the refinery which appear to be leading advocacy into new territory. This 
points to the potential of the environment to act as an umbrella issue to mobilise action 
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(Child, 2009), and following the Mabira forest struggle example, highlights the importance of 




9.0 Chapter nine 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction  
The overall aim of the thesis is to explore the subnational within Uganda’s oil assemblage 
during the pre-oil stage of Uganda’s oil industry. A subsidiary aim is to consider the 
implications of the processes taking place at the subnational level during the exploration 
period for equitable outcomes. In this chapter I summarise the key findings of the thesis 
against the research objectives of the study. I then set out the broader empirical, conceptual 
and methodological contributions of the thesis, before reflecting on any limitations of the 
thesis and making suggestions for future research and recommendations for practice.  
 
9.2 Summary of findings 
In this study I developed a conceptual framework that brings together a focus on ideas, 
materiality, practices and agency to analyse in Uganda’s emerging oil assemblage. The 
framework was used to inform the analysis in three empirical chapters which explored aspects 
of Uganda’s oil assemblage and the role of the subnational within it. The thesis addressed the 
following research objectives: 
 
Objective 1a: Map the key actors in Uganda’s oil assemblage and show how their 
interests are shaped during the exploration phase of the industry. 
 
Objective 1b: Explore how the subnational level articulates with the emerging oil 
assemblage to shape outcomes.  
 
Objective 2: Explore the role of oil MNCs in the oil assemblage and the significance 
of the subnational level in shaping and constraining their interests and activities.  
 
Objective 3: Explore the role of civil society actors in the oil assemblage and the 
significance of the subnational in shaping and constraining their interests and 
activities. 
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In addressing research objective 1a, the findings showed that the discoveries of commercial 
quantities of oil in Uganda’s remote Albertine Graben enrolled the interests of powerful global 
players in the oil industry, mobilised the interests of actors external and internal to Uganda 
concerned about oil governance, and shaped the interests of the state. These interests were 
mobilised, aligned or in tension at different stages of the exploration phase, and through a 
categorisation of the assemblage in three phases (pre-commercial threshold 2005-2008, 
industry consolidation and progression to oil 2009-2012, post frontier management and 
governance 2013-2016), I showed that the configuration of actors in the assemblage changed 
over time. The assemblage became more complex as Uganda’s oil project progressed towards 
oil and the impacts of oil exploration became more evident. The analysis showed that 
Uganda’s oil assemblage is not only shaped by oil capital and the project cycle, but also by the 
materiality of the resource, ideas about oil and the practices which aim to facilitate and govern 
extraction. The material impacts of oil were experienced in terms of livelihoods implications 
through enclosure, restriction and displacement, and also in terms of the development 
imaginaries which shaped responses to the industry and enrolled the support of actors.  
 
In addressing research objective 1b, the findings demonstrate that the subnational is not a 
passive recipient of a global oil industry. The findings show not only the importance of the 
subnational level in the oil assemblage, but the active role the subnational plays in shaping the 
frontier space as a constitutive part of the oil assemblage. The exploration of the subnational 
within the oil assemblage demonstrated the increasing importance both of global assemblages 
to govern and manage the resource space as the project cycle progressed, and the importance 
of the subnational level in shaping Uganda’s oil assemblage and influencing outcomes. A key 
finding from the study is that what is already known about oil in the context of post-colonial 
Africa shapes the practices which seek to govern and manage Uganda’s oil through 
connections to global assemblages (Weszkalnys, 2011). These knowledge practices shaped 
corporate engagement practices and informed the agendas and practices of CSOs in Uganda’s 
oil assemblage. However, subnational dynamics shaped and constrained how these practices 
played out at the subnational level.  
 
In addressing research objective 2, the findings revealed the complex processes of legitimacy 
seeking in the pre-oil stage by oil MNCs. The findings showed that post frontier measures to 
manage the space became increasingly important as the industry consolidated and 
professionalised as the project cycle moved closer to production. However, while Tullow, 
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Total and CNOOC draw on similar norms and post frontier devices, the findings showed that 
there considerable diversity in how these were implemented at the local level, emphasising 
the agency of the companies in the legitimacy seeking process, and noting the different ways 
these processes shape the subnational assemblage. The overriding concern of the business 
case for CSR and unpredictability of the frontier context limits CSR investment, which is seen 
by Total and CNOOC to be for the production phase. However, the chapter demonstrates that 
the subnational space played an active role in shaping CSR and stakeholder engagement. 
Grievances at the subnational level about land and resources, exacerbated by the state’s poor 
handling of compensation and displacement processes, influenced the companies’ approaches 
to manage social issues in the space. Local development politics and a push for inclusion by 
local people shaped CSR to an extent, as local people actively sought benefits and a 
relationship with industry to navigate the uncertain future.  
 
In addressing objective 3, the findings showed that oil governance in Uganda has been ad hoc, 
fragmented, focusing on some issues and not others, and reactive to human rights issues in 
the oil region. The findings show that civil society activity on oil and gas is carried out by 
urban professional CSOs, supported financially and discursively by a resource governance 
assemblage. This governance assemblage influenced and shaped CSO activities in phases one 
and two of the industry and limited the space for locally driven advocacy. CSO efforts to 
engage with oil communities through governance-related activities were constrained by 
subnational power dynamics, yet at the same time were facilitated by the material impacts of 
oil and ideas about oil in the assemblage. The refinery displacement proved to be a catalyst 
that facilitated political action and provided opportunities for marginalised actors to be 
included and for CSOs to address some issues of local concern.  
 
9.3 Thesis contributions 
In addressing the research aims and objectives, this thesis makes conceptual, empirical and 
methodological contributions.  
 
Conceptually, the novel assemblage framing developed in this study brings together a focus on 
ideas, materiality, practices and agency, and generates important insights into the role of the 
subnational within Uganda’s emerging oil assemblage. The thesis addresses a gap in studies of 
oil by focussing on the processes taking place at the subnational level prior to oil existing as 
revenues and demonstrating that these processes have a bearing on equitable outcomes 
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(Haarstad, 2016). The analysis highlighted that the subnational level articulates with the 
emerging oil assemblage in ways that shape and constrain outcomes, and is not dominated by 
a hegemonic global oil project. These insights show that dynamics in the subnational space 
during the pre-oil stage are shaped by oil, but at the same time are continually shaping the 
context into which oil becomes inserted (Watts, 2009b, Logan and McNeish, 2012a). 
 
The assemblage framing showed that the oil assemblage is not only shaped by oil capital, but 
the materiality of the resource and ideas about oil play a consequential role in the pre-oil stage 
by mobilising actors interests and shaping development imaginaries. This conceptual 
contribution extends our understanding of the processes taking place in the oil frontier during 
the pre-oil stage of the industry, supporting studies which show the complexities of processes 
and range of actors involved at multiple scales (Barney, 2009, Tsing, 2003, Li, 2001). The thesis 
shows that the oil frontier is not solely characterised by the destructive processes in resource 
frontiers that suspend rights and dissolve the existing social order (Rasmussen and Lund, 
2018), but is also a space of diverse development imaginaries. This study therefore extends the 
focus of studies to include a focus on productive processes in resource frontiers such as the 
role of aspirations in the pre-oil stage. I showed that it is the different ways of imagining the 
future which influence responses to the industry that can range between consent and 
contestation (Cross, 2014). The framing provides insights into extractives relationships in 
frontiers by illuminating that actor positions in the assemblage are not fixed or clearly 
distinguishable, and can be ambivalent.  
 
A further insight from the inclusion of materiality and ideas into the same framework is that 
while the materiality of the resource can facilitate political action (Mitchell, 2009, Brown and 
Spiegel, 2017), at the same time the ideas about the resource can delimit the focus of that 
action, highlighting the interplay of materiality and ideas. 
 
Empirically, the study makes a number of contributions. The focus on the interactions of a 
range of actors at the subnational level during the pre-oil stage shows that the interests of 
actors in the assemblage are shaped over time and involve processes of collaboration, 
cooperation, negotiation and contestation. The positions of actors were not always clearly 
distinguishable; in some cases, actors positioned themselves to benefit from the industry while 
at the same time expressed grievances. These insights show that the pre-oil stage of the 
industry is not always characterised by community ‘resistance’ vis-à-vis the industry as is 
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common in other contexts (Watts, 2004a, Sawyer, 2004), and provides further empirical 
evidence to show the importance of considering a range of interactions in extractive contexts 
(Logan and McNeish, 2012a).  
 
The subnational focus in the study shows that the processes taking place in the pre-oil stage at 
the subnational level have a significant bearing on equitable outcomes. It is at this stage that 
exclusionary dynamics increase vulnerabilities for some, and opportunities arising through oil 
MNC and CSO engagement tend to exclude some and benefit others with existing capacity.  
However, responses to the industry varied among actors and within actor categories. In 
general, although there were pockets of discontent, in the pre-oil stage there was the 
acceptance of the new industry in the region because of the promise of development that the 
industry represented. The study adds to those which show resistance to extractives is not 
always the response (Bebbington, 2000, Maconachie, 2014, Conde and Le Billon, 2017), and 
makes a contribution to this body of work by demonstrating the role of development 
imaginaries in the pre-oil stage.  
 
The empirical focus on the emergence of resource governance in a new oil context with no 
previous extractive industries makes a novel contribution. The findings showed the influence 
of a resource governance assemblage that shaped the narratives and practices of oil 
governance and delimited what CSOs focussed on. This study supports other work that shows 
that what is already known about oil in the context of post-colonial Africa shapes the practices 
which seek to govern and manage oil (Weszkalnys, 2011). This thesis adds further insights to 
these studies by demonstrating that the local conditions of possibility influence how these 
practices play out on the ground and become ‘translated’ by the dynamics of the subnational 
context (Reyna, 2007, Tsing, 2011).  
 
The comparative analysis of three international oil companies generated insights into the 
complexities of the legitimacy seeking process during the pre-oil stage and showed that 
approaches to managing the resource space and seeking legitimacy differed but established oil 
MNCs as social actors. The findings showed that development imaginaries became shaped and 
sustained by industry presence and the negotiations of access and legitimacy seeking at the 
earliest stage of the industry, supporting studies which show that CSR has wider social effects 
beyond discrete projects (Rajak, 2011). The findings demonstrate the importance of the 
community perspective and understanding the importance of social reciprocity (Banks et al., 
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2016, McLennan and Banks, 2019), which this study extends by demonstrating how the notion 
of competing resource ontologies contribute to expectations of reciprocity in the pre-oil stage 
(Richardson and Weszkalnys, 2014). This generates further insights into understand industry-
community relationships from the earliest stage of the industry. Community expectations of 
industry and CSR in the pre-oil stage have to be seen in light of these wider social affects and 
expectations of reciprocity that shape the responses of local people. 
 
An additional novel empirical contribution is the inclusion of civil society actors and oil 
company actors into the same study and analysing their activities and interactions in the pre-
oil stages of the industry and from a longitudinal perspective. The findings show that both 
CSOs and oil MNCs face the challenge of ensuring legitimacy in the oil region, with CSOs 
having to show their relevance to oil communities and oil MNCs needing to craft acceptance 
for the oil project. The study revealed insights into the relationship between oil MNCs and 
CSOs, showing that it changed during the pre-oil phase from one of mutual mistrust towards 
increasing cooperation.  
 
Methodologically, this thesis makes a contribution through the longitudinal perspective to 
studying an oil assemblage. Data collection, observations and immersion in the context during 
eleven visits to Uganda over a four-year period revealed important insights from such an 
approach. Specifically, this enabled me to observe, map and analyse the oil assemblage over 
time and identify actors, interests, events, narratives, practices and interactions and how they 
emerged, shaped and changed over time. A further methodological contribution is made by 
capturing the perspectives of industry actors and bring them into the same analysis with a 
range of non-industry actors. Given issues of access, especially in the oil sector, there has been 
little research that engages with industry perspectives and few studies that analyse oil 
companies as separate actors (Bury, 2008).  
 
9.4 Limitations and ideas for future research 
This study addresses important gaps in the literature by focusing on subnational dynamics of 
an emerging oil state in the pre-oil stage of the industry. This section reflects on the 
limitations of the study and suggests areas for future research.  
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9.4.1 Limitations  
One limitation was due to the scope of the study. The aim to explore the subnational in the 
assemblage and a range of actors and interactions was potentially an enormous undertaking. 
The number of actors with interests in the assemblage and the sheer number of interactions 
taking place over the period of study was inevitably more than could be tackled in the space of 
a PhD. The task of narrowing down the data into a story was a challenge, given that there were 
potentially many different ways and strands of the story that could be told. However, due to 
my ability to engage in the context over an extended period of time throughout the part time 
PhD and my research role in the Leeds study, through my immersion in the data and my 
interpretation of the data I have been able to make sense of a complex oil story.  
 
Another limitation is related to the generalisability of the findings. Because case studies reveal 
specific insights from specific circumstances, they are critiqued for the limited opportunities 
they provide for generalisation (Idowu, 2016). However, a key importance of engaging in a 
detailed case study of subnational oil dynamics in Uganda was to challenge the idea that the 
experiences of other oil contexts can be readily applied to understand this context. Stake 
(2005) has argued that one danger of generalisation is that it can lead the researcher to see 
something in a simplistic light. Nonetheless, it is possible to generalise from the theoretical 
framing of the case, and thick description can enable similarities and differences between 
contexts to be analysed (Idowu, 2016). As I discussed in chapter eight, there is the potential for 
comparative research of other new oil contexts through the framing of the oil assemblage and 
a subnational focus. 
 
9.4.2 Ideas for future research  
The study of an emerging oil assemblage is inevitably a study of a fast changing, dynamic 
context. Indeed, the findings of the thesis highlighted the importance of taking a longitudinal 
approach. Data collection for the thesis ended in 2016, and there have been considerable 
developments in Uganda’s oil industry since then, including Tullow Oil leaving Uganda, 
community resistance in Total’s area of operation, and further instability in the oil price in 
light of Covid-19. One of the most interesting developments recently is the changing 
narratives and activities around resource governance, which have become focused on the 
environmental impacts of the upcoming oil pipeline as I noted in chapter eight. An important 
way to continue my study would be to map how the actors, issues, interests and narratives 
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have changed since the end of my study in ‘phase three’ in 2016. It would be interesting to see 
how the local to global alliances that emerged during the period of study in the PhD have 
further consolidated or changed, and any new opportunities for agency of local people in 
Uganda.  
 
Another important avenue of research to build on my study is to further explore and unpack 
the local content agenda in Uganda and critically analyse the extent to which this is a vehicle 
through which local people are able to participate in the industry. Such a study would 
generate important insights about the ways in which local content shapes and constrains 
equitable outcomes. Another avenue of research is the role of Community Liaison Officers 
which is poorly understood in the literature. The findings in my study already contributed to a 
research project on CLOs and a paper exploring their role (Bebbington et al., 2017). Further 
research is required to understand the role they play in territorialising an oil project and the 
wider relational effects of the CLOs role at the local level.  
 
Finally, the findings of the study emphasise the importance of critical comparative study 
between the African post frontier and Latin American post frontier contexts. This could 
generate some important findings about the different ways in which civil society and social 
movements mobilise to engage in shaping post frontier institutions and what are the enabling 
and constraining factors.  
 
9.6 Recommendations 
This study raises complex issues, many of which cannot be resolved by the efforts of actors 
through the frameworks of extractives governance, post frontier measures, or CSR that are 
typically adopted. It has highlighted the importance of appreciating subnational dynamics in 
the pre-oil stage of the industry. From the findings of the study, it is possible to identify ways 
in which engagement by a range of actors could lead to more equitable outcomes for local 
communities in the oil region. To this end I offer the following recommendations: 
 
For oil MNCs, it is clear that the goal of achieving ongoing legitimacy would be better served 
by engagement with a wide range of local actors from the very start of the industry. It is 
important to recognise that the direct and indirect impacts of extractives are taking place from 
the early stages of the industry and so engagement should take into account legacy issues 
from previous companies in the area, in addition to any current impacts that are direct or 
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indirect. Oil MNCs should also consider their obligations as social actors in these contexts, 
especially where attachments to land of local people are beyond the immediate and economic. 
This involves ‘reversing the lens’ (Banks et al., 2016) and would generate deeper understanding 
of the local context and ultimately impact legitimacy more positively in the long term. 
Community development agreements (CDAs) which are used in some extractives contexts to 
address social and environmental impacts of operations and set out the roles and 
responsibilities of actors could be something that oil MNCs could consider negotiating with 
subnational actors in recognition of the importance of reciprocity, while bearing in mind the 
power inequalities in these agreements (Conteh and Maconachie, 2019). 
 
For CSOs, a deeper understanding of the range of issues being experienced at the local level in 
the early stage of the industry is crucial to ensure that they are better placed to support local 
people. The study has shown the need to move beyond the oil legislative framework to 
understand and engage with frontier dynamics in the pre-oil stage. CSOs have an important 
role to play in facilitating relationships and connections between the local and global. If CSOs 
are to retain the role of ‘experts’ then this must be through a deeper understanding of the 
complexity of dynamics in the specific setting rather than a reliance predominantly on 
knowledge and assumptions from other contexts.  
 
Donors and INGOs have a role to play in ensuring that resource governance is relevant for 
local contexts by focusing on early engagement that is evidence based. Donors should ensure 
that funding does not exacerbate competition between organisations in an already 
competitive space by identifying opportunities to enhance coordination and cooperation 
between CSOs. Donors and INGOs must recognise their responsibilities in the context of a 
hybrid regime such as Uganda, that working to influence around the state can inadvertently 
narrow or closed space for advocacy by CSOs and undermine the longer-term goals of 
accountability. The findings of the study point to the importance of casting the net wider in 
terms of what constitutes ‘civil society’ and deeper than urban elite-led civil society coalitions. 
Again, sensitivity to the context and historical state-society relations and evidence-based 
engagement through action research in the context would reveal the types of subnational 
organisations and associations that might support local people to navigate change.  
 
For the state, there are clear lessons from this study about the importance of adhering to 
national laws, international human rights norms and post frontier measures (e.g. international 
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guidelines for resettlement) to address complex issues around land and resources in ways that 
respect the rights of local people. The findings show that support for the project in the future 
is compromised by the failure to ensure that local people feel part of that future. There is the 
potential to ensure consistency on compensation procedures and build the capacities of 
subnational authorities to support the processes of land acquisition and resettlement. The 
state has shown willingness to address some of these issues retrospectively by including 
subnational government. Ideally, greater involvement of subnational authorities, CSOs and 
local community representatives in the Refinery Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) from the 
very beginning could have helped to mitigate some of the social issues that have the potential 
to reduce support for the upcoming pipeline.  
 
As a final comment, this study does not intend to claim that oil does not have hegemonic 
effects; there is clear evidence the oil shapes frontier in certain ways, and there are complex 
processes of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004), dispossession without moving 
(Acuña, 2015, Nixon, 2011) and dispossession of futures that I have shown to be taking place. 
Rather, the study shows that these destructive processes are not the only ones taking place in 
the oil frontier in the pre-oil stage. It is at this stage that the oil assemblage is especially 
dynamic (Schritt, 2016) and there are opportunities for change (Haarstad and Wanvik, 2017). 
Through this study, it is hoped that the case for more attention to be paid to subnational 
dynamics during the pre-oil stage of a new oil context has been made. It is during the pre-oil 
stage at the subnational level that dynamics and processes are taking place which influence 




ABRAHAMSEN, R. & WILLIAMS, M. 2017. Golden assemblages: security and 
development in Tanzania’s gold mines. Private security in Africa: from the global 
assemblage to the everyday. London: Zed Books. 
ABRAHAMSEN, R. & WILLIAMS, M. C. 2010. Security beyond the state: Private security 
in international politics, Cambridge University Press. 
ACKAH-BAIDOO, A. 2013. Fishing in troubled waters: oil production, seaweed and 
community-level grievances in the Western Region of Ghana. Community 
Development Journal, 48, 406-420. 
ACOSTA, A. 2013. Extractivism and neoextractivism: two sides of the same curse. Beyond 
development: alternative visions from Latin America, 61-86. 
ACUÑA, R. M. 2015. The politics of extractive governance: Indigenous peoples and socio-
environmental conflicts. The extractive industries and society, 2, 85-92. 
AFRICAN UNION 2009. Africa mining vision. African Union, Addis Ababa. 
AKUMU, P. 2013. Ugandans fear curse of oil wealth as it threatens to blight 'pearl of Africa'. 
The Guardian, 29 December 2013. 
ALLEN, J. 2012. A more than relational geography? 
ANAND, N., GUPTA, A. & APPEL, H. 2018. The promise of infrastructure, Duke 
University Press. 
ANDERSON, B. & MCFARLANE, C. J. A. 2011. Assemblage and geography. 43, 124-127. 
ANDERSON, D. M. & BROWNE, A. J. 2011. The politics of oil in eastern Africa. Journal 
of Eastern African Studies, 5, 369-410. 
ANDERSON, M. B. 1999. Do no harm: how aid can support peace--or war, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
ANDREWS, T., ELIZALDE, B., LE BILLON, P., OH, C. H., REYES, D. & THOMSON, I. 
2017. The rise in conflict associated with mining operations: What lies beneath. 
Canadian International Resources 
Development Institute, 1-127. 
APPEL, H. 2012a. Offshore work: Oil, modularity, and the how of capitalism in Equatorial 
Guinea. American Ethnologist, 39, 692-709. 
APPEL, H., MASON, A. & WATTS, M. 2015. Subterranean estates: Life worlds of oil and 
gas, Cornell University Press. 
APPEL, H. C. 2012b. Walls and white elephants: Oil extraction, responsibility, and 
infrastructural violence in Equatorial Guinea. Ethnography, 13, 439-465. 
ARELLANO-YANGUAS, J. 2011. Aggravating the resource curse: decentralisation, mining 
and conflict in Peru. The Journal of Development Studies, 47, 617-638. 
AUTY, R. 1993. Sustaining development in mineral economies: the resource curse thesis. 
London: Routledge. 
AYRES, L. 2008. Semi-structured interview. The SAGE encyclopedia of qualitative research 
methods. USA: SAGE. 
BAINOMUGISHA, A., KIVENGYERE, H. & BENSON, T. 2010. Escaping the oil curse 
and making poverty history: a review of the oil and gas policy and legal framework 
for Uganda. 
BAKKER, K. & BRIDGE, G. 2006. Material worlds? Resource geographies and thematter of 
nature'. Progress in human geography, 30, 5-27. 
BALLENTINE, K. 2003. The political economy of armed conflict: Beyond greed and 
grievance, Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 248 
BANKS, G., SCHEYVENS, R., MCLENNAN, S. & BEBBINGTON, A. 2016. 
Conceptualising corporate community development. Third World Quarterly, 37, 245-
263. 
BANKS, N. & HULME, D. 2012. The role of NGOs and civil society in development and 
poverty reduction. Brooks World Poverty Institute Working Paper. 
BARNEY, K. 2009. Laos and the making of a ‘relational’resource frontier. Geographical 
Journal, 175, 146-159. 
BARRY, A. 2006. Technological zones. European journal of social theory, 9, 239-253. 
BATEGEKA, L., KIIZA, J. & SSEWANYANA, S. 2009. Oil discovery in Uganda: 
Managing expectations. Economic Policy Research Center, Makerere University, 1-
27. 
BATEGEKA, L. & MATOVU, J. M. 2011. Oil wealth and potential Dutch disease effects in 
Uganda. 
BATUNGI, N. 2008. Land reform in Uganda: Towards a harmonised tenure system, 
Fountain Publishers. 
BAVIER, J. 2007. Congo says shot at Heritage Oil boat, killed worker. Reuters, 9 August 
2007. 
BEBBINGTON, A. 2000. Reencountering development: Livelihood transitions and place 
transformations in the Andes. Annals of the association of american geographers, 90, 
495-520. 
BEBBINGTON, A. 2010. Extractive industries and stunted states: conflict, responsibility and 
institutional change in the Andes. Corporate Social Responsibility: Discourses, 
Practices and Perspectives. London. Palgrave MacMillan. 
BEBBINGTON, A., ABDULAI, A.-G., BEBBINGTON, D. H., HINFELAAR, M. & 
SANBORN, C. 2018. Governing extractive industries: Politics, histories, ideas, 
Oxford University Press. 
BEBBINGTON, A., ABRAMOVAY, R. & CHIRIBOGA, M. 2008a. Social Movements and 
the Dynamics of Rural Territorial Development in Latin America. World 
Development, 36, 2874-2887. 
BEBBINGTON, A. & BURY, J. 2013. Subterranean struggles: New dynamics of mining, oil, 
and gas in Latin America, University of Texas press. 
BEBBINGTON, A., HINOJOSA, L., BEBBINGTON, D. H., BURNEO, M. L. & 
WARNAARS, X. 2008b. Contention and ambiguity: Mining and the possibilities of 
development. Development and Change, 39, 887-914. 
BEBBINGTON, A. & HUMPHREYS BEBBINGTON, D. 2011. An Andean Avatar: Post-
Neoliberal and Neoliberal Strategies for Securing the Unobtainable. New Political 
Economy, 16, 131-145. 
BEBBINGTON, A. J. 1997. Reinventing NGOs and rethinking alternatives in the Andes. The 
Annals of the american Academy of Political and Social Science, 554, 117-135. 
BEBBINGTON, A. J. 2014. Socio-environmental conflict: an opportunity for mining 
companies. Journal of Cleaner Production, 84, 34. 
BEBBINGTON, A. J. & BURY, J. T. 2009. Institutional challenges for mining and 
sustainability in Peru. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, 17296-
17301. 
BEBBINGTON, C., WILSON, E., SMITH, L. & VAN ALSTINE, J. 2017. Community 
liaison officers: exploring the frontline of corporate practice in the oil and gas sector. 
London: Audire and ECW Energy Ltd. 
BEDDEWELA, E. & FAIRBRASS, J. 2016. Seeking legitimacy through CSR: Institutional 
pressures and corporate responses of multinationals in Sri Lanka. Journal of business 
ethics, 136, 503-522. 
 249 
BEHRENDS, A. 2011. Fighting For oil When there is no oil Yet. In: BEHRENDS, A., 
REYNA, S. P. & SCHLEE, G. (eds.) Crude domination: An anthropology of oil. 
Berghahn books. 
BEHRENDS, A., REYNA, S. & SCHLEE, G. 2013. Crude domination: an anthropology of 
oil, Berghahn books. 
BERNARD, H. R. 2017. Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, Rowman & Littlefield. 
BILLO, E. 2012. Competing sovereignties: Corporate social responsibility, oil extraction, 
and indigenous subjectivity in Ecuador. 
BILLO, E. 2015. Sovereignty and subterranean resources: An institutional ethnography of 
Repsol’s corporate social responsibility programs in Ecuador. Geoforum, 59, 268-277. 
BIRYABAREMA, E. 2015. Uganda picks Russia's RT Global Resources to build refinery. 
Reuters, 17 February 2015. 
BIRYABAREMA, E. 2018. Uganda signs agreement with investors to build oil refinery. 
Reuters, 10 April 2018. 
BLACKSTONE, A. 2018. Principles of sociological inquiry: Qualitative and quantitative 
methods. 
BLAIKIE, N. 2007. Approaches to social enquiry: Advancing knowledge, Cambridge: Polity. 
BLOWFIELD, M. & DOLAN, C. S. 2014. Business as a development agent: evidence of 
possibility and improbability. Third World Quarterly, 35, 22-42. 
BLOWFIELD, M. & FRYNAS, J. G. 2005. Editorial Setting new agendas: critical 
perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility in the developing world. 
International affairs, 81, 499-513. 
BONG, S. A. 2007. Debunking myths in CAQDAS use and coding in qualitative data 
analysis. Experiences with and reflections on grounded theory methodology. 
Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung. Supplement, 258-275. 
BRERETON, D. 2014. Is the seeming paradox resolvable? Some reactions to Professor 
Hodge's paper. Journal of cleaner production, 84, 37-38. 
BRIDGE, G. 2004. Contested terrain: mining and the environment. Annu. Rev. Environ. 
Resour., 29, 205-259. 
BRIDGE, G. 2008. Global production networks and the extractive sector: governing 
resource-based development. Journal of Economic Geography, 8, 389-419. 
BRIDGE, G. 2009. Material worlds: Natural resources, resource geography and the material 
economy. Geography Compass, 3, 1217-1244. 
BRIDGE, G. 2014. Resource geographies II: The resource-state nexus. Progress in Human 
Geography, 38, 118-130. 
BRIDGE, G. & LE BILLON, P. 2017. Oil, John Wiley & Sons. 
BRIGGS, P. & ROBERTS, A. 2013. Uganda 7th Bradt Travel Guide, Bucks, Bradt Travel 
Guides Ltd. 
BROWN, B. & SPIEGEL, S. J. 2017. Resisting coal: Hydrocarbon politics and assemblages 
of protest in the UK and Indonesia. Geoforum, 85, 101-111. 
BRYDON, L. 2006. Ethical practices in doing development research. Doing development 
research, 25-33. 
BUEGER, C. 2018. Territory, authority, expertise: Global governance and the counter-piracy 
assemblage. European Journal of International Relations, 24, 614-637. 
BUKENYA, B. & NAKAIZA, J. 2018. Closed but Ordered: How the Political Settlement 
Shapes Uganda’s Deals with International Oil Companies. 
BUNYORO-KITARA.ORG. Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom Uganda [Online]. Available: 
http://bunyoro-kitara.org/ [Accessed 14 September 2020]. 
 250 
BURY, J. 2004. Livelihoods in transition: transnational gold mining operations and local 
change in Cajamarca, Peru. Geographical Journal, 170, 78-91. 
BURY, J. 2008. Transnational corporations and livelihood transformations in the Peruvian 
Andes: An actor-oriented political ecology. Human organization, 67, 307-321. 
BUUR, L., NYSTRAND, M. & PEDERSEN, R. H. 2017. The political economy of land and 
natural resources in Africa: An analytical framework, DIIS Working Paper. 
BYAKAGABA, P., MUGAGGA, F. & NNAKAYIMA, D. 2019. The socio-economic and 
environmental implications of oil and gas exploration: Perspectives at the micro level 
in the Albertine region of Uganda. The Extractive Industries and Society, 6, 358-366. 
CASH, A. C. 2012. Corporate social responsibility and petroleum development in sub-
Saharan Africa: The case of Chad. Resources Policy, 37, 144-151. 
CASTELLS, M. 2010. Globalisation, networking, urbanisation: Reflections on the spatial 
dynamics of the information age. Urban Studies, 47, 2737-2745. 
CATER, C. 2003. The political economy of conflict and UN intervention: Rethinking the 
critical cases of Africa. In: BALLENTINE, K. & SHERMAN, J. (eds.) The political 
economy of armed conflict: Beyond greed and grievance. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Reinner. 
CHABAL, P. & DALOZ, J.-P. 1999. Afrika works: disorder as political instrument. 
CHABAL, P., DALOZ, J. P. & INSTITUTE, I. A. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrument, International African Institute. 
CHECK, J. & SCHUTT, R. K. 2011. Research methods in education, Sage Publications. 
CHILD, K. 2009. Civil society in Uganda: the struggle to save the Mabira Forest Reserve. 
Journal of Eastern African Studies, 3, 240-258. 
CLARK, T. 2011. Gaining and maintaining access: Exploring the mechanisms that support 
and challenge the relationship between gatekeepers and researchers. Qualitative 
Social Work, 10, 485-502. 
CLEARY, D. 1993. After the frontier: Problems with political economy in the modern 
Brazilian Amazon. Journal of Latin American Studies, 25, 331-349. 
CNOOC LTD 2012. CNOOC Limited 2011-2012 Social Responsibility Report. Beijing. 
CNOOC LTD 2013. CNOOC Limited 2012-2013 Social Responsibility Report. Beijing. 
CNOOC LTD 2014. CNOOC Limited 2014 Social Responsibility Report. Beijing. 
COHEN, L. & MANION, L. 1994. Research methods in education 4th edition Routeledge. 
London. 
COLDHAM, S. 2000. Land reform and customary rights: the case of Uganda. Journal of 
African law, 65-77. 
COLLIER, P. 2000. Doing well out of war: An economic Perspective. In: BERDAL, M. & 
MALONE, D. M. (eds.) Greed Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. 
COLLIER, P. & HOEFFLER, A. 1998. On economic causes of civil war. Oxford economic 
papers, 50, 563-573. 
COLLINS, C. S. & STOCKTON, C. M. 2018. The central role of theory in qualitative 
research. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 17, 1609406918797475. 
CONDE, M. 2017. Resistance to mining. A review. Ecological Economics, 132, 80-90. 
CONDE, M. & LE BILLON, P. 2017. Why do some communities resist mining projects 
while others do not? The extractive industries and society, 4, 681-697. 
CONS, J. & EILENBERG, M. 2019. Frontier Assemblages: The Emergent Politics of 
Resource Frontiers in Asia, John Wiley & Sons. 
CONTEH, F. M. & MACONACHIE, R. 2019. Spaces for contestation: The politics of 
community development agreements in Sierra Leone. Resources Policy, 61, 231-240. 
COOPER, F. 2005. From colonial state to gatekeeper state in Africa. 
 251 
CORBIN, J. & STRAUSS, A. 2014. Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory, Sage publications. 
CRESWELL, J. W. & CRESWELL, J. D. 2017. Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, 
and mixed methods approaches, Sage publications. 
CRESWELL, J. W. & POTH, C. N. 2016. Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing 
among five approaches, Sage publications. 
CROOK, R. C. 2003. Decentralisation and poverty reduction in Africa: the politics of local–
central relations. Public Administration and Development: The International Journal 
of Management Research and Practice, 23, 77-88. 
CROSS, J. 2014. Dream zones: Anticipating capitalism and development in India, Pluto 
Press London. 
DAILY MONITOR. 2012. Oil Bill passed but 198 MPs didn’t vote. Daily Monitor, 9 August 
2012. 
DAVIDSON, C. 2009. Transcription: Imperatives for qualitative research. International 
journal of qualitative methods, 8, 35-52. 
DE KOCK, P. & STURMAN, K. 2012. The Power of Oil Charting Uganda's Transition to a 
Petro-State. 
DE WAAL, A. & IBRECK, R. 2013. Hybrid social movements in Africa. Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, 31, 303-324. 
DELANDA, M. 2006. Assemblage: A New Philosophy of Society. New York: Continuum 
Books. 
DELANEY, D. 2009. Territory and territoriality. 
DELOITTE 2014. The deloitte guide to oil and gas in east Africa: uniquely structured. New 
York: Deloitte, 2014: 18. 
DENIVA 2006. Civil Society in Uganda: At the Cross Roads? : DENIVA CIVICUS, Civil 
Society Index Project Kampala. 
DENNING, L. 2010. No Longer Slumming It With Schlumberger. The Wall Street Journal 
10 November 2010. 
DENZIN, N. & LINCOLN, Y. 2011a. The discipline and practice of quality research. In: 
DENZIN, N. & LINCOLN, Y. (eds.) The SAGE handbook of qualitative research. 
USA: SAGE. 
DENZIN, N. K. 1994. The art and politics of interpretation. 
DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. 2011b. The Sage handbook of qualitative research, sage. 
DESAI, V. & POTTER, R. 2006. Doing development research, Sage. 
DICKLITCH, S. 1998. The elusive promise of NGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda, 
Springer. 
DIETSCHE, E. 2012. Institutional change and state capacity in mineral-rich countries. 
Mineral rents and the financing of social policy. Springer. 
DOLAN, C. & RAJAK, D. 2016. The anthropology of corporate social responsibility, 
Berghahn Books. 
DOYLE, S. 2006a. From Kitara to the lost counties: genealogy, land and legitimacy in the 
kingdom of Bunyoro, western Uganda. Social identities, 12, 457-470. 
DOYLE, S. D. 2006b. Crisis & decline in Bunyoro: population & environment in western 
Uganda 1860-1955, Ohio University Press. 
DULANI, B. 2011. „Democracy Movements as Bulwarks against Presidential Usurpation of 
Pow er: Lessons from the Third-Term Bids in Malawi, Namibia, Uganda and Zambia 
“. Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien, 20, 115-139. 
EDWARDS, J. 2012. Tullow refutes bribery accusations in Uganda. Reuters, 13 April 2012. 
ENERGY INTELLIGENCE. 2008. Uganda: Testing Threshold. Energy Intelligence, 31 
October 2008. 
 252 
ENNS, C. & BERSAGLIO, B. 2015. Enclave oil development and the rearticulation of 
citizenship in Turkana, Kenya: Exploring ‘crude citizenship’. Geoforum, 67, 78-88. 
ERM 2008. Tullow Uganda Operations Early Production System EIA. South Africa. 
FARQUHAR, J. D. 2012. Case study research for business, Sage. 
FERGUSON, J. 2005. Seeing like an oil company: space, security, and global capital in 
neoliberal Africa. American anthropologist, 107, 377-382. 
FERGUSON, J. 2006. Global shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order, Duke 
University Press. 
FISHER, J. 2011. International perceptions and African agency: Uganda and its donors 
1986-2010. Oxford University, UK. 
FISHER, S., ABDI, D. I., LUDIN, J., SMITH, R., WILLIAMS, S. & WILLIAMS, S. 2000. 
Working with conflict: skills and strategies for action, Zed books. 
FONTANA, A. & FREY, J. H. 2000. The interview: From structured questions to negotiated 
text. Handbook of qualitative research. USA: SAGE. 
FOWERAKER, J. 2002. The struggle for land: a political economy of the pioneer frontier in 
Brazil from 1930 to the present day, Cambridge University Press. 
FRANKS, D. M., DAVIS, R., BEBBINGTON, A. J., ALI, S. H., KEMP, D. & SCURRAH, 
M. 2014. Conflict translates environmental and social risk into business costs. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111, 7576-7581. 
FREDERIKSEN, T. & HIMLEY, M. 2020. Tactics of dispossession: Access, power, and 
subjectivity at the extractive frontier. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 45, 50-64. 
FRIEDMAN, J. 2015. 11 Global systemic crisis, class and its representations. Anthropologies 
of Class, 183. 
FRYNAS, J. G. 2005. The false developmental promise of corporate social responsibility: 
Evidence from multinational oil companies. International affairs, 81, 581-598. 
FRYNAS, J. G. 2009. Corporate social responsibility in the oil and gas sector†. The Journal 
of World Energy Law & Business, 2, 178-195. 
FRYNAS, J. G. 2010. Corporate social responsibility and societal governance: Lessons from 
transparency in the oil and gas sector. Journal of business ethics, 93, 163-179. 
FRYNAS, J. G. & PAULO, M. 2007. A new scramble for African oil? Historical, political, 
and business perspectives. African affairs, 106, 229-251. 
GAMU, J., LE BILLON, P. & SPIEGEL, S. 2015. Extractive industries and poverty: A 
review of recent findings and linkage mechanisms. The Extractive Industries and 
society, 2, 162-176. 
GARDNER, K. 2015. Chevron's gift of CSR: moral economies of connection and 
disconnection in a transnational Bangladeshi village. Economy and Society, 44, 495-
518. 
GARDNER, K., AHMED, Z., BASHIR, F. & RANA, M. 2012. Elusive partnerships: Gas 
extraction and CSR in Bangladesh. Resources Policy, 37, 168-174. 
GARRIGA, E. & MELÉ, D. 2004. Corporate social responsibility theories: Mapping the 
territory. Journal of business ethics, 53, 51-71. 
GEDICKS, A. 2001. Resource rebels: Native challenges to mining and oil corporations, 
South End Press. 
GEHMAN, J., LEFSRUD, L. M. & FAST, S. 2017. Social license to operate: Legitimacy by 
another name? Canadian Public Administration, 60, 293-317. 
GILBERTHORPE, E. 2013. In the shadow of industry: a study of culturization in Papua New 
Guinea. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 19, 261-278. 
 253 
GILBERTHORPE, E. & BANKS, G. 2012. Development on whose terms?: CSR discourse 
and social realities in Papua New Guinea's extractive industries sector. Resources 
Policy, 37, 185-193. 
GILBERTHORPE, E. & HILSON, G. 2016. Natural resource extraction and indigenous 
livelihoods: Development challenges in an era of globalization, Routledge. 
GILBERTHORPE, E. & PAPYRAKIS, E. 2015. The extractive industries and development: 
The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels. The extractive industries and 
society, 2, 381-390. 
GIVEN, L. M. 2008. The Sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods, Sage 
publications. 
GLASSMAN, J. 2006. Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, accumulation 
by ‘extra-economic’means. Progress in human geography, 30, 608-625. 
GLOBAL RIGHTS ALERT 2015. Aquisition of Land for the Oil Refinery: Tracking 
progress in resettling project affected persons. Kampala: Global Rights Alert. 
GLOBAL WITNESS 2010. Donor engagement in Uganda’s oil and gas sector: an agenda for 
action. Global Witness, London. 
GLOBAL WITNESS 2014. A Good Deal Better?: Uganda's Secret Oil Contracts Explained, 
Global Witness. 
GORDEN, R. L. 1998. Basic interviewing skills, Waveland Press. 
GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA 2013. Uganda Vision 2040. Kampala. 
GREEN, E. 2008. District creation and decentralisation in Uganda, Citeseer. 
GREEN, E. 2015. Decentralization and development in contemporary Uganda. Regional & 
Federal Studies, 25, 491-508. 
GREEN, E. D. 2006. Ethnicity and the politics of land tenure reform in central Uganda. 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 44, 370-388. 
GUBA, E. G. & LINCOLN, Y. S. 2004. Competing paradigms in qualitative research: 
Theories and issues. In: HESSE-BIBER, S. & LEAVEY, P. (eds.) Approaches to 
qualitative research: A reader on theory and practice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
HAARSTAD, H. 2016. Natural resource extraction and the development conundrum. The 
Palgrave Handbook of International Development. Springer. 
HAARSTAD, H. & WANVIK, T. I. 2017. Carbonscapes and beyond: Conceptualizing the 
instability of oil landscapes. Progress in Human Geography, 41, 432-450. 
HAMANN, R. 2003. Mining companies' role in sustainable development: The 'why' and 
'how' of corporate social responsibility from a business perspective. Development 
Southern Africa, 20, 237-254. 
HARRISON, M. E. 2006. Collecting sensitive and contentious information. Doing 
Development Research, 115-129. 
HARVEY, D. 2004. The 'new' imperialism: accumulation by dispossession. Socialist 
register, 40. 
HARVEY, P. 2018. Infrastructures in and out of time: The promise of roads in contemporary 
Peru. The promise of infrastructure, 80-101. 
HEARN, J. 2001. The ‘uses and abuses’ of civil society in Africa. Review of African political 
economy, 28, 43-53. 
HEARN, J. 2010. Foreign aid, democratisation and civil society in Africa: a study of South 
Africa, Ghana and Uganda. IDS Discussion paper 368. 
HEIKKURINEN, P. & BONNEDAHL, K. J. 2013. Corporate responsibility for sustainable 
development: a review and conceptual comparison of market-and stakeholder-
oriented strategies. Journal of Cleaner Production, 43, 191-198. 
 254 
HENNINK, M., HUTTER, I. & BAILEY, A. 2020. Qualitative research methods, SAGE 
Publications Limited. 
HICKEY, S., BUKENYA, B., IZAMA, A. & KIZITO, W. 2015. The political settlement and 
oil in Uganda. ESID Working Paper No. 48. [Online].  [Accessed August 15 2020]. 
HICKEY, S. & IZAMA, A. 2017. The politics of governing oil in Uganda: Going against the 
grain? African Affairs, 116, 163-185. 
HILSON, G. 2014. The extractive industries and development in sub-Saharan Africa: An 
introduction. Resources Policy, 40, 1-3. 
HILSON, G. & LAING, T. 2017. Guyana gold: a unique resource curse? The Journal of 
Development Studies, 53, 229-248. 
HILSON, G. & MACONACHIE, R. 2008. “Good governance” and the extractive industries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Mineral Processing and Extractive Metallurgy Review, 30, 
52-100. 
HIMLEY, M. 2013. Regularizing extraction in Andean Peru: mining and social mobilization 
in an age of corporate social responsibility. Antipode, 45, 394-416. 
HIMLEY, M. J. S. 2010. Global mining and the uneasy neoliberalization of sustainable 
development. 2, 3270-3290. 
HINOJOSA, L., BEBBINGTON, A., CORTEZ, G., CHUMACERO, J. P., BEBBINGTON, 
D. H. & HENNERMANN, K. 2015. Gas and development: Rural territorial dynamics 
in Tarija, Bolivia. World Development, 73, 105-117. 
HIRO, D. 2007. Blood of the Earth: The Battle for the World's Vanishing Oil Reserves. New 
York: Nation Books. 
HODGE, R. A. 2014. Mining company performance and community conflict: moving 
beyond a seeming paradox. Journal of cleaner production, 84, 27-33. 
HUBER, M. T. 2011. Oil, life, and the fetishism of geopolitics. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 
22, 32-48. 
HUMPHREYS BEBBINGTON, D. 2012. Consultation, compensation and conflict: natural 
gas extraction in Weenhayek territory, Bolivia. Journal of Latin American 
Geography, 11, 49-71. 
HUMPHREYS, M., SACHS, J. D., STIGLITZ, J. E., SOROS, G. & HUMPHREYS, M. 
2007. Escaping the resource curse, Columbia University Press. 
IDEMUDIA, U. 2012. The resource curse and the decentralization of oil revenue: the case of 
Nigeria. Journal of Cleaner Production, 35, 183-193. 
IDOWU, O. E. 2016. Criticisms, constraints and constructions of case study research 
strategy. Asian Journal of Business and Management, 4. 
IMBUN, B. Y. 2007. Cannot manage without the ‚significant other’: Mining, corporate social 
responsibility and local communities in Papua New Guinea. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 73, 177-192. 
JENKINS, K. 2014. Women, mining and development: An emerging research agenda. The 
Extractive Industries and Society, 1, 329-339. 
JEPSON, W. 2006. Producing a modern agricultural frontier: firms and cooperatives in 
Eastern Mato Grosso, Brazil. Economic Geography, 82, 289-316. 
JONES, S. 2002. Social constructionism and the environment: through the quagmire. Global 
Environmental Change, 12, 247-251. 
JOVCHELOVITCH, S. & BAUER, M. W. 2000. Narrative interviewing. Qualitative 
researching with text, image and sound, 57-74. 
JOYCE, S. & THOMSON, I. 2000. Earning a social licence to operate: Social acceptability 
and resource development in Latin America. CIM bulletin, 93, 49-53. 
KAGORO, J. 2016. Competitive authoritarianism in Uganda: the not so hidden hand of the 
military. Zeitschrift für vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 10, 155-172. 
 255 
KANTEL, A. 2019. Fishing for Power: Incursions of the Ugandan Authoritarian State. 
Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 109, 443-455. 
KARL, T. L. 1997. The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states, Univ of California 
Press. 
KARL, T. L. 2004. Oil Led Development: Social Economic and Political Consequences. 
Encyclopedia of Energy, 4. 
KARLSTRÖM, M. 1999. Civil society and its presuppositions: lessons from Uganda. Civil 
society and the political imagination in Africa: Critical perspectives, 104-123. 
KEEN, D. 2005. The economic functions of violence in civil wars, Routledge. 
KIIZA, J., BATEGEKA, L. & SSEWANYANA, S. 2011. Righting resources-curse wrongs 
in Uganda: the case of oil discovery and the management of popular expectations. 
Mawazo: The Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Makerere University, 10, 
183-203. 
KINYERA, P. B. 2019. Land, oil and expressions of citizenship in Uganda’s Albertine 
graben. The Extractive Industries and Society, 6, 110-119. 
KLARE, M. & VOLMAN, D. 2006. America, China & the scramble for Africa's oil. Review 
of African political economy, 33, 297-309. 
KOTHARI, U. 2005. Authority and expertise: The professionalisation of international 
development and the ordering of dissent. Antipode, 37, 425-446. 
LAHIRI‐DUTT, K. 2015. The feminisation of mining. Geography Compass, 9, 523-541. 
LAPLANTE, L. J. & SPEARS, S. A. 2008. Out of the conflict zone: The case for community 
consent processes in the extractive sector. Yale Human Rights and Development Law 
Journal, 11, 69. 
LARSEN, P. 2015. Post-frontier resource governance: indigenous rights, extraction and 
conservation in the Peruvian Amazon, Springer. 
LARSEN, P. B. 2017. Oil territorialities, social life, and legitimacy in the Peruvian Amazon. 
Economic Anthropology, 4, 50-64. 
LAVERS, T. 2012. ‘Land grab’as development strategy? The political economy of 
agricultural investment in Ethiopia. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39, 105-132. 
LAWER, E. T., LUKAS, M. C. & JØRGENSEN, S. H. 2017. The neglected role of local 
institutions in the ‘resource curse’debate. Limestone mining in the Krobo region of 
Ghana. Resources Policy, 54, 43-52. 
LAY, T. & MINIO-PALUELLO, M. 2010. Contracts Curse: Uganda's Oil Agreements 
Place Profit Before People, Platform. 
LE BILLON, P. 2001. The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts. 
Political geography, 20, 561-584. 
LE BILLON, P. 2008. Diamond wars? Conflict diamonds and geographies of resource wars. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 98, 345-372. 
LEITE, M. C. & WEIDMANN, J. 1999. Does mother nature corrupt: Natural resources, 
corruption, and economic growth, International Monetary Fund. 
LESUTIS, G. 2019. Spaces of extraction and suffering: Neoliberal enclave and dispossession 
in Tete, Mozambique. Geoforum, 102, 116-125. 
LEWIS, D. & MOSSE, D. 2006. Development brokers and translators: The ethnography of 
aid and agencies, Kumarian Press. 
LEWIS, J., RITCHIE, J. & ORMSTON, R. 2003. Generalising from qualitative research. In: 
LEWIS, J., RITCHIE, J. & ORMSTON, R. (eds.) Qualitative research practice: A 
guide for social science students and researchers. USA: SAGE. 
LI, T. M. 2001. Relational histories and the production of difference on Sulawesi's upland 
frontier. The Journal of Asian Studies, 60, 41-66. 
 256 
LI, T. M. 2007a. Practices of assemblage and community forest management. Economy and 
society, 36, 263-293. 
LI, T. M. 2007b. The will to improve: Governmentality, development, and the practice of 
politics, Duke University Press. 
LI, T. M. 2010. To make live or let die? Rural dispossession and the protection of surplus 
populations. Antipode, 41, 66-93. 
LI, T. M. 2014. What is land? Assembling a resource for global investment. Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers, 39, 589-602. 
LI, T. M., AMITA, B., CRAMB, R., GHOSH, K., IDRUS, R., PETERS, P. E., POSTERO, 
N., RATA, E. & WENK, I. 2010. Indigeneity, capitalism, and the management of 
dispossession. Current Anthropology, 51, 385-414. 
LIMBERT, M. 2008. » Depleted Futures. Anticipating the End of Oil in Oman «. Timely 
assets: The politics of resources and their temporalities. 
LOGAN, O. & MCNEISH, J. 2012a. Rethinking responsibility and governance in resource 
extraction. In: MCNEISH, J.-A. & LOGAN, O. (eds.) Flammable Societies. Studies 
on the Socio-economics of Oil and Gas. Pluto Press. 
LOGAN, O. & MCNEISH, J.-A. 2012b. Flammable societies: Studies on the socio-
economics of oil and gas, Pluto Press. 
LONG, N. 2003. Development sociology: actor perspectives, Routledge. 
LONG, N. 2004. Actors, interfaces and development intervention: meanings, purposes and 
powers. Development intervention: Actor and activity perspectives, 14-36. 
LUND, C. 2019. Framing Essay: Assemblages and Assumptions. In: CONS, J. & 
EILENBERG, M. (eds.) Frontier Assemblages: The Emergent Politics of Resource 
Frontiers in Asia. Joan Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
LYNCH, G. & CRAWFORD, G. 2011. Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: an 
assessment. Democratization, 18, 275-310. 
MACONACHIE, R. 2014. Dispossession, exploitation or employment? Youth livelihoods 
and extractive industry investment in Sierra Leone. Futures, 62, 75-82. 
MACONACHIE, R. & HILSON, G. Safeguarding livelihoods or exacerbating poverty? 
Artisanal mining and formalization in West Africa.  Natural Resources Forum, 2011. 
Wiley Online Library, 293-303. 
MACONACHIE, R. & HILSON, G. 2013. Editorial introduction: the extractive industries, 
community development and livelihood change in developing countries. Community 
Development Journal, 48, 347–359. 
MACROTRENDS.NET. CNOOC Revenue 2006-2020 [Online].  [Accessed 11 November 
2020]. 
MACROTRENDS.NET. TOTAL S.A Revenue 2006-2020 [Online].  [Accessed 11 November 
2020]. 
MACROTRENDS.NET. WTI Crude Oil Prices - 10 Year Daily Chart [Online]. Available: 
https://www.macrotrends.net/2516/wti-crude-oil-prices-10-year-daily-chart [Accessed 
6 August 2020]. 
MAHER, C., HADFIELD, M., HUTCHINGS, M. & DE EYTO, A. 2018. Ensuring rigor in 
qualitative data analysis: A design research approach to coding combining NVivo 
with traditional material methods. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 17, 
1609406918786362. 
MAMDANI, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late 
colonialism James Currey. Oxford. 
MANYINDO, J., VAN ALSTINE, J., AMANIGARUHANGA, I., MUKURU, E., SMITH, 
L., NANTONGO, C. & DYER, J. 2014. The governance of hydrocarbons in Uganda: 
creating opportunities for multi-stakeholder engagement. 
 257 
MARKOVITZ, I. L. 1998. Uncivil society, capitalism and the state in Africa. Commonwealth 
& Comparative Politics, 36, 21-53. 
MAWEJJE, J. 2019. The oil discovery in Uganda’s Albertine region: Local expectations, 
involvement, and impacts. The Extractive Industries and Society, 6, 129-135. 
MAXWELL, J. A. 2012. Qualitative research design: An interactive approach, Sage 
publications. 
MBEMBE, A. 2016. Africa in theory. In: GOLDSTONE, B. & OBARRIO, J. (eds.) African 
Futures: Essays on Crisis, Emergence, Possibility. The University of Chicago Press. 
MCFADYEN, J. & RANKIN, J. 2016. The role of gatekeepers in research: learning from 
reflexivity and reflection. GSTF Journal of Nursing and Health Care, 4, 82-88. 
MCLENNAN, S. & BANKS, G. 2019. Reversing the lens: Why corporate social 
responsibility is not community development. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, 26, 117-126. 
MCNEISH, J.-A. 2012. On curses and devils: resource wealth and sovereignty in 
autonomous Tarija, Bolivia. In: MCNEISH, J.-A. & LOGAN, O. (eds.) Flammable 
Societies: Studies on the Socio-Economics of Oil Gas. Pluto Press: London. 
MEMD 2008. National Oil and Gas policy for Uganda. Uganda: Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development. 
MEMD 2015. Strengthening the Management of the Oil and Gas Sector in Uganda. Uganda: 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. 
MERTENS, D. M. 2014. Research and evaluation in education and psychology: Integrating 
diversity with quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods, Sage publications. 
MIIRIMA, H. F. 2008. The Land of Oil: Demystifying oil exploration in Uganda, Kampala, 
Henry Ford Miirima. 
MILES, M. B., HUBERMAN, A. M. & SALDAÑA, J. 2014. Qualitative data analysis: A 
methods sourcebook. 3rd. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
MIRAFTAB, F. 1997. Flirting with the enemy: Challenges faced by NGOs in development 
and empowerment. Habitat international, 21, 361-375. 
MITCHELL, R. K., AGLE, B. R. & WOOD, D. J. 1997. Toward a theory of stakeholder 
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. 
Academy of management review, 22, 853-886. 
MITCHELL, T. 2009. Carbon democracy. Economy and Society, 38, 399-432. 
MONTROSE 2012. Review of Portfolio of Social Investment Projects for Tullow Oil 
Kampala. 
MOSBACHER, J. 2013. Fighting the resource curse: Uganda's pivotal moment. The 
Washington Quarterly, 36, 43-54. 
MWENDA, A. M. 2007. Personalizing power in Uganda. Journal of democracy, 18, 23-37. 
MWENDA, A. M. & TANGRI, R. 2005. Patronage politics, donor reforms, and regime 
consolidation in Uganda. African affairs, 104, 449-467. 
NAKAWEESI, D. 2010. Tullow Oil Wins CSR Award. The Daily Monitor, 13 May 2010  
NASRALLA, S. 2020. Tullow exits Uganda project, sells stake to Total for $575 million. 
Reuters, 23 April 2020. 
NEW VISION. 2009. President Museveni's 47th Independence day speech. New Vision, 10 
October 2009. 
NEWELL, P. 2005. Citizenship, accountability and community: the limits of the CSR 
agenda. International affairs, 81, 541-557. 
NIXON, R. 2011. Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Harvard University 
Press. 
NORAD 2012. Facing the Resource Curse: Norway’s Oil for Development Program. 
Norway: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. 
 258 
NORTHEDGE, R. 2007. Independent Irishman shows rivals the way. The Telegraph, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2817661/Independent-Irishman-shows-
rivals-the-way.html. 
O'FAIRCHEALLAIGH, C. 2013. Extractive industries and Indigenous peoples: A changing 
dynamic? Journal of Rural Studies, 30, 20-30. 
ODORA, A. F. 2007. Rising from the ashes: The rebirth of civil society in an authoritarian 
political environment. Int'l J. Not-for-Profit L., 10, 79. 
ÖGE, K. 2017. Transparent autocracies: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) and civil society in authoritarian states. The Extractive Industries and Society, 
4, 816-824. 
OGWANG, T. & VANCLAY, F. 2019. Social impacts of land acquisition for oil and gas 
development in Uganda. Land, 8, 109. 
OGWANG, T., VANCLAY, F. & VAN DEN ASSEM, A. 2018. Impacts of the oil boom on 
the lives of people living in the Albertine Graben region of Uganda. The Extractive 
Industries and Society, 5, 98-103. 
OJAMBO, H. 2012. Decentralisation in Africa: A critical review of Uganda's experience. 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 15. 
OLANYA, D. R. 2015. Will Uganda succumb to the resource curse? Critical reflections. The 
Extractive Industries and Society, 2, 46-55. 
OTTAWAY, M. & CAROTHERS, T. 2000. Funding virtue: civil society aid and democracy 
promotion, Carnegie Endowment. 
OWEN, J. R. & KEMP, D. 2013. Social licence and mining: A critical perspective. 
Resources policy, 38, 29-35. 
PATEY, L. 2015. Oil in Uganda: Hard bargaining and complex politics in East Africa. The 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 
PATTON, M. Q. 2014. Qualitative research & evaluation methods: Integrating theory and 
practice, Sage publications. 
PERREAULT, T. 2013. Dispossession by accumulation? Mining, water and the nature of 
enclosure on the Bolivian Altiplano. Antipode, 45, 1050-1069. 
PHILLIPS, J., HAILWOOD, E. & BROOKS, A. 2016. Sovereignty, the ‘resource curse’and 
the limits of good governance: a political economy of oil in Ghana. Review of African 
Political Economy, 43, 26-42. 
POLUS, A. & TYCHOLIZ, W. J. 2017. The Norwegian Model of Oil Extraction and 
Revenues Management in Uganda. African Studies Review, 60, 181-201. 
PONCIAN, J. & JOSE, J. 2019. Resource governance and community participation: Making 
hydrocarbon extraction work for Tanzania. Resources Policy, 62, 84-93. 
PORTER, M. E. & KRAMER, M. R. 2006. The link between competitive advantage and 
corporate social responsibility. Harvard business review, 84, 78-92. 
PRNO, J. 2013. An analysis of factors leading to the establishment of a social licence to 
operate in the mining industry. Resources Policy, 38, 577-590. 
RAJAK, D. 2011. In good company: An anatomy of corporate social responsibility, Stanford 
University Press. 
RAJAK, D. 2016. Hope and betrayal on the platinum belt: responsibility, violence and 
corporate power in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 42, 929-946. 
RAJAK, D. 2017. The gift of CSR. Corporate Citizenship in Africa: Lessons from the Past; 
Paths to the Future, 190. 
RASMUSSEN, M. B. & LUND, C. 2018. Reconfiguring Frontier Spaces: The 
territorialization of resource control. World Development, 101, 388-399. 
REUTERS. 2019. Green groups ask French court to order Total to disclose environmental 
steps in Uganda. Reuters 23 October 2019. 
 259 
REYNA, S. P. 2007. The Traveling Model that would Not Travel: Oil, Empire, and 
Patrimonialism in Contemporary Chad. Social Analysis, 51. 
RICHARDSON, T. & WESZKALNYS, G. 2014. Introduction: resource materialities. 
Anthropological Quarterly, 87, 5-30. 
RIESSMAN, C. K. 2008. Narrative methods for the human sciences, Sage. 
ROBINSON, J. A., TORVIK, R. & VERDIER, T. 2006. Political foundations of the resource 
curse. Journal of development Economics, 79, 447-468. 
ROBINSON, M. & FRIEDMAN, S. 2007. Civil society, democratization, and foreign aid: 
Civic engagement and public policy in South Africa and Uganda. Democratization, 
14, 643-668. 
ROSS, M. L. 2001. Does oil hinder democracy? World politics, 53, 325-361. 
ROSS, M. L. 2004. How do natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from thirteen 
cases. International organization, 35-67. 
ROSS, M. L. 2013. The oil curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations, 
Princeton University Press. 
ROSS, M. L. 2015. What have we learned about the resource curse? Annual Review of 
Political Science, 18, 239-259. 
ROSSER, A. 2006. The political economy of the resource curse: A literature survey.  
[Accessed 5 August 2020]. 
ROSSMAN, G. R. & RALLIS, B. 2003. Learning in the Field: An Introduction to 
Qualitative Research, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
ROST, K. & EHRMANN, T. 2017. Reporting biases in empirical management research: The 
example of win-win corporate social responsibility. Business & Society, 56, 840-888. 
ROULSTON, K., DEMARRAIS, K. & LEWIS, J. B. J. Q. I. 2003. Learning to interview in 
the social sciences. 9, 643-668. 
SASSEN, S. 2000. The Global City: Strategic Site/New Frontier. American Studies, 41, 79-
95. 
SASSEN, S. 2008. Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages, 
Princeton university press. 
SAVAGE, G. C. 2019. What is policy assemblage? Territory, Politics, Governance, 8, 319-
335. 
SAWYER, S. 2004. Crude chronicles: Indigenous politics, multinational oil, and 
neoliberalism in Ecuador, Duke University Press. 
SCHMINK, M. & WOOD, C. H. 1992. Contested frontiers in Amazonia, Columbia 
University Press. 
SCHRITT, J. 2016. From nuclear imperialism to petro-democracy? Resource assemblages 
and the emergence of a new political configuration in Niger. Canadian Journal of 
African Studies/Revue canadienne des études africaines, 50, 229-254. 
SCHWANDT, T. 2000. Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry: Interpretivism, 
hermeneutics, and social constructionism. In: DENZIN, N. & LINCOLN, Y. (eds.) 
Handbook of qualitative research. USA: SAGE. 
SCOTT, J. C. 2008. Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance, Yale 
University Press. 
SHEPHERD, B. 2013. Oil in Uganda: International Lessons for Success. Chatham House. 
London. 
SHEVER, E. 2010. Engendering the company: Corporate personhood and the “face” of an oil 
company in metropolitan Buenos Aires. PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology 
Review, 33, 26-46. 
SJÖGREN, A. 2013a. Between Militarism and Technocratic Governance: State Formation in 
Contemporary Uganda, Fountain Pub Limited. 
 260 
SJÖGREN, A. 2013b. Oil, territorial control and political belonging in Uganda. In: 
TORNIMBENI, C. (ed.) Working the System in Sub-Saharan Africa: Global Values, 
National Citizenship and Local Politics in Historical Perspective,. Newcastle UK: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
SMITH, L. & VAN ALSTINE, J. 2018. Neoliberal Oil Development in Uganda. In: 
WIEGRATZ, J., MARTINELLO, G. & GRECO, E. (eds.) Uganda: The dynamics of 
neoliberal transformation London: Zed books  
SSEWANYANA, S., MATOVU, J. M. & TWIMUKYE, E. 2011. Yes, Africa Can: Success 
Stories from a Dynamic Continent. 1. 
STAKE, R. E. 1995. The art of case study research, sage. 
STAKE, R. E. 2005. Qualitative case studies. 
STEVENS, P. & DIETSCHE, E. J. E. P. 2008. Resource curse: An analysis of causes, 
experiences and possible ways forward. 36, 56-65. 
STEWART, F. 2002. Root causes of violent conflict in developing countries Commentary: 
Conflict—from causes to prevention? BMJ Clinical research, 324, 342-345. 
SUCHMAN, M. C. 1995. Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. 
Academy of management review, 20, 571-610. 
SULTANA, F. 2007. Reflexivity, positionality and participatory ethics: Negotiating 
fieldwork dilemmas in international research. ACME: An international journal for 
critical geographies, 6, 374-385. 
SUTER, W. N. 2011. Introduction to educational research: A critical thinking approach, 
SAGE publications. 
SUUTARINEN, T. K. 2015. Local natural resource curse and sustainable socio-economic 
development in a Russian mining community of Kovdor. Fennia-international 
journal of geography, 193, 99-116. 
SZABLOWSKI, D. & CAMPBELL, B. 2019. Struggles over extractive governance: Power, 
discourse, violence, and legality. The Extractive Industries and Society, 6, 635-641. 
THURBER, M. C., HULTS, D. R. & HELLER, P. R. 2011. Exporting the “Norwegian 
Model”: The effect of administrative design on oil sector performance. Energy Policy, 
39, 5366-5378. 
TOTAL S.A 2013. Doing Business Responsibly CSR Report 2013. Paris. 
TRIPP, A. M. 2010. Museveni's Uganda: paradoxes of power in a hybrid regime, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers Boulder, CO. 
TSING, A. L. 2003. Natural resources and capitalist frontiers. Economic and Political 
Weekly, 38, 5100-5106. 
TSING, A. L. 2011. Friction: An ethnography of global connection, Princeton University 
Press. 
TULLOW OIL PLC 2006 Tullow Oil plc Corporate and Social Responsbility Report 2006. 
TULLOW OIL PLC 2010. 2009 Corporate Responsibility report: Building Africa’s leading 
responsible independent oil company. 
TULLOW OIL PLC 2012. 2012 Corporate responsibility Report Creating Shared Prosperity 
London. 
TULLOW OIL PLC 2015. Tullow Oil plc 2014 Full Year Results. 
TURYAHABWE, N., GELDENHUYS, C., WATTS, S. & BANANA, A. 2006. Technical 
and institutional capacity in local organisations to manage decentralised forest 
resources in Uganda. Southern African Forestry Journal, 208, 63-78. 
UGANDA LAND ALLIANCE 2011. Land Grabbing and its effects on the communities in 
the oil rich Albertine region: The case of Hoima. Buliisa and Amuru. 
UNDP. 2017. Uganda [Online]. UNDP. Available: 
http://www.biodiversityfinance.org/uganda [Accessed 10 October 2020]. 
 261 
UNDP. 2019. Uganda Human Development Report [Online]. UNDP. Available: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/UGA.pdf [Accessed 10 
October 2020]. 
VAN ALSTINE, J. 2014. Transparency in resource governance: The pitfalls and potential of 
“new oil” in Sub-Saharan Africa. Global Environmental Politics, 14, 20-39. 
VAN ALSTINE, J., MANYINDO, J., SMITH, L., DIXON, J. & AMANIGARUHANGA, I. 
2014. Resource governance dynamics: The challenge of ‘new oil’in Uganda. 
Resources Policy, 40, 48-58. 
VAN MAANEN, J. 1979. Reclaiming qualitative methods for organizational research: A 
preface. Administrative science quarterly, 24, 520-526. 
VOKES, R. 2012. The politics of oil in Uganda. African Affairs, 111, 303-314. 
VOLLSTEDT, M. & REZAT, S. 2019. An Introduction to Grounded Theory with a Special 
Focus on Axial Coding and the Coding Paradigm. In: KAISER, G. & PRESMEG, N. 
(eds.) Compendium for Early Career Researchers in Mathematics Education. Cham: 
Springer International Publishing. 
WARURU, M. 2020. Nearly One Million People Sign Petition to Stop Total's East Africa 
Crude Oil Pipeline 'Madness' [Online]. UK: DesmogUK. Available: 
https://www.desmog.co.uk/2020/09/21/nearly-one-million-people-sign-petition-stop-
total-s-east-africa-crude-oil-pipeline-madness [Accessed 15 November 2020 2020]. 
WATTS, M. 2004a. Antinomies of community: some thoughts on geography, resources and 
empire. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 29, 195-216. 
WATTS, M. 2004b. Resource curse? Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria. Geopolitics, 9, 50-80. 
WATTS, M. 2005. Righteous oil? Human rights, the oil complex, and corporate social 
responsibility. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 30, 373-407. 
WATTS, M. 2008. Imperial Oil: The Anatomy of a Nigerian Oil Insurgency (Imperial Oil: 
Anatomie eines nigerianischen Ól-Aufstandes). Erdkunde, 27-39. 
WATTS, M. 2009a. Crude politics: Life and death on the Nigerian oil fields. Niger delta 
economies of violence working papers, 25, 1-27. 
WATTS, M. 2009b. Oil, development, and the politics of the bottom billion. Macalester 
International, 24, 11. 
WATTS, M. 2009c. The rule of oil: Petro-politics and the anatomy of an insurgency. Journal 
of African Development, 11, 27-56. 
WATTS, M. 2012. A tale of two gulfs: Life, death, and dispossession along two oil frontiers. 
American Quarterly, 64, 437-467. 
WEAVER, A. & ATKINSON, P. 1994. Microcomputing and qualitative data analysis, 
Avebury Aldershot. 
WEST, P. 2006. Conservation is our government now: the politics of ecology in Papua New 
Guinea, Duke University Press. 
WESTOBY, P. & LYONS, K. 2016. Community organising in the oil conflict zone: Friends 
of the earth Uganda'sustainability school'advocacy initiative. Chain Reaction, 46. 
WESZKALNYS, G. 2008. Hope & oil: expectations in São Tomé e Príncipe. Review of 
African Political Economy, 35, 473-482. 
WESZKALNYS, G. 2009. The curse of oil in the Gulf of Guinea: A view from Sao Tome 
and Principe. African Affairs 108, 679-689. 
WESZKALNYS, G. 2011. Cursed resources, or articulations of economic theory in the Gulf 
of Guinea. Economy and Society, 40, 345-372. 
WESZKALNYS, G. 2013. Oil’s magic: Contestation and materiality. Cultures of energy: 
Power, practices, technologies, 267-283. 
WILLIAMS, M. 2003. Making sense of social research, Sage. 
 262 
WILLIS, J. W., JOST, M. & NILAKANTA, R. 2007. Foundations of qualitative research: 
Interpretive and critical approaches, Sage. 
WILSON, E. 2016. What is the social licence to operate? Local perceptions of oil and gas 
projects in Russia’s Komi Republic and Sakhalin Island. The Extractive Industries 
and Society, 3, 73-81. 
WITTE, A. 2016. Uncertain blessings. 
WITTE, A. 2018. An Uncertain Future-Anticipating Oil in Uganda, Universitätsverlag 
Göttingen. 
WITTE, A. & NAKAYI, R. 2019. Making Cultural Heritage Claims on Profitable Land: The 
Case of the Ngassa Wells in Uganda's Oil Region. Africa Spectrum, 54, 222-243. 
WORLD BANK. 2018. Poverty Maps of Uganda [Online]. World Bank Available: 
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/456801530034180435/pdf/Poverty-
Maps-Report.pdf%20accessed%20October%2010 [Accessed 10 October 2020]. 
WORLD BANK. no date. The World Bank Data [Online]. The World Bank Group Available: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=UG [Accessed 23 
October 2020]. 
YATES, D. 2006. The scramble for African oil. South African journal of international 
affairs, 13, 11-31. 
YATES, D. A. 1996. The rentier state in Africa: Oil rent dependency and neocolonialism in 
the Republic of Gabon, Africa World Press. 
YIN, R. K. 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, SAGE Publications. 
YIN, R. K. 2011. Applications of case study research, Sage. 
ZALIK, A. 2009. Zones of exclusion: offshore extraction, the contestation of space and 









code Year  
Date of 
interview  Type of interview 
Organisation 
/ village Gender  
Interview 
location  Category 
1 COMA01 2012 8.12.12 Interview Village A M Village Community 
2 COMA02 2012 8.12.12 Focus group Village A M Village Community 
3 COMA03 2012 8.12.12 Focus group Village A M Village Community 
4 COMA04 2012 8.12.12 Interview Village A M Village Community 
5 COMB01 2012 9.12.12 Interview Village B M Village Community 
6 COMB02 2012 9.12.12 Focus group  Village B M/F Village Community 
7 COMB03 2012 9.12.12 Focus group  Village B M/F Village Community 
8 COMB04 2012 9.12.12 Focus group  Village B M/F Village Community 
9 COMD01 2012 9.12.12 Focus group  Village D F Village Community 
10 COMD02 2012 9.12.12 Interview  Village D M Village Community 
11 COMD03 2012 9.12.12 Focus group  Village D M Village Community 
12 COME01 2012 10.12.12 Interview Village E M Village Community 
13 COME02 2012 10.12.12 Focus group  Village E M/F Village Community 
14 COMF01 2012 10.12.12 Focus group  Village F M/F Village Community 
15 COMA05 2014 08.08.14 Interview Village A M Village Community 
16 COMA06 2014 08.08.14 Interview Village A M Village Community 
17 COMA07 2014 08.08.14 Interview Village A F Village Community 
18 COMA08 2014 08.08.14 Interview Village A F Village Community 
19 COMA09 2014 08.08.14 Interview Village A F Village Community 
20 COMA10 2014 08.08.14 Interview Village A F Village Community 
21 COMA11 2014 08.08.14 Interview Village A M Village Community 
22 COMA12 2014 10.08.14 Interview Village A F Village Community 
23 COMB05 2014 10.08.14 Interview Village B M Village Community 
24 COMB06 2014 10.08.14 Interview Village B M Village Community 
25 COMB07 2014 10.08.14 Interview Village B M Village Community 
26 COMB08 2014 10.08.14 Interview Village B   Village Community 
27 COMB09 2014 10.08.14 Interview Village B   Village Community 
28 COMC01 2014 16.08.14 Interview Village C M 
Hoima 
town Community 
29 COMC02 2014 18.08.14 Interview Village C M 
Hoima 
town Community 
30 COMC03 2014 18.08.14 Interview Village C F 
Hoima 
town Community 
31 COMC04 2014 18.08.14 Interview Village C F 
Hoima 
town Community 
32 COMC05 2014 18.08.14 Interview Village C M 
Hoima 
town Community 




34 COMA13 2015 14.06.15 Interview village A M 
Hoima 
town  Community 
35 COMA14 2015 14.06.15 Interview village A M 
Hoima 
town  Community 
36 COME03 2015 14.06.15 Interview Village E   
Hoima 
town Community 
37 COME04 2015 14.06.15 Interview Village E   
Hoima 
town Community 




District  M/F 
Hoima 
town Community 
39 COMC08 2016 13.07.16 Interview Village C M Village Community 
40 COMC09 2016 13.07.16 Interview Village C M Village Community 
41 COMC10 2016 13.07.16 Interview Village C M Village Community 
42 COMC11 2016 13.07.16 Interview Village C M Village Community 
43 COMC12 2016 13.07.16 Interview Village C F Village Community 
44 COMC13 2016 13.07.16 Interview Village C  Village Community 
45 COMC14 2016 13.07.16 Interview  Village C M Village Community 
46 COMC15 2016 13.07.16 Interview Village C M Village Community 
47 DLG01 2012 10.12.12 Focus group  
District Local 
Government  M/F 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
48 DLG02 2012 10.12.12 Focus group  
District Local 
Government  M/F 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
49 DLG03 2012 11.12.12 Focus group  
District Local 
Government  F 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
50 DLG04 2012 11.12.12 Focus group  
District Local 
Government  M 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
51 DLG05 2014 05.08.14 Interview 
District Local 
Government  M 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
52 DLG06 2014 06.08.14 Interview 
District Local 
Government  M 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
53 DLG07 2014 06.08.14 Interview 
District Local 
Government  M 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
54 DLG08 2014 06.08.14 Interview 
District Local 
Government  M 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
55 DLG09 2014 06.08.14 Interview 
District Local 
Government  M 
Hoima 
town  Government  
56 DLG10 2014 07.08.14 Interview 
District Local 
Government  M 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
57 DLG11 2014 07.08.14 Interview 
District Local 
Government  M 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
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town  Government  
59 SLG01 2015 19.02.15 Interview 
Subcounty 
government  M 
Hoima 
town  Government  
60 SLG02 2015 19.02.15 Interview 
Subcounty 
government  M 
Hoima 
town  Government  
61 DLG12 2015 20.02.15 Interview 
District Local 
Government  F 
District 
Gov HQ 
Hoima Government  
62 DLG13 2015 20.02.15 Interview 
District Local 
Government  M 
Hoima 
town Government  




Government  M 
Hoima 
town Government  
64 KGD01 2012 12.12.12 Interview 
Bunyoro 
Kingdom  M 
Hoima 
town Kingdom 
65 KGD02 2012 12.12.12 Interview 
Bunyoro 
Kingdom  M 
Hoima 
town Kingdom 
66 KGD03 2014 09.09.14 Interview 
Bunyoro 
Kingdom  M 
Hoima 
town Kingdom 
67 KGD04 2014 12.08.14 Interview 
Bunyoro 
Kingdom  M 
Hoima 
town Kingdom 
68 KGD05 2015 25.02.15 Interview 
Bunyoro 
Kingdom  M 
Hoima 
town Kingdom 
69 KGD06 2015 27.02.15 Interview 
Bunyoro 
Kingdom  F Kampala Kingdom 
70 TUL01 2012 8.12.12 Interview Tullow Oil  M 
Hoima 
town Industry  
71 TUL02 2012 9.12.12 Interview Tullow Oil  F 
Hoima 
town Industry  
72 TUL03 2012 11.12.12 Interview Tullow Oil  M 
Hoima 
town Industry  
73 TOT01 2012 12.12.12 Interview Total E & P M 
Hoima 
town Industry  
74 TOT02 2012 12.12.12 Interview Total E & P F 
Hoima 
town Industry  
75 TOT03 2013 21.01.13 Focus group  Total E & P M/F Kampala Industry  
76 TUL04 2014 01.08.14 Interview  Tullow Oil  M Kampala Industry  
77 TUL05 2014 06.08.14 Interview  Tullow Oil  M 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
78 TUL06 2014 12.08.14 Interview  Tullow Oil  M 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
79 TUL07 2014 15.08.14 Focus group  Tullow Oil  M 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
80 CNC01 2014 13.08.14 Interview  CNOOC M 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
81 JVP01 2014   Observation    M/F 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
82 JVP02 2014   Observation  
Tullow Oil / 
CNOOC M/F 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
83 CNC02 2015 21.02.15 Interview  CNOOC M 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
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84 CNC03 2015 21.02.15 Interview  CNOOC M 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
85 CNC04 2015 21.02.15 Interview  CNOOC M 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
86 TUL08 2016 18.07.16 Interview  Tullow Oil  M 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
87 CNC05 2016 18.07.17 Interview  CNOOC M 
Hoima 
town  Industry  
88 NCSO01 2012 12.12.12 Interview National CSO M Kampala Civil society 
89 NCSO02 2012 12.12.12 Interview National CSO M Kampala Civil society 
90 NCSO03 2012 13.12.12 Interview National CSO M Kampala Civil society 
91 NCSO04 2012 13.12.12 Interview National CSO M Kampala Civil society 
92 NCSO05 2012 13.12.12 Interview National CSO F Kampala Civil society 
93 NCSO06 2012 14.12.12 Interview National CSO M Kampala Civil society 
94 NCSO07 2012 14.12.12 Interview National CSO M Kampala Civil society 
95 NCSO08 2013 05.03.13 Focus group  National CSO M/F Kampala Civil society 





CSOs M/F Kampala  Civil society 
97 SCSO01 2014 05.08.14 Focus group  
Hoima 
branch of 
national CSO M/F 
Hoima 
town  Civil society 
98 SCSO02 2014 05.08.14 Interview 
Hoima 
branch of 
national CSO M 
Hoima 
town  Civil society 




town  Civil society 




town  Civil society 




town  Civil society 






town  Civil society 




town  Civil society 




town  Civil society 




town  Civil society 
106 NCSO10 2014 21.08.14 Interview National CSO F Kampala Civil society 
107 SCSO10 2015 19.02.15 Interview 
Hoima 
branch of 
national CSO M 
Hoima 
town  Civil society 




town  Civil society 




town  Civil society 
110 NCSO11 2015 25.02.15 Interview National CSO M Kampala Civil society 




town  Civil society 
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town  Civil society 






town  Civil society 






town  Civil society 




town  Civil society 




town  CSR partner  




town  CSR partner  




town  CSR partner  




town  CSR partner  






town  CSR partner  






town  CSR partner  






town  CSR partner  





town  CSR partner  





town  CSR partner  




town  CSR partner  





town  CSR partner  




town  CSR beneficiary 




town  CSR beneficiary 




town  CSR beneficiary 




town  CSR beneficiary 




town  CSR beneficiary 






town  CSR beneficiary 
132 CNS01 2015 20.02.15 Interview  Tullow Oil  M 
Kaiso 
village  Consultant 
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133 CNS02 2015 24.02.15 Interview  
Tullow Oil / 
NGOs M 
Hoima 
town  Consultant 
134 CNS03 2015 24.02.15 Interview  Independent M 
Hoima 
town  Consultant 
135 MED01 2014 09.08.14 Interview  
Daily 
Monitor  M 
Hoima 
town Local media 
136 MED02 2015 22.02.15 Interview 
Daily 
Monitor  M 
Hoima 
town Local media 




Monitor  M 
Hoima 
town Local media 
         
         
         
 
